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Foreword
Attempts to build interstate cooperation on migration within a global
framework are not new. In 1927, the League of Nations explored at some
length the possible adoption of an international convention to “facilitate and
regulate” international exchange of labor. But no definitive decision was taken,
and there was little follow-up. In the wake of World War II, when Europe was
economically devastated and suffered from serious labor shortages, several
international and regional organizations, including the International Labour
Organization (ILO), the European Economic Community (now the European
Union), and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (now the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]), were
calling for freer movement of workers to help economic reconstruction and
development. But by the mid-1970s, as oil prices soared and most industrial
countries faced massive unemployment and looming stagflation, these calls
were abandoned and new slogans of “trade in place of migration” and “taking
work to workers” gained ground.
Years later, in 1980, the Willy Brandt Commission lamented the absence
of a shared understanding of the principles that should guide international migration and urged nations to “build, on the basis of the interests of the countries
concerned, a framework that would be more just and equitable than the present
one” (Brandt 1980). Yet, again, nothing much happened.
In the past few years, however, things have been slowly, but perceptibly,
changing. The enormous economic, political, and human costs of the growing
mismatch between rising emigration pressure and dwindling opportunities for
legal entry (especially for low-skilled labor migrants) have led a number of
academics and policy analysts to call for a concerted global approach to international migration. Some have also emphasized the efficiency gains that the
world economy would derive from more multilateral openness in international
migration. Some have also linked these gains to future labor market, social
security, and demographic trends in developed and developing regions. But
while these calls from individual academics and policy analysts have become
increasingly vocal, they have made relatively little institutional or policy-level
impact.
A first major institutional approach to the issue was then made in 1993,
when the Commission on Global Governance (cochaired by Ingvar Carlsson,
the then Prime Minister of Sweden) considered a paper outlining a proposal
for the establishment of a new global regime to better manage migration. As
a direct follow-up, a global project (New International Regime for Orderly
Movement of People [NIROMP]) was launched in 1997, with the support of
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the United Nations (UN) and several European governments, to build a global consensus for such a regime. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) served as the main executing agency. A first intergovernmental meeting held in Geneva (September 1997) under its auspices generally endorsed
the concept and objectives of the global regime. In December 1999 a second
intergovernmental meeting, also held in Geneva, helped develop a common
framework for return and reintegration of migrants as a component of the new
regime. In the following year it found a regional echo in a West African ministerial conference on migration, which was held in Dakar. During 2001 the
project concept and findings were widely debated in a series of meetings held
in a number of capitals and university centers in Europe and the United States.
A momentum was created for moving forward. However, soon thereafter, with
a shift in the organization’s program priorities alongside changes at the top of
its secretariat, IOM lost interest in the initiative.
A next major step was the Berne initiative, a state-owned process launched
by the Swiss government in 2001. In line with the NIROMP approach, it aimed
to develop a broad policy framework to facilitate cooperation between states in
planning and managing migration, based on interests and concerns common to
all. Following its first conference (Berne I) in July 2003, it held four regional
consultations in 2004 to enable regions to become associated with the initiative. A second international conference (Berne II) was held in the same year to
take into account the regional inputs. But by that time the original thrust of the
initiative had been considerably diluted, with a shift away from its collective
and regulatory multilateral approach. The consequence was the adoption of a
nonbinding agenda for pursuing well-meaning goals for migration management. With political changes in the country and transfers of key officials in the
government, further activities soon tapered off.
Meanwhile, the need for a more coherent and concerted global approach
to migration management was underscored by several independent international commissions. These included the Commission on Human Security
(2001–2003), set up at the initiative of the Government of Japan, and the World
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, sponsored by the ILO.
They repeated the call already made under NIROMP and the original Berne
Initiative for the development of an international framework for better governance of migration. In 2004 the ILO then formally adopted a plan of action, one
component of which concerned the development of a nonbinding multilateral
framework for a rights-based approach to labor migration. There was, however, no mention of freer movement of labor under a multilateral arrangement.
Then came the Global Commission on International Migration, established by Switzerland, Sweden, and several other like-minded governments,
with the active encouragement of the then UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan.
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However, the commission shied away from the idea of a harmonized multilateral framework on grounds that “the governments were not ready for it,”
making its deliberations more of a fact-finding, rather than a forward-looking,
exercise. No action was taken on the report, except that it was used as one
of the inputs for the “High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development”
(HLD), which the UN organized in September 2006. But the hopes, if any, for
a reinvigorated multilaterally harmonized approach to migration were dashed
as the member states were unable to agree on any new initiative by the UN in
this area. It just encouraged the establishment, outside the UN’s organizational
framework, of a Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) to be
run by willing and like-minded governments. The GFMD held its first session
in Brussels in 2007 and the second in Manila (GFMD II) in October 2008. It
has no formal mandate, however, and the agenda for its annual meeting is fixed
mostly by the host government in consultation with others. The GFMD can
thus discuss any of the issues bearing on migration and development, but it is
not specifically geared to developing an internationally harmonized migration
regime; however, nothing prevents it from addressing the issue.
The above narrative of events highlights the fact that, despite eloquent
pronouncements and a plethora of consultations, governments and intergovernmental organizations have so far remained sluggish in giving a concrete
shape to the proposed international framework. Meanwhile, however, several
nongovernmental organizations and academic groups have been pushing ahead
with the proposal, building on the work already undertaken. For instance, at
its sixth annual conference in Rotterdam, the Canada-based International
Metropolitan Project focused on the issue under the session’s keynote theme,
“Managing Migration in the 21st Century.” At its ninth annual conference, held
in Geneva in 2004, it revisited the theme and organized a panel discussion on
the subject under the title “The Emerging Migration Management Paradigm:
Cooperation and Partnership.” In the Netherlands, the 21-Point Action Programme—adopted in 2002 by the Hague Process on Refugees and Migration
(THP)—includes a commitment to gathering support for developing a concerted global approach to migration management.
Professor Joel Trachtman’s excellent study appears at this juncture,
which makes it particularly timely. It examines openness in migration from
economic, political, and ethical perspectives, and relates the discussion to the
existing international law of migration. It also puts forward proposals for a set
of detailed international legal rules on liberalization of economic migration,
based on reciprocity of state’s interests—a distinctive contribution that carries
forward earlier work done in this area. In doing all this, Trachtman, a widely
respected legal scholar, shows a high degree of professional rigor and scholar-
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ship combined with an objective, balanced, and forward-looking approach to
the complex issues involved.
The excellence of the book notwithstanding, it would be naïve to assume
that everyone will fully agree with all that it suggests. Admittedly, there are
also new or additional issues relevant to the subject of the book that remain to
be further explored.
In appraising the ground for a global compact on economic migration
based on reciprocity of interests, Trachtman delves into such issues as skilled
migration, remittances, and temporary migration, drawing with considerable
dexterity on the mainstream economic migration literature on these questions.
The problem, however, is that the mainstream debate has yet to catch up fully
with the changing nature of some of these issues and the most recent research
findings on them. For example, following the mainstream view, the study often assumes that emigration of skilled workers is necessarily harmful for a
developing country. A number of recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest however that it is not always or invariably so and that at least in some
cases it may, on balance, even benefit a country. Under these “optimal skilled
migration models” much depends on the country-specific situation, especially
as concerns the proportion of a country’s skilled migrants abroad to the total
number of its skilled workers and the quality and structure of its education system. To the extent that these findings are valid, some developing countries may
be willing to send specified numbers of selected skilled migrants in exchange
for the admission of a number of unskilled workers by developed countries.
Although not mentioned in the study, this opens up a new window of reciprocity in the bargaining between developed and developing countries.
On the other hand, for many developing countries the net value of remittances as a compensation for their loss of skills is often much more limited
than what much of the mainstream migration literature (reversing the views in
the past) seems to suggest. It tends to underrate several of the potential pitfalls
involved, such as excessive dependence on remittance income, postponement
of essential economic reform, and volatility as well as pro-cyclicality of investment-oriented remittances. The book rightly takes a cautious view of the role
of remittances in the context of any bargaining on openness in migration. In a
similar vein, it shows prudence in addressing the issue of temporary migration.
Although temporary immigration may be more attractive for receiving countries because (arguably) it entails lower political cost, it does raise, as a recent
OECD study shows, the adjustment and training costs due to recurrent changes
in workforce. Sending countries, too, may suffer due to the possible temporary
unemployment of the returning migrants and the cost of their reintegration into
the job markets.
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The somewhat random comments I have just made do not detract from
Trachtman’s basic paradigm or the conceptual approach that underpins his
proposal. They only point to the promising scope for further exploration of
several potential areas of reciprocity or trade-offs between migrant sending
and receiving countries to facilitate liberalization commitments envisioned in
the book. Of some special interest in this context are the areas of reciprocity
being opened up by the emerging role of transnational diasporas that link migrant receiving (developed) and migrant-sending (developing) countries. They
include, in addition to remittances to sending countries, diasporas’ financial
and entrepreneurial engagement in business, promotion of trade and tourism,
transfer of technology and skill circulation, and establishment of knowledge
and information-based networks. In a globalized world economy, these links
often yield benefits to both groups of countries. In several ways they add new
dimensions to the conventional debate on such issues as skilled migration, remittances, and temporary movements.
Not surprisingly, a number of countries have therefore adopted dual
nationality legislation or analogous arrangements to facilitate transborder
movement, especially of those diasporas who are now host country citizens. It
seems logical to think that countries that are not inclined to do so may find it
useful to explore an alternative reciprocal arrangement—developing countries
could trade their supportive measures, including access to special, multi-entry
visas, to facilitate diaspora participation in productive business and other ventures in their countries against developed countries’ commitments to liberalize
labor immigration under the agreement. This avenue of action makes it easier
for developing countries to tap the development potential of their noncitizen
diasporas than through the taxation arrangements discussed in the book. There
may also be some promising areas of cross-sectoral reciprocity. For example,
as the recent Doha Round of trade negotiations showed, there is a glimmer of
real possibility for nations, developed and developing, to exchange trade concessions in certain farm products or manufactures against admission of certain
groups of labor migrants.
An attractive feature of the agreement proposed in the book relates to the
flexibility and gradualness of its approach to openness. This makes Trachtman’s approach, which is very much in line with the principle of “regulated
openness” as envisioned under NIROMP, politically more realistic. This probably also explains why he has opted for a “positive list” approach (under this
each state specifies sectors in which it would liberalize) to commitments for
openness. Admittedly, one potential weakness of the positive list approach
is that, unless counterbalanced by other agreed measures, it tends to give a
differential edge to the more economically powerful or hegemonic states. In
the present case, the rising pressure for emigration (or excessive demand for
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admission) in labor-abundant countries is likely to put them in a weaker bargaining position. Fearful of excessive inflows, rich destination countries may
be inclined to withhold commitments on openness. A way out of this situation
may lie in a collateral commitment by both sending and receiving countries to
reduce excessive labor emigration pressure, with appropriate assistance from
the rich destination countries.
The book focuses on economic or labor migration, which is the most important component of contemporary international migration. But is it possible
to ensure the sustainability of an international agreement that, however fle ible otherwise, is confined to labor migration in isolation? Experience shows
that different channels of migration are closely interconnected, and that when
the pressure or demand for emigration by a particular channel far exceeds the
opportunities for legal entry, the flows are diverted to an alternative legal (or
irregular) channel, encouraging “category jumping.” The fact that much of the
contemporary international migration is driven by mixed motivation exacerbates the potential risk of category jumping. This could clog the channel for the
admission of bona fide labor migrants under the proposed agreement, unless
the excessive pressures from other sources can at the same time be reduced.
The “reverse safeguard” included in the agreement does provide for increased liberalization commitments under exceptional circumstances. But
do these emergency measures, however useful, go far enough? In many poor
countries, causes for potential surges—such as environmental degradation,
drought, floods and loss of crops, endemic poverty, widespread violence, and
gross violation of human rights—are so structurally embedded that they need
to be reckoned as “chronic emergencies.” If the labor migration channel is to
be kept free from congestion, it seems important to address these other sources
of emigration pressure through complementary measures within a comprehensive and coherent framework of interstate cooperation. As an autonomous but
interconnected instrument, the proposed agreement on economic migration
can then be expected to function more smoothly.
The book’s discussion makes a sharp distinction between sending (origin) and receiving (destination) countries, and sometimes assumes that all in
the first group are developing countries while those in the second group are
rich, developed countries. Recent ILO surveys show, however, that at least
one-fourth of all countries are major senders and major receivers of migrants
at the same time. For these countries, migration in large part is bidirectional.
Most recent statistics also reveal that much of international migration takes
place within the developing world itself. The World Bank recently suggested
that some 40 percent of the world’s migrant stock was in developing countries
and that roughly half of the migrants from developing countries were migrating to other developing countries. Clearly, both these trends have important
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implications for a possible multilateral agreement on economic migration. For
example, the involvement of a significant number of countries in both sending
and receiving migrants is likely to widen the areas of reciprocity and scope for
bargaining between countries. On the other hand, the divergence of interests
within the developing world makes the process of group bargaining more complex. Further exploration of these issues would facilitate interstate trade-offs
and cooperation envisaged in the book.
I believe that in the coming years, stung by the gathering malaise of a
mismatch between rising emigration pressures and dwindling opportunities for
legal entry, nations will be impelled to cooperate more closely to bring these
contradictory trends into a dynamic harmony and improve the governance of
human mobility. It is difficult to foresee what form(s) such cooperation would
take; it would probably lead to the development of a set of autonomous but
interconnected normative instruments—both hard and soft, as appropriate—
complementing those that already exist. Hopefully, these specific subregimes
would be formulated within a common, multilaterally harmonized framework
ensuring overall policy coherence. It is conceivable that by 2025 the global
migration system would become more stable and these normative arrangements will work under much less tension. This stability would come from two
sources: 1) improved political and economic situation, including high rates
of economic growth in some (though not all) of the major sending countries
and declining income and wage differentials between these and rich receiving
countries; and 2) technological progress and rich countries’ increased ability
and willingness to make adjustments in their labor market, social security, and
demographic policies as well as in aspects of their lifestyle.
This book, while standing out for its excellence as a scholarly text, gains
additional salience from the perspective of policy development as conjectured
above for several reasons. First, it strengthens the arguments for a cooperative
global approach to international migration, and bolsters the ongoing efforts to
build support for it. Second, it delineates a specific legal model for structuring
such interstate cooperation on economic migration that could fit into a wider
global framework of common norms and principles. Third, it lays the basis for
further research and exploration of areas of reciprocity to enhance the prospects of cooperation on economic migration.
Scholars, academics, and policymakers, as well as anyone interested in
better governance of human mobility, will find it rewarding to go through this
timely, well-reasoned, and lucidly written book.
Bimal Ghosh
Mies, Switzerland
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1
Introduction: Toward
the Fourth Freedom
It was permissible from the beginning of the world, when
everything was in common, for anyone to set forth and travel
wheresoever he would.
—Francisco de Vitoria
(quoted in Plender [1988], p. 2)
International migration is the missing link between globalization and development.
—Rubens Ricupero
(quoted in International Organization for Migration [2001])
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
—Robert Frost (1914)
This book explores the economic and political ramifications of
liberalization of national rules of migration through international legal agreements, examines the existing international law of economic
migration, and develops detailed conjectural proposals for new international legal rules in this field 1
As I reviewed the prior literature on the law of economic migration, and as I interviewed policymakers and scholars active in this field,
it was continually impressed upon me that “people are not commodities.”2 When I began my research, I tended to set aside this caveat,
thinking that this truism was simply a way to avoid grappling with the
hard issues of whether to have, and how to structure, international legal
commitments on labor migration. However, as I learned, and thought,
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2 Trachtman

more, I understood that the point is that people are complex, with complex needs and relationships.
Goods are often single purchase events and do not broadly entail a
continuing relationship between buyer and seller. Services, while often
entailing more complex and durable relationships than a purchase of
goods, are relatively unidimensional. Individuals, on the other hand,
are multidimensional, and their movement as workers involves longterm relationships of great complexity with governments and with
employers.
Throughout my research for this book I was also periodically reminded of the aphorism attributed to the Swiss author Max Frisch:
“We imported workers and got men instead.” Men and women come
with cultures and skills and grow up in dense familial and social networks. They have spouses and children. They need education, health
care, political engagement, and all the other fruits of society. They bear
responsibilities to society as well, including taxes and perhaps military
service. So, as we discuss migration, we must recognize that it requires
breaking and restructuring many relationships: a costly endeavor in the
deepest sense.
Despite this complexity, and despite these costs, individuals sometimes determine that migration is their best option. However, there are
substantial barriers in place today, which prevent people from achieving
their desires to move to seek a better life. These barriers often demean
human welfare. So it seems worthwhile to grapple with the complexity in order to evaluate whether and how to unlock substantial welfare
gains. But it is important to say that at stake is welfare in the broadest
sense: the right and power to move should be seen as an essential liberty, which is today highly constrained.
Individuals will only decide to undertake migration if they perceive
that it is worthwhile to them. Throughout history, some have decided
to do so while many others have not. But we must also recognize that
there are costs and benefits that are external to the individual migrant.
The migrant may be permitted to decide whether to accept these costs
and benefits for his or her own family, but what about costs and benefits
of the migrant’s decision that are felt by the migrant’s former compatriots, or by the migrant’s new hosts? The external effects of migration
legitimate the desire to regulate migration to some extent.
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Introduction 3

Migra tion, the S ta te, and In terna tional

L aw

For millennia, human migration was unconstrained, and people
and even peoples often moved to seek a better life (Diamond 1999).
While migration was a mechanism of social and biological evolution,
by which stronger societies overcame weaker ones, and human society
expanded its geographic scope and adaptive capacity (Chua 2007), it
was also a mechanism of integration, forming multicultural societies
which then became new cultures.
One of the main roles, and powers, of the modern state involves
citizenship, and the capacity to exclude outsiders. This role of the state
stands in opposition to the natural movement of individuals, limiting
human freedom. On the other hand, one might argue that the freedom
to associate within a state, even exclusively of others, is an important
innovation in human freedom and enhances the ability of individuals
to develop unique and enhanced cultures. Perhaps freedom is on both
sides of the argument. But to the extent that these freedoms are inconsistent with one another—which merits further analysis—what is the
best trade-off?
The role of international law in this as in other contexts is to allow
states to constrain themselves where their unregulated action would be
less desirable than action constrained by international law. International
law has not broadly responded to state restraints on immigration. There
are a number of reasons why there is little international law addressing
state restraints on immigration. One reason is that these restraints are
fairly recent.
The United States, which was once a nation of immigrants, only
began to restrict immigration at the federal level in 1875, and then restrictions were limited to those who were destitute, engaged in immoral
activities, or physically handicapped.3 These restrictions seem to be intended to protect the public fisc, as opposed to jobs. However, the U.S.
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 responded to concerns about competition from cheap immigrant labor, as well as racism. In fact, throughout
the history of immigration restrictions, we see the influence of both
protectionism and racism. However, the late nineteenth century was
still a period of effectively liberal policies toward migration. “Roughly
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60 million Europeans emigrated to the New World between 1820 and
1914” (O’Rourke 2004, p. 2). This liberalism ended in the imposition of
country of origin quotas during the early twentieth century (O’Rourke
2004).
During the early twentieth century, many popular destination states
began to establish restrictions on immigration. During the past sixty
years, global society has made important strides toward free movement
of goods, money, and even some types of services. Yet human migration
for economic and noneconomic reasons remains broadly constrained.
This book explores the law and policy of international economic
migration. It analyzes the economics and politics of migration in order
to assess the fit between the legal rules and institutions that presently
exist to govern international economic migration, and the goal of
maximizing welfare. In fact, there are practically no multilateral international legal rules regulating migration for economic purposes. This
work shows that, in order to establish the domestic and international
political conditions for welfare-enhancing liberalization of migration, it
may be necessary to establish complex and binding international legal
agreements regarding liberalization.

Four Freedo

ms

In connection with trade in goods and services, and also in connection with movement of workers, the European Union (EU) is a paradigm
of advanced integration. Within the EU, the drive toward free trade and
economic integration has been defined in terms of four freedoms: free
movement of 1) goods, 2) services, 3) money, and 4) labor. The EU
has made important progress in achieving all four freedoms, including
the fourth freedom: legally authorized free movement of labor. In the
global setting, we have done little to establish, or reestablish, the fourth
freedom.
In the United States during the Second World War, Franklin D.
Roosevelt declared four other freedoms for each citizen of the globe:
1) freedom of expression, 2) freedom of conscience, 3) freedom from
fear, and 4) freedom from want. This fourth freedom—freedom from
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want—is directly linked to free movement of labor: free movement of
labor enhances the capacity of individuals to be free from want. While
throughout history migrants have moved to avoid oppression of all
kinds, today many would like to move to obtain better livelihoods. The
European fourth freedom is closely related to Roosevelt’s fourth freedom: freedom from want can be enhanced by freedom of movement of
labor.
This fourth freedom seems to have intrinsic value, but it also has
enormous instrumental value. The dual pressures of globalization and
demographic imbalance suggest the utility of greater legal structure to
facilitate and regulate economic migration.
D emography and D estiny
One important set of determinants of the quantity of migration is
supply of and demand for work abroad.
On the demand side, the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group
(2006, p. 28) explains why demographic trends—principally the relative youth of developing country populations—suggest that the number
of people who wish to migrate from developing to high-income countries will rise in the period through 2026. While the global workforce is
expected to increase substantially in the decade ending in 2010, the vast
majority of the increase will take place in developing countries. As developing countries have relatively young populations, and as the returns
to migration are greater the earlier in one’s life that one migrates, it
is appropriate to anticipate increased numbers of people in developing
countries interested in emigration (World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group 2006, p. 28).
Demography also operates on the “supply” side in this model: the
supply of immigration opportunities would be expected to increase
as developed country populations age. The workforces in developed
countries are about to begin a decline. The high-income countries will
experience a general decline in working-age population during the period 2010–2025 (OECD 2007; World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group 2006, p. 29).
Wealthier states such as Germany, Japan, and the United States are
anticipating labor shortages that will have substantial adverse conse-
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quences for their prosperity, for their ability to provide services to aging
populations, and for their ability to fund social welfare programs (McDonald and Kippen 2001). The stock of immigrants to high-income
countries increased at about 3 percent per year from 1980 to 2000, up
from a 2.4 percent pace in the 1970s (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 27). About 70 percent of this increase is accounted
for by the United States and Germany, which only account for 40 percent
of the population of high-income countries. The Pew Research Center
has recently stated that, based on current trends, “The population of the
United States will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005,
and 82 percent of the increase will be due to immigrants arriving from
2005 to 2050 and their U.S.-born descendants . . .” (Passel and Cohn
2008).
In some advanced states, these shortages arise from fertility rates
that are below replacement levels. It is estimated that between 2010
and 2030, the number of employed people in Europe will fall by approximately 20 million, while the number of older people will rise from
71 million to 110 million (Commission of the European Communities
2003a,b).
Thus, there are prospective increases on both the demand and supply side of international migration. Therefore, both wealthy and poor
states will find themselves responsible to manage and regularize, even
encourage, flows of migrant labor—flows of migrants. While this need
will be reflected in part in unilateral policy measures, it will become
important, for a variety of reasons addressed in this work, for states to
cooperate in managing global migration. In some cases, it will be beneficial to enter into international agreements simply to manage flows
of immigrant labor. There are a number of historical examples of international agreements used to regulate economically inevitable flows
of workers, and there exist today hundreds of bilateral labor mobility
agreements that do so. In other cases, it will be useful for states to make
commitments to liberalize their restrictions on immigration.
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Force

s beh ind the L a w o f Migra tion

There are great gains in welfare to be made in freeing up international economic migration, just as there have been and continue to be
great gains to be made in freeing up international trade in goods, services, and money. The global and sectoral welfare effects of migration
will be examined in detail in Chapter 2.
It is estimated that a modest increase in industrial countries’ quotas
on incoming temporary workers, equal to an aggregate of 3 percent of
their current workforces, would result in increased world welfare of
more than US$356 billion a year by 2025 (World Bank Independent
Evaluation Group 2006). Scaled to the same reference year, 2001, the
gains from a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants is $175 billion,
while the gains from total trade liberalization are $155 billion (World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 41). “If international policy makers were really interested in maximizing worldwide efficienc ,
they would spend little of their energies on a new trade round or on the
international financial architecture. They would all be busy at work liberalizing immigration restrictions” (Rodrik 2001).
These gains would be shared by developed and developing countries, although the greatest portion of gains would accrue to the migrants
themselves. But perhaps even more important, migration, if it is managed carefully, can help to raise the living standards in poor countries.
In order to achieve these gains, it is necessary to overcome obstacles to
bargaining, and to assist political processes in realizing the magnitude
of the potential gains. With so much welfare improvement to be gained,
states will endeavor to overcome these obstacles to bargaining. Chapter
3 addresses the possibilities for doing so through international legal
commitments.
So, poverty reduction may be an important goal of liberalization of
migration. However, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2003) argue that
compared with the late 19th century . . . early 21st century policies
make it far more difficult for developing countries to use migration as a means of convergence on the rich. One hundred years ago
mass emigration raised living standards significantly in countries
such as Ireland, Italy and Sweden, enabling them to converge on
the core countries of the day, Britain and the U.S. Indeed, mass
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migration can account for as much as 70 percent of the convergence in living standards worldwide which occurred during the
late 19th century . . . Today’s rich country immigration policies not
only prevent developing economies from raising their average living standards via emigration; by admitting skilled workers rather
than unskilled workers, these policies may actually hurt developing economies via the brain drain effect, and also make them less
equal (by raising the relative wages of skilled workers).

There are important barriers to realizing increased welfare and increased economic equality. But the critical point is that these are policy
barriers rather than natural barriers. The goal of this work is to explore
these barriers, and to suggest international legal responses.
In economic terms, migration is a result of demand and supply. To
think of this relationship in economic terms from the standpoint of the
potential migrant deciding whether to migrate, we might understand
the present value of life opportunities at home, plus the cost of migration, as the total cost to the potential migrant, while the present value of
life opportunities in the destination state is the benefit to the potential
migrant. Whenever the benefit exceeds the cost, the potential migrant
will wish to migrate. Of course, each individual will have different opportunities at home and in the destination state, and different ways of
valuing various components of their opportunities.
Of critical importance, now and in the future, will be demographic
supply and demand, as discussed above. Pressure to emigrate from poor
countries is increasing (Ghosh 2000, pp. 6, 10). Differences in wages,
largely due to differences in productivity, drive the demand. “For example, in 1975 per capita GDPs in the high-income countries were on
average 41 times higher than those in low-income countries, and 8
times higher than in middle-income countries. By 2000, high-income
countries had per capita GDPs that were 66 times those in low-income
countries and 14 times those in middle-income countries” (Martin 2004,
p. 4). “Despite the public announcements by policy-makers in numerous regional and international fora for a concerted use of aid, trade, and
foreign investment to reduce emigration pressure in labour-abundant
countries, there is little evidence that the strategy is being consistently
applied or that it is making a real impact at the global level” (Ghosh
2000, p. 17).
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Source countries are sometimes ambivalent, and would at least be
expected to vary in their policy responses to emigration. First, emigration can reduce pressure on domestic employment markets, and can
produce remittances, which can be an important source of foreign exchange. So, important countries such as the Philippines and India have
sought to promote emigration. However, the risk of brain drain might
raise concerns in particular circumstances.
Demand to migrate is not exclusively dependent on demography
and economic circumstances. Reduction of transportation costs due to
new transportation technologies has reduced the costs of migration to
a point within reach of the very poor. This change has increased the
number of potential migrants (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 1). Costs
imposed by the destination country’s immigration system also affect the
decision to migrate. For poor people, these costs have been a significant
barrier.
Demand to migrate is also affected by conditions in departure countries, compared to conditions in destination countries. So, in addition
to the critical factors of wages and productivity, human rights abuses,
insecurity, disease, and other negative factors in the departure countries,
combined with their opposites in the destination countries, would be
expected to affect demand for migration. Famines, revolutions, government crises, and ethnic cleansing and other action have contributed to
the timing and source of migration (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p.
213). There are important links between economic migration and forced
migration, and the border between these phenomena is not always clear.
In fact, any regime for management of either voluntary or forced migration must deal with the problem of definition and enforcement of
categories.
The cost of migration is also dependent on the costs of travel and
information, and on the ease of obtaining legal permission for migration to the destination country, or on the ease of evading enforcement of
legal restrictions. It is important to note that migration is facilitated by
reduced costs of transportation and communication. Perhaps less obvious as a causal factor is greater information and education, increasing
awareness of better conditions abroad. Migration can also build upon
itself, as emigrants supply information and support to future emigrants.
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Earlier migration has resulted in “diasporas” in developed countries
that can promote and facilitate future migration.
Restrictions on immigration reduce the supply of immigration opportunities. They can also be understood as increases to the price of
migration, as the restrictions themselves would have effects on the cost
of migration. Supply and demand will adjust toward equilibrium. Occasionally, shocks will occur, changing some of these parameters and
thereby changing the relevant prices.
As these demand and supply factors change, there is no particular
reason for the relevant law to remain static. “With respect to migration,
national regulatory regimes and municipal law in general simply must
accommodate the development of international markets for skilled and
unskilled workers” (Hollifie d 2000, pp. 75, 87; Sassen 1996). The
same perspective applies to the applicable international law. In fact, all
law is to some extent dynamic, as it responds to changed conditions and
aspirations. In addition to being molded to fit social conditions, law can
also play a leading role, driving social change.
Migration, G lobalization, and L aw
Migration is a parameter of globalization, and it also has complex
relationships of substitutability and complementarity with other parameters of globalization: movement of goods, services, information,
money, and investment. Rubens Ricupero states that “migration is the
missing link between globalization and development” (International
Organization for Migration 2001).
Freeman (2006) examines the degree of international economic
integration in labor, evaluating both quantities of movement of labor
compared to movement of other factors, and price differentials in labor
compared to price differentials in other factors. He finds that the labor
market “is the least developed part of globalization.”
Harris (2002, p. 93) describes a globalization sequence between
freeing trade (1950–1980 and beyond), freeing capital (1980 onward),
and freeing movement of people. If Harris is correct regarding this
sequencing, it might help us to understand why trade has been liberalized while migration has not. Harris sees xenophobic resistance to
liberalization of immigration as nothing short of a survival of “the old
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order of states and the reality of warfare between them” (Harris 2002,
p. 94). Indeed, xenophobia, as well as a tendency to value the welfare
of compatriots over that of foreign persons, is an important reason for
antipathy to globalization. For Harris, the resistance to liberalization of
migration is ideational, rather than necessarily economic. Law can play
a leading role in changing ideas.
It seems true that free migration would challenge the nation-statebased world order, insofar as under a regime of free migration the
composition of states would no longer be formally based on “nations,”
and would be fluid. The ruler-subject relationship would be broken, and
citizens would have greater freedom to “vote with their feet.” Furthermore, as some degree of a global society is formed through globalization,
it seems increasingly reasonable to see the freedom to move within this
global society—global movement—as a basic liberty comparable to the
fundamental freedom to move within a national state.
International L aw of E conomic Migration
States have found it useful to exchange authority with others in
particular contexts: this is the role of international law.4 What are the
changing social elements that would lead states to agree to reduce their
authority further in the field of migration? First, demographic change
will result in increasing demand for certain types of labor in the developed world.5 Second, individuals in poor countries will continue to seek
better standards of living in wealthier countries. Finally, there are large
economic surpluses to be captured from mobility. These surpluses arise
from rather large wage differentials between developing and developed
countries; labor mobility will allow individual workers, their employers, and eventually consumers to share these surpluses.
This study assesses the existing international law of economic migration, both descriptively and analytically. While the world has found
it useful to establish rules regarding the entry of foreign goods, services, and investment, there is a remarkable scarcity of international
law establishing commitments of states to admit foreigners to work in
their markets (Aleinikoff 2003, p. 2). In 1992, Sohn and Buergenthal
(1992) wrote, “The preoccupation of many governments with international trade in goods and services across national borders has resulted
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in an elaborate set of international rules on that commercially important
subject. Less attention has been paid to the development of the rules
governing the movement of human beings across national borders.”
On the other hand, there are significant rights accorded to migrants
upon their arrival. Authorized migrants are entitled to a full panoply of
human rights—but while it is clear that migrants have rights, few people outside of a few regional arrangements generally have the right to
be a migrant—to immigrate.6 The fourth freedom still seems neglected.
This work seeks to explain the dog that did not bark: the failure,
thus far, to establish international law regarding labor market access
(Hollifield 2000, pp. 75, 87). This work is intended to contribute to a
small but growing literature on this topic, commenced in the late 1990s
with Bimal Ghosh’s project (2000) for a “new international regime for
the orderly movements of people” and continuing recently with Lant
Pritchett’s Let Their People Come (2006).
It is worthwhile here to observe that, as we will see in Chapters
6 and 7, the states of virtually all of Europe, most of Latin America,
the Caribbean, much of Africa, and Australia and New Zealand are
party to fairly comprehensive regional labor movement liberalization
agreements. These agreements demonstrate that, at least outside of Asia
and North America, states have been willing at some level to engage
in liberalization of labor migration. There are additional initiatives in
Asia, including an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
effort to liberalize movement of highly skilled and professional workers, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides
for a very modest degree of liberalization of North American migration.
However, most of the liberalization commitments that have been undertaken in Africa and Latin America have not been fully implemented.
Furthermore, while many states have engaged in some liberalization
with some states, few have engaged in liberalization with many other
states.
Thus, one question that arises in connection with liberalization of
migration is the conflict (or competition or synergy) between regional
or plurilateral liberalization on the one hand and multilateral liberalization on the other. Are regional or plurilateral efforts in this area building
blocks or stumbling blocks toward multilateral liberalization? A different but related question is whether they increase or reduce welfare. Any
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multilateral agreement in this area will have to address whether mostfavored nation (MFN) type prohibitions of discrimination will apply to
prevent states from treating specified other states better than others, and
whether regional or other plurilateral arrangements will benefit from an
exception to an MFN rule.
L egalizing Migration
The focus of this work will be on international legal commitments
regarding legal immigration. Legal immigration has a complex relationship with illegal immigration. First, legal immigration serves as a
substitute for illegal immigration, and thus can suppress illegal immigration. Second, legal immigration (like illegal immigration) produces
remittances which increase wealth in sending states, also possibly suppressing illegal immigration. Third, legal immigration, to the extent that
it is limited, may induce increased illegal immigration through information or other support provided by legal migrants to potential illegal
migrants.
There is an ongoing competition between illegal immigration
(Ghosh 2000, p. 12) and legal immigration, both in the decision making of individual migrants and in the policy of the receiving countries.
A substantial percentage of global migrants are illegal immigrants.7 An
important research question asks to what extent the demand to migrate
is elastic in relation to increased costs based on legal restrictions, or
based on increased enforcement of legal restrictions.
In any event, poverty-induced migration, like the poor, will always
be with us. Since half the world’s workers live on less than US$2 per
day, there will be strong incentives for them to migrate, and for those
seeking inexpensive labor to employ them. Experience along the United
States–Mexico border shows that it is difficult for immigration law
and enforcement to stop behavior required by the “laws” of economics (Pritchett 2006). However, illegal migration can have a number of
adverse consequences, for the migrants themselves, for citizens of the
host country, and for the political fortunes of liberalization of market
access.
Of course, no system of border controls will be impermeable. Each
destination state must make a policy choice regarding its investment in
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controls, both in terms of financial cost and social cost. In addition, at
some level, immigration controls become too expensive financiall , or
are inconsistent with an open society and open economy (Harris 2002).
If there are otherwise gains to the destination state from excluding illegal aliens, these gains may be overcome by the costs of exclusion.
Making immigration illegal increases the costs, including the dangers,
experienced by migrants.
In examining national policy, it is important to examine not just the
law on the books but also the law in practice. Many destination states
purport to limit legal immigration, but their lax enforcement policy with
respect to illegal immigration can be understood instead as evidence of
a liberal policy.
For example, the United States has an ambivalent relationship with
illegal immigration: it declines to legalize certain unskilled flows, but
declines also to devote sufficient resources to enforce the exclusion.
The then commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Lionel Castillo, said in 1989 testimony to the U.S. Congress
that “The actual policy of the U.S. government is quite different from
its stated policy . . . the de facto policy is to keep the door half open”
(Harris 2002, p. 80). While interior enforcement can be more effective
than border control, especially if it focuses on imposing penalties on
employers who hire illegal immigrants, some destination states, such
as the United States, have declined to implement it. This ambivalence
may represent an attempt to placate two opposing political forces: 1)
employers who seek immigrant labor, and 2) general public opinion
which is opposed to increased immigration.
To the extent that a state implicitly permits illegal immigration,
with the presumed result (see Chapter 2) that labor prices are artificially
suppressed compared to legal immigration, it may have the effect of
subsidizing the domestic production of goods or services. Even in the
1940s, during the formation of the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), states were concerned about the trade effects of
prison labor, with some of the same trade-distorting characteristics.
At any rate, the main point is that controls on immigration—illegality—seek to stem a natural phenomenon, one that is likely to enhance
global welfare and is unlikely to diminish local welfare in the destination state. Where wage or welfare differentials are sufficiently large,
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individuals will find a way to overcome barriers: they will make great
expenditures and incur fearsome risks in order to migrate. The barriers are simply part of the price. Yet this expenditure and risk may be a
source of deadweight loss: it may be a cost incurred in order to frustrate
efficient transactions. The efficiency of any particular act of migration
is not assured, as there will be external costs that the migrant will not
take into account, but the data presented in Chapter 2 showing the welfare gains from liberalized migration suggests that it is safe to assume
that much migration is efficient.
R ecent Initiatives
There have been a number of recent initiatives that have sought
to stimulate interest and action relating to international migration. Of
course, there were earlier initiatives. For example, the League of Nations explored in the 1920s an international convention to “facilitate and
regulate international exchange of labour.” In 1939, the ILO adopted
a Migration for Employment Convention, which was never ratified by
any state.
The purpose of this section is to introduce the current initiatives,
with a focus on their perspectives and goals.8 But the main point is
that these are talking initiatives and have not yet resulted in significant
changes in law. The formation of new international legal commitments,
or protections for migrants, does not appear to be on today’s formal radar
screen. However, this book examines the possibility that new international legal commitments might be worthy of greater consideration.

G lobal
C o mmission on In terna tional Migra tion
R epor t: Migra tion in an In terconnec
ted W orld
The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was
established in 2003 by a self-appointed core group of states, with the
encouragement of then UN secretary-general KofiAnnan.9 The mandate
of the GCIM was to formulate a coherent global response to international migration. The commission was established as an independent
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body consisting of 19 experts, including Mike Moore, former director
general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Mary Robinson,
former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The GCIM issued an important report in October 2005. This report
states that migration has risen to the top of the global policy agenda,
and that “In every part of the world, there is now an understanding that
the economic, social and cultural benefits of international migration
must be more effectively realized, and that the negative consequences
of cross-border movement could be better addressed” (GCIM 2005).
The report establishes six principles that it recommends be followed
in formulating global migration policy (GCIM 2005). First, individuals
should migrate out of choice, not necessity. It is worth pointing out here
that choice and necessity may be difficult to separate, especially when
the choice arises from poverty. Second, migration should be part of
development policy. Third, states should cooperate to regulate illegal
immigration. Fourth, efforts should be made to integrate immigrants
into host country society. Fifth, the rights of immigrants should be respected and strengthened. Sixth, governance of international migration
should be improved, with greater attention to coherence.
Importantly, while these principles otherwise provide a reasonable
starting point, they do not explicitly include liberalization of market
access for migrants.
The report wisely recommends that policymakers pay attention to
the relationship between supply and demand for workers (GCIM 2005).
So long as developed country demand is subject to political constraint,
it is useful to seek to reduce developing country supply through continued focus on poverty alleviation at home.
The report concludes that “a well regulated liberalization of the
global labour market would also be preferable to the current situation,
in which labour market gaps are filled in part by means of irregular migration and unauthorized employment” (GCIM 2005).
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B erne In

itia tive

In recognition that there is no comprehensive and harmonized system regulating international migration through which the movement of
people can be managed in an orderly and cooperative way, the Swiss
Federal Office for Refugees launched the Berne Initiative in 2001 to
establish a dialogue between countries of origin, transit, and destination
on the full range of migration issues with the objective of identifying
common understandings and enhancing migration management at the
global level (Klein, Solomon, and Bartsch 2003).
At the International Symposium on Migration (“Berne I”) in June
2001, some 80 government officials and experts from international
agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academia comprehensively reviewed current migration dynamics and trends. The
participants considered the diverging interests and perspectives of
origin, transit, and destination countries, but also identified interests
common to all states (Klein, Solomon, and Bartsch 2003).
The “undermining of state sovereignty and security by uncontrolled
and irregular migration” was identified as a major concern for many
countries, both in developing and industrialized regions, with important
financial, economic, social, and legal implications. It was concluded
that there is a need for a balanced approach to facilitate regular migration and prevent irregular migration, and that mutual benefits could
derive from enhanced interstate cooperation. The participants decided
to pursue the development of a framework of guiding principles for the
management of migration, through an ongoing and broadened process
of consultations, rather than through efforts to create new international
law in this area (Klein, Solomon, and Bartsch 2003). This was obviously
a decision to avoid formal obligations, but to pursue greater communication and informal cooperation.
However, as a first step, the Swiss authorities, in coordination with
the International Organization for Migration ([IOM], an intergovernmental organization that deals with international issues of migration
management), undertook the preparation and publication of an expert
stocktaking on existing international law norms relevant to migration.
The study, International Legal Norms and Migration, seeks to clar-
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ify the existing legal framework and identify gaps and grey areas not
adequately covered by international law, but where the elaboration of
effective practices might be useful. To complement the expert study,
IOM’s Migration Policy and Research Programme prepared a Compilation of Significant International Statements on Migration. This
compilation focuses on nonbinding common understandings emanating
from regional consultative processes on migration and selected international migration-related conferences (Berne Initiative 2002, 2003).
The most important outcome of the Berne Initiative process is the
International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM) (Berne Initiative 2004a), a reference system and nonbinding policy framework
aimed at facilitating cooperation between states in planning and managing the movement of people in a humane and orderly way. It gathers
states’ common perspectives and understandings on migration in a comprehensive framework in the form of a nonbinding agenda, mapping out
in a comprehensive manner all major aspects of migration at the international level (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
2006, p. 23). The IAMM has two components: 1) a set of common understandings underlying migration management and summarizing the
values and perceptions that governments bring to migration, and 2) a set
of “effective practices” for a national approach to migration. It addresses
the following issues: migration and development, human rights of migrants, labor migration, integration, irregular migration, trafficking and
migrant smuggling, trade and health, and return (Nielsen 2007).
At the 2004 Berne II Conference, participants engaged in a substantive exchange on three selected sets of issues addressed in the IAMM:
1) migration, development, and interstate cooperation; 2) labor, regular,
and irregular migration and interstate cooperation; and 3) rights, responsibilities, integration, and interstate cooperation (Berne Initiative
2004a, p. 5). Preparatory work for the Berne II Conference included
four regional consultations for each of Africa, Europe, Asia, and the
Americas, where government officials and migration experts discussed
the further development of the IAMM (Berne Initiative 2004a, p. 3).
The Berne II Conference culminated in the following recommendations and suggestions being made. First, the IAMM should be widely
disseminated amongst governments to assist them in the management
of migration. Second, international organizations should be invited to
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assist governments upon their request to put the IAMM to use at the
national, regional, and global levels (Berne Initiative 2004a, p. 7).

UN G eneral

Ass e mbl y’ s Hi gh- L evel

Di alogue

The UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development took place on September 14–15, 2006, at the UN headquarters in New York. The first high-level UN event devoted entirely
to the topic of migration and development, the High-Level Dialogue
brought together ministers from UN member states and representatives
from UN agencies, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector (UN General Assembly [UNGA] 2006, p. 1).
The purpose of the High-Level Dialogue was to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in
order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development benefits and minimize its negative impacts. Additionally, the
High-Level Dialogue had a strong focus on policy issues, emphasizing
the challenge of achieving internationally agreed development goals,
including the Millennium Development Goals (UNGA 2006, p. 2).
The two-day dialogue included four thematic roundtables covering
the following topics:
• the effects of international migration on economic and social development;
• measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human
rights of all migrants, and to prevent and combat smuggling of
migrants and trafficking in persons
• the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development, including remittances;
• promoting the building of partnerships and capacity building and
the sharing of best practices at all levels, including the bilateral
and regional levels, for the benefit of countries and migrants
alike (UNGA 2006, p. 1).
The High-Level Dialogue produced a number of proposals for
future action; in recognition of the fact that the IOM has consider-
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able experience in the field, proposals were made for the IOM to take
greater measures to make migration work for development, to enhance
interagency coordination, and to enhance global intergovernmental cooperation (IOM 2006).
It was also at the High-Level Dialogue that the idea of a global forum on migration and development was first proposed. The first global
forum on migration and development was held July 9–11, 2007, where
more than 800 representatives from 156 UN member states and more
than 20 international organizations participated in two plenary sessions
and 12 roundtable sessions (UNGA 2007, p. 3).

In terna tional

O rgan iza tion for M igra tion

The IOM is concerned with management of migration, and assists
governments by providing expert support and facilitation of regulated
labor migration, as well as direct assistance to migrants. The IOM facilitates the development of policies and programs that can individually
and mutually benefit the concerned governments, migrants and societies in connection with migration (IOM 2008b).10
The Commission on Global Governance, meeting in 1993–1994,
considered a paper on “Movements of People: The Search for a New
Regime.” This was followed by the launch of a global project, financed
by the United Nations and to be executed through the IOM, toward
a “new international regime for the orderly movement of people”
(NIROMP). An intergovernmental meeting in 1997 endorsed the concept of a global arrangement for regulated openness of international
migration. A second meeting was held in 1999, and this project was debated until 2001, when it was decided not to pursue it through IOM.11
Since 2001, the IOM Council has conducted an International
Dialogue on Migration (IDM). The IDM is an informal consultation
mechanism intended to contribute to a better understanding of migration and to strengthen cooperative mechanisms between governments
(Nielsen 2007).
The IOM assists in harnessing migration to achieve economic development objectives in countries of origin and destination by two specific
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types of initiatives. The first type of initiative focuses on building the
capacity of governments and other stakeholders in countries of origin
to communicate with and engage their expatriate communities in initiatives related to home country development, and on contributing to the
increase of more development-oriented migration policies. The second
type of initiative contributes to addressing root causes of economically
motivated migration by enhancing the ability of governments and other
key actors to focus development actions more strategically on home
country migration dynamics. Projects focus on expanding economic opportunities and improving social services and community infrastructure
in specific geographic areas prone to economically induced outward
migration, or in need of development to absorb and sustain the return of
migrants to that region.12
According to the IOM, the return and socioeconomic reinsertion
of skilled and qualified nationals can benefit the national development
or rehabilitation and reconstruction processes of developing countries,
countries with economies in transition, or countries recovering from
conflict situations. The IOM runs several programs that facilitate Return and Reintegration of Qualified Nationals and other projects that
can help shape the economic and social environment in countries of
origin in a manner conducive to further returns.13
The IOM’s Technical Cooperation on Migration Division helps
governments equip themselves with the necessary policy, legislation,
administrative structures, operational systems, and human resource
base needed to tackle diverse migration problems, to help lessen the
root causes of economically forced migration.14
In June 2006, IOM Brussels hosted a roundtable on labor migration
gathering 20 representatives of think tanks and the European Commission. This roundtable aimed to further the public debate, launched with
the adoption in January 2005 of the European Commission Green Paper
on “An EU approach to managing economic migration” and the “Policy
Plan on Legal Migration,” adopted by the European Commission in
December 2005 as a follow-up to the Green Paper.15 In 2007, as part
of its initiative of capacity building in countries of origin, the IOM and
the Republic of Korea have agreed to create a migration research and
training center in Korea which aims to help governments in the region
facilitate the movement of human resources.16
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In terna tional

L abor

O rgan iza tion

The ILO, the UN specialized agency concerned with labor issues, is
the leading international organization dealing with labor. The preamble
of the constitution of the ILO assigns to it the task of protecting “the
interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own”
(ILO 1974).
The ILO provides advisory services and technical assistance to
member states and provides a tripartite (government, worker, and employer) forum for consultations (ILO 2004a, p. 7). It has established
international conventions on migration policy and protection of migrant
workers, as well as a multilateral framework on labor migration in order
to guide its constituents. The ILO distinguishes among three leading
forms of labor migration: 1) temporary migration of professional, technical, managerial, and business workers, as well as people providing
cross-border services; 2) contract migration for ordinary employment,
but for a limited period of time, guest workers; and 3) migration to
settle for ordinary employment purposes (Abella 2000, pp. 113–114).
In 2004, the 92nd Session of the International Labour Conference
included a discussion of the challenges of labor migration under globalization. The conference concluded with a resolution for a comprehensive
plan for migrant workers, including a nonbinding multilateral framework for a rights-based approach to labor migration (ILO 2004b).

W orld

Trade

O rgan iza tion

In terms of specific formal commitments, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has avoided addressing immigration per se. Nevertheless,
it is clear that because immigration is importantly related to trade in
goods and trade in services, immigration will increasingly be linked to
negotiations on goods and services. The WTO General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) specifically includes commitments on trade
in services by a service supplier of one member, through presence of
natural persons of a WTO member in the territory of any other WTO
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member. However, the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons
stipulates that the GATS “shall not apply to measures affecting natural
persons seeking access to the employment market of a member, nor
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.” Furthermore, the scope of coverage of
Mode 4 is limited to the category of “service suppliers.” This is a limited category, although most developed country gross domestic product
is derived from services.

The G lobal

Migra tion G roup

The Global Migration Group (formerly the Geneva Migration
Group) was originally comprised of the heads of the IOM, ILO, UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime,
and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and now includes
the UN Development Program, the UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, the UN Population Fund, and the World Bank. The
aim of the Global Migration Group is to provide policy coherence in
migration. The Global Migration Group seeks to “promote the wider
application of all relevant international and regional instruments and
norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more
coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue
of international migration” (Global Migration Group 2006, p. 1).

Plan o

f the B ook

The purpose of this book is first to review the economic, ethical,
and political rationales for greater international legal rules in the field of
economic migration (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Second, the book describes
the existing international law of economic migration (Chapters 5–8).
By analyzing the existing international law of economic migration, this
book will facilitate discussion and analysis of new proposals. Third,
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this book attempts to show how the economic, political, and ethical
rationales that it describes may be aligned with particular international
legal rules and institutions. Chapters 2–8 form a basis for Chapters
9–11, which seek to suggest the dynamics of negotiation of new legal
rules for labor market access, the types of new rules that may be negotiated, and the institutional structures that may be useful to assist in the
implementation of these rules.
Chapter 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical work on
the welfare economics of migration. Under a trade-based model of
welfare, given wide disparities in wage rates across borders, global
welfare would be increased by permitting greater trade in labor. The
chapter reviews the various parameters that seem important to the welfare analysis, including distinguishing between global welfare, national
welfare, welfare of migrants, and welfare of other groups. It addresses
the distinction between permanent and temporary migration, as well
as the distinction between migration of skilled and unskilled workers.
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to describe the welfare considerations that
will be important to negotiations regarding international legal rules for
economic migration.
Chapter 3 examines the arguments from ethics for free movement of
people. These arguments may have an effect on the preferences and voting patterns of individuals, or on the behavior of government officials.
This chapter shows the weaknesses in some arguments to the effect that
there is no ethical obligation, or a severely limited ethical obligation, to
act to improve the circumstances of poor people in foreign states.
Political economy, reviewed in Chapter 4, adds two important
dimensions to the analysis. First, how are the dictates of welfare economics mediated by domestic politics? Second, how do states fail to
achieve welfare-enhancing agreements or transactions due to strategic
problems or other market failures? These two dimensions combine to
present a cooperation problem in connection with international migration. How is this cooperation problem different from that experienced
in other areas, such as international trade in goods and services? What
are the implications of these differences for legal structures? This chapter develops a political economy schematic of the possible utility of
legal rules relating to economic migration. International legal rules may
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induce the formation of domestic political coalitions that support liberalized immigration in destination states.
In order to evaluate possible reforms of the international law of
migration, it is necessary to describe the existing international law.
Chapter 5 addresses existing customary international law and treaty
law relating to human rights, as they pertain to economic migration.
The core point of this chapter is that states generally have no obligation
to accept economic migration by citizens of other states. However, it is
important to establish the general absence of rules in this area, and to
explain the modest rules that do exist. This chapter plays an additional
role. It points out some of the possible human rights law requirements
that may apply in connection with the formation of international legal
rules to govern economic migration.
The EU has reached a very high degree of formal labor market integration, although important barriers remain and the level of actual
integration is modest. The EU has developed a set of disciplines designed to permit a very high degree of labor market integration, while
respecting national regulatory and public policy prerogatives. Under
these disciplines, individual nationals of EU member states have the
formal right to enter the labor market of any other member state, without explicit discrimination, without implicit discrimination, and without
losing rights that they would otherwise have, such as social security
rights. The history of the development of labor market integration in the
EU is salient to a study of broader international labor market integration, insofar as it represents a kind of maximal menu of labor market
integration devices. The issues that have arisen, and the way that these
issues have been addressed, both substantively and institutionally, can
provide, if not a roadmap, a checklist for anticipating issues that will
arise as other efforts at international legalization of migration are undertaken. Chapter 6 attempts to provide this history and description.
There are several bilateral, regional, and plurilateral arrangements
for labor mobility beyond the EU. Some of these are based on historically rooted arrangements, such as the British Commonwealth. Others
are more recent adjuncts to bilateral or regional free trade agreements
or customs unions. Examples include the recent free trade area agreements that the United States has entered into with Australia, Chile, and
Singapore. The goal of Chapter 7 is not to provide a comprehensive
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survey of all arrangements, but rather to describe a set of examples and
develop a basic taxonomy to assess the variety of bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral arrangements for migration.
The WTO does not deal with labor or immigration per se, just as
it does not deal with finance or investment per se. However, labor has
entered the WTO in several ways, including, as relevant here, through
the subject of trade in services. In fact, there is an important overlap
between trade concerns and immigration concerns. One motivation for
this book is to bring a trade perspective to the field of immigration.
From a trade perspective, limits on immigration are analogous to tariffs
or quantitative restrictions. These limits include quotas or other quantitative restrictions on immigration, bureaucratic formalities involved
with obtaining a visa, visa fees, discrimination against foreign workers,
and limits on recognition of professional qualifications.
The Doha Development Agenda negotiations included efforts
by developing countries to increase developed country liberalization
commitments with respect to the movement of individuals to supply
low-skilled or semiskilled services. Chapter 8 describes the structure of
commitments, and the applicable rules, within the WTO. Chapter 8 also
provides information that will be relevant to the discussion in Chapter
11 of the extent to which the WTO provides an appropriate institutional
structure for negotiation and administration of possible international legal rules on labor migration.
Chapter 9 catalogs the potential goals that states might pursue in
connection with negotiations on global rules regarding labor market
liberalization. Would states negotiate on a multilateral basis, and would
they accept a rule of most favored nation nondiscrimination? Would
negotiations over liberalization be structured around a “positive list” in
which only those areas that are specifically listed are liberalized, and
then only to the extent specified, or around a “negative list” in which all
areas are liberalized except as stated?
Chapter 10 builds on Chapter 9, by considering what types of specific disciplines would align with the negotiation goals developed in
Chapter 9. Issues considered in this chapter include
• rules relating to restrictions on national limits on emigration,
• the application of an MFN (nondiscrimination across foreign
states) principle,
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• the application and scope of a national treatment principle,
• taxation of migrants,
• professional regulation and licensing of migrants,
• access of migrants to public services and transfer payments, and
• rights to have family members accompany migrants.
A number of subsidiary disciplines will be required in order to
guard against defection from primary disciplines. Examples of these
specific disciplines are articulated in sample treaty language form in
Appendix A.
Chapter 11, building on Chapters 9 and 10, describes the possible
role of an organization, and structures within an organization, to manage international economic migration. An international organization
may assist in resolving a number of strategic problems. This organization could provide secretariat services of various kinds, including
negotiation initiatives, research, surveillance, dispute settlement, and
even possibly enforcement. The types of services would depend on an
analysis of the strategic utility of these services provided by an international organization in the context of the types of rules that are likely to
be negotiated.
Chapter 12 provides some concluding remarks, and suggests a
number of areas for further inquiry and discussion.
Appendix A provides an illustrative draft treaty. This illustrative
draft is intended simply to show the types of specific provisions that
could be included in an international agreement on international economic migration. Indeed, this draft is a framework agreement, which
would be designed to serve as a facility for states to make the kinds of
agreements that make sense to them, individually and collectively. It is
only once these agreements are made that we would truly know whether
states believed that reciprocal legal commitments were useful.
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N otes
1. Throughout this book, I follow the conventional practice of referring to “emigration” as the act of leaving one’s home state, “immigration” as the act of entering
the destination state, and “migration” as the combination of the two.
2. Indeed, Polanyi (1944) decried the commodification of labo .
3. As Neuman (1993, p. 1883) points out,
there existed state qualitative regulation of immigration before 1875,
and this qualitative regulation was an antecedent for federal regulation:
Thus, state immigration law in the century preceding 1875 included five
major categories: regulation of the migration of convicts; regulation of
persons likely to become or actually becoming a public charge; prevention of the spread of contagious diseases, including maritime quarantine and suspension of communication by land; and regionally varying
policies relating to slavery, including prohibition of the slave trade, bans
on the migration of free blacks, and the seamen's acts. Federal statutes
backed up the state quarantine laws and state laws barring importation
of slaves or free black aliens.

4. For a broad statement of this argument, see Trachtman (2008).
5. Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2004) argue that immigration growth can only solve
demographic problems in the developed world if it is concentrated in high-skilled
workers from the developing world. See also Gordon’s (2003) argument regarding
the importance of population growth for economic growth in the United States
during the near future.
6. Unauthorized migrants retain their humanity, but they may enjoy fewer rights
(Lyon 2005).
7. Ghosh estimates that one-fifth of all migrants are unauthorized (Ghosh 2000,
p. 18).
8. In order to do so as accurately as possible, while focusing on the issues of interest
here, this section liberally adapts from the relevant organizations’ Web sites and
other published materials.
9. As of August 2005, these states included Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria,
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the EC/EU.
10. A list of the projects being undertaken by the IOM to facilitate labor migration can
be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/706 (IOM 2008a).
11. This discussion is based on personal communication with Bimal Ghosh.
12. A fuller discussion of the two initiatives can be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/
Jahia/pid/542 (IOM 2008b).
13. A list of such ongoing projects can be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/op/
edit/pid/742 (IOM 2008c).
14. The full activities of the TCM Division of IOM are described at http://www.iom
.int/jahia/Jahia/op/edit/pid/749 (IOM 2008e).
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15. A full discussion on the proceedings of the IOM Brussels Roundtable on Economic Migration is available at http://www.belgium.iom.int/index.asp?Selected=
2&News_ID=483&sm=71 (IOM Brussels 2008).
16. The establishing of the IOM-Korea migration research and training center may
even be seen as a move to improve migration management between Asia and Europe. See http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAS/cache/offonce?entryId=15964
(IOM 2008d).

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Part 1
Normative Analysis of
International Migration

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Job Name:

--

/309724t

2
Welfare Economics of Migration
Given existing wide disparities in wage rates across borders, global
welfare would be greatly increased by permitting greater mobility of
labor (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983, pp. 61, 70). Rodrik (2001) puts
it as follows:
As every economist knows, the efficiency cost of any policyimposed (“artificial”) price wedge is proportional to the square of
the wedge. Where international markets for commodities and fi
nancial assets are concerned, these price wedges rarely exceed a
ratio of 2:1. Where labor services are concerned, however, wages
of similarly qualified individuals in the advanced and low-income
countries differ by a factor of 10 or more. So the gains from liberalizing labor movements across countries are enormous, and much
larger than the likely benefits from further liberalization in the traditional areas of goods and capital.

The artificial price wedge that Rodrik refers to is of course the result of restrictions on immigration. Empirical studies of factor mobility,
and estimates prepared by Winters et al. (2002) and the World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group (2006), seem to confirm large potential
returns from increased liberalization of migration. Barriers to both permanent and temporary movement of natural persons are still quite large,
and many of these barriers lack a compelling noneconomic, or prudential, justification. Thus, there is a strong initial argument from allocative
efficiency for liberalization of economic migration.
From the dynamic standpoint of destination states also, immigrants
may bring many benefits, including skills, knowledge, entrepreneurial spirit, and innovation. These benefits may assist in growth. There
is little doubt that many likely destination states would gain from immigration of skilled workers. Trade in services by virtue of migration
provides economies of scale, benefits of specialization, and stronger
competition. Thus, while developing countries bemoan the brain drain,
developed countries institute “quality-selective” immigration policies
that seek to ensure that only brains are drained.1 On the other hand, it
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is at least theoretically possible that destination states may under some
circumstances lose from immigration of unskilled workers, while origin
states may gain.
We will see that economic theory suggests that, for destination
states, an “optimal immigration policy would admit individuals whose
skills are in shortest supply and whose tax contributions, net of the cost
of public services they receive, are as large as possible” (Hanson 2007,
p. 4). Yet it may not be a simple matter to determine relative scarcity or
abundance.
“A given type of worker may be scarce either because the U.S. supply of his skill type is low relative to the rest of the world, or because
the U.S. demand for his skill type is high relative to the rest of the
world, as with computer scientists and engineers” (Hanson 2007, p. 14).
So it is not strange, as Hanson explains, that in the United States, both
high-skilled software programmers and engineers employed by rapidly
expanding technology industries, as well as low-skilled workers in construction, food preparation, and cleaning services, are scarce (Hanson
2007).
Perhaps another way of formulating the question of optimality is as
follows: an optimal immigration policy admits all immigrants so long
as the benefits they contribute exceed the costs they impose. Immigrants
may bring benefits or costs in terms of the work they do, and they may
bring benefits or costs from a fiscal standpoint. The core question addressed in this chapter is whether increased migration would provide
welfare benefits, to whom, and how much? Armed with detailed answers, and informed by greater knowledge of the parameters that might
affect the magnitude and distribution of benefits, it may be possible to
determine whether these benefits are worthy of efforts toward realization, and what will be the best means of realization.
While it seems fairly clear that there are significant potential global
gains to be achieved by liberalizing migration, it is also clear that these
gains are not distributed evenly. Rather, as is the case with trade in
goods or services, there will be winners and there will be losers. The
problem for domestic and international politics, and for international
institutions, is to establish a method of facilitating policy changes that
are Pareto improvements in the sense that even those who might otherwise be losers are better off.2 The problem for international institutions

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Welfare Economics of Migration 35

is to assist in building domestic coalitions that will enable welfareenhancing policy changes. These policy changes may require careful
structuring of liberalization, or linkage of liberalization of emigration
to other measures.
Chapter 3, which examines the distributive justice perspective on
migration, is predicated on the analysis presented in this chapter of
the welfare and distributive effects of migration. Of course, individual
voters and individual governments often seem to reject greater formal
liberalization of labor movement. Even more powerfully, governments
and constituencies outside the EU would be skeptical of the value of
international legal commitments to liberalize. Chapter 4 examines the
political economy of liberalization of labor movement, analyzing the
domestic and international political bargaining barriers to realizing the
welfare benefits identified in the current chapt .
Much of the remainder of this work will be devoted to identifying
legal mechanisms that may be useful in overcoming political bargaining problems in order to realize these benefits.
The large potential welfare gains from immigration provide an
important incentive for migration, whether legal or illegal. It is clear
that the greatest beneficiaries of migration are the migrants themselves,
often creating high-powered incentives for migration. In many cases,
the alternative to legal migration will not be “no migration,” but rather
illegal migration (Hanson 2007). In order to prevent illegal migration,
powerful disincentives must be structured to overcome the powerful
incentives to migrate. There are great costs to doing so, especially potential risks to the migrants.
As a consequence, these welfare gains provide an incentive to structure legal and institutional mechanisms that can channel, facilitate, and
regularize legal migration, thereby reducing the incentives for illegal
migration and the costs of control of illegal migration. It is important to
note, however, that experience shows that increased legal immigration
can induce increased illegal immigration, depending on the particular
context and structure. It appears that the overall effect of legal migration on illegal migration is ambivalent and context-dependent.
Thus, these unrealized large welfare gains are an institutional puzzle. It would be useful to solve this puzzle and to imagine a way to
restructure legal and organizational mechanisms to allow these gains to
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be realized. This work is intended to advance that project, as an exercise
in institutional imagination.

Th eor y
In theory, liberalization of migration should lead to global gains in
welfare. This is an application of the fundamental theorem of welfare
economics: under perfect competition, the allocation of resources is efficient and output is maximized. Immigration restrictions are limits on
perfect competition. Thus, liberalized migration would cause a rise in
world welfare. As noted above, a number of leading economists have
suggested that the potential global benefits from liberalization of migration are very significant, and therefore merit an effort comparable
to, or greater than, that devoted to liberalization of trade in goods and
services. Assuming that a destination country’s higher wages––which
attract immigrants––result from a higher marginal product of labor, mobility will be efficient. That is, by allowing migrants to move to where
they can achieve greater productivity, we increase world welfare.
“By prohibiting the immigration of many persons, the United States
inevitably shrinks the size of the world economic pie, reducing the
economic opportunities that could be available to many persons in the
source countries” (Borjas 1999, p. 181). “If we consider both the sending and the receiving countries as part of the same world, then—and
on this every economist agrees—the overall effect of the migration on
the average standard of living of the world’s people is positive. The
reason for this is that the migrant goes from a place where he or she is
less productive to a place where he or she is more productive” (Simon
1999, p. 299).
While individual workers will by definition do better by moving
(absent information problems), and while it seems reasonable to expect
that increased free movement will enhance global welfare, it is difficult
to determine the effects of mobility on the welfare of other individuals
or on national welfare. Free migration is not necessarily beneficial to
all. For example, home states that make substantial expenditures on education may lose in a particular emigration transaction. However, there
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may be an economic payoff to the home state, in the form of remittances, or in the form of returning workers bringing back capital, skills,
and information. We even encounter a problem in defining the “home
state”—does welfare of former home state residents count as part of
home state welfare? A cosmopolitan perspective would ignore differences between home state and destination state welfare and consider
only global welfare, but it would certainly examine the distributive consequences of immigration. From a cosmopolitan perspective, if all the
residents of a home state improved their welfare by leaving the home
state, immiserating the now-empty home state, that would be a welfareimproving and desirable outcome.
Destination states may experience economic benefits but also detriments, especially if they make great expenditures on social services.
Individual workers in destination states may lose jobs to immigrants,
and there may be costs associated with dislocation, also putting strains
on the destination state’s fiscal situation. Furthermore, the destination
state will incur the costs of administering an immigration system, of assimilating an immigrant population, and of potential transfer payments
for medical care, education, retirement benefits, and unemployment
benefits, among other social services. It would be appropriate for governments to assess these costs in formulating immigration policy.
A basic labor economics model of supply and demand views immigration as an increase in the number of workers at any given level of
the wage rate. “The result is an outward shift of the labor supply curve”
(Friedberg and Hunt 1999, p. 343). Figure 2.1 depicts how an increase
in the supply of labor due to immigration affects the earnings of workers for whom the immigrants are assumed to substitute. S is the initial
supply of labor. Immigration of I persons increases the supply to S + I.
This reduces the wage from Wo to Wo1. Total output increases by the
trapezoid DGHE, but much of this gain, represented by the rectangle
KGHE (labeled “Immigrant income”), accrues to the immigrants.
“The gain to residents is the welfare triangle DKE, which consists
of the loss in incomes to factors that substitute for immigrants of BADK
and a gain to factors complementary to immigrants” (Freeman 2006).
Hatton and Williamson (2005, p. 290) find that “the overall gain from
immigration to all native-born residents is likely to be very small.”
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Figure 2.1 Gains and Losses from Immigration and Emigration
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All other things being equal, theory predicts that the increased supply will result in reduced prices (wages) and an increased number of
employees. (We see below that empirical verification of this effect is
subject to debate.) However, because the wage falls, some will decide
not to work, and the employment rate will fall. Output increases, because inputs become cheaper (Friedberg and Hunt 1999, p. 343). The
distributional effects are unambiguous in the sense that wage earners
lose while their employers gain (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 290).
On the home country side, a converse simple model may be applied. A reduction in the workforce due to emigration increases wages,
increases the employment rate, and decreases output.
Of course, this analysis does not examine the effects on other factors
of production, or differentiation between different types of workers, not
to mention both dynamic and fiscal e fects. In recent years, economists
have engaged in detailed empirical analysis that suggests that additional
factors must be considered in order to develop a full picture of the effects of migration.
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For example, immigrants are often unskilled, focusing the effects of
immigration on the market for unskilled labor. This focused effect may
cause substitution of unskilled workers for more skilled workers, affecting the skilled labor market, or it may call for employment of skilled
workers with complementary skills, such as managers. Therefore, it is
initially uncertain what the effects of unskilled migration will be on
skilled workers (Friedberg and Hunt 1999).
Migration, Trade, and Investment
Globalization in the form of reduced barriers to trade in goods,
services, and capital may reduce the demand to migrate by increasing
economic opportunity in the potential departure country. It also reduces the potential effects of migration on competing workers. “That
immigration and trade are substitute ways to obtain the same output
suggests that changes in the number of immigrants will have less effect on native incomes in the presence of relatively free trade than they
otherwise would” (Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 147). More broadly,
free trade may also have the effect of leveling wages, reducing incentives to migrate.
How does migration relate to trade? There are instances of similarity, substitutability, and complementarity. “The primary effect of both
immigration and international trade is to allow us to specialize in producing those things we are good at and to consume something other
than what we can produce ourselves . . . In the extreme, immigration
could equalize the composition of labor skills and capital/labor ratios
across countries, eliminating incentives for much of trade. In principle,
so too might international flows of capital” (p. 146)
Smith and Edmonston find that in the United States, immigrants
are disproportionately employed in import-competing sectors, and thus
largely substitute for imports. They observe that analyses that fail to
take this aspect into account may overstate the adverse effects of immigration on native workers (p. 148).
As described by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group
(2006), migration affects trade through several channels, some of which
increase and others of which decrease trade. First, to the extent that
migration raises global incomes, it may increase trade flows. Second,
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the World Bank model assumes disproportionate migration of skilled
workers (compared to historical flows), many of whom will work in
nontraded sectors, such as personal services, rather than produce goods.
Third, remittances increase imports and decrease exports of developing countries. Thus, while changes in migration can affect trade flows,
they are not substitutes for one another. On the other hand, trade and
migration may be complementary along a number of dimensions. For
example, greater migration may stimulate trade due to the preferences
or knowledge of migrants (Rauch and Trindade 2002). Economists find
a “migration hump” that arises from increased free trade, meaning that
upon trade liberalization, the number of migrants first increases, and
then, due to income and job growth, decreases.
Immigration of workers who specialize in import competing sectors
will result in a shift in resources into those sectors. The result should be
a reduction of the relevant imports. Therefore, the terms of trade would
shift in favor of the importing state, while the importing state’s comparative advantage would be smaller, and it would gain less from trade
(Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 148).
On the other hand, immigration of workers who specialize in export
sectors would tend to increase the destination state’s comparative advantage. Thus, it is possible that one state would seek to accentuate its
comparative advantage by attracting and admitting a particular type of
worker, while other states would seek a different type of worker.
Where there is a barrier to trade in goods that inefficiently protects a
domestic manufacturing industry, that domestic manufacturing industry
may hire increasing numbers of immigrants. Under these circumstances,
the efficiency of migration is predicated on an inefficient trade barrier.
If the trade barrier were eliminated, migration would be less attractive.
However, Sykes (1995) points out that if the trade barriers cannot be
removed, then migration might be a second-best adaptation.
H eckscher-O hlin
The standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade assumes labor immobility as a basis for trade in goods in which labor-abundant countries
export labor-intensive goods. Trade in goods in this sense substitutes
for movement of people (and vice versa) (Faini, de Melo, and Zim-
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mermann 1999). The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade holds that, all
other things being equal, countries endowed with more skilled workers
will export skill-intensive goods, while countries endowed with fewer
skilled workers will export unskilled-labor-intensive goods. This is the
operation of comparative advantage. The operation of this trade will
move toward relative factor price equalization.
Trade may result in convergence of wages, in accordance with the
factor price equalization theorem. Increased wages in the home country relative to the wages in the potential destination country reduce the
incentives for migration. This was one of the motivations of the United
States in entering into NAFTA with Mexico: to reduce incentives for
illegal migration.
In order for trade and migration to be considered substitutes, five
assumptions, consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory, must be made
(Martin, Lowell, and Taylor 2000, pp. 149–152):
1) identical production technology,
2) same factors of production (factor homogeneity),
3) constant returns to scale,
4) instant adjustment to changes in international market environment, and
5) perfect competition.
Under these assumptions, factor prices, including wages, will be
equalized between the two trading countries. There will therefore be no
economic reason for migration. As Simon explains, this type of trade
model can only explain why migration need not take place under certain
conditions––ideal conditions at that. It does not explain why migration
should occur (Simon 1999, p. 19).
In this simple Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which technology is
identical across countries, and in which there are only two factors of
production, trade and migration are thus substitutes: they have identical effects on factor prices, leading to factor price convergence, and
the more one type of liberalization occurs, the less incentive there is
for the other (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 18). Furthermore, under
factor price equalization, immigration will not affect wages, which are
already equal.
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This perspective may provide a partial answer to the question of
why barriers to immigration have increased while barriers to trade in
goods have decreased: the decreasing barriers to trade in goods undermines the incentives for immigration. To the extent that trade and
migration are substitutes for one another, trade liberalization may reduce the pressure for migration, and vice versa. Incidentally, the same
might be said with regard to investment liberalization.
Friedberg and Hunt (1999, p. 345) explain that the “predictions of
this most simple trade model are thought to be unrealistic, but even
more complex versions of the model predict that small numbers of immigrants will have no effect on the wage.” This simple model may be
supplemented by allowing factor endowments and technology to vary
between states. Friedberg and Hunt conclude that theoretical models
“thus have predictions ranging from a definite fall in the wage and employment rate (the closed economy case) to a wage fall after a certain
threshold of immigration is passed, to no fall in wages (open economy
models)” (p. 345). They call for empirical work to address the question
of the effects of migration on wages.
Of course, once the assumption that technology is identical across
countries is abandoned, or once there are more than two factors of
production, it becomes possible that trade and immigration would be
complements instead of substitutes. For example, if technology is better in the higher-skilled country, or if the higher-skilled country is better
endowed with another factor compared to the lower-skilled country,
then it no longer follows that skilled workers will migrate from highskilled countries to low-skilled countries (Markusen 1983, p. 341).
Under some circumstances, both skilled and unskilled workers
may flow toward the high-skilled country. Importantly, differences in
productivity explain why we still see migration from countries where
high-skilled labor is scarce to countries where high-skilled labor is
abundant: in countries where high-skilled labor is abundant, the productivity of high-skilled labor is often higher than in countries where
high-skilled labor is scarce. Therefore, high-skilled workers may migrate to high-skilled countries in order to achieve a higher wage. “This
is, of course, what happens in the real world, suggesting that richer
countries do indeed enjoy superior technology to poor countries, and
that endowments alone cannot explain differences in income, or for that
matter trade patterns and factor flows” (Markusen 1983).
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Thus, even factor price equalization does not necessarily lead to
equal wages. Trefler (1993, 1998) shows that the factor price equalization theorem must be modified to refer to productivity-adjusted wages.
“Trade, people flows, and capital flows were not substitutes in the U.S.
economy during the 1980s and into the 2000s, when imports of goods
and services, and financial capital, and skilled and unskilled immigrants
increased” (Freeman 2006, p. 160). Freeman suggests that “one plausible explanation is that countries differ in technology (Markusen 1983;
Markusen and Svennsson 1985). If an advanced economy uses more
productive technology than a developing country, then returns to both
labor and capital will be higher in the advanced economy and both factors will migrate there” (Gierking and Mutti 1983). Similarly, Martin,
Lowell and Taylor (2000, p. 150) point out that if infrastructure has important effects on labor productivity, then migration may be stimulated
by differences in infrastructure. They give the example of the Mexican
shoe industry in the 1980s, where Mexican workers moved to Los Angeles to produce shoes for export to Mexico.
On the other hand, free trade can change labor supply conditions.
So, if an advanced country, such as the United States, is able to produce certain manufactured or agricultural goods using capital intensive
technology with great efficienc , while a developing country uses less
efficient labor-intensive production methods, a move to free trade may
displace workers in the developing country.3 Significant displacement
of workers by such trade may affect the demand for emigration.
Let us relax the assumption of free trade. Under a tariff or other barrier, there may be incentives for migration (Sykes 1995). Assume that
a wealthy country imposes a tariff on a labor-intensive good. This tariff
is likely to cause domestic firms to increase output, increasing demand
for labor and therefore increasing wages. The increase in wages may
induce immigration, reducing the relevant wage. “For example, skillabundant countries tend to import low-skilled labor intensive products
and receive immigrants who are less skilled than natives on average”
(Mayda 2007; Moses and Letnes 2004, p. 1610).
As countries move toward free trade in goods, the price of skilled labor rises in the country with more skilled workers, and falls in the country
with less-skilled workers (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 18). Therefore, it is expected that in skill-abundant countries, the unskilled would
favor trade protection, while in low-skilled countries, the skilled would
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favor protection. This is consistent with the holding of the HeckscherOhlin theorem: that owners of a country’s abundant factors gain under
trade liberalization while owners of scarce factors lose (Mayda 2007).
Of course, from a policy standpoint, those who favor protection might
favor selective protection that protects their market position.
In North America, there is an interesting historical connection between labor market integration and goods integration. The Bracero
program, which was utilized between 1942 and 1964 to bring Mexican
temporary workers into the United States, produced a degree of dependence by a group of Mexican workers on U.S. jobs, and also stimulated
demand in Mexico for U.S. jobs.
Upon the termination of the Bracero program, the border region of
Mexico faced a surge in returning workers. Mexico turned to offshore
assembly processing and created the Maquiladora program (Martin,
Lowell, and Taylor 2000, pp. 137, 142–143). The Maquiladora program allowed U.S. investors to create jobs in the Mexican border areas
by shipping components for assembly to Mexican plants. The finished
goods would be subject to tariffs only on the Mexican value added. The
next step was the creation of NAFTA, raising the question of whether
trade liberalization is a substitute for migration. The U.S. Commission
for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development concluded that “expanded trade between the sending
countries and the United States is the single most important remedy”
for unwanted immigration (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1990).
Faini, de Melo, and Zimmermann (1999, p. 7) suggest that in the
absence of effective means of inhibiting informal migration, “trade
policy may represent a more effective strategy to deal with migratory
pressures.” They quote former Mexican president Salinas: “Mexico
wants to export goods, not people.”
Furthermore, when domestic agricultural sectors experience strong
competition from imports, the rural agricultural sector can lose viability,
leading to internal migration from villages to cities. This internal migration can increase the pressure to emigrate to another country (Hollifield
2000, pp. 75, 87; Sassen 1996, p. 78).

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Welfare Economics of Migration 45

Complementarity
There are certainly elements of complementarity between migration and trade. In considering the U.S. entry into NAFTA, former U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner McNary put it
this way: “I feel more than a bit confident in acknowledging that if immigration is not formally on the table, someone at the table will sooner
or later realize as a practical matter, that moving goods and services
in international commerce involves moving people who trade in these
goods and services” (McNary 1992).
Furthermore, from a dynamic perspective, offshoring, foreign investment, intellectual property licensing, and other globalized economic
relationships increase the demand for temporary, and in some cases
permanent, migration. In fact, restrictions on immigration can suppress
these other forms of commerce. So, to some extent, restrictions on immigration are restrictions on trade, investment, etc. This can be seen
in Modes 2, 3, and 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), where movement of natural persons (Mode 4) is necessary or
important to other types of trade in services: 1) consumption abroad
(Mode 2), and 2) commercial presence (Mode 3). Mode 4 is addressed
in more detail in Chapter 8.
Bases for Trade: Comparative Advantage, Absolute Advantage,
and Economies of Scale
Simon (1999, p. 17) argues that the gains from migration are unlike
the gains from trade. The core difference, based on the simple model
used by Simon for illustration, is that trade-induced shifts in prices and
production benefit consumers in both the importing and the exporting
countries, while migration-induced shifts principally benefit the migrant. Prices of goods remain as they were before migration. “And most
important, there is no gain to non-moving natives similar to the Ricardian wine-and-cloth increase in total production whose benefit is realized
by native consumers in both countries” (Simon 1999, p. 20).
Furthermore, trade is based on comparative advantage, while migration is based on absolute advantage. Therefore, if productivity is
sufficiently greater across categories of labor in wealthy countries as
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compared to poor countries, there may be little reason for migration
from wealthy countries to poor countries. Hatton (2007, p. 359) concludes that for wealthy countries, migration is a one-way street: poor
country citizens wish to migrate to rich countries, but not vice versa.
There is significant migration from wealthy countries to poor countries, but it is a fraction of that from poor countries to wealthy countries
(UNGA 2006).
Nevertheless, there may be an opportunity for a particular type of
comparative advantage to operate in the field of migration. Indeed, for
example, the Philippines seems to specialize in providing maids, nurses,
and merchant marine sailors to other countries. Think of the worker as a
product (a capital asset, if you will). Assume that Mexico produces masons more efficiently due to agglomeration effects, economies of scale,
or network externalities in training, while the United States produces
electricians more efficiently for similar reasons.
Under these circumstances, “trade” between the United States and
Mexico in masons and electricians might produce benefits in accordance with absolute advantage. However, even if Mexico were better at
producing both masons and electricians, it might make sense for Mexico to concentrate on production of masons if its advantage in producing
masons is greater than its advantage in producing electricians. This is
similar to the Ricardian example of transactions in wine and cloth between England and Portugal. Simon is still correct that those remaining
in the labor-exporting state do not today generally realize the same type
of benefits as producers of goods. However, a Bhagwati tax (or perhaps
expectations of remittances) could allow Mexico to realize the benefits
of its comparative advantage, and thereby provide Mexico with incentives for effici nt production of workers. A “Bhagwati tax,” discussed
in detail later in this chapter, is a tax applied by the home country to
earnings of emigrants that are sourced in the destination country.
Another basis for trade in workers would be economies of scale
or agglomeration effects in manufacturing or production of services.
It may be that it is useful for one state to specialize in a particular type
of production. For example, immigration of workers who specialize in
export sectors would tend to increase the destination state’s comparative advantage in connection with the relevant exported goods. Thus,
it is possible that one state would seek to accentuate its comparative
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advantage by attracting and admitting a particular type of worker, while
other states would seek a different type of worker. This type of variation of state preferences could form the basis for a mutually beneficial
arrangement between states.
Migration and Investment
In addition to a certain degree of substitutability between movement
of individuals and goods, there is also a certain degree of substitutability between movement of individuals and capital. That is, if the
increased productivity that may be achieved by migration of individuals may also be achieved by movement of capital to the individuals,
then movement of capital is a substitute for migration. As Wong (2006,
p. 112) notes, one suggestion made by way of reducing incentives for
migration is to encourage more investment in the home countries. On
the other hand, increased emigration may reduce incentives to invest in
the home country.
If, as Freeman (2006) and Markusen (1983) suggest, technological
differences may explain why both capital and labor flow together to
developed countries—because both are more productive in developed
countries—then it is also true that reduction of technological differences may reduce this effect and reduce incentives for skilled persons
in developing countries to migrate to developed countries. This effect
may also increase incentives for skilled persons in developed countries
to migrate to developing countries.
While we cannot expect that technology will necessarily flow to developing countries, if it were directed to developing countries, outbound
migration of skilled persons would likely be reduced. To the extent that
investment results in technological advancement, investment can serve
as a substitute for migration.
Wong develops a theoretical model that argues that there are cases
in which capital movement and migration are substitutes in the price
sense, and cases in which they are complements, but that they are most
likely to be substitutes. Wong’s findings (2006, p. 138) support the common perception that if the movement of one factor is liberalized, then
the movement of the other factor will tend to decrease. On the other
hand, using a Ricardian model that emphasizes technological differ-
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ences, Davis and Weinstein (2002) find complementarity and support
this view with an empirical analysis.

Glo bal Effects
Theory suggests that there are substantial possible benefits from
migration, but it also suggests that the lion’s share of these benefits accrues to the migrants themselves. In this section, I review the empirical
analysis of the global effects of migration. In the following sections, I
review the parameters that determine the separate effects on a number
of groups.
In migration, the early work of Hamilton and Whalley (1984) provides estimates of global gains from a move to free migration. Using
1977 data, Hamilton and Whalley estimate that gains from completely
free migration could reach US$16 trillion. This exceeded world GNP
for 1977. Importantly, Hamilton and Whalley assume that differences
in the marginal productivity of labor are exclusively the result of barriers to mobility, and their estimates are based on politically infeasible
levels of migration. They estimate movements of labor once restrictions on migration are removed, assuming that labor would continue to
move until wage rate equalization is achieved. Wage rate equalization
would raise the wages of the world’s lowest-paid workers substantially.
While these massive gains may be unrealistic for a number of reasons,
including failure to reflect fully the transportation costs, externalities,
and other costs involved with migration, this research motivates further
research into the scope of achievable global gains.
Moses and Letnes (2004), noting that there are remarkably few
analyses of global gains from freer migration, update the Hamilton and
Whalley (1984) research using 1998 data. In their “most reasonable”
scenario, the expected global efficiency gains from complete liberalization are almost US$3.4 trillion. When these figures are adjusted
for workforce and efficiency differences, the lowest estimate is still
US$1.97 trillion, which amounts to 5.6 percent of 1998 world income.
Moses and Letnes (2004) estimate that even a 10 percent increase in in-
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ternational migration would produce an annual efficiency gain of about
US$774 billion 1998 dollars.
The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 31) estimates that a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants to 2025 would
produce global gains of US$356 billion for 2025, a 0.6 percent increase
in annual global real income.4 The main gains come from the higher
incomes that migrants can earn in the destination country.
Of course, these estimates are contingent on a number of assumptions, and it is impossible to determine with specificity the conditions
that would have to be met in order to increase international migration by
the specified measures. For example, it is important to note here that the
World Bank’s assumption is that the 3 percent rise in the workforce is
allocated between skilled and unskilled workers on the basis of the proportion already existing in the destination developed country economy
as a whole, rather than the proportion already existing among migrants.
This requires a much larger increase in the number of skilled migrants
compared to the increase in the number of unskilled migrants. The
number of unskilled migrant workers increases by 39 percent, while the
number of skilled migrant workers rises by 138 percent (World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 33). The World Bank does not
explain what might cause this increase in the proportion of skilled migrants (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006).
As we consider the effects on migrants, and the antipoverty effects
of this type of migration, it will be useful to keep in mind the disproportionate growth in skilled worker migration assumed by the World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group (2006). While this assumption seems
somewhat implausible, given the fact that many destination states are
selecting for higher-skilled immigrants, it may be appropriate.
I will discuss distributional issues in more detail below, but it is
worthwhile here to note how these gains are distributed between
wealthy and poor countries. Under a migration increase of 10 percent,
in Moses and Letnes’s (2004) “middle” scenario, workers in the poorest
regions receive an increase in wages of 4.1 percent, while wages in the
richest regions decline by 2.5 percent. On the other hand, capital owners in wealthy states are made better off, while capital owners in poor
states are made worse off. According to the World Bank model, the aggregate percentage income gain to developing countries (including the
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new migrants) is 1.8 percent, while the gain to high-income countries
is 0.4 percent (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006).5 The
inclusion of the new migrants in the developing countries category, despite their departure, may be questioned by some. That is, if the goal
is to benefit developing countries, then benefits to migrants per se are
irrelevant. On the other hand, for those who have a more cosmopolitan
concern for the effects on former residents of developing countries, assuming that they are relatively poor, the inclusion of emigrants in this
category may seem appropriate.
These models suggest that the potential global gains from reducing
restrictions on migration are great. But today, almost no international
diplomatic resources are devoted to realizing these gains, with the exception of highly restricted efforts under Mode 4 of GATS. (See Chapter
8.) On the other hand, the resources devoted to international trade negotiations are much greater, while the expected returns are considerably
smaller.
The World Bank’s trade model suggests that the gains from removing all barriers to goods trade would yield $287 billion in global income
gains in 2015 (Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). The
Doha negotiations are not expected to yield anything close to this level
of liberalization. Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe project
that a “base Doha scenario” would yield only $96 billion in annual
gains by 2015, with developing countries capturing a mere $16 billion
of this amount.
On the other hand, we have the World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group (2006), Moses and Letnes (2004), and Hamilton and Whalley
(1984) studies noted above, estimating gains from migration liberalization that would exceed, in some cases greatly, the gains from a “likely
Doha scenario” (Walmsley and Winters 2003). Scaled to the same year,
2001, the gains from total trade liberalization are $155 billion while
the gains from a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants is $175 billion (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 41). Not only
does migration reform provide greater aggregate gains, but the gains are
distributed more greatly to developing countries. No wonder thoughtful
observers wonder why migration is not on the global agenda. However, these estimates do not appear to take into account possible adverse
brain drain or dynamic effects on growth in the home country. If these
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were viewed as significant, they might reduce the value of increasing
migration, especially to the extent that the migration is heavily oriented
toward skilled labor.
It seems reasonable to conclude that liberalization of migration
presents the possibility of substantial improvement of global welfare,
even though these are only estimates, with many assumptions and empirical gaps. However, the devil is in the details of the distribution of
increased (and decreased) welfare, and the political consequences of
these distributional details. It is also worth noting that the gains from
increased migration are largest with the initial, even small, increases in
migration (Moses and Letnes 2004).
Effects on Migrants
It seems reasonable to assume that under a permissive, as opposed
to forced, migration regime, individual migrants will benefit from
their own migration. This assumption follows from the assumption of
individual rationality, and from methodological and normative individualism. And indeed, we would expect to see few individuals choosing
to migrate to a state where their welfare is reduced, based on a comparison of the available baskets of wages, public services, general living
conditions, taxes, transfer payments, and many social and political parameters. Mexico has far fewer U.S. native immigrants than the United
States has native Mexican immigrants.
However, the assumption that individual decision-making is consistent with individual welfare maximization is not always true. There
may be circumstances in which migrants are prey to information asymmetry in which their decision to migrate will reduce their expected
welfare (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 61). Migrants may be unaware of the simultaneous decisions of other migrants,
causing wage expectations to be frustrated, or causing congestion.
There may be circumstances where excessive migration would cause
disruption and adjustment costs that exceed the gains. If, for example,
Switzerland today were to open its borders to all who wish to become
Swiss citizens, it might be that so many poor people would suddenly
move to Switzerland that it would become congested and their welfare
would actually be diminished.
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Individual migrants, and their accompanying families, hope that
they will benefit by migration from two sources: higher wages and better living conditions.
First, they may benefit from higher wages in the destination country
compared to the home country. This is the main source of gains. Indeed,
the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 35) estimates
that under the scenario studied there, migrants increase their own real
income by 199 percent: they nearly triple their real income, even after
adjusting for a higher cost of living in the destination country. These
gains are, of course, striking, although gains will vary depending on
the particular home country—a less wealthy home country results in
greater gains.
Where do these gains come from? Freeman (2006, p. 154) explains
that
the huge gains in income that immigrants from a low-income
country obtain by moving to a high-income country virtually guarantees that most of the gains to immigrants occur not because of
positive selectivity of immigrants but rather because high-income
countries have more complementary inputs: higher capital-labor
ratios, more modern technology, superior infrastructure, more efficient markets due to greater legal protections of property and persons, and lower levels of corruption and rent-seeking.

So it is generally the factors, such as technology, that are available
in the wealthy host country that allow immigrants from poor countries
to achieve greater wages. Conversely, the lack of these factors generally results in lower wages for similar work in poor countries, ensuring
that there is no rush of wealthy country individuals to migrate to poor
countries.
Second, migrants and their families may benefit from better living conditions in the destination country. These better living conditions
may arise from a number of sources, including the destination country’s
institutions, transfer payment programs, climate, geography, culture,
economy, etc. The particular sources of benefits that seem to cause the
greatest concern, perhaps because they are rival in their consumption,
are transfer payments and welfare programs. These include unemployment payments, health care and insurance, retirement benefits, public
education, and perhaps other programs.
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There is little doubt that increased wages are an important inducement to migration, and we can expect migrants to improve their own
lots whenever they migrate. However, other parameters will be important to the decision to migrate. These will include the following, each of
which might be the subject of international legal rules on migration:
• Whether the migrant is permitted to remain in the destination
country permanently, or is only permitted to remain temporarily. As a potential migrant calculates the total present value of
migration, he or she would tend to find less value in a short-term
migration than in a long-term migration. The migrant would of
course want the option to return, and may well return, but the
option to stay makes migration most valuable.
• Linguistic and cultural differences and accommodation. Destination states may require facility with local language and culture, or may provide greater accommodation to those who are
not familiar with local language and culture.
• Licensing and recognition of credentials for skilled workers. For
occupations that require credentials or licensing, recognition of
foreign credentials and licensing would facilitate mobility.
• Access to transfer payments and welfare programs.
• Ability to bring along family members.

H o me State Effects
Although much of the policy discussion of migration focuses on
destination country effects, the greater effects may be felt by the home
country of the migrant. As suggested above, liberalization of migration generally increases global welfare and also generally increases the
welfare of migrants. But migrants themselves are only one segment of
society. There are other segments whose welfare and political influence
must be considered.
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Those R emaining Behind in the H ome State
First, let us consider those who the migrants leave behind in the
home country. These people might be hurt in some ways but might also
be helped in other ways. The World Bank estimates that most developing
countries will experience some modest aggregate gains from emigration (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 37). These
gains depend on continuing average remittances at prior levels equal
to 17 percent of migrant income. But it is important to emphasize that
the impact on particular countries will depend on their circumstances,
including the magnitude of migration, the skill level of migrants, and labor market conditions at home and abroad. In addition to the magnitude
of remittances, the quality of remittances—most importantly, whether
they are for consumption or investment—will determine their impact.
O’Rourke (2004, p. 7) finds that wages rose in emigration countries
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, converging
with countries of immigration, and that “emigration was an important
source of living standard convergence for [emigration countries].”
Taylor and Williamson (1997, p. 27) find that international real wage
dispersion declined by 28 percent from 1870 to 1910, but that without the mass migrations of this period, wage dispersion would have
increased by 7 percent. Migration explains about 70 percent of living
standards convergence during this period. O’Rourke (2004, p. 9) concludes that “emigration was thus a major source of poverty relief in
these economies, allowing living standards to grow far more rapidly
than they would have in its absence” (see also Williamson [2002]).
Hatton and Williamson (2005, p. 3) conclude that “In the first global
century, emigration raised living standards in poor countries a lot. In the
second global century, emigration could raise living standards in poor
countries a lot, but typically it does not.”
Although the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006)
finds that increasing emigration of low-skilled workers would signifi
cantly reduce poverty in developing countries, those remaining behind
do not necessarily benefit from the emigration of their compatriots.
First, emigration of high-skilled workers may reduce welfare in the
sending country. Second, for the same types of reasons that workers in
the destination country are not necessarily hurt by immigration, work-
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ers in the home country are not necessarily helped by emigration. It is
possible, however, that workers in the home country who otherwise
compete with emigrants would experience a rise in wages. Recall that
the World Bank simulation assumes an increasing proportion of skilled
migrants, compared to unskilled migrants, to developed countries. So,
beyond the ability of emigrants to escape poverty, what are the mechanisms that affect those remaining behind in developing countries?
Low-Skilled Migration and Domestic Employment in the
H ome State
Emigration of low-skilled workers can increase wages and reduce
unemployment and underemployment of poor workers in the home
country. Migration of low-skilled workers has usually been beneficial to
developing countries, contributing to poverty alleviation (World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 64). However, recent studies
of Albania, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka show no discernible wage improvements, despite large-scale emigration (Lucas 2004).
“Reducing the restrictions on low-skill emigration, while remaining sensitive to concerns in destination countries over social tensions,
job opportunities for low-skilled natives and the potential burden on
public expenditures, may best be achieved through managed migration
programs designed jointly by origin and destination countries” (World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 58). This is an argument
for international migration agreements. Whether these agreements are
bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral, and whether they are formal or
informal, will depend on a number of factors. (See Chapter 9.)
H igh-Skilled Migration and Brain Drain
Where skilled labor flows from developing countries to developed
countries, we can expect the destination country to benefit. On the other
hand, the origin developing country may be harmed by the loss of
skilled workers, reducing total output, the tax base, and scale economies
(Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975, p. 195; Krugman 1971, p. 483; Sykes
1995). This is known as “brain drain.” “Depending on the length of the
skilled workers’ absences, such a loss also could reduce an economy’s
entrepreneurship, the ability to absorb new technologies, and various
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positive spillovers from skilled to other workers and to society in general” (Straubhaar 2000, p. 110; Sykes 1995).
High-skilled migration has grown as a proportion of migration,
in part due to selective immigration policies in countries such as the
United States, Singapore, Canada, and Australia. Those remaining behind may be hurt by brain drain. Brain drain costs to those remaining
behind may include increased wage costs for employers and consequent
increased prices paid by consumers and reduced returns to capital.
High-skilled migration can be expected to affect different countries differently. Large developing countries with many skilled people, and the
capacity to produce large numbers of skilled people, may not be harmed
by high-skilled migration, whereas smaller countries with fewer skilled
people, and relatively smaller capacities to produce skilled people, may
experience greater harm (Bhagwati 2004, p. 215).
Brain drain may reduce both the welfare of those remaining behind
and growth in developing countries when the emigrant was generating
or would have generated positive externalities. For example, positive
externalities from home country education programs may arise because
the total return to education of workers may exceed the private return—
in fact, one would assume that this is the reason for national investment
in education. Furthermore, there may be economies of scale or scope
that become unavailable after a certain level of emigration. Finally,
emigration may reduce tax receipts; moreover, emigrants, if they remained, might have contributed more to their home country taxes than
they received in public services (World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group 2006, pp. 58, 67).
Desai, Kapur, and McHale (2004) calculate that India loses $700
million annually in tax revenues that would have been realized from
emigrants to the United States under its H-1B visa program, an amount
equal to approximately 12 percent of India’s tax revenues. The World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006) concludes that it is impossible to estimate reliably the benefit or cost to home countries of
high-skilled emigration. The literature on brain drain is almost exclusively theoretical, with the exception of a 2001 study that found a
positive and significant correlation between migration prospects and
human capital formation. There has been no systematic empirical assessment of the effects of brain drain on developing countries, largely
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due to a lack of harmonized international data (Beine, Docquier, and
Rapoport 2003, p. 4).
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) have produced estimates of
migration rates from 61 developing countries, distinguishing three
educational levels. These estimates confirm that those with greater
educational levels are more likely to emigrate. Beine, Docquier, and
Rapoport (2003) find that countries that incur important losses are generally those that have very high migration rates, but that the magnitude
of losses and gains, in terms of GDP per capita growth rate, remains
limited for most countries. Except for Jamaica and Guyana, with very
high migration rates, the net variation of GDP per capita growth rate is
always lower than 0.20 percent per year (p. 29). While Beine, Docquier,
and Rapoport find that more states are losers than winners, the winners
include the most populous states, representing nearly 80 percent of the
total population of their sample. These results suggest first that brain
drain is not a problem in all origin developing states, and that on an
aggregate basis, it is not a problem at all. However, particular origin
developing states might experience a welfare loss, and may determine
to take steps to reduce this loss.
Kapur and McHale (2005, p. 4) note first that the prospect of migration affects investment in human capital: potential migrants seek
human capital to enhance their ability to migrate successfully (see also
Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport [2003, p. 4]; Stark and Wang [2002]).
Lundborg (2006) argues that “the prospect of emigration to high-wage
countries raises the expected returns to education, stimulates human
capital formation, and raises the growth rate in the emigration country.”
This has become known as the “brain gain.” Of course, in order for
this investment in education to enhance growth in the home country, a
certain number of individuals must erroneously invest in education—
expecting migration opportunities that fail to materialize (Mountford
1997). Kapur and McHale (2005) also note the adverse effects on the
home developing country of the loss of human capital.
There is also a related dynamic public policy problem with brain
drain, relating to public investment in human capital. If we understand
brain drain as a positive externality conferred by home countries on
destination countries in the form of subsidized education of migrants,
then the home countries may not be able to capture the full benefits of
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public education. Public education would become a global public good,
with the risk that states may therefore invest less in public education,
and public education would tend to be underproduced.6
Remittances, Return, and Other Diaspora Benefit
There are a number of so-called feedback effects that can improve
welfare in the origin state, including remittances and return migration
with additional skills, contacts, and know-how (Beine, Docquier, and
Rapoport 2003, p. 4).
Perhaps the most significant source of positive feedback effects is
remittances. The United Nations International Fund for Agricultural
Development’s 2007 report states that
the driving force behind this phenomenon is an estimated 150
million migrants worldwide who sent more than US$300 billion
to their families in developing countries during 2006, typically
US$100, US$200 or US$300 at a time, through more than 1.5 billion separate financial transactions. These funds are used primarily
to meet immediate family needs (consumption) but a significant
portion is also available for savings, credit mobilization and other
forms of investment. In other words, the world’s largest poverty
alleviation programme could also become an effective grass roots
economic development programme, particularly in the rural areas
that present some of the greatest challenges to financial inclusion.
(International Fund for Agricultural Development 2007)

Remittances have been identified as an important compensation to
origin countries, to compensate them for losses incurred with the departure of workers (Goldfarb, Havrylyshyn, and Mangum 1984). “In
small countries, remittances can account for a large share of GDP and
foreign exchange. Even in a large country, remittances can greatly boost
an economy” (Freeman 2006).
Home countries are increasingly acting to enhance the quantity
and quality of remittances. They may establish programs to encourage remittances for investment. For example, Mexico has established a
matching funds program that matches remittances for certain types of
investment projects. Where migrant communities develop abroad, it is
also possible for organizations of migrants to band together to assist or
invest at home.7
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Assuming remittance rates at current levels, the World Bank estimates that those remaining behind would experience a net increase of
0.9 percent in their real incomes (World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group 2006, p. 34). Unger (2005) estimates that income grew more
rapidly in Mexican towns experiencing greater emigration, and that income growth was associated with greater remittances.
Of course, remittances have other effects. For example, while poverty alleviation is an important effect of remittances, an increase in
remittances used for other consumption can draw resources away from
more productive or more development-conducive uses. Remittances
can cause an increase in the real exchange rate, and therefore a loss of
export competitiveness. This is the standard “Dutch disease” (World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 39).
An IOM survey carried out in Guatemala . . . found that recipient households used 53 per cent of remittances to buy basic items
such as food and clothing. A further 11 per cent was spent on education and health. As much as 36 per cent was directed to savings, economic purposes and for the purchase of assets, including
housing. Studies in CIS countries (Tajikistan, Moldova, Armenia)
have found that the amount allocated for savings and investment
is small. In Tajikistan (Olimova and Bosc 2003), labour migration
and remittances have not led to individual accumulation of wealth
nor have they accelerated the pace of SME development. Nevertheless, as a survival strategy, labour migration has become a crucial stabilizing factor to offset the effects of economic crisis. (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2006, p. 77)

Indeed, remittances may be used more for consumption than for investment, and this may limit their effect on growth (Kapur and McHale
2005, p. 150). It may be that remittances from more-skilled workers
more frequently take the form of growth-promoting investment (Desai,
Kapur, and McHale 2004). For example, highly skilled Indian emigrant
technicians might make remittances as part of a venture capital project
in India. Kapur and McHale conclude that the effects of remittances on
poverty and development are still poorly understood (p. 161).
Martin (2004) observes that
most studies suggest that each $1 in remittances generates a $2 to
$3 increase in GDP, as recipients buy goods or invest in housing,
education, or health care, improving the lives of non-migrants via
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the multiplier effects of remittance spending. Research suggests
that the exit of men in the prime of their working lives initially
leads to reduced output in local economies, but the arrival of remittances can lead to adjustments that maintain output. For example,
migrant families can shift farming operations from crops to livestock, which require less labor, hire labor to produce crops, or rent
crop land to other farmers, enabling them to achieve economies of
scale. (p. 15)

Some home countries have tried to capture the value of remittances
by regulating the activities of their emigrants.
For example, many Korean migrants in the Middle East in the late
1970s and early 1980s were considered employees of their Korean
construction company, and had their Korean currency earnings
sent to their families in Korea while receiving a stipend in local
currency abroad. Many Chinese and Vietnamese migrants today
go abroad as employees of Chinese and Vietnamese firms, and
their wages are paid in a similar way—most go to the migrant’s
family or bank account in local currency . . . Similarly, between
1942 and 1946, Mexican Braceros had 10 per cent of their earnings
sent from US employers directly to the Bank of Mexico. (p. 15)

Return of emigrants can provide development benefits (Ellerman
2003). Brain drain may be turned into “brain circulation,” strengthening
developing country human capital. For example, in India, IT workers
may return from the United States with the know-how and contacts to
start up new high-tech businesses. There have been a number of programs, organized by destination states or international organizations
such as the IOM, established to facilitate or encourage return (World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 71).
In addition, the home country can benefit informally, as “a welleducated diaspora can improve access to capital, technology, information, foreign exchange, and business contacts for firms in the country of
origin” (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 58).
Producers in the H ome State
Producers in developing home countries would be likely to suffer from emigration. Capital returns may decline, while labor returns
may improve. In fact, multinational corporations that have the ability

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Welfare Economics of Migration 61

to invest in developing countries may therefore find liberalization of
migration unattractive.
Importantly, and unfortunately, free migration would serve, at least
in the short term, as a deterrent to investment. In the World Bank simulation, developing country pools of unskilled workers only decline by
0.3 percent, while skilled workers decline by 1.7 percent (World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 44). However, there is at least a
plausible argument that emigration may raise the productivity of those
left behind (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 6). Furthermore, the loss to
capital may be offset by the gain to labor.
The generally adverse effect of emigration on producers in developing countries means that it may be difficult to develop political
coalitions in developing countries to lobby to seek liberalization of immigration by destination states. On the other hand, those home state
residents who anticipate a possibility for migration may support efforts
to seek liberalization abroad. This will be further elaborated upon in
Chapter 4.

Destin ation S tate Effects
Destination states are benefited by migration to the extent that the
migration responds to relative scarcity and/or productivity gains, increasing the general productivity of the economy. By increasing the
supply of labor, immigration increases the productivity of factors that
are complementary to that labor. The increased income for destination
country employers is termed the “immigration surplus.” Smith and
Edmonston (1997) develop a basic economic model using what they
believe to be plausible assumptions, including constant returns to scale,
to show that immigration produces net economic gains for domestic
residents. Immigration allows existing domestic workers to increase
their specialization, producing goods more efficientl . On the consumption side, immigrants produce new goods and services and are paid less
than the value of these goods and services, so domestic residents gain.
Consumers thus benefit from reduced prices.
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Furthermore, to the extent that immigrants contribute more in taxes
than they receive in government services and transfer payments, immigrants may provide another benefit. The excess is a net fiscal transfer to
nonimmigrant taxpayers. It is easy to see that high-skilled immigrants
are likely to pay more in taxes, and consume less in government services and transfer payments, than low-skilled immigrants.
However, destination states may be harmed (in economic terms)
through three mechanisms. Each of these harms must be balanced
against potential benefits. First, they may be harmed to the extent that
certain groups of native or earlier immigrant workers are harmed,
where the costs of adjustment exceed the productivity benefits. Costs of
adjustment may include costs of retraining or of providing other social
welfare programs to displaced workers, or social costs of simply having
displaced workers.
Second, the destination state will experience the costs of administering an immigration system. Of course, these costs do not necessarily
militate against liberalized immigration, unless they increase as a function of the level of immigration.8
Third, destination states may be harmed through the fiscal mechanism, whereby immigrants receive more in public services and transfer
payments than they contribute through taxes. Sudak and Trebilcock
(2006) propose a required insurance mechanism to ensure that each individual migrant avoids imposing an inappropriate cost to the public
fisc 9 As Hanson concludes (2007, p. 21), if “immigrants are a net fis
cal drain, the total impact of immigration on the United States would
be positive only if the immigration surplus exceeded the fiscal transfer
made to immigrants.” “For low-skilled immigration . . . this does not
appear to be the case.”
Of course, immigrants may also enhance the welfare of natives in
important dimensions. Immigrants may bring greater productivity and
less expensive goods. Immigrants may also help to fund publicly provided goods and services.
There seems to be wide agreement that the United States as a whole,
and other likely destination states, would benefit from increased immigration by highly skilled workers (even though competing domestic
workers might be harmed). But immigration of less-skilled workers,
which has been the recent trend, is more ambiguous. This may ex-
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plain why many destination states, such as the United States, Germany,
Canada, or Singapore, provide more liberal access for high-skilled
persons.
In the end, Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 6) argue that immigration is unlikely to have a very large effect on earnings or on gross
domestic product per capita in the large and complex U.S. economy.
They find savings, investment, and human capital of U.S. workers to be
“far more critical.”
There has been a lively empirical debate among economists with
respect to the destination country effects of immigration to the United
States, and this debate has spilled over into the public arena (Lowenstein
2006). This debate has focused, importantly, on the effects of immigration on low-skilled workers.
Before reviewing this debate, it is important to state that the outcome is not the final word with respect to global welfare, or even with
respect to U.S. aggregate welfare. That is, even if it is found that the
United States is harmed by liberalized immigration, it may be that
global welfare is increased, and therefore it would be efficient (albeit
perhaps unappealing from a distributive standpoint) to compensate the
United States in order to induce the United States to accept liberalized immigration. Of course, the compensation could take the form of
a measure that would have beneficial effects on the home states, such
as liberalization of investment or of trade in high value-added services.
Recall that in the GATS negotiations, Mode 4 liberalization of movement of natural persons was seen as both compensation for, and linked
to, Mode 3 liberalization of commercial presence, which often is associated with investment.
Second, even if the poorest workers in the United States are otherwise harmed by liberalized immigration, it may be that the United
States as a whole benefits from liberalized immigration. Again, under
these circumstances, it might be efficient to compensate the harmed
workers in order to induce them to accept liberalized immigration.10
Workers in the Destination State
Individual workers in destination states may lose jobs to immigrants, and there may be costs associated with dislocation. Of course,
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in the simplest terms, adding to the supply of workers should result in
a new supply-demand equilibrium, shifting the price downward (see
Figure 2.1).
Supply and demand, and historical data, suggest that the impact on
specific groups of domestic workers would depend on the composition
of immigrant worker groups: if the immigrants are largely unskilled,
or low skilled, their effect will generally be to reduce the wages of the
unskilled or low skilled (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 14).
Under the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, we would expect high-skill
workers to migrate from high-skill countries to low-skill countries,
and we would expect high-skill workers in low-skill countries to oppose immigration (at least by high-skill workers). Conversely, low-skill
workers would migrate from low-skill countries to high-skill countries,
and we would expect low-skill workers in high-skill countries to oppose immigration (at least by low-skill workers) (O’Rourke and Sinnott
2003, p. 7). We discuss this further in Chapter 4.
It is worth noting that “between 1960 and 2000, the share of workingage native-born U.S. residents with less than twelve years of schooling
fell from 50 percent to 12 percent” (Hanson 2007). By comparison, in
Mexico, “as of 2000, 74 percent of working-age residents had less than
twelve years of education” (p. 14). While these statistics are not proxies
for abundance or scarcity, they are highly suggestive. Thus, immigration from Mexico to the United States, if unregulated, would likely be
dominated by unskilled workers.
There are five potential mechanisms by which an influx of foreign
workers may affect the circumstances of native-born workers (as workers—we will examine the effects on consumers and taxpayers below).
1) An increase in the supply of workers competing for particular
jobs should, in theory, drive down wages. (See Figure 2.1.) This
could result in reduced employment, as some workers determine
not to work at the reduced wage.
2) An influx of foreign workers may result in some adjustment in
industry or in the types of capital investment made by industry.
Producers may adjust the composition of their workforces, or
their investment, in response to changes in composition of the
workforce. An increase in the number of unskilled workers by
immigration may result in adjustment through a change in the
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output mix—toward more products produced by unskilled workers (Gaston and Nelson 2000, p. 104).
3) An influx of foreign workers may induce U.S. industry to invest
in a particular area, actually increasing the number and quality
of jobs in that area.
4) An influx of foreign workers may cause U.S. workers to seek
other jobs in other communities.
5) An influx of immigrant workers should increase the wages of
complementary workers—workers whose skills become more
valuable due to immigration. An influx of chefs results in increased demand for waiters.
Much depends on the degree to which labor is specific to a particular sector, and on the mobility of labor between sectors. If labor were
perfectly immobile between sectors, we would expect concentrated
effects on the domestic workers in the sector or sectors targeted by immigrants. If labor were perfectly mobile, wages would fall by the same
proportion in all sectors. Of course, it may be that immigrants would
address a broad range of sectors. The greater the breadth of sectors affected, the more diffuse the effects.
This type of natural or autonomous “diffusion” can be simulated
by an “institutional” diffusion—through taxation and adjustment payments.
So, an important question regarding national welfare calculations,
and political and institutional responses, relates to the composition of
the immigrant labor pool. If the pool of immigrants were such that overall welfare is increased by immigration, or if the pool of immigrants
could be controlled to ensure that overall welfare is increased, then
the argument for liberalized immigration would be similar to the argument for broad liberalization of trade in goods or services: while some
are made worse off, those who are made better off are benefited in an
amount greater than the amount by which those made worse off are
hurt. That is, under these circumstances, liberalized immigration would
be a potential Pareto improvement. As with the argument for free trade,
this argument leaves aside the question of whether actual compensation
would be provided to those made worse off, making the move to liberalized immigration an actual Pareto improvement.
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But the debate in the United States is even narrower in its focus
than an analysis of overall U.S. welfare: it examines whether immigrants hurt the economic position of the U.S. persons with whom they
compete. So, it puts aside—it ignores—questions of compensation, although the outcome of the debate might have some bearing on policy
decisions to make compensation available. Juxtaposing this migration
policy discussion with that surrounding trade in goods and services, we
might ask why the immigration debate looks at this narrower question
of whether some groups are hurt, while the trade discussion is often
content to deal with potential Pareto efficiency: whether enough surplus is generated to make compensation, even if compensation is not
actually made. One answer is that the groups who actually seem to be
hurt by migration to the United States are the lowest income groups,
whereas trade in goods and services may be less focused in its effects.
But this narrow focus makes it even more important to consider the possibility of compensation to those harmed.
While the United States cannot stand as a proxy for all developed
destination countries, this section will review this empirical debate regarding the effects on native-born workers in the United States.
Examining the U.S. context, Card (1990, p. 245) argues that the link
between immigration and wage suppression is difficult to isolate. Card’s
work considers the “natural experiment” of the arrival of 125,000 Cuban “Marielitos” (boat people) in Miami, increasing Miami’s workforce
by 7 percent. He compares the changes in the labor market structure in
Miami to that of other cities over the same period, and finds that the
increased workforce in Miami did not have a discernible effect.
Borjas (2004, p. 2) responds that intercity comparisons are not revealing because the flow of jobs and workers in response to immigration
will “effectively diffuse the impact of immigration across the national
economy.” Inflows of migrants may be associated with outflows of natives, with the natives accepting reduced wages in other cities. However,
Card and DiNardo (2000) use a three skill-group division and find that
native mobility has virtually no offsetting effect with respect to supply
shocks caused by immigration. (See also Card [2005]).
Furthermore, Borjas argues that Card’s method of cross-city comparison erroneously assumes that immigrants are randomly distributed
across labor markets. However, if “immigrants tend to cluster in cities

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Welfare Economics of Migration 67

with thriving economies, there would be a built-in spurious positive
correlation between immigration and wages” (Borjas 2004, p. 2). This
would mask the negative effects of immigration. In addition, as immigrants enter a particular city, owners of capital may move their capital
to those cities to take advantage of cheap labor. This increase in demand
would have the effect of supporting labor prices in the city that experiences the inflo , while depressing wages in the city that the owners
of capital abandoned. Thus, Borjas asserts that “because labor markets
adjust to immigration, the labor market impact of immigration may be
measurable only at the national level” (p. 2).
Therefore, instead of looking at specific cities, Borjas (2003, 2004)
examines specific skill groups and experience cohorts nationwide. He
finds that immigration has a very strong effect on earnings. Using data
from the U.S. censuses between 1960 and 2000, Borjas finds that wages
grew fastest for workers in those skill groups that were least affected
by immigration. He develops a statistical model describing the link between wages and immigration, by relating data across skill groups and
calendar years. Based on this model, he predicts that an immigrant influx that increases the number of workers in a particular skill group by
10 percent will reduce annual earnings in that skill group by 8 percent
(Borjas 2004). By increasing the labor supply from 1980 to 2000, “immigration reduced the average annual earnings of native-born men by
an estimated $1,700 or roughly 4 percent” (Borjas 2003, p. 1359). The
effect was greater among those without a high school education (7.4
percent), and smaller for high school graduates (2.1 percent) (Borjas
2004, p. 5). However, when Ottaviano and Peri (2006) relax the restrictive assumptions of Borjas (2003) that capital markets did not respond
to immigration and that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes,
they arrive at divergent conclusions.
In a 2005 paper, Borjas and Katz (2005) find that the influx of
Mexican workers to the United States in recent years has significantly
depressed the earnings of high school dropouts, while enhancing the
earnings of college graduates. DeLong (2006) argues that Borjas and
Katz’s finding of these large effects is “imprecisely estimated: their data
are fuzzy and give an approximately one-sixth chance that the effect on
high school dropouts is positive.”
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Borjas (2004, p. 3) cites several national studies (Camarota 1998;
Jaeger 1995; Smith and Edmonston 1997) that have found that “immigration adversely affects the wages of natives in competition with
immigrants.”
On the other hand, Card (2005) finds that the wages of less-skilled
natives are insensitive to supply shocks of immigrants. He reviews the
possible explanations for the failure of the simple theoretical prediction
that increased supply depresses prices. Card examines data suggesting
rejection of both the thesis that selective mobility of native workers
masks the local effects of immigrants, and the Heckscher-Ohlin model’s prediction that the supply shock is absorbed by changing industry
structure. He finds that the bulk of the absorption occurs within industries, which adapt to use more unskilled labor.
Card refers to data showing significant local supply effects of immigration (Card 2001, 2005), meaning that the supply of immigrant
labor is not dissipated by mobility (as Borjas, Freeman, and Katz [1997]
suggest). However, he finds that these significant supply effects do not
translate into significant wage effects. His estimates suggest that “there
is no relationship between the supply of high school dropouts [including immigrants] and their relative wages . . . As in most of the previous
work looking at local labor market impacts of immigration, there is
a surprisingly weak relationship between immigration and less-skilled
native wages” (Card [2005], p. 11, citing Friedberg and Hunt [1995] and
Borjas [1994]). He refers to the fact that the relationship between wages
of native dropouts relative to wages of native high school graduates has
remained nearly constant since 1980, despite pressure from immigrant
inflows increasing the supply of labor. Card suggests that the aggregate
data relied upon by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) are uninformative without knowing the trend in relative demand for dropouts.
Further, Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 148) find that in the United
States, immigrants are disproportionately employed in import-competing
sectors, and thus they largely substitute for imports. They observe that
“analyses that ignore this pattern may overstate the possible adverse effects of immigrants on low-skilled natives.”
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) find that “overall immigration generates
a large positive effect on the average wages of U.S.-born workers.”
Their analysis, using both estimation and simulation methods, exam-
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ines closely the effects of skill complementarities and physical capital
accumulation. They calculate that the average wage of native workers
increased between 2 percent and 2.5 percent due to the inflow of foreign workers from 1990 to 2000, although the wages of native workers
without a high school degree declined by 1 percent.
On the other hand, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2003, p. 15), examining
the literature on effects on the unskilled, conclude broadly that “several
studies, using various methodologies, have shown that in immigrant nations such as the United States, immigration had a significant negative
impact on unskilled real wages.”
In their meta-analysis of studies of this topic extending beyond the
U.S. context, Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005) find that results differ
across countries and that the effects of migration on wages are small:
“one percentage point increase in the proportion of immigrants in the
labor force lowers wages across the investigated studies by only 0.119
percent.”
Thus, applying the Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005) findings to the
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006) simulation (assuming a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants) we would anticipate
a 0.357 percent reduction in wages in the destination states. The World
Bank simulation itself finds that in higher-income countries, unskilled
native wages decline by around 0.3 percent, while skilled native wages
decline by 1.1 percent (p. 44). (Recall that the World Bank simulation
assumes a larger proportion of skilled migration than has occurred in
the past.) On the other hand, more severe adverse consequences are felt
by earlier migrants, whose wages decline by more than 10 percent for
unskilled earlier migrants and 20 percent for skilled earlier migrants.
These distinctions depend, of course, on the degree of substitutability
between migrants and native workers.
Given the diverse positions in this literature, the best conclusion
that can be reached at this time is one of uncertainty as to whether and
to what extent immigrants suppress the incomes of competing workers (Gaston and Nelson 2000). However, several things are clear. First,
under this literature it is by no means clear that the United States, or
any other destination country, is harmed as a whole by immigration.
Second, the composition of the class of workers harmed will depend on
the composition of the class of workers who immigrate, and immigrants
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(at least to the United States) have had a much higher proportion of
unskilled persons than the native population (Card 2005, p. 3). Third,
and of great practical importance, if immigration harms some group of
native workers, the harm seems to vary directly with the magnitude of
immigration. So, at least from the standpoint of immigrant-competing
native workers, a stream is preferable to a flood. Fourth, the historical experience represented in this empirical literature is not necessarily
indicative of future experience, especially under significantly changed
policy. Finally, this literature does not address the possibility that
the gains from immigration might be sufficient to compensate those
harmed.
While there appears to be a consensus that the average destination
country worker will only experience modest wage pressure (Ottaviano
and Peri [2005] suggest that the average effect is indeed positive), if
any, from liberalization of migration, other destination country constituencies will be affected by liberalization. Of course, each individual
“belongs” to multiple constituencies, moderating or accentuating some
effects.
Producers and Consumers in the Destination Country
Producers in the destination country that employ the type of labor supplied by immigrants would tend to benefit from immigration.
In higher-income countries, capital will enjoy an increase in returns,
as wages decline (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006,
p. 44). As we will see in Chapter 4, this results in a radically different political economy of immigration policy, compared to the political
economy of trade policy.
Assuming that migration reduces wages, or increases productivity, then consumers may gain from lower prices. Those consumers in
the destination country are situated similarly to consumers of goods in
importing countries. They enjoy increased welfare by virtue of lowerpriced goods.
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Tempor ar y an d Per man en t Migr ation
While the direct economic consequences of temporary migration
are comparable to those of permanent migration, with the level of
impact reduced by virtue of the reduced period of foreign residence,
temporary migration presents less difficult cultural, social, and political
dimensions.
However, in the Walmsley-Winters model, permanent residents in
home developing countries tend to lose from the outflow of even temporary migrants, despite assumed remittances, because the decrease in
the labor supply reduces the return to capital and other factors of production (Martin 1990, p. 81). Winters et al. (2002) find that straight loss
for the origin country is far from inevitable (as discussed above) and
will depend on the length of absence. Recall that the skilled workers are
likely to be achieving productivity gains by moving (assuming that they
do not move erroneously). If they return or otherwise interact with their
home markets, they may also bring back innovations, skills, knowledge
of markets, and capital. The main uncertainty regarding the benefits to
the origin country of temporary migration relates to the magnitude and
quality of remittances, and the magnitude and quality of skills brought
home by returning workers. Indeed, there is a possibility that return
would reduce the welfare of those remaining behind. Permanent migration may provide reduced incentives for remittances or return, although
a Bhagwati tax–type mechanism could address this concern.
Winters et al. (2002, p. 68) concludes that “developing countries’
policies toward the temporary movement of skilled natural persons
should depend heavily on the net balance of these effects, which is
currently very uncertain. Moreover, the balance is likely to vary by
country.” Although temporary movement of natural persons “will clearly
deliver only some of the economic benefits of straight migration in
terms of output and income, it avoids most of the latter’s political costs”
(Winters 2003, p. 69).
Temporary migration schemes are usually selective based on skills.
A number of industrialized countries have established programs for
temporary acceptance of workers (OECD 1998). Examples include the
U.S. H-1B visa program, and temporary skilled migration programs in
Australia and Canada.
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The Walmsley-Winters model suggests that although “developing
countries are the main beneficiaries of [an increase in quotas for temporary migration], the initial residents of most of the industrial countries
also experience increases in welfare from the higher returns to capital
and increased taxes collected” (Martin 1990). In this sense, at least from
a national aggregate and global perspective, temporary migration has
the same type of win-win welfare profile that trade in goods has. The
problem then is to induce those harmed within national economies to
accept increased temporary migration.
Importantly, programs for temporary movement may, depending on
the quality of administration and incentives for return, provide incentives for increased authorized and unauthorized immigration (Ghosh
2000, p. 15). Temporary guest worker programs, like the Bracero
(“strong arm”) program which brought Mexican workers to the United
States from 1943 to 1964, led to a good deal of permanent migration
(Martin 2001). The Bracero program admitted Mexicans under conditions similar to the currently existing H-2A temporary or seasonal
agricultural visa program, which allows U.S. farmers to recruit foreign
workers, after a good-faith effort to recruit U.S. workers. Both the Bracero program and Germany’s Gastarbeiter program increased legal and
illegal immigration to the host countries.
Preference of temporary migration over permanent migration may
arise from a concern to ensure that arrangements benefit developing
countries. “If the movement is temporary, then we can be fairly confident that both the host and home country will gain. The benefits of
permanent migration are less clear: the gains from remittances, networks, investment, etc. must be weighed against the possible costs of
‘brain drain’” (Chaudhuri, Mattoo, and Self 2004, p. 15). Rodrik (2004)
writes, “To ensure that labor mobility produces benefits for developing
nations it is imperative that the regime be designed in a way that generates incentives for return to home countries. While remittances can be
an important source of income support for poor families, they are generally unable to spark and sustain long-term economic development.”
Of course, brain drain also presents risks in connection with temporary migration—it is simply assumed to be reduced in magnitude.
This reduction depends on the temporal relation between the brain drain
harms and the length of sojourn. It could be that most of the harms
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are felt during the earlier period of the sojourn, while benefits would
occur later. Nor is it correct to assume that temporariness ensures benefits to developing countries. Indeed, there will be circumstances where
limitations to temporariness reduce or destroy benefits to developing
countries. Furthermore, there must be circumstances where permanent
migration would be more beneficial globally than temporary migration, so that if it were possible to compensate developing country home
states, permanent migration would be superior both for the source developing country and for the world.
While few would argue with a goal to ensure that migration arrangements redound to the benefit of the poor, a limitation to temporary
migration may be too blunt an instrument to achieve the goal. Economists sometimes also seek to ensure that international economic
arrangements in trade are “foolproof”: some have argued that international trade arrangements should be limited to tariff reduction, because
that is the only type of liberalization where policymakers can do no
harm. But it is possible that institutional as opposed to prohibitive responses to these concerns may allow greater increases in welfare.
Limitation of migration to temporary migration reduces the incentive to migrate, which can be understood as the present value of the
lifetime difference in income available in the home state versus that
available in the destination state. Temporary or rotational migration involves greater transportation and reinstallation costs. Thus, the ratio of
migration expense to migration benefits will be reduced under temporary
migration, with greater expenses and smaller benefits. Requirements
of temporariness also may exclude the migrant from participation in
pension and other public welfare programs, and so further reduce the
incentive to migrate. Requirements of temporariness also artificially
suppress the broader potential benefits of migration. Indeed, it seems
clear that the main effect of a requirement of temporariness is to moderate the effects of migration. If these effects are good, temporariness is
bad; conversely, if these effects are bad, temporariness is good.
To be sure, a more refined instrument that can capture all of the
benefits of migration of unrestricted duration, while protecting against
brain drain, may require substantial development of international institutional arrangements, but the benefits of increased global welfare and
increased freedom for individuals may justify the costs. Facilitation of
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remittances, the establishment of a Bhagwati tax, commitments of destination states to accept a specified number of less-skilled immigrants,
naked transfers from destination states to home states, or some combination of the foregoing, may be used to ensure benefits to the poor.
Temporary migration has many costs of its own, including administration, disruption of family and social life, and the naked deadweight loss
of suppressing the efficient allocation of resources.

Sk illed an d Un sk illed Migr ation
Skill levels will affect the economics of migration through at least
two paths. First, as explained above, high-skilled workers will often
contribute to the destination state from a fiscal perspective, and their
departure may confer a loss on the home state from a fiscal perspective.
Second, also as explained above, to the extent that the destination state
has a deficit of high-skilled workers, or the high-skilled workers create
positive externalities, high-skilled workers may benefit the destination
state.
Hatton and Williamson explain that the quality of immigrants to the
United States, and to other OECD destinations, declined between the
1950s and 2000, largely due to changes in the home country composition of these immigrants (Hatton and Williamson 2006). In response,
a number of the wealthy destination countries have moved to qualitybased selection criteria for immigrants.
In recent years, a number of destination states have moved toward
“point” or other systems to admit skilled workers while excluding
less-skilled workers. For example, the United States has periodically
provided temporary increases in the number of H-1B visas for highly
skilled workers, in response to industry demands for more skilled
workers.
Developed destination states seem to be in a competition to attract
highly skilled workers (Harris 2002, p. 99). “‘To maintain and improve
economic growth in the EU, it is essential for Europe to become a magnet for the highly skilled,’ said Franco Frattini, the EU justice and home
affairs commissioner. ‘Qualified and highly qualified migrants prefer
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the U.S.A., Canada and Australia’” (Bilefsky 2007). The contribution
of immigrants to high technology is impressive. Wadhwa et al. (2007)
report as follows:
Our research produced some startling statistics: in 25.3 percent
of technology and engineering companies started in the United
States from 1995 to 2005, at least one key founder was foreignborn; in California, this percentage was 38.8; in North Carolina,
the percentage was only 13.9. Our analysis of Silicon Valley and
Research Triangle Park (RTP) showed greater concentrations of
immigrant founders. In Silicon Valley, 52.4 percent of companies
had an immigrant as a key founder, as did 18.7 percent of RTP.

Legal an d Illegal Migr ation
Interestingly, from an economic standpoint, regulation of migration is similar to other market-suppressing regulatory interventions.
All other things being equal, and assuming perfect competition, this
intervention reduces welfare. So it is not strange that Hanson (2007)
concludes that there is little evidence that legal immigration is preferable from an economic standpoint to illegal immigration, and concludes
that illegal immigration is more responsive to labor market conditions
than legal immigration. Examining the U.S. context, Hanson argues
that legal immigration “is subject to arbitrary selection criteria and bureaucratic delays, which tend to disassociate legal inflows from U.S.
labor-market conditions” (p. 5). Temporary legal immigrants are far
less flexible than illegal immigrants, as most work visas are linked to
a particular employer, and the visa holder cannot change jobs without
employer approval (p. 12).
Of course, market imperfections exist, and the welfare state provides attractions that may induce inefficient illegal immigration, at
least insofar as illegal immigrants have access to transfer programs, so
it is not possible to say that, from a global welfare standpoint, illegal
immigration is superior to legal immigration. Furthermore, illegal immigration can erode the “rule of law” and may reduce the ability to
enforce workers’ rights.
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For certain types of employers, illegal immigration may be more
attractive than legal immigration. Illegal immigrants may be less costly
and more pliable than legal immigrants. They may be less costly in part
because they have difficulty joining in efforts to organize, and because
they fear exposure.11 They may be in the “black economy,” and fail to
pay taxes or attract contributions to social security or health care funds.
Illegal immigrants may undercut the pricing and protections of domestic
workers more severely than legal immigrants. Thus, certain employers
may be expected to oppose expanded legal immigration. In fact, one of
the preambular provisions of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of Their
Families (1990) recites as follows: “Considering that workers who are
non-documented or in an irregular situation are frequently employed
under less favourable conditions of work than other workers and that
certain employers find this an inducement to seek such labour in order
to reap the benefits of unfair competition . . .
We would expect that labor interests would prefer legal immigration
to illegal immigration, all other things being equal. Some labor interests
would prefer to provide amnesty to existing illegal immigrants, compared to maintaining the status quo. Freeman (2006, p. 163) explains
with respect to the United States that
in 2000 the AFL-CIO reversed its long-standing support for the
employer sanctions law that criminalized the hiring of undocumented immigrant workers and endorsed amnesty for millions of
undocumented workers and repeal of the employer sanctions law.
The underlying rationale was that the growing immigrant community would provide good recruits and political allies for unions,
and that legalizing the workers would reduce the impact of such
immigrants in reducing wages and opportunities for other workers.

Of course, if the legal immigration has little effect in suppressing
illegal immigration, competing domestic labor interests might have less
of an interest in supporting legal immigration. Similarly, if amnesty
has the effect of inducing increased illegal immigration, labor interests
might be ambivalent regarding amnesty.
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Fiscal Effects
As noted above, migration may be induced not only by greater
wages, but also by the attraction of destination country public services to
migrants. Here, migration is different from trade in goods and services.
And migration of workers for purposes of already identified employment is different from migration of other individuals. That is, goods and
services are subject to a natural market discipline, as are workers who
already have identified employment.12 While imported goods and services compete with domestic goods and services, the market naturally
clears. Individual immigrants may arrive and use resources without
ever being subjected to market forces. In fact, they may be motivated
by nonmarket forces to come, especially by social welfare programs
such as education, health care, or income support.
Migration induced by public services, as opposed to productivity
enhancement, may result in inefficiency from a global perspective and
may harm the destination state. The inefficiency is simply a result of a
public goods problem, in which public services are transformed from
a private good available only to natives to a public good available to
anyone wishing to migrate. So, when we discuss effects of migration
on the destination state, we must distinguish among different types of
migrants. The risk of migrants traveling to obtain the benefits of public
services and transfers has increased with the rise of the interventionist,
or welfare, state and the decline in the costs of transportation.
The concern from a destination state welfare standpoint is that immigrants will cost more in public services than they contribute in taxes,
or in other terms, resulting in a net welfare loss for natives. Under progressive income taxation, migrating unskilled workers will be likely to
pay less in taxes than average natives. So even if these migrants absorb
an average level of public service and transfer payments, their effect
will be to dilute the total fisc. Of course, we must keep in mind that
the “immigration dividend” arising from decreased costs of production
could countervail this type of welfare loss on an aggregate basis.
Because of the possibility that immigrants could confer a net welfare
loss, destination states may determine to limit access to their markets to
those less likely to use these services, or less likely to use them soon.
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Alternatively, destination states may limit access to their public
services. For example, in 1996, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation
excluding noncitizens from access to a number of entitlement programs
(the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996). An alternative to this type of exclusion is to establish eligibility
requirements or waiting periods that would allow immigrants to enter
but exclude them from these programs. This may be unpalatable, or
even unconstitutional, for some states. It may raise human rights or
other international legal issues. Still another alternative is to combine
some degree of public service harmonization with moves toward liberalization of migration.13
Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 293) find that each immigrant-headed household imposed a net fiscal cost of between $1,613 and $2,206
on the United States. “If the net fiscal impact of all U.S. immigrantheaded households were averaged across all native households in the
United States, the burden would be . . . on the order of $166 to $226 per
native household” (p. 9). The reasons for net transfers to immigrants in
the United States are that immigrants tend to have younger children,
utilizing school resources; immigrants tend to be poorer, and thus receive more transfer payments; and under progressive income taxation,
poorer immigrants contribute less (p. 9).
However, these figures include the costs of educating the children
of immigrants but not the taxes that the native-born children of immigrants pay after leaving the immigrant-headed household (p. 298). A
dynamic analysis by Smith and Edmonston including these taxes indicates that the average immigrant confers a net benefit of $80,000 in net
present value (p. 336).14
Interestingly, under most scenarios, “the long-run fiscal impact is
strongly positive at the federal level, but substantially negative at the
state and local levels” (p. 12). This is largely because of the kinds of
fiscal responsibilities undertaken by states. States like California, where
immigrants tend to concentrate, may incur net long-term burdens, while
other states receive net benefits.
Of course, as mentioned above, any fiscal transfers must be balanced
against the immigration dividend through consumption and production
channels. Furthermore, it is clear that more highly skilled immigrants
would tend to make fiscal contributions rather than receive net trans-
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fers. Simon shows that, at least in the case of immigration to the United
States, immigrants have been net contributors when dynamic effects
on production and fiscal effects are taken into account along with labor
market effects (Simon 1990, pp. 105–164).
The high-income countries will experience a general decline in
working-age population during the period 2010 to 2025 (World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 29). The expected decline in
the labor force is accompanied by a rise in these countries’ dependency
ratios: the ratio of nonworkers to workers. In a “pay as you go” transfer
system, such as the U.S. Social Security system, a rise in the dependency ratio means that fewer workers must bear a bigger burden.
Here, much depends on the relative age and skill level of the migrants.
Examining forward-looking projections of the effects of immigrants,
Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 11) find that immigrants arriving at
ages 10–25 produce net benefits under most scenarios. Young, skilled
migrants can be expected to be net contributors, while old, unskilled
migrants would be expected to be net recipients. (See also Rowthorn
2004 and Storesletten 2000.) This could provide a motivation for governments to be selective in immigration. In some contexts, increases in
immigration at the right age and skill levels could contribute to finan ing pensions by improving the dependency ratio.
While there no doubt are some cases of transfer payment–
motivated immigration, the greater effect on the transfer payment system is likely to be positive, at least insofar as migrants are relatively
youthful and able to work. However, this effect is too small to support
hope that migrants from relatively poor countries will, to some extent,
“bail out” the U.S. Social Security system. Unless migration is very
large, the bailout from this source will be very small (Freeman 2006;
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 29). In the past,
migrants have been broadly revenue-neutral in terms of their level of
consumption of public goods and services compared to their level of
payment of taxes (OECD 2007; World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group 2006, pp. 39–40).
Interestingly, the 2008 annual report on the U.S. Social Security
system points out that illegal immigrants provide two significant benefits to the system: 1) they are more likely than others to leave before
they can actually take advantage of benefits, and 2) they tend to be
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younger than other immigrants and younger than the population as a
whole. According to the report, the effect of illegal immigrants will
close 15 percent of the U.S. Social Security system’s projected longterm deficit (Board of Trustees 2008; New York Times 2008).
While the most politically appealing––and economically
plausible––argument against liberalization of migration is that individuals will be induced to migrate inefficiently in order to take advantage
of destination country transfer programs, this phenomenon does not
appear to have been significant to date. As noted above, one way to
avoid the risk that migration will be motivated by transfer payments is
to make immigrants ineligible for relevant programs, but this strategy
raises ethical, political, and human rights concerns.

Migr ation Rest r iction s an d a Bh agwati Tax
As a response to the actuality or perception of harmful brain drain,
it is certainly possible that home countries would determine to restrict
or to tax certain types of emigration. From the standpoint of a trade
model, a numerical restriction would be similar to an export quota on
goods (generally illegal under Article XI of GATT), while a tax would
be similar to an export tax (generally permitted). Policy debates in the
1970s discussed whether a tax on emigration (known as a “Bhagwati
tax”) could compensate the origin developing countries for brain drain
(Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2003, p. 3).
While restrictions on emigration may violate human rights obligations, such restrictions have been seen in the past for a variety of
reasons, including to block transfer of technology or to maintain high
land rents (Dowty 1987). For example, Britain restricted emigration
by skilled workers from 1719 to 1825 (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p.
1). More recently, the former Soviet Union and its satellites restricted
emigration in order to retain certain skilled workers, and presumably in
order to prevent a rush for the exit in a failing state. I discuss the Soviet
and Chinese tax structures below.
There may be circumstances under which developing countries
would benefit from restrictions on emigration. While direct restrictions
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raise human rights concerns and might prevent some efficient migration, a well-structured Bhagwati tax may provide a more subtle and
appealing instrument (Wilson 2007). Perhaps a Bhagwati tax would be
a superior tool, compared to remittances, for home countries to capture
some of the benefits of migration. For example, a Bhagwati tax might
allow states to capture some of the benefits from their public education
systems, preventing public education from becoming an undersupplied
public good.
One of the major criticisms of a Bhagwati tax has been the inability of the home country to enforce collections on migrants who
reside in the destination country (Sudak and Trebilcock 2006). This
may be addressed through international agreements or other enforcement cooperation arrangements. While there are no direct precedents
for cooperative arrangements of this type, there is no a priori reason
why they could not be implemented. Furthermore, with the rising concern regarding international money laundering, financing of terrorism,
and tax evasion, efforts such as the Financial Action Task Force could
be adapted to foster cooperation in this field. International society has
moved closer to international enforcement of private judgments, which
are not necessarily more intrusive than a carefully delimited set of tax
obligations.15
Indeed, it would be possible to attain a similar effect to a Bhagwati
tax simply by restructuring the obligation as a debt for money borrowed
instead of a tax. A Bhagwati tax is not formally very different from
an obligation to repay tuition or an exit fee that is enforced over time,
instead of in a lump sum upon migration. Financing arrangements,
provided either privately or publicly in the destination country, could
provide a basis for collection. Countries concerned about brain drain
might establish an obligation to repay the cost of public education upon
emigration, and require the borrower/migrant to agree in advance to the
enforceability of this debt in courts around the world (Sudak and Trebilcock 2006). Although enforcement may still be costly, it would not
be doctrinally exceptional.
Of course, any exit tax or Bhagwati tax would reduce incentives
to migrate, except to the extent that the destination country accepted it
as the basis for a credit or deduction against destination country taxes.
Deductibility or creditability might be a basis for fiscal competition for
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migrants among destination countries. Insofar as the destination country recognizes the value of the contribution of the home country to the
migrant’s human capital, it may accept the principle that it should reduce its taxation in deference to the home country.
While this type of shared dual taxation arrangement would no
doubt be quite complex, modern information-processing technology
might render it reasonably simple to administer. Many modern tax treaties contain arrangements for states to work out in advance the relative
contribution to income of two states, in order to avoid double taxation
based on allegations of transfer pricing. The task of determining the
degree of contribution from human capital to the production of income
may not be substantially greater.
Chinese and Soviet Taxes upon Emigration
In this subsection, I describe the Chinese and Soviet taxes on migration. The purpose is not to advocate these particular types of taxes,
but to provide an idea of how they were structured.
In 1993, the Chinese State Education Ministry announced the implementation of a tax on self-financed students who wished to study abroad
(the PRC tax) (People’s Republic of China State Education Committee
1993).16 (Students financed by the government were subject to a different regime.) The announcement provided that students may apply for
self-financed study abroad only if they have worked in the mainland for
a specified number of years or after they pay the PRC tax.17 The amount
of the PRC tax payable by the student was calculated with reference to
their level of education as well as the number of years of work experience in the mainland.18 The PRC tax was repealed in 2004.
By the 1990s, it became apparent that the brain drain was a real
problem for China. The PRC tax was part of a broad education program to reduce the brain drain without compromising China’s reliance
on overseas higher education to produce skilled labor. Steps adopted
by the Central Party to remedy the situation ranged from measures to
restrict study abroad (such as the PRC tax) to nonrestrictive measures
to entice students to return from abroad. Restrictive measures, in addition to the PRC tax, included placing limitations on students’ abilities
to obtain funding from foreign aid agencies and limitations on the time
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allowed for a student to complete his or her studies overseas (Orlean
1989). Nonrestrictive measures included offering returning students
high-salaried positions, beneficial tax rates, special business loans, and
even forgiveness for participation in organizations advocating against
the government (Liu 2007, pp. 188–189; Xiang 2003).
Students in China have been heavily reliant on the state for provision of free or heavily subsidized higher education (Wang 2001). Yet, by
the early 1990s, the traditional mechanism of publicly financed higher
education began to dissolve. This was due, to a large extent, to unprecedented growth in the domestic higher education system (Wang 2001, p.
208). The quantum of state appropriations for higher education simply
could not keep up with its costs. As a result, the Central Party decided
to diversify the sources of funding for higher education, which included
raising the private costs of higher education to students (Wang 2001,
pp. 211, 215). Such a diversification would also include injecting funds
into the higher education system from tax revenue from students who
had benefited from previous free or heavily subsidized higher education. Accordingly, the circular that announced the PRC tax specifically
states that the raison d’etre of the PRC tax was reimbursement for free
education and development provided by the state to the student.19 Moreover, proceeds of the tax would be used to develop higher education in
the mainland and support returned overseas students in their careers.20
By 2004, the Central Party’s policies to entice students abroad to
return to the mainland were proven successful (Xiang 2003, p. 31).
Moreover, the system of financing higher education stabilized as institutions of higher learning became largely self-funded through university
enterprises or by collection of tuition fees, donations, or endowments
(Wang 2001, p. 214). The Central Party saw fit to repeal the PRC tax
(People’s Republic of China 2004).
The concept of a tax imposed on emigrants based on their levels
of educational attainment was not novel. In 1972, the Soviet Union
announced the imposition of such a tax which implicitly was directed
toward Soviet Jewish citizens who wished to emigrate to Israel (the
“Soviet Tax”) (Bhagwati 1976b, p. 45; Pregelj 2005). Similar policies
were later adopted in other Soviet bloc countries. This provoked strong
reactions from the United States and culminated in the Jackson-Vanik
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amendment, imposing trade penalties on states that restrict emigration,
as part of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.21
There are apparent similarities between the PRC tax and the Soviet
tax. However, the operation of and the circumstances surrounding the
imposition of the PRC tax are clearly different from those of the Soviet
tax.
While the intent of the Soviet tax was political, the intent of the
PRC tax was policy-oriented. Tellingly, the PRC tax was repealed after
the policy objectives of reducing the brain drain and stabilizing the system of financing higher education were met.
The Soviet tax contemplated “compensation for the Soviet investment in the education of the emigrants” (Bhagwati 1976b, p. 45). There
is a fine but crucial distinction between a tax directed at students and one
directed at emigrants. While the Soviet tax assumed that the emigrant
would not return to the Soviet state, China always made the contrary
assumption. The policy position in the 1990s was “support study overseas, encourage returns, guarantee freedom of international movement”
(Xiang 2003, p. 29).
The same distinction can be made with the Bhagwati tax. As
Bhagwati (1976b, p. 45) recognizes, “We conceive of our tax rather
as compensation for the loss imposed by the emigrant on those left behind, or alternatively as a method of earning, for a poor country, a share
in the improved income accruing to the émigré.” Indeed, to the extent
that differences in wages arise from differences in productivity due to
complementary factors, the Bhagwati tax is a way for the poor home
country to share in the benefits of increased productivity. It allows not
only for the individual migrant to cross borders, but allows those left
behind to share in the benefits of the trip.
Bhagwati (1976b, p. 47) continues, “In a world composed of nation states, where immigration policies are typically devised to reflect
national advantage rather than notions of utopian world order, it surely
makes sense for countries to seek suitable restrictions on emigration as
well, in their own interest. A tax of the kind we have proposed seeks
to combine in a suitable way the pursuit of this national self-interest in
the poor countries, consistent with maintaining open the possibility of
emigration as a value itself.”
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In that sense, the imposition of the PRC tax clearly was a policy
measure taken by China to mitigate the negative effects of brain drain
while ensuring that its labor force retained opportunities to seek higher
education abroad.

Fiscal Co mpetition an d th e Tiebo ut Mo del
Most analyses of the welfare economics of migration focus on
economic effects within the labor market. However, the prior two subsections show that liberalized migration may have effects in the market
for governmental services. Specificall , mobility of labor may affect
certain competitive pressures on governments. “Emigration countries
are challenged to keep their brightest citizens. They have to avoid a
brain drain and offer attractive local club goods (low taxes, cheap complementary factors of production like infrastructure, construction sites,
and good business opportunities)” (Straubhaar 2000, p. 127). Similarly,
there is a growing competition among destination countries for the best
and the brightest (Shachar 2006). The OECD (2007, p. 96) reports that
most OECD countries have instituted new policies to attract skilled
workers in recent years. In 2005, France introduced a special tax regime
for “impatriates” employed by multinationals in France, taxing these
individuals in line with the most favorable tax regimes among competing countries (p. 120).
Interestingly, there are two levels at which welfare may be assessed
in the international legal context. The first level, addressed in the earlier
part of this chapter, examines welfare derived from efficiency in the
market. The fundamental theorem of welfare economics and HeckscherOhlin theory address this type of efficienc . The second level involves
welfare in connection with the efficiency of government provision of
goods and services. A variant of the fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, the Tiebout model, addresses this type of efficienc . The
base concern is that efficiency in the market for privately supplied goods
and services may, under certain circumstances, be inconsistent with efficiency in the market for publicly supplied goods and services. Where
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these two types of efficiency may conflict with one another, it would
make sense to seek an optimal level of each in relation to the other.
Most claims in favor of regulatory competition are based on the
Tiebout model (1956, p. 416), which predicts a Pareto optimal (first
best) outcome assuming certain parameters are met. To the extent that
the criteria for efficiency of the Tiebout model are met,22 it may be that
mobility increases the efficiency of government provision of goods and
services. Where these criteria are not met, there can be no assurance that
mobility enhances the efficiency of governments. The Tiebout model
has been described and debated in great detail in many important works.
It posits that competition among small cities for mobile individuals results in the efficient supply of local public goods by those cities, subject
to the satisfaction of five conditions (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997)
1) publicly provided goods and services are produced with a congestible technology (there is an optimal size of jurisdiction),
2) there is a perfectly elastic supply of jurisdictions, each capable of
replicating all attractive economic features of its competitors,
3) mobility of households among jurisdictions is costless,
4) households are fully informed about the fiscal attributes of each
jurisdiction, and
5) there are no interjurisdictional externalities.
Of course, these conditions are never satisfied; in fact, the point of
this work is that T3 is not close to realization in the legal system that
presently exists. As to T1, there may not today be an optimal size of
jurisdiction that is smaller than the entire world for certain global concerns. T2 requires greater homogeneity of resources than exists in the
international setting. As to T4, again, there are serious concerns regarding whether individuals, firms, or investors are fully informed regarding
the attributes of each jurisdiction. Finally, as to T5, the world is beset by
interjurisdictional externalities.
The theory of the second best suggests that, given that all of the
conditions of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics are not satisfied, there can be no assurance that increasing the level of satisfaction
of any other conditions––such as enhanced mobility of individuals––
will yield greater efficienc . While we are uncertain as to whether the
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competition leads to efficie cy, it seems that states compete, and it
seems worthwhile to examine the structure of this competition.
The Tiebout model can only be suggestive in the realm of the second best (Bratton and McCahery 1997). However, it contains important
insights about the benefits of regulatory competition, which should not
be ignored simply because the model itself cannot be applied. Our existential task is to engage in policy analysis even where formal tools
come up short. Moses (2005) expects greater migration to make states
more responsive to citizens.
What would be the parameters of fiscal competition? States would,
in theory, seek to provide a package of governmental goods and services that would attract the type and number of constituents that are
desired. Individuals would migrate in response to their assessments of
these packages (Moses 2005). So, assuming that there is great demand
for highly skilled software engineers, due to positive externalities or
complementary assets, states could reduce taxes on these individuals
or provide the types of public services that these individuals desire.
States might finance these attractions by reducing their own investment in human capital, hoping to attract individuals who have benefited
from human capital investments in other countries. Thus, investment
in human capital could become an international public good, subject to
underinvestment.
It is worthwhile to address the mechanism by which fiscal competition operates to induce changes in governmental policy. Presumably
governments are motivated to maximize the basket of goods that they
provide, and in order to do so, seek to attract migrants. But this assumption is consistent with a public interest–motivated government.
Under circumstances where government officials are optimizing their
own utility by optimizing their political support, there is less reason to
expect that benevolent fiscal competition will result. Another mechanism by which fiscal competition may operate is through demonstration
effects, or more simply, observation by citizens of superior baskets of
goods provided in other states (Salmon 1987).
Furthermore, there are substantial concerns as to whether the
Tiebout model can result in a stable equilibrium (Breton 1991; Gramlich 1987). The stability of intergovernmental competition is separate
from its efficiency: an unstable market for regulation might be char-
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acterized by “price wars” or a race to the bottom. Externalities, such
as the inability of a home state to capture the benefits of its investment
in human capital, can be a source of instability. Breton points out that
centralization may not be the best way to provide stability, but the existence (without necessarily the assertion) of central authority appears
necessary to address problems of instability.
Breton concludes that in the international context, it is not possible
to prevent an unstable competitive process from degenerating, unless,
in the language of international relations “realists,” a hegemonic power
undertook to intervene in order to stabilize competition (Breton 1996).
There appears to be no reason in theory why this hegemonic power must
be a state; we have seen the EU emerge as just such a power in Europe,
and it might be argued that the WTO or functional organizations may
play such a role also. Alternatively, perhaps the United States or EU
exercise, or share, hegemony through these organizations. But the point
is that, to realize the benefits of regulatory competition, and to avoid
the detriments, it may be necessary to centralize certain governance
areas. This insight suggests at least some linkage between particular
areas of policy and migration. That is, just as the EU, as it emerged
and established greater mobility, found it necessary to establish greater
centralization of policy making, and just as current concerns about globalization may be understood as fundamentally addressing a mismatch
between economic integration and governance, it may be that increased
economic integration in the field of migration may give rise to greater
calls for coordination of some types of regulatory measures.
Perhaps a dynamic governance structure along the lines of “cooperative federalism” may provide a kind of contingent hegemony or
centralization that can maintain stability. Within the U.S. federal system, stability is provided by the ability of the federal government to
intervene; this is an important distinction between regulatory competition in the U.S. domestic context and regulatory competition in the
international context, and may be an important distinction between
corporate law, where the federal government has not intervened, and
securities law, where it has chosen to intervene.
In the international context, in order to have a similar institutional
capability, we would need to build and empower a central authority.
Furthermore, Breton (1996) argues that horizontal cooperation cannot
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solve the problem of horizontal instability. The practical question for the
international community is how much authority it must cede to a central
“government” in order to develop satisfactory horizontal competition.
This question of centralization cannot be answered separately from
other questions about the level at which governmental power should be
assigned: from questions of subsidiarity. The question of centralization
to stabilize regulatory competition may best be joined with the question
of subsidiarity raised in the property rights/theory of the firm literature:
as we consider the utility of centralization––of institutional ownership
of regulatory assets––we must consider the utility of establishing an
authority capable of intervening to support regulatory competition.
Thus, as we consider modified rules for international migration, considerations of interjurisdictional competition may enter into
a cost-benefit analysis of various institutional components. If greater
migration could induce a beneficial fiscal competition—a race to the
top—that would make greater migration more attractive. Conversely,
if externalities or other problems cause an inefficient or unstable fis
cal competition, that would make greater migration less attractive, as it
would presumably accentuate this effect.
Wilson (2007) explains that the “literature on optimal income taxation in an open economy has built a case for home-country taxation
of skilled emigrants by analyzing the difficulties in collecting a progressive income tax when emigrants cannot be taxed.” Wilson argues
that progressive taxation increases the incentive to migrate (although it
should be kept in mind that the destination state will also be likely to
impose progressive taxation).
Hufbauer (1989) criticizes a Bhagwati tax as inconsistent with
beneficial fiscal competition, on the basis of the Tiebout model. However, as noted above, the Tiebout model assumes no spillovers, whereas
migration of educated workers may be understood as a positive externality conferred on the destination state. Therefore, an appropriately
structured Bhagwati tax—one that is well-designed to internalize this
externality—might be conducive to efficient regulatory competition
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Con clusion
The foregoing analysis of the welfare economics of international
migration supports an analysis of the potential value, in welfare terms,
of agreements to liberalize migration. Generally speaking, migration
results in global gains, but in local winners and losers. And so, while
agreements to liberalize migration will often be potential Pareto improvements, this will depend on the particular circumstances, including
whether losers are actually compensated. The international legal system
generally requires consent as a basis for obligation, so states that would
be losers would be expected to decline to consent to a treaty that reduces their welfare, unless there is an alternative worse than the status
quo that can be imposed upon them.23
Legal rules in this area cannot be derived solely from a priori
analysis. While Chapter 3 develops a distributive justice analysis that
suggests the normative appeal of obligations to liberalize, distributive
justice analysis does not necessarily carry the day in political discourse,
and perhaps even more importantly, distributive justice analysis does not
provide detailed answers to most of the important questions. Therefore,
legal rules must be analyzed in terms of their utility to increase welfare,
or to change the distribution of welfare. In Chapter 10, I develop a set
of possible legal rules for consideration in light of the welfare economics analysis described here, the distributive justice analysis described in
Chapter 3, and the political economy analysis described in Chapter 4.

N otes
1. See Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2003). Many developed countries favor visa
applicants with academic degrees or specific professional skills.
2. It is not correct that every policy change must be a Pareto improvement, but as
a first approximation of political feasibility, the Pareto improvement criterion is
useful. Indeed, it is possible that a policy change that made the very wealthy somewhat less wealthy would be determined to be desirable, despite its inability to
satisfy the Pareto criterion. In the trade policy context, analysts often use the potential Pareto improvement criterion (also known as the Kaldor Hicks criterion): if
enough surplus is created to compensate the losers, even if actual compensation is
not made, then the measure is a potential Pareto improvement. This criterion raises
important distributional, fairness, and political problems.
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3. Martin, Lowell, and Taylor (2000, p. 150) use the example of corn between the
United States and Mexico.
4. More specificall , the World Bank introduces an increase in migration from developing to high-income countries sufficient to raise the labor force of high-income
countries by a total of 3 percent over the period 2001–2025. This assumed increase, roughly one-eighth of a percentage point a year, is close to that which took
place over the 1970–2000 period. The World Bank analysis uses the welfare theory
concept of “equivalent variation.” Welfare is affected by changes in income as well
as by changes in prices. For new migrants to high-income countries, it is usually
possible to achieve much greater income, but prices are higher also. The equivalent variation concept allows the inclusion of changes of prices in the calculation.
Perhaps more importantly, in order to estimate global gains, it is necessary to sum
equivalent variation across households. Economic analysis generally refrains from
interpersonal comparison of utility, so it is not possible to compare the gains of
the “winners” with the losses of the “losers.” As in the trade context, it is useful to
evaluate whether there is a net increase in welfare, even if there is no mechanism
by which to compensate the losers in order to ensure that the policy change is a
Pareto improvement. It may be best analytically to first evaluate whether there is
a significant global increase in welfare, and then consider the distributional effects
(World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, pp. 36–37).
5. This distribution includes the gain to migrants, which makes up the largest share
of the gain, on the developing country side. Of course, other than remittances and
perhaps other transfers, the gain itself would not actually redound to the benefit of
the home country itself, but it would redound to the benefit of people who, ex ante
but not ex post, lived in the home country. It is important to recognize, however,
that under this assumption, the gains are available to improve the situation of poor
people, but not necessarily poor countries. One might criticize this assumption,
and combine it with the assumption that the proportion of skilled migrants would
increase, to argue that the World Bank simulation assumes that the wealthier inhabitants of poor countries move to rich countries and become even wealthier,
while the less-skilled and less-wealthy inhabitants of the poor countries stay behind, both physically and economically.
6. While it might be argued that a move to private education, paid for by the student,
could solve this problem, the financial markets in many countries do not efficiently
allow poor students to finance their education based on future earnings. A “Bhagwati tax” might be a method for the home country government to achieve a similar
result.
7. Clubs of Mexican immigrants to the United States have formed to invest in their
local communities at home (Lapper 2007).
8. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for noting this clarification.
9. This insurance mechanism is reminiscent of early requirements of bonds and head
taxes. See Neuman (1993).
10. Compensation has sometimes come in the form of adjustment assistance. It should
be noted that in a complex government with a variety of harmed groups and ben-
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11.

12.
13.
14,
15.

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

efited groups, compensation may not be direct or specific. Often, compensation
does not occur at all.
See Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2002): Aware of the desperation of
these people and the unprotected state in which they normally live, particularly
from a legal standpoint, employers very frequently offer employment in conditions that fall a long way short of safety and sanitation standards and pay very
low salaries, normally less than the legal minimum wage. Furthermore, they deny
them labor benefits, such as health or industrial accident insurance, and restrict
their freedom of association. Situations of exploitation in which the employer
forces migrant workers to work exhausting hours without rest, or in which they
simply do not pay them for their work, are also common. Accusations of physical mistreatment and intimidation—such as threatening to report undocumented
persons to the authorities—to discourage complaints of abuse are also reported.
Trebilcock (2003) makes prescriptions motivated by the idea that it is useful to
devolve and decentralize power over immigration decisions to private parties.
See the discussion of the EU in Chapter 6. A program of essential harmonization
and mutual recognition—or interstate allocation of responsibility for individuals
who cross borders—may be required.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for noting this point.
The EU governs the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments among its member states by a regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No.
44/2001 of December 22, 2000 (see European Union [2001]). For a convention
among OAS member states, see the Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (1979). See also the
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments (1985).
The idea of restrictions on study abroad was reported to be under consideration as
early as February 1990. However, as of 1990, it was “unclear to what extent (the
PRC Tax) had been implemented” (Shive 1990).
Id. at Section 2(1). The Circular states that to be exempted from payment of the
PRC tax, a self-financed student shall be required to have worked five years for
undergraduates, three years for graduate (nondoctoral graduates) students, and
two years for faculty graduates and adult university graduates.
Id. at Section 2(4).
Section 1(2) of the Circular.
Section 1(4) of the Circular.
Pregelj (2006, p. 1) notes:
The enactment of the so-called Jackson-Vanik (“freedom-of-emigration”) amendment (Section 402) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618;
January 3, 1975) was a U.S. reaction to the Soviet Union’s highly restrictive emigration policy of the time, but particularly to the assessment, begun in August 1972, of exorbitant “education reimbursement
fees” (also referred to as “diploma taxes”) on its citizens wishing to
emigrate to nonsocialist countries . . . The legislation would condition
the restoration of most-favored-nation status to nonmarket economy
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(NME) countries (including the Soviet Union), their access to U.S. fi
nancial facilities, and their ability to conclude a trade agreement with
the United States on their compliance with the free-emigration criteria
of the proposed legislation.

22. After stating that current empirical evidence is suggestive that competitive local
governments can provide an efficient level of congestible (local) public goods,
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) offer the following caveat: What is not assured is the
efficient allocation of public goods with significant spillovers. In this case, a subsidy is needed to internalize the externalities. But any such policy to control interjurisdictional spillovers would require the agreement of the competitive city-states.
For such agreements we must look to more encompassing political institutions. In
Madison’s compound republic this is the representative central government.
23. For example, in connection with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, some observers argued that the U.S. threat to withdraw from the
existing GATT agreement served to coerce developing countries to accept a WTO
bargain that was worse than the status quo, but better than the alternative.
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3
Ethics of Migration
Chapter 2 reviews the welfare economics of international migration
in order to develop a “map” of the benefits and detriments of migration. The underlying assumption, of course, is that these benefits and
detriments, and the maximization of benefits, will or should influence
domestic and international policy relating to migration. However, another influenc on domestic and international policy is likely to be an
ethical analysis of the distributive effects of alternative migration regimes that may influence the political preferences of individual voters.
This chapter reviews the distributive ethics of international migration. It explores and challenges the moral right of nationals of a state
to exclude foreign persons from the opportunities associated with residence in that state. Conversely, it suggests the rights of a citizen of one
state to migrate to another.
While the ethical analysis presented in this chapter supports a duty
of individuals, and their states, to work to provide freedom of movement for other individuals, it must be recognized that this duty will
not be fulfille in the near future. Rather, it seems best to understand
changing perceptions of our duties as a contributing vector in complex
domestic politics in destination states. In Chapter 4, I will focus on what
I assume to be the strongest vector in domestic politics: rational citizen
perceptions of their economic interests. I will even propose arrangements to harness these rational citizen perceptions in order to promote
agreements to liberalize migration. However, these arrangements might
result in discrimination against migrants in areas such as taxation, and
in this dimension they would be likely to be inconsistent with the ethical duties outlined in this chapter.

95
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Th e righ t to b e a migran

t

Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa, described the
present international distribution of wealth in terms of “global apartheid.” We might understand this phrase as describing a circumstance in
which the legal system is used to lock certain people into a position of
poverty, inequality, and disenfranchisement, or to artifici lly separate
groups of people. Under apartheid, the accident of birth into a particular
race radically affected one’s life opportunities. Under the international
legal system as it exists, the accident of birth into a particular nationality
has a similar effect. “Indeed, geographic variation in wages and living
standards around the world gives the global economy the appearance
of a gated wealthy community consisting of the advanced countries,
surrounded by impoverished ghettos, with immigration restrictions preventing the ghetto residents from moving to where their productivity
and well-being would be higher” (Freeman 2006).
Global apartheid could be reduced by allowing workers from poor
countries to take jobs in wealthier countries––the current global system
of restricted migration may be understood in at least one dimension
as a macrocosm of the internal passport system that was used under
apartheid.1 Joseph Carens observes that “citizenship in Western liberal
democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege—an inherited
status that greatly enhances one’s life chances” (Carens 1987).
The iconic American political philosopher John Rawls would seem
to accept global apartheid, with a limited duty of interstate assistance
that is not intended to lift the poor out of poverty, and sharply limited
rights to immigrate.2 Up until 1993, with the publication of the article
“The Law of Peoples” (Rawls 1993), Rawls seemed simply to assume
closed societies, isolated from other societies, as a modelling device
rather than as a normative commitment.3 In the article, Rawls seeks to
defend closed societies, principally on moral hazard grounds.4
This chapter develops a Rawlsian perspective on migration, arguing that a fully realized Rawlsian perspective would not defend closed
societies. The argument will support the position that borders are ethically artificial and therefore should not be accepted as determinative of
ethical duties or life opportunity.5
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Crossing
Im aginar y B ord ers: A Cri tiqu e of
Terri torial B ord ers in Th e L a w of Peo pl es
Is there an ethical duty to open wealthy countries to immigration
from poor countries? Let us begin with the Rawlsian analysis of the
foundation of ethical responsibility to assist the poor. As is well known,
Rawls argues that his two principles of justice only apply within a domestic society. (Note that the second principle of justice, the difference
principle, permits inequalities only to the extent that they improve the
position of those who are worst off.) For Rawls, the factual context of
political borders, which are territorial borders, is decisive.
Rawls’s work has been intensively criticized for finding a lesser
duty to foreign persons than to compatriots. This criticism is concerned
with the justificatory role that Rawls’s work may play, for nothing less
is at stake than the question of whether individuals in wealthy countries,
and therefore their governments, have an ethical duty to open their markets to immigration by poor persons. If we find no duty, there will be
less basis to encourage the growth of political will for change.
G oal and B ackground A ssumptions R egarding the A ppropriate
Political U nit
All social scientists must be careful to ensure that their methodological assumptions do not insinuate themselves into normative positions.
Rawls’s goal in his monumental Theory of Justice (1971) was to articulate principles of justice for a national society, and so it made sense, as a
methodological convenience and first approximation, to assume closed
borders.
If a closed system was all that was required, however, he could have
described a global theory of justice, using that closed system (Pogge
2004). So, in this sense the particular selection of the state or people
as the salient vertical unit of society is largely arbitrary, and therefore,
like gender, race, and other arbitrary categories, has no moral force for
our purposes (Nussbaum 2004). If one defends Rawls’s choice as part
of ideal theory, as Beitz does (2000, pp. 669, 680), then the “people”
would be a mere variable, rather than a substantive concept related to
the world as it exists today.6
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Another defense of Rawls’s choice is that the principles of justice
that he articulated in A Theory of Justice are applicable only within
politically liberal societies and peoples. Thus, one argument for focusing on the state, or the people, is that it may support an assumption of
consensus around political liberalism, which is a predicate for Rawls’s
domestic theory of justice. However, this assumption is just as problematic in a real domestic society as it is in global society. After all, today it
is often as implausible to assume consensus regarding political liberalism within a society, as to assume consensus across societies. Part of the
reason for this implausibility is immigration itself. Indeed, as we will
see below, integration has undermined Rawls’s assumptions.
Rawls’s main topic is the basic structure of society, defined as “a
cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (1996, p. 4). In his later
work, responding to skepticism expressed by Brian Barry (1982, pp.
232–234) regarding the determinacy of the concept of mutual advantage, Rawls focused on reciprocity based on a “benchmark of equality.”
This reference to reciprocity based on a benchmark of equality also fails
to achieve the intended goal of distinguishing domestic society from
international society.
As many have now pointed out, globalization has at least raised a
question regarding the salience, or exclusive salience, of the state under
this definition of society.7 Again, lawyers can point to scores of international cooperative ventures for mutual advantage: all international law
may fit this description, and international law is a rapidly growing body
(Benhabib 2004; Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999). There is increased
discussion of international public goods. World Trade Organization law
is replete with references to reciprocity, and is understood by many as a
system of reciprocal economic liberalization.8 The arbitrary selection of
the state as the exclusive system for mutual advantage, or for reciprocity, cannot withstand much factual pressure.
International lawyers can assert pressure on the essential differences
between the national state and other subdivisions, or other supranational organizations, and it is impossible to specify a sharp substantive
distinction. Is a Swiss canton the right unit? What about a member state
of the EU? When in U.S. federal history did the states of the union stop
being the salient unit? The rise of the national state and the increasing
globalization of concerns and governance structures demonstrate the
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historical contingency of the state. Mathias Risse (2006) has used this
data to show that even those who are not reflexively cosmopolitan can
no longer take the normative role of the state for granted. It is strange
for a moral theory to depend so much on such incompletely specified
categories.
W hose O riginal Position, with W hat R esults?
Rawls begins with his well-known original position, in which each
representative operates under a veil of ignorance as to his principal’s
actual position in society. This original position is a heuristic, designed
to generate principles that would be acceptable to each person under
ignorance as to his or her actual position.
Importantly, in order to develop the law of peoples, Rawls articulates
a second original position, among diplomats representing “peoples.”
Rawls thereby takes for granted an international, as opposed to a transnational, world. He does so because he wishes to take the world “as we
see it” (Rawls [1993]; revised and updated in Rawls [1999, p. 83]) and
work out a foreign policy for a “liberal people.”
Furthermore, Rawls’s analytical goal is sharply and arbitrarily inconsistent with his method in developing the rules of justice among
individuals (Pogge 2004, pp. 1739, 1755) where he does not take society “as we see it,” but takes social rules as wholly contingent and
subject to formulation ab initio in the original position.
Rawls argues that in the domestic original position, representatives
of individuals would select two principles of justice. The first principle
of justice holds that “each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar
scheme of liberties for all” (Rawls 1971, p. 291). The second principle
of justice holds that “social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society”
(pp. 5–6). These two principles of justice would be implemented differently in different societies.
According to Rawls, neither of these principles would be selected
in the second original position among representatives of peoples, and
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therefore they would not apply across national borders. In fact, Rawls
appears to subscribe to a standard Westphalian concept of international law (Buchanan 2000), with ruggedly independent states and, most
importantly, where the rights and obligations, even relating to human
rights, appear to be available only to states. This is definite y, and intentionally, not a cosmopolitan vision (Rawls 1993; 1999, p. 119). Rawls
concludes that his approach in The Law of Peoples is concerned not
with individual welfare, but with justice and stability of liberal and decent societies. So, under Rawls’s law of peoples model, the kind of
broad equality of liberty, opportunity, and redistribution available at
home would not be available to foreigners.
Yet we might ask why would the representatives of peoples choose
different principles of justice from those selected by the representatives
of individuals? At least from a normative individualist perspective, peoples are merely aggregates of individuals.9 Would not true diplomatic
representatives of aggregates of individuals select exactly the same
safeguards as the individuals themselves selected in the first original
position? If, as I have suggested, the “people” unit is arbitrary, why
would the principles chosen within a people be different from those
chosen by multiple peoples together? In order to posit a different selection of principles of justice, it is necessary to assume a different set of
concerns.10
Thus, even if we imagine, as Rawls does, an original position among
representatives of peoples, we must understand this two-level original
position as an integrated original position. That is, the representatives
of states should be assumed to represent their principles with perfect
fairness and accuracy, not with the public choice and other agency
problems that are endemic in the real world.11 This integrated two-level
original position, then, should not be assumed to be different from a
single, global, original position. Under perfect representation, a federal
original position is not different from a unitary original position.
Rawls’s heuristic assumption regarding the participants in the international original position results in the inapplicability of the principles
of justice, including the difference principle, the core redistributive
component of Rawls’s theory of justice. This is because strangely, arbitrarily, and counterfactually, Rawls assumes that states (or peoples) do
not have interests in the distribution of wealth.12 Therefore, instead of
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requiring conformity with the difference principle, the law of peoples
prescribes at the global level only a modest “duty of assistance,” which
does not have any specified redistributive goal (Rawls 1999, pp. 105–
120). It certainly does not appear to have the power of the difference
principle, as the recipient state may remain “relatively poor.”13
Rawls’s position is contradicted, however, by the consistent behavior of states: no one can study the international economic system
without recognizing that states seek wealth (among other things). Actually, the states that fail to seek wealth are generally failed states: the
states where dictators are able to enrich themselves the most by declining to seek broad wealth for their constituents. Shall we construct a
theory of justice based on the preferences of failed states?
There are important arguments that Rawls’s separation between national and international society—that is, his particular conception of a
two-part original position, one for international and one for domestic
principles—is artificial (Beitz 2001; Carens 1987; Forst 2001). Political
philosophers, including Charles Beitz (1999) and Thomas Pogge (Pogge
1989), argue for a cosmopolitan approach, in which each individual,
regardless of borders, enters into a global original position.14 Of course,
under this global original position, individuals (or their representatives), fearing that they might in the real world be among the poorest
persons, would almost certainly decide on a difference principle, in the
same way that they would in a domestic original position (Carens 1987,
pp. 257–258). As the risks are the same, or even greater, the principles
would be the same.
Under the law of peoples, Rawls believes that “a people has at least
a qualified right to limit immigration” (1993, p. 48). He articulates two
reasons for this “right.” The first reason is rooted in efficienc , in the
sense of avoiding moral hazard. For Rawls, restrictions on immigration
serve to avoid moral hazard in the form of failure to husband territorial
resources. I discuss the efficiency or moral hazard argument in detail
below.
Second, Rawls refers to Walzer’s argument (1983) based on a desire
to protect a people’s political culture.15 However, this argument seems
susceptible to an economic critique. Chang (2006, p. 10) shows that
rational people would be willing to sacrifice the purity of their national
political culture in exchange for the welfare benefits of international
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mobility. Furthermore, it is clear that distinctive culture (including political culture) can survive free immigration, as we have found in the
EU.16 Even if it cannot, we cannot assume that individuals in an original
position would value distinctive culture over other benefits, especially
under poverty.
Walzer’s argument, as adopted by Rawls, would seem artificially
to insulate existing cultures from challenge, although Walzer concedes
that “the collective version of mutual aid might require a limited and
complex redistribution of membership and/or territory” (p. 47). Indeed,
Walzer would go farther than Rawls. He cites Sidgwick’s proposal
(1891, pp. 296–297) that immigration might be restricted “in order to
maintain an adequately high standard of life among the members of
the community generally—especially the poorer classes” as a “primitive and parochial version of Rawls’s difference principle . . .” (Walzer
1983). However, it is important to note that this proposal is parochial:
it artificially restricts the scope of concern to local poorer classes. This
is highly relevant in connection with the discussion in Chapter 2 of
the effects of immigration on unskilled workers. Given that there are
other, less restrictive ways to ensure that local poorer classes are protected, such as redistributive domestic taxation, can the protection of
local poorer classes serve as a justification for the imposition of harm
on foreign poorer classes?
Of course, it is necessary, both ethically and politically, to ensure
that the domestic poor do not bear the burden of improving the lot of the
foreign poor: “If securing native benefits is a means to maintain domestic support of immigration, this should also serve an enhanced role of
international migration in the global attempt to alleviate world poverty”
(Felbermayr and Kohler 2006).
The important point is that the artificially constrained domestic difference principle conflicts with an international difference principle.
This economic concern is real but may be addressed through domestic
redistribution. That is, it is not possible to justify injustice to outsiders
in order to provide justice to insiders, when the insiders who are hurt by
a policy that satisfies obligations to outsiders may be compensated for
their harm in a way that satisfies the domestic difference principle. If
this argument were accepted, an “intrafamily” or “intralocality” difference principle could trump the statewide difference principle.
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Also, we must note the fear that concerns for cultural integrity may
be a disguise for irredentism. It is worth considering the argument made
by Hampton (1995) that “in most of the world the concept of nationality is intimately connected to the ethnicity or race (narrowly defined)
of the members of that society.” Irredentism is morally questionable,
and it raises important issues for the “encompassing group” concept
advanced by Raz and Margalit (1990, p. 439). As Carens (1987, p. 258)
points out, ideal theory does not require the elimination of all linguistic,
cultural, and historical differences. Nor does it mean that restrictions on
immigration are justified, that all differences are to be preserved, or that
all existing features of state sovereignty are justified.
If proximity resulting from immigration is the basis for solidarity
or redistribution, and proximity is restricted in order to maintain cultural integrity, it must be asked whether the true motivation is cultural
integrity, or to what extent reluctance to engage in redistribution is the
motivating force. If there were an obligation to redistribute regardless
of proximity, then we could at least be certain of the bona fides of the
cultural integrity motivation.
Furthermore, most of the arguments for free immigration parallel
the arguments for free trade, which Rawls seems to endorse. It may be
that some states are hurt and some are helped by free immigration, and
that some individuals are hurt and some are helped. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, states with high-quality public education systems
may undesirably confer a positive externality on other states through
emigration. In addition, natives of destination states who compete with
immigrants may find their incomes reduced by immigration. Therefore,
we might expect representatives in the original position to agree to free
immigration accompanied by a redistributive mechanism in order to
compensate those who are hurt by free immigration.
L iberty or D istribution?
I have been focusing on distribution, but from a very practical
standpoint, international borders restrict liberty. They restrict the liberty
to move, the liberty to engage in commerce, and the liberty to accept
employment. It is worth noting from the outset that, at some level, these
liberties are included in Rawls’s list of basic (domestic) liberties (1996),
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protected by his first principle of justice. However, Rawls also stipulates
that “while some principle of opportunity is surely [a constitutional] essential, for example, a principle requiring at least freedom of movement
and free choice of occupation, fair equality of opportunity . . . goes
beyond that and is not such an essential” (p. 228). While this distinction
may make sense in Rawls’s framework, in a practical sense, freedom of
movement and free choice of occupation go a long way toward achievement of equality of opportunity. So, we must recognize that Rawls’s
first principle of justice is supportive of liberalized immigration to the
benefit of poor persons.
But does the first principle of justice apply to foreign persons? Can
it be restricted to exercise by foreign persons from politically liberal
states? It would seem an artificial constraint on freedom of movement
and free choice of occupation to say that “you can have all the freedom
you want, so long as you exercise it within your own state’s borders.”
It would seem sensible, and likely, that diplomats in the original position would reciprocally agree to extend these liberties to one another’s
citizens.
Once we relax the assumption of closed societies, restraints on
immigration seem to interfere with liberty in a way that violates the
domestic principles of justice. However, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls
supports restrictions on immigration. How are we to distinguish between immigration on the one hand, and the liberties of freedom of
movement and occupation on the other? One way is to use a guest
worker category. However, guest worker categories, to the extent that
they constitute second-class citizenships, may be deeply problematic,
particularly if they do not convert over some reasonable period of time
into first-class citizenship.
There is a conflict between the domestic and international principles
of justice in the context of international immigration. When applied
globally to the immigration context, the principles of justice would suggest freedom to emigrate. However, when applied domestically in a
poor state, the second principle of justice requires that constitutional
arrangements be structured to benefit the poorest. It may be that brain
drain of the middle class would confer a detriment on the poorest, and
so a domestic difference principle would limit migration.
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As Sidgwick (1891) pointed out, there may be settings in which free
immigration, as well as foreign assistance, would confer a detriment on
the poorest members of domestic society.17 Under these circumstances,
the operation of the domestic difference principle would either prevent
these cosmopolitan acts, or would require domestic compensation sufficient to balance the damage done to the poorest. Recall that the first
principle is lexically prior to the second (Rawls 2001). So, in order to
comply with a global difference principle, or even a global first principle of justice, it may be necessary to compensate the domestic poor.
There is a systemic relationship between domestic and global justice.
Moral H azard and R egulatory Competition
Rawls (1999, pp. 8, 39) assumes that people will only act responsibly in connection with the stewardship of their physical territory if
they are confined to it, in perpetuity. Importantly, this incentive-based
rationale is not sufficient even for Rawls, as he argues that the problem
of immigration is not simply left aside, but is eliminated by virtue of the
establishment of social justice in a realistic utopia—within each state.
Under a realistic utopia, Rawls suggests, people simply would not have
any motivation to migrate. Note the tension between this perspective,
which would seem to assume that citizens have an identical utility function, or perhaps that there are a limited number of utility functions, and
the Tiebout regulatory competition perspective, outlined in Chapter 2,
which assumes a wide variety of objective functions and incentives to
migrate in order to find matching arrays of public services.
Will national societies have appropriate incentives to become prosperous if outsiders can simply invite themselves to the table, or if they
can simply call for a redistributive bailout when lack of industry has
its inevitable results? This is the issue of public goods or policy externalities addressed in Chapter 2. If citizens could rely on unconditional
global redistribution, or simply move to share in the fruits of the industry of others, they would lack appropriate incentives to cause their
own state efficiently to achieve their goals––in economic terms, there
would be “moral hazard” or a “soft market constraint.”18 Rawls and
other philosophers reject global redistribution largely because they do
not believe this soft market constraint can be overcome. So the moral
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hazard argument stands in the way of both free immigration and international redistribution.
Rawls’s argument, which Pogge (2001, pp. 139–144) calls “explanatory nationalism,” assumes first that differences in position result
from governance choices, and second that citizens are responsible for
governance choices. Thus, explanatory nationalism argues that if citizens could rely on global redistribution, they would lack appropriate
incentives to cause their own state to achieve their goals efficiently; in
economic terms, there would be a “soft market constraint” or “moral
hazard.” The argument is that because the apparatus of the state exists
and has responsibilities, the consequences of failure must be felt by
those who control the state.19
While the underlying assumptions are suspect, there is a sense in
which states and their citizens should bear the consequences of their
choices.20 Under ideal circumstances, we might assume that states are
accountable to citizens. However, in the non-ideal world, governments
are often not accountable. Furthermore, there are other ways to make
governments accountable than to leave their citizens in misery. Three
important mechanisms of accountability are regulatory competition, international legal requirements, and conditionality.
Actually, as suggested in Chapter 2, free immigration may, under
certain conditions, have beneficial competitive effects on governments,
as well as on producers of goods and services. In fact, the very mobility
that Rawls would restrict is a critical assumption within the powerful
literature of competition among governments (Breton 1996).21
It is entirely plausible that in a global original position, representatives would not agree to closed states but to states open to immigration,
in order to enhance regulatory competition, as discussed in Chapter 2.
I do not want to assert this argument too strongly, as there are substantial questions regarding the mechanism and efficiency of regulatory
competition (Trachtman 2000, p. 331), but I do want to highlight this
additional reason why, in an original position, openness might be selected. The critical question is how we can maximize incentives for
good government while minimizing punishment of innocent citizens.
This question has much in common with the sanctions debate with respect to so-called rogue states.
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Furthermore, economists and lawyers have much experience with
moral hazard in the fields of corporate law, bank regulation, and insurance. There may be ways to obtain the benefits of appropriate incentives
for good governance without giving up the possibility of “bailout.” In
the private sector, this is done through insurance premiums and deductibles, supervision, or other mechanisms. If this possibility exists, why
would representatives in the original position give it up?
Moreover, Rawls’s moral hazard position is dependent on citizen empowerment: the ability of citizens to get the government they
want, and so to have the government they deserve. A host of failed and
kleptocratic states have demonstrated that letting citizens absorb the
consequences of their governments’ failures does not necessarily result
in governmental reform. The predatory state seems to benefit from a
vicious cycle of predation of its citizens, giving rise to further concentration of power and wealth that, in turn, allows further predation.
Government officials may find that policies that reduce total welfare
maximize their individual welfare. Thus, the moral hazard argument for
restrictions on emigration may be undermined in just the type of case
where Rawls would most hope that it would be operative.
Furthermore, if the moral hazard problem could be addressed
through a mechanism other than restricting emigration by citizens, this
argument against liberalized migration would fall away. So, is there a
less-restrictive alternative? It is possible that conditionality in the intergovernmental context can play a role similar to bank supervision
or risk-based deposit insurance premia in the private banking sector.
Although conditionality as applied by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has many critics, it is an example of
externally applied discipline on the state—of a constraint that might
reduce the problem of moral hazard and disrupt the cycle of predation. Conditionality is a form of intervention, and some call it a form
of neocolonialism. Conditionality certainly reduces the bundle of autonomous state rights known as “sovereignty.” But sovereignty, in the
form of absolute state control over its own affairs, has been oversold to
poor small states, and more specifically to citizens. Local control does
not benefit individuals when the control is in the hands of predatory
or incompetent governments––we must be open to a post-postcolonial
possibility of intervention, in cases of failed domestic governance. If
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predatory governments can be disciplined, through a regime of analysis, transparency, and conditionality, it is possible to improve the lot of
their citizens.
It may seem strange to be advancing greater international intervention and conditionality, at a time when the policies underlying World
Bank and IMF conditionality have been hotly criticized. While international governance is quite imperfect, to the extent that it can engage in a
policy dialogue with poor countries, it is possible that useful measures
will result, and will be less imperfect than the alternatives. Mechanisms
need to be created to ensure and facilitate reasoned dialogue based on
agreed principles and citizen welfare, rather than on theory and diktat.
With such a dialogue, states may be subjected to appropriate disciplines
without imposing excessive restrictions on migration.
Even within a state-based original position, diplomats faithful to
their constituents might agree that if they empower states, there should
be restrictions on the authority of states and a possibility of international
intervention under certain circumstances—specificall , in order to provide the constituents a minimum level of security and welfare. This is
the role of international law. Such an agreement might be compared to a
form of federalism in that the individuals would be authorizing a central,
supranational government to intervene—to exercise jurisdiction—in
particular areas. Certainly diplomats faithful to individual constituents
would adhere to contingent intervention under some conditions.

Con clusion
Under a liberal, normative individualist, ethical framework, each
of us would enter into society to maximize the achievement of our
preferences. Given variations in economies of scale, externalities, and
preferences, it is natural that we would work together in different horizontal and vertical frameworks. It is also natural that in a Rawlsian
original position as to each of our social structures, we would be concerned with distributive justice.22 Furthermore, it is natural that we
would link our various horizontal and vertical social structures so as
to maximize the achievement of our preferences: a federal style sys-
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tem, or a network of international legal commitments, characterized by
subsidiarity.
Imagine a global cosmopolitan original position. It would begin
with representatives not of peoples but of individuals. These individuals would pay no regard to political borders in formulating exactly the
two principles of justice that Rawls derives from the domestic original
position. But they might also agree to establish subunits called states, or
peoples. As Rawls finds, principles of justice would need to be worked
out for different social units.
Considering the vertical structure of society, whether the sequence
of pyramidic original positions is top-down, from global to domestic, or
bottom-up would not make any difference. Either way, the cosmopolitan
nature of the original position would draw on individual perspectives.
Either way, the deliberations would be recursive, and so would draw
together lower and higher levels of organization. In fact, participants
in a domestic original position, aware of global society, would choose
precisely the same principles that would be chosen in a global original
position.
Similarly, participants in the global original position, without particular cultures and without histories, would also stipulate some rules of
permitted diversity. In this ideal context, there is no path dependence;
therefore the participants can choose any unit of organization. But they
would wish to establish units that allow individuals to maximize the
achievement of their somewhat diverse preferences. This wish would
give rise to a rule of constitutional subsidiarity, determining allocations
of authority and responsibility to subglobal units based on preference
maximization. Of course, preferences here include those for cultural
diversity, as well as all of the rights to influence government, and to be
protected from excesses of government, that people would wish for in
establishing subglobal units. However, before we show too much respect to culture, let us remember that not all cultures are beneficial, and
that cultural change is an instrument of human improvement.
A global system following these principles would seek to institute
free movement of labor. From a practical standpoint, as Chapter 2 shows
and as Rawls understood, free movement of labor puts some pressure
on welfare states, and may perpetuate failed states. Therefore, it may
give rise to some need for contingent intervention or harmonization. As
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discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, at some level, it would be necessary to
compensate those harmed by these liberalization measures.
This system of governance would entail some difficult allocative
decisions. But the decision of whether to help a compatriot to obtain
goods above basic goods while foreigners suffered without basic goods
would always be unacceptable, just as the decision to give one’s own
child a luxury before taking care of the basic needs of a neighbor’s child
would always be morally unacceptable.
Perhaps a governance system along these lines would have some
degree of proximity-based tiering in the intensity of redistribution, after
basic needs are met, or more properly some reflection of the human
tendency to compare ourselves with those nearby. Perhaps it would
also have a kind of extended purchasing power parity concept, which
would accept that different integrated baskets of goods are needed for a
good life in different contexts. In the end, it seems clear that borders, as
part of the basic construction of society, must be structured—including
features of permeability—in order to advance the position of the least
fortunate.
My basic premise is cosmopolitan in the sense of individual duty, as
well as individual rights, so we need to begin with the duty of individuals as opposed to the duty of states or peoples. Should we really feel
that we owe duties to those near but not those far? Certainly the idea of
the original position is to identify ideal duties, as opposed to narrowly
reciprocal real obligations. So the fact that a compatriot is behaviorally
more likely to reciprocate, should not, in the original position, make a
difference. And in the original position, distance is a mere abstraction
and should count for little.
Could it be that Rawls declined to apply the principles of justice
developed for domestic society to international society because of the
tremendously disruptive, even revolutionary, redistributive effect of
applying these principles in an international context?23 If we consider
Rawls’s formulation (1971, pp. 212–213) of the lexically prior first
principle of justice, we see that even its liberties can be constrained
in favor of public order. As Carens (1987, p. 259) points out, even in a
global original position, participants would approve restrictions on immigration in order to avoid chaos and the breakdown of order.

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Ethics of Migration 111

A sudden move to global free migration would be unattractive. Individuals need time to adjust, and might agree in the original position to
gradually make some changes, even those required to do justice. Over
time, complex factors may provide natural and beneficial limits on emigration that would not be able to operate instantly. As we discussed in
Chapter 2, economic integration is a self-equilibrating mechanism in
the sense that trade, migration, and investment are to some extent substitutes and result in a degree of price homogenization.
Clearly one might back away from recommending—indeed, calling for—disruptive changes, but it is striking that the position Rawls
takes on this matter calls for little change, and seems difficult to justify
within his own framework. An alternative approach seems consistent
with Rawls’s methodology, and could avoid sudden revolutionary disruption. Modeled on the experience of trade liberalization over the past
60 years, a gradual approach combined with adjustment seems intuitively appealing within a global original position. “You are not required
to finish the task, but neither are you free to abstain from it” (Pirke Avot
2:21).
Thus, we might understand Rawls’s duty of assistance as a starting
point. Expanded immigration could be introduced gradually in order
to avoid disorder and allow adjustment, and in order to provide time
for the other parameters to have an effect that reduces the desire to
emigrate.

N otes
1. Howard Chang (2006) makes an explicit comparison between apartheid and restrictions on immigration: “Just as we condemn segregation at the local level
for undermining equality of opportunity in the domestic context, I suggest, we
should condemn immigration restrictions for undermining global equality of
opportunity.”
2. In using Rawls’s work as a basis and as a foil, I follow an established tradition.
“Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is generally considered to be the most complete and
systematic account of a rights-based justice in contemporary philosophy. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the important attempts at developing a systematic theory
of global justice have been attempts at ‘globalizing’ Rawls’s theory of justice”
(Tan 2004, p. 54).
3. Rawls (1971, 1996) notes: “I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the
time being as a closed system isolated from other societies . . . It is natural to
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4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

conjecture that once we have a sound theory for this case, the remaining problems
of justice will prove more tractable in the light of it.”
“Moral hazard” is an economic concept describing a circumstance in which individuals do not bear the full adverse consequences of their decisions, and so may
have perverse incentives to act in a way that diminishes social welfare.
For a similar perspective, see Johnson (2003).
The distinction between peoples and states need not concern us, as Rawls’s
intent (1993) is to emphasize the responsibility of states to their individual constituents—the people, and avoid implicit acceptance of some of the powers he
understands states to have at traditional international law. This position is revised
and expanded in Rawls (1999).
This question seems to have been asked by Beitz (1979).
The third preambular statement of the WTO Charter may be cited as evidence
of the existence of a reciprocal cooperative venture for mutual advantage: Being desirous of contributing to these objectives [raising standards of living, full
employment, expanded production, sustainable development] by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations (emphasis added: the italicized language
suggests that the draftsmen were aware of the international justice debate).
For a criticism of the use of “peoples” from both an empirical and methodological
perspective, see Benhabib (2004).
Even assuming an illiberal people, it seems subversive of Rawls’s domestic principles of justice to assume that individuals in the domestic original position would
select an illiberal political culture.
Rawls (1993, 1999) makes the assumption of fair representation in the domestic
original position.
Their interest is to live in a well-ordered (liberal or decent) society. This society is
one that can provide basic goods (Wenar [2001], citing Rawls [1993]; revised and
expanded in Rawls [1999]).
This duty is limited to an amount sufficient “to help burdened societies to be able
to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become
members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples” (Rawls 1999, p. 111).
Beitz (1999, p. 291) states that, “I believe that the philosophical weakness most
characteristic of cosmopolitan theories—although not found equally in all of
them—is a failure to take seriously enough the associative relationships that individuals do and almost certainly must develop to live successful and rewarding
lives.” However, Beitz accepts a federal possibility: “It is hardly clear that a sophisticated cosmopolitanism cannot explain how local affiliations might give rise
to special responsibilities. Such a view would recognize the value to individuals of
their associations with domestic or local communities and argue that ethically significant properties of these associations justify internal distributive arrangements
that are different from, although not inconsistent with, what is required by global
principles.” (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
For a summary and critique of Walzer’s argument, see Bosniak (1994).
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16. See the interesting argument by Kok-Chor Tan (2004) that nationalism can be
reconciled with cosmopolitanism.
17. There is no clear evidence that free immigration would generally confer a detriment on domestic workers. See Chapter 2.
18. Rawls (1999, p. 8) makes this argument explicitly.
19. It is also worth noting the flip side of this argument: that states would have reduced incentives to become wealthy due to the prospect that they would be taxed
to help the poor. Of course, this argument has no more impact internationally than
it would in domestic society; the difference principle seems to survive this concern.
20. Tan (2004, pp. 74–76) makes an important argument that Rawls seems to accept
collective responsibility for governmental choices, in a manner inconsistent with
his domestic focus on normative individualism.
21. For application in the migration field, see Straubhaar (2000, p. 127)
22. On application of the principles of political justice to all domains, see Rawls
(2001, p. 166).
23. This issue is touched upon by Caney (2001).
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International Political
Economy of Migration
Chapter 2 discusses the welfare economics of migration, raising
the possibility that legal rules might be structured to enhance global
welfare. Yet it is well understood that states do not necessarily behave
in accordance with the dictates of welfare economics (Dixit 1998). Not
only is it possible that they would take actions that are inconsistent
with global welfare, in pursuit of their individual welfare, but it is also
possible that states would take actions that are inconsistent with their
domestic welfare. Rather, the distributive consequences within states,
and the relative political influence of the various constituencies, determine national policy. The political decision-making and behavior of
states in connection with international economic relations is the subject
of international political economy.
However, the international political economy academy has devoted
much less attention to migration than to international trade or finance,
both theoretically and empirically (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2007).
This chapter reviews some of the work to date, and suggests the implications of this analysis for international legal rules relating to migration.
As Grossman and Helpman (1994, p. 849) put it, at the conclusion of
their leading work on the political economy of protectionism in trade,
“A next step might be to assess the relative desirability of alternative international ‘rules of the game.’ Such rules limit the policy choices open
to national governments and change the nature of the strategic interactions between elected officials and their constituents. Our framework
could be used to generate predictions about what domestic policies will
emerge from the political process in different [international] institutional settings, and therefore to evaluate which rules give rise to preferred policy outcomes.”
Chapter 3 assesses the ethics of migration, yet it is also well understood that states do not necessarily behave in accordance with the
dictates of ethics, and of course, the dictates of ethics are more contest-
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able than the dictates of welfare economics. Martin (2004) shows that
destination states tend to structure restrictions on immigration to meet
their own needs, pursuing national gains, rather than altruism. Yet we
must recognize that altruism may have some marginal effect on domestic politics in destination states.
In this chapter, I examine how welfare economics concerns, and
others, are mediated through national political processes, and how the
resulting national political equilibria may result in an international political equilibrium. I then take up the Grossman and Helpman challenge
to assess the relative desirability of international legal rules to change
the nature of the strategic equilibrium, both between governments and
within domestic coalition politics. Once we evaluate the domestic politics of states arising from the distributive consequences of migration,
we must also recognize that other factors, including recession, income
inequality, history, ignorance, demagogic scapegoating, chauvinism,
and even racism may be added to the forces that determine policy, and
that the alchemy of domestic coalitions is complex.
As seen in Chapter 2, the welfare factors themselves are complex
and variegated, and welfare analysis would require individual country
evaluation, and customized solutions, with the possibility for change
over time. Despite this complexity, at the level of the state we may generalize and say at least that in the current world economy, most states
will benefit from immigration of high-skilled persons, while they may
be more ambivalent about low-skilled persons. Some states may be
harmed by emigration of high-skilled persons: brain drain. Some suggest that temporary migration may present a win-win possibility for
home states and destination states.
Within each state, some groups of individuals will be harmed by
liberalization, while some will be helped. In order to assess domestic
political dynamics, we must analyze and synthesize the domestic coalition politics of migration. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, those
domestic workers who compete with immigrants may experience reduced wages and, unless adjustment assistance is provided, reduced
welfare. This result is not certain, nor is the magnitude necessarily very
great. Nor does it appear that immigrant workers generally consume
public services excessively. However, in certain cases it may be that
some segments of native workers are hurt significantly or that immi-
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grants consume greater amounts of public services than they contribute.
Alternatively, perhaps workers and voters may succumb to prejudice or
demagogic appeals, and therefore oppose immigration (Faini, de Melo,
and Zimmermann 1999, pp. 6–7).
It is worthwhile to compare the political economy of migration with
the political economy of trade. The standard political economy account
of protectionism in trade in goods is as follows. Domestic manufacturers for domestic consumption, perhaps supported by domestic labor,
are interested in protection against imports in order to increase their
profitabilit . Domestic manufacturers for domestic consumption are
more concentrated, and therefore better organized and more powerful
politically, than domestic consumers interested in cheap imports. Being
better organized than consumers, domestic manufacturers for domestic
consumption succeed in determining policy (Olson 1965; WTO 2007).
In contrast, one would assume generally that domestic manufacturers that compete with imports, domestic manufacturers seeking to
export, domestic workers in complementary industries, and domestic
consumers, would all welcome immigrants who are presumed to bring
reduced labor costs (see Chapter 2 for more on this point). However,
for some multinational corporations that already have the advantage of
being able to access foreign labor markets at low prices, it may be more
advantageous to locate labor-intensive activities in cheap labor markets,
which may not benefit from higher prevailing wages, minimum wages,
collective bargaining, or costly safety standards. At the same time, these
multinational corporations may wish to deprive their domestic competitors of cheap labor by promoting immigration restrictions. This presents
the possibility of bootlegger-Baptist coalitions between multinational
corporations on the one hand, and wealthy country unskilled labor on
the other hand, in support of restrictions on immigration.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, some domestic employers may prefer illegal immigration to legal immigration, because of the bargaining power
they may hold in relation to illegal immigrants. These employers may
lobby against policies that would liberalize legal migration, while possibly opposing enforcement of restrictions on illegal immigration. Along
with nativists, these employers may form another type of bootleggerBaptist coalition.
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We might expect better-organized producer interests, combined with
diffuse consumer interests, to be able to overcome less well-organized
labor interests. As suggested above, much would depend on the extent
to which producer interests benefit from use of illegal immigrants, or
derive a competitive advantage from differential access to cheap labor
markets abroad. In addition, much would depend on the extent of labor
organization. If labor interests were less well-organized, or otherwise
weaker, under the standard political economy simplification that government decision-makers are rational political support–maximizers,
we would expect government policy to be favorable to immigration.
Indeed, Freeman (1995, pp. 882–883) argues in 1995 that “there is in
general an expansionary bias in the politics of immigration in liberal democracies such that official policies tend to be more liberal than public
opinion and annual intakes larger than is politically optimal.”1
Freeman (1995) suggests that the liberal bias may depend on a clientelistic political influence model in which policy interactions take
place outside of public view. The governments of destination states have
sometimes been able to overcome skeptical public opinion, in favor of
the superior organization of employers. They did so by making policy
in administrative settings, “without public participation and with little
parliamentary supervision” (p. 891, citing Hammar [1985]). In order to
liberalize outside of public view, informal or illegal immigration may
be preferred to formal arrangements, including larger quotas or international legal commitments, which draw greater attention. So, while the
bias may be liberal, it may also be suboptimal if informal immigration
produces less welfare than formal immigration.
Freeman argues that “there are serious barriers to the acquisition
of information about immigration and . . . there is a highly constrained
process by which immigration issues are debated that distorts the information that is available” (p. 883). We need only refer to the debate
among economists such as George Borjas and Andrew Card, discussed
in Chapter 2, as to the effects of immigration on wages, to understand
that the problem goes even further, in that consensus-based information
simply is not necessarily available. Yet this lack of information could
cut either way in the political debate.
“Despite public indifference or opposition, and often in apparent
disregard of rising unemployment rates, governments in the settler soci-
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eties substantially increased immigration intakes [from 1975 to 1995]”
(p. 887). The “settler societies” include the United States, Canada, and
Australia. What caused these increased intakes? Presumably business
interests influenced public policy where the voting public was either
indifferent or opposed. In these societies, unions did not directly oppose
immigration during this period, and political parties avoided intense
political debate regarding immigration. The United States in the early
twenty-first century may constitute a departure from this pattern, but
even there, the debate often transcends party politics.
The so-called new countries of immigration—Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece—became both receivers and senders of migrants in the
1970s and 1980s. Mass publics varied in their reaction to immigration,
but public opinion was not a major influence on policy, and each of
these states remained receptive in the 1990s. As in the western European states, much decision making took place at the administrative level,
and was not the subject of intense political debate (p. 895).
Freeman concludes more broadly that “the concentrated benefits
and diffuse costs of immigration mean that the interest group system
around immigration issues is dominated by those groups supportive of
larger intakes, and, by implication, the organized public is more favorable to immigration than the unorganized public” (p. 885).
Interestingly, Freeman suggested in 1995 that this liberal dynamic
is reinforced by an antipopulist norm in mainstream political parties,
according to which politicians decline to exploit racial, ethnic, or
immigration-related fears in order to succeed. We might wonder whether the same observation would be made today. Politicians do sometimes
engage in demagoguery to exploit or precipitate these meaner sensibilities of their constituents, and it appears more acceptable to target
“outsiders” through immigration-related fears than to target citizens of
particular racial or ethnic groups. As discussed below, political, cultural, ethnic, religious, nationalist, and other factors may play a role,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, in the national politics of immigration. Ethnic groups may play a role in limiting migration from some
areas, and promoting migration from other areas.
As suggested above, politics is driven by more than just welfare, and
it is certainly driven by the intranational distributive aspects of welfare.
That is, the politics of migration policy involves complex historical, so-
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cial, patriotic, chauvinistic, and other factors, and experience has shown
that it is too much to expect politicians consistently to play to the best
interests or to the greater virtues of their constituents. Second, politics
involves the examination not just of aggregate effects, but of effects
on particular interest groups. Furthermore, political analysis requires
examination of the relative intensity of the preferences and influence of
these particular interest groups: their concern and clout.
Therefore, while Chapter 2 begins with global welfare, and then
examines the welfare of individual states and groups of constituents,
this chapter begins at the local level, and then moves to the global, or
in this case international, level. Once we are able to establish a set of
parameters that determine national policies with respect to migration,
we are able to turn to the international politics of migration. Once we
understand the national politics and the international politics, we can
examine the potential role of international law.
Political economy analysis thus adds three important dimensions to
our analysis:
1) At the domestic level, how and to what extent are the distributive outcomes indicated by welfare economics transformed into
political pressure in domestic politics? This is a question both
of economic effects and of the mediation of economic effects
through political and social mechanisms. What additional parameters are important to political decision-making regarding
migration?
2) At the international level, how do states fail to achieve welfareenhancing agreements or transactions due to strategic problems
or other market failures?
3) The prior two dimensions interact to present a cooperation problem in connection with international migration. In order for
welfare-enhancing international agreements to be entered into,
they must engage the domestic politics of member states. They
require the assembly of domestic coalitions that have the political power to approve international agreements that will be acceptable to foreign counterparties. In order to convince foreign
counterparties to engage in reciprocal concessions, they require
the assembly or contingent assembly of domestic coalitions that
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have the political power to induce continued compliance with the
relevant agreement. Compliance coalitions may be supported, in
part or in whole, by international legal commitments that include
the threat of specific or diffuse, formal or informal, retaliation, or
of other types of consequences. How is this cooperation problem
different from that experienced in other areas, such as international trade in goods and services? What are the implications of
these differences for legal structures?
This chapter is an exercise in normative political economy, insofar
as it examines the extent to which existing national and international
political equilibria are consistent with the maximization of global, national, and individual welfare. Alternative legal rules and institutions
may allow achievement of welfare-enhancing domestic and international political equilibria.

Trad e Pol itics and M igra tion Pol
Pol icy Paradox?

itics: A D ual

A number of scholars have asked, if there is some equivalence
between importing a good and importing a worker capable of making
the same good (see Chapter 2), why does it appear that domestic labor
is strong enough to block greater openness in immigration, while the
world has moved toward greater liberalization in trade in goods? The
factual predicates for this question are not unassailable, as the economic
equivalence between these two phenomena is questionable, as liberalization of trade in goods still has substantial deficits, and as it is not
clear that domestic labor has indeed successfully blocked openness in
immigration. However, at least from the standpoint of competing domestic workers there are important similarities.
Hatton and Williamson (2006) and Mayda (2007) explore this “dual
policy paradox” that a simplified theory predicts that immigration and
import restriction policy should coincide, but never have. Hatton and
Williamson find that immigration policy was very open compared to
trade policy up to 1914. The policies of the United States, Canada, Ar-
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gentina, Brazil, and Australia were proimmigration from 1860 to 1890,
and then gradually tightened.
Hatton and Williamson emphasize the fiscal importance to destination governments of tariff revenues during the earlier periods, providing
disincentives to liberalize in trade that do not apply with respect to immigration. In fact, since government welfare functions were still rather
modest, and since immigrants were more productive compared to natives, threats to the national treasury did not play the role prior to 1914
that they do today. “Thus, tariffs brought plenty of fiscal benefit in the
era before 1914 while immigrants brought no fiscal costs” (p. 13).
As the fiscal importance of tariffs declined in industrializing states
that introduced income taxation, and as increased governmental services and transfer programs increased the potential fiscal cost associated with immigrants, this pattern began to change. Hatton and
Williamson explain that these factors, combined with increased voting
by lower-skilled and unskilled workers, combined to explain restrictive
immigration policy in the later period. Restrictions were raised sharply
in destination states, led by the United States, beginning in 1917, and
immigration was subjected to a general worldwide clampdown with the
onset of the Great Depression.
Hatton and Williamson (p. 20) find that in the present context, the
average citizen in 14 relatively labor-scarce OECD countries would
like to see both immigration and imported goods reduced—they find
little difference in the average opposition.
Analyzing modern survey data, Mayda (2007) finds, consistent
with the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
that individual skill and protrade attitudes are positively correlated in
skill-abundant countries and negatively correlated in skill-scarce countries. Similarly, she finds that individual skill and promigration attitudes
are positively correlated in countries that receive unskilled immigrants
and negatively correlated in countries that receive skilled immigrants.
Along similar lines, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2002) find that unskilled
workers in wealthy countries evince the greatest opposition to immigration, and that this opposition is stronger in more egalitarian countries,
such as continental European countries.
On the other hand, Hainmuller and Hiscox (2007) find that “In
contrast to predictions based upon conventional arguments about la-
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bor market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose
immigration of workers with similar skills to their own, but support
immigration of workers with different skill levels . . . people with
higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to
favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants
in question.”
Mayda finds that individuals are today more protrade than proimmigration across several countries studied. She suggests that the reason
for this difference is that in the trade context, as compared to the immigration context, there is a distinction between individuals working in
traded as opposed to nontraded sectors. Individuals in nontraded sectors
do not oppose trade. When Mayda examines labor market determinants
of trade and immigration preferences in a short-run sector-specific
model, where factors are immobile across sectors, she finds that the
distinction between traded goods and nontraded goods sectors applies
only to trade, and not to immigration. The proliberalization perspective
of workers in nontraded goods sectors does not apply to immigration.
“Workers in nontraded sectors feel shielded from foreign competition
working through trade but not from labor-market competition of immigrants” (p. 4).
Thus we see that the political economy of migration policy has substantial differences from the political economy of trade, and that the
factors driving the political economy of migration policy are distinct,
although there are some overlaps. So, it is not surprising that migration
and trade policy have diverged, and converged, at various times.
L abor versus C apital
One important distinction between the political economy of trade in
goods and that of migration is the fact that labor and capital often have
more antagonistic interests in relation to migration. While owners of
firms that manufacture for the domestic market may be hurt by imports
of goods, they are generally not hurt by imports of workers that make
the same goods. In fact, the opposite is often true.
Importantly, greater mobility of labor has a double-edged effect on
workers. Mobility can allow workers to overcome barriers, enabling
them to engage in the same type of factor arbitrage that multinational
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corporations are able to achieve. In fact, to the extent that this arbitrage
involves the competition of immobile factors for mobile resources, mobility of labor can change bargaining power. Multinational corporations
seek the cheapest inputs (including labor) and the greatest prices for
their output. Mobile labor can also seek the greatest prices for its output and thereby counter the market power of local employers and even
multinational corporations.
However, it must be recognized that not all labor can be made mobile,
and the types of workers that will be hurt most by immigration—those
whose types are scarce—would ordinarily find that international mobility does not help them. On the other hand, workers whose types are
abundant may be assisted by mobility and unharmed by immigration.
According to Freeman (1995), immigration tends to result in concentrated benefits and diffuse costs within the destination state. Those
who benefit from immigration in the destination state therefore have
greater prospects to organize than those who are hurt. This is similar
to, but the reverse of, the politics of protectionism in trade (where the
illiberal policy causes concentrated benefits and diffuse costs). In destination states, the principal beneficiaries of liberal immigration are
generally employers in labor-intensive and in particular unskilled labor-intensive industries. Other beneficiaries may include industries that
benefit from population growth, such as the construction industry, and
family members of the immigrant who migrated earlier.
However, perhaps it can be argued that the more intense or directly
observable nature of the effects on employees, by virtue of the fact
that they may observe immigrant workers employed at lower wages,
causes them to lobby with greater intensity against immigration than
they do in connection with trade. In connection with trade, the competing workers would be abroad rather than at home. Indeed, it may be
that this intensity could give rise to a greater lobbying effort, explaining
a more protectionist approach to immigration. However, the other difference between trade and immigration is that, largely due to the way
tariff schedules are negotiated, each separate manufacturer of a particular classification of product, and its workers, may lobby intensely
and separately with respect to trade in the relevant good. This lobbying
may be more fragmented than lobbying regarding general immigration
policy, but it is focused on a much more precisely specified target. Im-
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migration lobbying does not necessarily distinguish among particular
types of production, or narrow categories of worker. On the other hand,
in connection with licensing or qualification requirements for particular
professions, we might expect to see more focused lobbying.
The initial costs of immigration fall directly on workers who compete with the immigrants, as well as others who compete with immigrants
for housing and other consumption items. These latter individuals may
lack the ability to organize or to mobilize resources to influence policy,
and they may fail to observe the effects that immigrants have on the
prices that they pay.
However, immigrant-competing workers may be members of
unions, and so may be able to pool resources and organize effectively
to oppose immigration. It would be an interesting test of this political
economy model to examine whether migration is more liberal in countries and sectors where labor is less well-organized.
On the other hand, Freeman (1995, p. 888) observes that in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S., unions “have generally come
to support immigration, resigning themselves to defensive rather than
restrictive measures, such as employer sanctions against hiring illegal
workers and labor certificati n programs tying the composition of inflows to employment sectors where demand is high” (citations omitted).
Watts (2002, p. 3) finds that French, Italian, Spanish, and U.S. unions
carry out educational programs for their members to convince them that
the best strategy is to seek more open immigration policies. French,
Italian, and German union leaders have worked to facilitate legal immigration and improve the treatment of migrant workers.
The opposition of unions to illegal immigration suggests the possible validity of the assumption that illegal immigration reduces the
bargaining power of unions. Illegal immigrants have more limited options than comparable natives or legal immigrants, and so may have
reduced bargaining power (Friedberg and Hunt, 1999, p. 344). An alternative or contributory explanation may be that illegal immigrants
are less likely to join unions, reducing the income of unions. The willingness of unions to support selective immigration pursuant to labor
certification programs suggests a sophisticated willingness to be selective in determining market access.
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It is important to recognize that while migration may have adverse
effects on the wages of scarce classes of workers in the destination state,
similar mobility could provide market power to abundant classes of
workers in the home state. Thus, in a state that is as likely to be a sending state as a destination state, workers as an aggregate may not have
a very strong position for or against migration. In effect, under nonselective liberalized migration, scarce types of workers give up market
power so that abundant types of workers may gain market power.
Thus, a possible basis for international agreement to liberalize migration may be the decision of labor to accept inbound migration in
exchange for promises of mobility that confers market power. Indeed,
labor may be at the heart of potential international commitments to reduce barriers to migration, insofar as labor in any particular country
would like to attain mobility. I discuss this possibility in more detail in
the latter part of this chapter.
Fiscal C onsiderations
In many modern OECD states, there is a concern that immigrants
may contribute less to the welfare state than they receive. This issue did
not arise in earlier periods of mass migration, as the welfare state was
much smaller (Felbermayr and Kohler 2006).
The research discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that immigrants have
not generally caused significant adverse or beneficial effects in fi cal terms: either in taxes collected or in public resources used. Note,
though, that if more unskilled immigrants, or other immigrants who
could not contribute to the workforce and tax revenues, were admitted,
they could have adverse fiscal effects. Over the long term, immigrants
and their children are more likely to be net fiscal contributors.
A djustment
Of course, at the most fundamental levels of both trade and migration, there will be some who are harmed by liberalization. Assuming
aggregate national benefits, adjustment assistance may promote the
development of proimmigration coalitions.2 Many have argued persuasively, in connection with trade, that liberalization is facilitated by
appropriate safety net or other redistributive mechanisms that allow
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working voters to accept liberalization without worrying about their
livelihoods.3 Presumably, a similar approach of “embedded liberalism”
(Howse 2002; Polanyi 1944; Rodrik 1999; Ruggie 1982) could apply
to address the distributive impacts of migration. However, in order to
fund the adjustment assistance and other programs of embedded liberalism, it will be necessary for the government to identify the necessary
revenues.

Endog enous Pol icy Mod els o f Trad e
and I mmigra tion
Grossman and Helpman (1994) develop a paradigmatic model of
trade politics in which owners of particular factors organize a lobbying
group in order to influence the government by political contributions.
Grossman and Helpman focus on the campaign contributions channel
of influence on government. In this model, the motivation of lobbyists
to contribute to political campaigns is not necessarily to affect the outcome of elections, but to “buy influence.”
In the Grossman-Helpman model, each interest group has a “contribution schedule” linked to various alternative policy vectors. In response,
government chooses a policy vector in order to maximize a weighted
sum of both contributions and national social welfare. National social
welfare is part of the calculus because it is assumed to affect votes. The
Grossman-Helpman model relates an industry’s equilibrium protection
to its political organization, its ratio of domestic output to net trade, and
the elasticity of import demand or export supply. The equilibrium is
that set of contribution schedules such that each lobby’s schedule maximizes the aggregate utility of the lobby’s members, taking as a given
the schedules of other lobby groups.
Grossman and Helpman assume a small competitive economy, for
which free trade is optimal. Under that assumption, government interventions in the form of tariffs or subsidies may be assumed to be
motivated by political considerations rather than national welfare. The
standard trade model of protectionism explains protection in national
public welfare terms by reference to terms of trade externalities, and
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holds that protectionism can only be welfare-improving for a large
country (with market power), which can use trade barriers to improve
its welfare as compared with free trade (Bagwell and Staiger 1999,
p. 215; 2001, p. 281; 2003).4
One commonly accepted extension of the Grossman-Helpman
approach to the domestic political economy of trade recognizes the
possibility to link the interests of domestic producers for export to the
interests of domestic consumers through reciprocal free trade agreements. By virtue of these agreements, the political power of domestic
producers for export is added to the political power of domestic consumers, overcoming the political power of domestic producers that compete
with imports for domestic consumption. The possibility of reciprocal
international trade agreements induces an antiprotection coalition to
form, in support of liberalization pursuant to these agreements. Thus,
the domestic political economy of trade is critically linked, by reciprocal trade agreements, to the international political economy of trade.
Is this approach to international trade relations adaptable to migration? As discussed above, migration does not display the same pattern
of domestic interests as trade. In the migration context, destination
state manufacturers, both for domestic consumption and for export,
would generally be expected to be in favor of liberalized immigration.
Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2007) suggest that migration politics is
strongly affected by political contributions by manufacturers, as well
as by labor union activity. However, destination state manufacturers
may experience difficulties in organizing, as the breadth of interest in
immigration could result in collective action problems unless immigration policy is selective by sector. Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra assume
selectivity in their model of protection against immigration.
We show that in equilibrium, in a given sector, the amount of protection afforded to labor, i.e. the restrictiveness of the migration
policy adopted by the government, depends on both the lobbying
expenditures made by organized labor, as well as on the expenditures made by capital (which is its complement). In particular,
if labor in a sector spends larger amounts, ceteris paribus it will
obtain higher levels of protection from foreign inflows of workers
to that sector and, hence, it will lower the equilibrium number of
immigrants. At the same time, if organized business owners spend
higher amounts, this will ceteris paribus make migration policy in
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that sector less restrictive and, therefore, increase the number of
immigrants. (p. 4)5

In that model, a lobby for labor and a lobby for capital engage in
a noncooperative game where each chooses an amount to pay in order
to maximize its own net welfare.6 It is uncertain, however, to what extent the sectoral divisions assumed by Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra
actually exist. In the United States, for example, there are few formal
distinctions between different occupations at the legislative level where
lobbying is expected to operate.
If destination states had no market power, as Grossman-Helpman
assume with respect to importing states, then the Facchini, Mayda, and
Mishra model would seem to provide a plausible tool by which to analyze immigration policy. However, popular destination states seem to
wield important market power, allowing them to improve their welfare
at the expense of migrants and home states. The ability to import labor
at a price lower than the price that would otherwise apply, by using policy measures to extract some of the income from the imported worker,
or to extract welfare from the home state, seems analogous to the use of
tariffs to increase domestic welfare at the expense of foreign welfare.
Market power of this type might be a more important factor in connection with less skilled labor than in connection with highly skilled labor.
Even wealthy states may find that they must compete in order to attract
highly skilled labor.
Some destinations, such as the United States, the EU, Canada,
Australia, and other wealthy states, undoubtedly are attractive to immigrants. Part of this attraction arises from the wages that can be earned in
these destinations, presumably due to high levels of productivity. This
strong attraction may give rise to market power, in the sense that supply
of immigration opportunities is limited, demand for immigration opportunities is high, and the governments of the destination countries have
control of entry. Of course, market power also requires that a state be
sufficiently large as a fraction of the global economy to affect the world
price of labor through its policies.7 Do these leading destination states
use market power to extract welfare gains from immigration? Consider
the following three possibilities:
1) States with market power in this context may exert that power by
accepting immigrants and denying the home state of the immi-
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grants the ability to tax those migrants—declining to implement
a Bhagwati tax. By doing so, the destination state may impose a
negative externality on the home state.8
2) Another way by which states with market power may exert their
power is to accept only highly skilled immigrants—those who
will make a positive contribution in terms of an immigration dividend and in terms of a fiscal contribution. Thus, we can interpret
brain drain as a negative externality imposed by the destination
state on the home state.
3) It is also possible that destination states could use their market
power to impose discriminatory taxes or other burdens on immigrants, or to deny immigrants public benefits that are available
to natives, causing immigrants to give up some of the surplus
from migration that they might otherwise capture (Bucovetsky
2003). Considering the United States’ relationship with Mexican
or other illegal immigrants, it may be that denial of public services or public transfer payment benefits could be understood as
discriminatory provision of public benefits, with the same motivation and effect. Of course, illegal immigrants are more likely
to suffer from this type of “discrimination.” Under U.S. law, illegal immigrants are denied certain public benefits. So, could it
be that a preference for illegal immigration can be explained in
terms of negative externalities?9
These types of measures are likely to provide disincentives for
migration, in a way that may reduce global welfare insofar as migration would otherwise be efficient 10 Indeed, it may be that a sufficient
rationale for states to cooperate in this area is simply to agree to suppress these types of measures in order to increase volumes of migration,
and thereby enhance global welfare. According to this rationale, states
could agree to increase international migration, and thereby increase
global welfare, provided that they are able to agree on the distribution
of the gains.
Note, however, that the home state is not necessarily directly harmed
by the destination state’s exercise of market power, nor does it feel the
full welfare loss caused by the destination state’s policy. Therefore, the
home state may not be sufficiently motivated to negotiate to protect its
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emigrants. On the other hand, if home states sought more actively to tax
their emigrants, they might understand refusal by destination states to
enforce these taxes as harmful, and discrimination may reduce amounts
available for remittances or to be used for investment upon return. Temporary migration arrangements may provide greater incentives for home
states to protect their emigrants: under these arrangements, the goal of
the home state is to have migrants send remittances and then return with
capital, skills, and contacts.
To the extent that these types of policy externalities are recognized
by the home state, it may have incentives to negotiate with the destination state over their reduction. Staiger (2006) explains this motivation
in the trade context as follows: “Beginning from the inefficient trade
policy choices made in the presence of this international cost-shifting,
the purpose of international trade negotiations is then clear: to provide
an avenue by which foreign exporters can have their interests represented in the trade protection choices of the national governments to
whose markets these exporters seek access, and thereby to face those
governments with internationally appropriate incentives that lead them
to choose internationally efficient levels of trade protection.”
Note that this is a political representation argument. The goal in
migration is also to induce destination states to choose internationally
efficient levels of restriction on immigration. To paraphrase Staiger, the
goal is to provide an avenue by which emigrants and those left behind in
home states can have their interests represented in immigration policies
of destination state governments. To the extent that destination state
governments take these interests into account, they will be more likely
to choose internationally efficient levels of immigration protection.
In the trade context, the terms of trade approach, focusing on the
exercise of market power, seems only to provide a rationale for negotiations among states with market power. As noted above, economists
expect that welfare-maximizing states without market power would
unilaterally make policy choices that are internationally efficient, since
they cannot gain welfare by raising barriers. Furthermore, they therefore expect that states with market power would see little benefit from
negotiating agreements with states that lack market power (WTO 2007).
There is no clear understanding regarding the extent of poor or small
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states’ market power, except an understanding that it is generally less
than that of wealthy and rich states.
In the labor migration context, it appears that states without market power frequently do not impose restrictions on immigration. One
reason, no doubt, is that the demand to immigrate to those states is, by
definition, not very great: their productivity rates generally do not result
in increased wages for immigrants. But the important point here is that
states without market power in migration would have little to bargain
with in a reciprocal liberalization transaction. On the other hand, we
must remember that in this context, market power is relative. Thus, a
middle-income developing country may have market power as a destination state vis-à-vis a lower-income developing country: it may be
attractive for residents of the latter to migrate to the former in order to
realize wage gains.
In the trade model addressing terms of trade externalities, the role
of international law is to allow states credibly to commit to exercise
reciprocal restraint. Even in a model that does not include terms of trade
externalities, in which states are failing to achieve optimal volumes of
trade and therefore are failing to achieve maximum global welfare, international law could play a similar role in allowing states credibly to
commit to exercise restraint, or to make compensation, as appropriate.
This type of cooperation problem has often been modeled, assuming a certain structure of payoffs, using the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The assumption is that the states could be better off if neither of them
defected, but that each is individually better off if it defects while the
other cooperates, and receives the worst payoff if it cooperates while
the other defects. The dominant solution—the expected behavior—is
defection by all states. However, by using international legal rules to
change (make negative) the payoffs from defection, states are able to
achieve the collectively optimal outcome of mutual cooperation.
Figure 4.1 shows a diagram of the prisoner’s dilemma, as applied
to trade. In this set of assumed payoffs, if international legal rules can
impose a cost on defectors (states that fail to liberalize or impose terms
of trade externalities) greater than 1 (in Figure 4.2, for illustration, I use
1.5), then they will decide to liberalize instead.
In Figure 4.2, the dominant solution for each player is to liberalize:
no matter what State B does, the best payoff for State A is to liberalize.
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Figure 4.1 A Trade Prisoner’s D ilemma G ame without International
	L egal R ules
State B
Liberalize
Liberalize

A: 2

A: 0
B: 2

State A
Defect

Defect

A: 3

B: 3
A: 1

B: 0

B: 1

If, in the migration context, home states saw themselves as harmed
by the kinds of negative externalities described above imposed by destination states in connection with migration, and if the positions were
symmetrical, a similar set of payoffs might arise. Alternatively, if states
saw themselves as harmed by global failure to achieve optimal volumes
of migration, a similar strategic setting, based on a public goods problem, might arise. On the basis of the example of trade, we might too
quickly assume that international migration agreements could play a
similar role. However, as I have suggested, the explanations developed
in connection with the political economy of trade do not neatly map
into the migration context: while the welfare economics analysis bears
Figure 4.2 	A Trade Prisoner’s D ilemma G ame plus International L egal
R ules Imposing Penalties for D efection (no longer a Prisoner’s
D ilemma)
State B
Liberalize
Liberalize

A: 2

Defect
A: 0

B: 2

B: 1.5

State A
Defect

A: 1.5

A: −0.5
B: 0

B: −0.5
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some limited similarities, and the international setting may be comparable, the domestic political economy parameters are different. There are
important reasons why we do not observe international agreements for
liberalization of migration.
Greenaway and Nelson (2006) state that there is little empirical research on immigration policy with a direct link to endogenous policy
modeling, in part due to weak evidence of economic impact and strong
evidence of noneconomic forces in determining preferences. They find
that “endogenous policy models of migration policy seem to provide
very little analytical leverage” (p. 312). One reason is that “there is no
equivalent, long-lived, group-based politics surrounding immigration”
(p. 314). Greenaway and Nelson conclude that “trade is seen as national
and essentially economic; while immigration is local and essentially
social” (p. 315). However, this conclusion may be seen as more an
observation of a result than an identification of a cause. A casual observer of U.S. immigration politics might conclude that immigration
is becoming more like trade: group-based, national if not international,
and essentially economic. Indeed, Willmann (2006), commenting on
Greenaway and Nelson, finds counterevidence in the work of Borjas
(2003) and Mayda (2003). Willmann (2006, p. 329) cites examples of
political positions that seem consistent with economic expectations.

Ma pping th e De s tina tion Sta te Pol itical
Econo my o f Migra tion
In order to develop some simple schematics of the possible coalition dynamics in the political economy of the destination state regarding
migration, comparable to the model of the political economy of the importing state regarding trade described above, it is necessary to make a
number of simplifying assumptions and to exclude much detail.11 These
assumptions are supported by the discussion above, as well as in Chapter 2.
For simplicity’s sake, I largely exclude from these schematics the
more contextual, historical, social, and political factors discussed in
subsequent sections of this chapter. Hatton and Williamson (2005, p.
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179) find that in the long run, “the New World countries tried to protect
the economic position of their scarce factor, the unskilled worker.” They
find “no compelling evidence that xenophobia or racism was driving immigration policy in the New World economies,” once you ignore Asian
exclusions and absent Africans. These factors are not unimportant, but
the purpose of these schematics is not to determine how states will necessarily behave, or what kind of international legal commitments they
will necessarily establish. Rather, it is to develop an idea of the way
that the welfare economics considerations may be translated into political pressures, the strategic constraints that domestic interests face, and
the strategic constraints that states face, in order to be able to suggest
how international legal commitments may facilitate the achievement of
these goals. By doing so, I hope to develop an idea of the broad parameters of possible international legal commitments in this area.
This strategy is predicated on a simplifying assumption that welfare
considerations will be strong and may, over time and in appropriate
contexts, overcome some of the contextual, social, historical, and political factors. Furthermore, these factors do not necessarily always
militate against liberalization. So, these schematics are simplifications.
However, an international negotiation toward an agreement would necessarily involve states determining their positions based on all of the
relevant factors, not only welfare.
I assume that citizens seek to influence their own governments
through two main channels: 1) political contributions, and 2) voting.
Governments act in response to utility functions based on an attempt
to maximize a weighted sum of these two components: they maximize
political support.12
As noted above, there is a domestic coalition-building game and a
linked international cooperation game: thus, migration policy is a twolevel game in the Putnam sense (1988). The question raised by this
book is whether governments may find it useful to enter into international agreements in order to induce the formation of domestic political
coalitions in support of liberalization. I describe the domestic coalitionbuilding problem textually, and show how it may drive an international
coordination or cooperation game with game theory matrices. I show
that, at least under certain hypothesized circumstances where, without
international agreements, proliberalization forces would not be suc-

Job Name:

--

/309724t

136 Trachtman

cessful in inducing formal liberalization, international agreements may
increase the possibility of formation of proliberalization coalitions.
In the following four sections, I develop four simple schematics of
possible structures of political support for liberalization of immigration.
The first two schematics use the assumption, based on Heckscher-Ohlin
theory, that unskilled labor would migrate to where it is scarce, and
skilled labor would migrate to where it is scarce. Opposition also follows Heckscher-Ohlin theory: the scarce factor in the destination state
has the most to lose in connection with immigration. The third schematic adds the possibility of capital mobility or offshoring, or illegal
immigration. The fourth schematic assumes that wealthy country labor
has no interest in migrating to poor countries. Under this schematic,
potential reciprocity within migration policy would play no role, as
wealthy country labor would not seek access to poor country markets.
1) Symmetric labor markets. I develop a schematic in which two
states are symmetric, with equal endowments of labor, including
equal proportions of skilled and unskilled labor. This schematic
could describe migration between poor or middle-income states
or between wealthy states. An example might be the migration
relationship between the United States and the EU. Here, engineers, doctors, or professors might migrate in search of a particular type of position or better pay. Although I assume symmetry
in terms of general endowments, it would be likely that some
states might have an advantage in producing a particular type of
worker. France would be expected to produce better chefs than
the United States, while the United States might be expected to
produce better basketball players than France. (While this schematic is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, since there is no
differential between the two states in relative abundance and
scarcity, migration cannot be said to be motivated by HeckscherOhlin factors.)
2) Asymmetric labor markets with two-way migration. I develop a
schematic that assumes asymmetry, where one state has abundant skilled labor while the other has abundant unskilled labor.
Here, the relationship between Spain and Morocco, or between
the United States and Mexico, are examples. Generally, developing countries are likely to have greater abundance of unskilled
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labor, while developed countries have greater abundance of
skilled labor.
3) Asymmetric labor markets with offshoring or illegal immigration. I add to the asymmetric context the possibility of offshoring or illegal immigration as an alternative to liberalization of
migration.
4) Asymmetric labor markets with one-way migration. I develop a
schematic that assumes asymmetry, but, contrary to HeckscherOhlin theory, assumes that poor country labor flows only toward
the wealthy country: wealthy country natives do not wish to migrate to the poor country.
These schematics are structured in bilateral terms. Obviously,
multilateral arrangements will be more complex. Indeed, multilateral
arrangements with most-favored nation nondiscrimination may be very
difficult to achieve where they include both relationships of symmetry
and asymmetry, and both “two-way street” migration relationships and
“one-way street” relationships.

S y mmetr ic L abor Mark
(Stag H un t) G a me

ets: A C oord

ina tion

Assume two symmetric states: domestic labor and foreign labor
are symmetric overall in quantity and skill level. Assume that in each
economy, skilled labor is abundant, and unskilled labor is scarce. (This
schematic would also apply to the opposite: symmetric economies
where unskilled labor is abundant and skilled labor is scarce.) Levels
of productivity and wages are closely aligned. In this context, there
may be little reason for migration, and little by way of welfare gains to
be captured by liberalizing migration. Conversely, there may be little
reason to oppose immigration, because it brings no pressure on wages
in the destination country. On the other hand, within certain sectors,
such as cooking, language training, software engineering, or baseball,
some countries might produce more highly skilled workers than others.
This would constitute a basis for migration, within the particular sec-
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tor. It might also constitute a basis for protectionism by the competing
domestic workers.
Nielson (2003, pp. 93, 94) suggests that generally, agreements
among countries that are geographically proximate and at similar levels
of development entail greater liberalization of labor mobility. Ghosh
(2007, p. 102) suggests that migration liberalization agreements among
countries of similar levels of income are most likely to emerge and
survive.
In Table 4.1, I set forth a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different broad groups under this condition of labor market
symmetry. I first describe each state’s unilateral policy and then examine how a regime of reciprocity would affect the groups’ positions.
Below the table, I explain my reasons for characterizing each group’s
position as I do. The main difference between the nonreciprocal case
and the reciprocal case is that the abundant labor factor, seeing opportunities abroad that could be opened up by reciprocity, favors reciprocal
liberalization. In some cases, this will be sufficient to change the balance of lobbying power, resulting in a new, proreciprocal liberalization
equilibrium. Indeed, this may be especially true in particular vocational
sectors, and not true in other vocational sectors. So it may be that an international agreement that differentiates by vocational sector, in which
states make schedules of liberalization commitments by vocational sector, would allow states to make the most precise choices in this field.
This would allow a kind of cross-vocational reciprocity, in which, for
example, the United States opens its market to French chefs in return
for France opening its market to U.S. basketball players.
Table 4.1 S ymmetric L abor Markets with Equal Productivity
Scarce labor

Abundant labor Capital

Consumers

Weakly in favor
No reciprocity Opposed to
Weakly in favor Weakly in favor
of liberalization
liberalization of liberalization of liberalization
(symmetry reduces (dispersed)
returns)
Reciprocity

Opposed to
More strongly
liberalization in favor

Weakly in favor

Weakly in favor
(dispersed)
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S carce labor factor opposes liberalization. Assume, consistent
with Heckscher-Ohlin, that unskilled workers believe that they are hurt
by immigration.13 Unskilled workers therefore oppose liberalization of
immigration. However, under conditions of equal productivity and symmetry, with little wage differential between the symmetric states, and
little expected migration, this opposition may not be strong. As noted
above, certain sectors may demonstrate greater concern than others.
C apital weakly supports liberalization. Domestic capital supports
liberalization of immigration. (See Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra [2007]
on the contributions of labor and capital to policy.) Benefits to capital
may include greater labor market flexibilit . As wage differentials are
assumed not to be significant, the benefits to capital are not great, and
therefore the support is not strong.
Furthermore, capital may have a more difficult time organizing in
connection with immigration than in connection with trade liberalization, because of accentuated collective action problems, unless the state
permits sector-selective immigration policy. In connection with trade,
tariffs are industry or product specific, as are many subsidies, giving rise
to concentrated incentives for lobbying. Immigration policy may not be
product or industry specific, at least at the legislative level, and so there
may be temptations to free ride. This will vary by state. While many
states require labor market certification, it is unclear to what extent this
type of certifi ation is susceptible to lobbying influence. Some states
have point systems or other devices for preferring individuals with certain vocations over others. On the other hand, GATS, as described in
Chapter 8, allows states to make vocation-specific commitments.
C onsumers weakly support liberalization. Except to the extent
that they compete with immigrants for consumption opportunities, consumers would benefit in welfare terms from immigration. However, as
the wage differentials are not significant, the likely savings to consumers would not be great. Moreover, as in trade, consumers are often not
sufficiently organized to articulate this preference in destination country politics.
A bundant labor factor weakly supports liberalization. Abundant types of workers benefit from liberalization to the extent that there
are complementarities by virtue of which increased immigration of unskilled workers may increase the returns to skilled workers. These are
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not powerful incentives for skilled workers to advocate liberalization,
and the actual position of the abundant type of workers would depend
on many factors.14 As noted above, one important caveat is that within
certain sectors, skilled workers may benefit from liberalization.
A bundant labor factor seeks mobility—a basis for reciprocation. Assume that domestic abundant labor believes that it would
benefit from its own international mobility, allowing its workers to
emigrate to where they are scarce, in search of higher prices. This benefit is presumed to accrue to the segment of labor that is plentiful. But
note that under the assumption of symmetry, mobility is not as valuable
as it would be under an assumption of asymmetry. This benefit gives
plentiful labor a modest added incentive to seek foreign liberalization.15
Again, within certain sectors, we might see greater interest in mobility.
Mobility of labor allows workers to “countervail” multinational
corporation mobility, allowing labor to seek the highest wages. Furthermore, foreign labor mobility would increase foreign labor bargaining
power and price, and therefore reduce the possibility that domestic
multinational corporations might offshore to foreign labor. However,
for the same reason that the scarce labor factor’s opposition is weak
in this symmetric context, mobility in this context does not provide
great incentives for support by the abundant factor. As noted above,
however, one important caveat is that within certain vocations, workers
may benefit more greatly from liberalization, and so to the extent that
liberalization can be differentiated by vocation, there may be stronger
support for liberalization in some vocations than in others.
Thus, it is possible that the added factor of reciprocal foreign liberalization, perhaps with the possibility for differentiation by vocation,
could induce the formation of a coalition between capital and abundant
labor, along with consumers, to overcome scarce labor’s opposition to
liberalization of immigration. However, note that while capital supports liberalization of immigration at home, it is unlikely to support
increased emigration by virtue of liberalization of immigration abroad.
Thus, reciprocal liberalization may actually reduce capital’s support.
The position of capital would depend on the extent to which capital is
a complement for emigrant labor, and the degree of mobility of capital.
Mobile capital might actually benefit from a more efficient allocation of
labor between countries.16
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On the other hand, it may be that if the true costs and benefits are
quite different depending on the sector involved, we would observe sectorally differentiated positions among workers.
A djustment and voters. Under this symmetric context, the gains
from liberalization are not likely to be very great. Therefore, the surplus generated may not be sufficient to cover the costs of adjustment
assistance plus its administration. It may be that unskilled labor simply
absorbs any loss that accrues to it—this loss is not likely to be great. If
the gains from liberalization accrue largely to capital, it might be appropriate to tax capital in order to acquire funds to provide adjustment
assistance. If the gains accrue largely to migrants, which is likely, it
may be useful to impose some type of charge or tax on migrants in order
to capture a sufficient portion of the surplus to be able to provide adjustment assistance. The United States charges such a fee in connection
with its H-1B visa program, discussed in Chapter 7. If these domestic
institutional arrangements could be made, a wider range of reciprocal
commitments to liberalize would become feasible. All other things being equal, if we can assume that liberalization improves global welfare,
and if this redounds to the general benefit of voters, we might expect a
slight impulse toward liberalization. This impulse would be vulnerable
to being countervailed by concern for those who lose their jobs, and by
a variety of noneconomic factors.
C oordination game. Given all these factors, it may be that the best
outcome for both states may be reciprocal liberalization. Under these
circumstances, this game could be understood as a coordination game,
like a stag hunt, in which each state government does better in this
political support game if it seeks liberalization, but only if other states
reciprocally liberalize. The critical question, then, is whether states may
provide assurance to one another regarding their liberalization. This assurance need not be great, as there are not strong incentives to defect.
This may explain why liberalization of migration among wealthy states
generally appears to require no international legal commitments to provide additional incentives for compliance. Note that the inducement to
domestic skilled labor to support liberalization is foreign market access.
If foreign market access can be achieved without liberalizing at home—
without reciprocation—domestic skilled labor will still be satisfied. But
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liberalizing at home does not harm domestic skilled labor, and so the
only reason to defect would be the concerns of unskilled labor.
Under the stag hunt, which is a type of “assurance” game, each state
may obtain smaller payoffs—in our case, a lower level of gains from
liberalization—by seeking protection for its own workers, without providing liberalization for foreign workers, while the other state liberalizes.
But if states are able to coordinate to forego settling for lower payoffs
from their own protection in favor of greater payoffs from global mobility, they will each be better off. Part of these increased payoffs will come
from increased global output. Cooperation may break down if players
are uncertain about the preferences and strategy of others.
The stag hunt game is derived from a Rousseauvian fable of cooperation among hunters (Abbott 1989). Unless all hunters are committed
to catching the stag, it will escape. Each individual hunter may be
tempted by a passing rabbit. Each hunter prefers a share of stag to an
individual portion of rabbit, but is uncertain about whether other hunters are sufficiently committed to capturing stag. Figure 4.3 shows the
analogy to international migration policy: each state prefers its share of
global liberalization of migration (stag), but may be distracted by the
opportunity to obtain local protection (rabbit), especially if it is unsure
of the commitment of other states.
In international legal or organizational terms, compared to a prisoner’s dilemma context, a stag hunt context may require a lesser level
of international legal inducements to compliance because each player’s
best strategy is to cooperate in global liberalization. Sufficient clarity regarding the definition of the cooperative behavior, monitoring to ensure
Figure 4.3 A S tag H unt G ame
State B
Liberalize
Liberalize
State A
Defect

A: 4

Defect
A: 1

B: 4
A: 3

B: 3
A: 3

B: 1

B: 3
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compliance, and modest penalties should be sufficient. Note that
we are assuming symmetry of preferences: no player actually prefers
protection. However, Sandler (2008) shows that as the number of players increases, depending on whether gains are dependent on uniform
compliance, coordination can become quite difficult.
Externalities. I have assumed no labor market externalities in
this model—no benefits that accrue more broadly than to the specific
groups named. However, if skilled labor is scarce (even where unskilled
labor is also scarce) and brings positive fiscal growth or other externalities, while unskilled labor brings negative externalities, this game
could be transformed into a prisoner’s dilemma (illustrated in Figure
4.1) between governments seeking to attract and retain skilled labor,
depending on the magnitude of the effects and how the political constituencies influence government decisions. Given positive externalities
of this type, states would compete to attract skilled labor. There is evidence that increasing numbers of wealthy states see themselves in such
competition for skilled labor. International agreements might be used to
resolve the prisoner’s dilemma (to change the payoff structure so that it
is a different game), assuming that the aggregate payoffs from cooperation exceed the aggregate payoffs from defection.
A symmetric L abor Markets with Equal Productivity: A Prisoner’s
D ilemma or “B ully” G ame
Now, assume that domestic labor and foreign labor are asymmetric
in skill level: labor in State A is largely high skilled, while labor in State
B is largely low skilled.
Under this assumed asymmetry, as contrasted with schematic (1),
there are significant gains from trade: aggregate welfare in each of State
A and State B can be increased by reciprocal liberalization (see Figure
4.3). This is an important part of each government’s utility function,
and may help to induce the government to enter into international legal
commitments to unlock this welfare increase. In Table 4.2, I summarize
a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different broad groups
under this condition of labor market asymmetry, assuming equal productivity across markets.
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Table 4.2 A symmetric L abor Markets with Equal Productivity
Scarce labor

Abundant labor

No reciprocity Strongly
Weakly in favor
opposed to
of liberalization
liberalization
Reciprocity

Capital

Consumers

Strongly in favor Weakly in favor
of liberalization (dispersed)

Weakly in favor
Strongly
Strongly in favor Still strongly
(dispersed)
opposed to
in favor but
liberalization
reciprocity may
reduce returns due
to emigration

S carce labor factor opposes liberalization. Given that these states
have asymmetric labor markets, under Heckscher-Ohlin, mobility (if
made available without selectivity between classes of labor) is likely
to benefit skilled labor in State A, and unskilled labor in State B, and
conversely, is likely to harm unskilled labor in State A and skilled labor
in State B.17 Actual positions, here and in connection with other factors,
would depend on cross-elasticities of substitution among the various
factors of production. Therefore, we would expect unskilled labor in
State A to oppose liberalization, while skilled labor in State B opposes
liberalization.
C apital strongly supports liberalization. Besides the migrants
themselves, capital is the main beneficiary of liberalization of immigration. Here, under asymmetry, there are greater cross-country price
differences, strengthening capital’s support for liberalization.
C onsumers weakly support liberalization. Except to the extent
that they compete with immigrants for consumption opportunities, consumers would be likely to benefit in welfare terms from immigration.
Here, under asymmetry, there are greater cross-country price differences, strengthening consumer support for liberalization. However, as
in trade, consumers are not well-organized to articulate this preference
in destination country politics.
A bundant labor factor weakly supports liberalization. Abundant
labor may benefit from liberalization by virtue of increased immigration of complementary types of workers. These complementary workers
may increase the returns to the abundant types of workers. These are not
powerful incentives to advocate liberalization.
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A bundant labor factor seeks mobility—a basis for reciprocation. As in the symmetric case, however, the abundant factor believes
that it would benefit from its own international mobility, allowing its
workers to emigrate to where they are scarce, in search of higher prices.
This benefit gives plentiful labor an added incentive to seek foreign
liberalization, as discussed above.
Thus, the added possibility of reciprocal foreign liberalization induces the formation of a coalition among capital, the abundant labor
factor, and consumers to overcome the scarce labor factor’s opposition
to liberalization of immigration.
However, note that while capital supports liberalization of immigration at home, it is less likely to support increased emigration by
virtue of liberalization of immigration abroad, at least with respect
to scarce labor factors. So, we would expect to see some diversity of
position within capital: some employers would benefit from increased
immigration, while others would be harmed by increased emigration.
Thus, unselective reciprocal liberalization may actually reduce capital’s
support. Selective reciprocal liberalization—by which the partner state
liberalizes its immigration policy only with respect to factors abundant
in the first state—would help to overcome this problem.
C ooperation game. Under these circumstances, each state would
generally have strong interests in liberalization by the other state, but
would prefer—in terms of political contributions and votes from scarce
labor—to avoid its own liberalization. This strategic setting may give
rise to a prisoner’s dilemma–type situation, in which each state is best
off protecting while the other state liberalizes, but both states are better
off if both liberalize than if both protect (see Figure 4.1).
In this asymmetric schematic, international legal rules could play
a role in migration similar to that described above with respect to international legal rules in trade (see Figure 4.2): international legal rules
could be entered into by states in order to resolve the prisoner’s dilemma, allowing states to achieve greater welfare.
Note the difference between the role of international legal rules in
schematic (1) and the role described here in the context of schematic
(2). Schematic (1) involved principally a coordination game, in which
international legal rules are useful in order to provide a focal point, but
each player has incentives to cooperate. Schematic (2), on the other
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hand, involves a prisoner’s dilemma in which each party has an incentive to play a strategy that would confer harm on the other party.
However, sufficiently strong international legal rules, changing the payoffs so that states comply, may restrain this behavior.
A reciprocal agreement to liberalize would create increased surplus, possibly allowing government to utilize this surplus to redistribute
to those harmed (the scarce factor). Arrangements within each state in
order to compensate previously scarce labor for the loss of its market
power may be necessary to induce agreement. If the gains accrue largely
to capital, it may be appropriate to tax capital in order to acquire funds
to provide adjustment assistance. If the gains accrue largely to migrants,
which is likely, it may be useful to impose some type of charge or tax on
migrants in order to capture a sufficient portion of the surplus to be able
to provide adjustment assistance (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 382).
If these domestic institutional arrangements could be made, a wider
range of reciprocal commitments to liberalize would become feasible.
Externalities. Alternatively, if skilled labor brings sufficient positive fiscal growth or other externalities while unskilled labor brings
sufficient negative externalities, this game could be transformed into a
“bully” game between governments, depending on the magnitude of the
effects and how the political constituencies influence government decisions. In this “bully” game, the state that has abundant high-skilled labor
may have little incentive to liberalize reciprocally, in order to encourage
outflows of high-skilled labor in exchange for inflows of low-skilled
labor, particularly if it will have to compensate its low-skilled labor for
its losses.
Note that protection by State A with liberalization by State B is not
only State A’s dominant strategy, but it is also the efficien outcome of
this game: it maximizes the joint payoffs. State A’s payoffs from protection are derived from its ability to avoid harm to its unskilled labor, and
its ability to avoid loss of skilled labor where State B also protects. State
B does not have a dominant strategy, but if State B understands State
A’s dominant strategy to protect, it can increase its payoff from 0 to 1
by playing “liberalize” while State A protects. Assuming that State A
understands State B’s dilemma, it will simply protect. This strategic setting may describe the typical relationship between developed countries
and developing countries. It is not attractive to developing countries
from a distributive standpoint.
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A symmetric L abor Markets, with Mobile C apital/O ffshoring or
Illegal Immigration
In the prior schematics, capital has not played a decisive role, in part
because it is not allied with labor, as it often is in the trade context. Yet
offshoring or illegal immigration may give capital a further source of
power that is not necessarily dependent on affirmative government action.18 The ability to offshore, or to hire illegal immigrants, reduces the
benefits of protection to scarce labor, thereby reducing its opposition to
legal immigration. Indeed, as suggested above, simple liberalization of
trade in goods or services plays a similar role. However, greater capital
mobility and greater access to illegal immigrants will reduce the returns
to capital from liberalization of immigration, reducing its support for
formal liberalization.
“That immigration and trade are substitute ways to obtain the same
output suggests that changes in the number of immigrants will have
less effect on native incomes in the presence of relatively free trade
than they otherwise would” (Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 147). This
is a critical point, as it suggests that resistance to immigration may be
reduced as trade in goods and services is liberalized. While this proposition depends on whether migration and trade are complements or
substitutes, the threat value of offshoring might persist even where they
are complements. Perhaps this point helps to account for the ability of
the EU to engage in extensive liberalization of labor movement, and
suggests that multilateral liberalization of markets for goods, services,
and investment will facilitate, and yet render less valuable, liberalization of labor movement. For further discussion, see Chapters 2 and 9.
Interestingly, globalization in one factor supports globalization in other
factors by reducing the returns to protection. In Table 4.3, I summarize
a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different broad groups
under this condition of labor market asymmetry, with the possibility of
offshoring or illegal immigration.
Thus, workers and their unions must recognize the alternatives
available to them and their opponents as they decide what policy to
support. Technological or institutional change that makes it possible to
offshore jobs to developing countries with lower wages is analytically
similar, assuming free trade in the products of this work, to a policy
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Table 4.3 A symmetric L abor Markets, with Mobile C apital/O ffshoring
or Illegal Immigration (Position of C ountry of Immigration)
Scarce labor Abundant labor

Capital

Consumers

Less strongly in
favor of
liberalization

Weakly in favor

No reciprocity Weaker
opposition

Weakly in
favor of
liberalization

Reciprocity

Strongly in favor Reciprocity may Weakly in favor
of liberalization reduce returns
due to emigration,
reducing support

Weaker
opposition

change relaxing restrictions on immigration (Jain, Kapur, and Mukand
2006). For example, U.S. farmers are increasingly shifting production
to Mexico in order to overcome barriers to immigration in the United
States.19
This type of change would ordinarily benefit owners of firms and
complementary inputs, including complementary workers, while hurting those whose work it replaces. With declining trade protection,
increasing liberalization of foreign investment, and technological
advances, offshoring must be understood as a growing strategic alternative available to firms. It may be that in some contexts, support for
relaxation of formal immigration controls is a superior alternative from
the standpoint of unions, compared to the default alternative of allowing offshoring.
Furthermore, if illiberal formal migration policies will result in
greater informal migration, with unorganized and vulnerable illegal immigrants competing with organized labor in the destination state, then
organized labor might find some attraction in managed formal migration
(Watts 2002).20 Watts suggests that labor unions may form a coalition
with employers in favor of legal immigration.
In an asymmetric context, offshoring or illegal immigration may
reduce the value to domestic scarce labor of blocking formal liberalization of immigration. Under these circumstances, domestic labor may
determine to support increased formal migration, as legal immigrants
might join unions and would be subject to destination country cost
structures, resulting in less competitive pressure than under the alternatives. Thus, offshoring and illegal immigration would tend to promote
greater permission from labor for formal migration to the wealthy state.
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On the other hand, these same factors of capital mobility or offshoring,
or illegal immigration, may reduce the returns to capital from liberalization of migration.
A symmetric O ne-Way Flow with C ompensation
Despite the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, as discussed in Chapter 2,
there is some reason to believe that for citizens of popular destination states, there may not be great interest in migration to the typical
sending states. As suggested above (Trefler 1993, 1998), under some
circumstances, both skilled and unskilled workers may flow toward the
high-skilled country—the wealthy country (Hanson 2007, p. 14). “This
is, of course, what happens in the real world, suggesting that richer
countries do indeed enjoy superior technology to poor countries, and
that endowments alone cannot explain differences in income, or for that
matter trade patterns and factor flows” (Markusen 1983). In Table 4.4,
I summarize a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different
broad groups under this condition of labor market asymmetry, assuming unequal productivity across markets.
Table 4.4 A symmetric O ne-Way Flow: U nequal Productivity (Position of
C ountry of Immigration)
Scarce labor

Abundant
labor

Capital

Consumers

No reciprocity

Strongly
opposed to
liberalization

Weakly in
Strongly in favor
favor of
of liberalization
liberalization

Reciprocity

Strongly
opposed to
liberalization

No change— Still in favor with Weakly in favor
no interest in enhanced benefits (dispersed)
emigration
for investment

Reciprocity
with side payment

Less opposed
if side payment is used
for adjustment
or increase in
export opportunities

More favorable if side
payment
is used for
increase in
export opportunities

Increased support
if side payment
provides increased
investment or trade
opportunities

Weakly in favor
(dispersed)

May increase
support if side
payment is used
to reduce taxes
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A bundant skilled labor in S tate A does not support reciprocity. I assume here that the skilled labor in the skilled labor–abundant
country is not interested in migrating to the unskilled labor–abundant
country because the wages are substantially lower. Therefore, it is not
valuable to State A’s abundant skilled labor to secure liberalization by
State B, so State A labor does not support liberalization by State A, and
reciprocity within the migration field is not appealing.
C apital supports liberalization. Under circumstances of asymmetry, capital is strongly in favor of liberalization. However, as in the prior
schematics, I assume that State A capital is not sufficientl powerful by
itself to procure a policy of liberalization.
B ully game. State A’s dominant strategy will likely be to protect,
and it will protect unless some other arrangements are made to induce
a different move by State A. The payoffs may be similar to the Bully
Game scenario described in connection with the externalities variation
of schematic (2) above. Thus, the question is whether State A constituencies could be given increased incentives to support liberalization, in
order to unlock an expected global welfare increase from liberalized
migration. Figure 4.4 illustrates the Bully Game.
S ide payments or linkage. Although a side payment might result in an efficient solution, it might also be unappealing for State B to
make financia compensation to State A. However, it is possible that if,
for example, State B were willing to liberalize in relevant high valueadded services sectors, under the GATS, State A capital might find this
opportunity valuable, and State A skilled labor might benefit from opportunities to be employed or otherwise to provide services to State B.
Figure 4.4 A “B ully” G ame with A symmetric Payoffs
State B
Liberalize
Liberalize

A: 1

Defect
A: 0

B: 2

B: 3

State A
Defect

A: 3

A: 2
B: 1

B: 0
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A similar type of side payment or linkage could arise from investment
liberalization in State B, providing opportunities for State A capital and
State A skilled labor.
This provides an argument for cross-sectoral linkage, by which two
efficient policy changes that do not have the political support to be effected alone, may be viable together under linkage. This is similar to
what is believed to have happened within the trade field, where mercantilism balances mercantilism. In fact, now that wealthy states have
few tariff barriers, while developing states still have substantial tariff
barriers, the outlines of a “grand bargain” toward a virtuous cycle of
efficiency may be identified: wealthy states allow greater immigration
of skilled and unskilled workers, perhaps also agreeing to enforce a
Bhagwati tax, while poor states reduce tariffs and barriers to investment
and high value-added services.
Migration fee or B hagwati tax. Another alternative or additional
type of “side payment” is to allow State A to achieve compensation by
imposing a special fee or tax on immigrants (Clarke 1994; Freeman
2006).
Because most of the gains from immigration accrue to the immigrants rather than to the residents of destination countries . . . there
is little incentive for destination countries to ease immigration restrictions. The only way I can think of to increase the receptivity
of destination countries to accept more immigrants would be to
redistribute the benefits of immigration so that a greater share of
the benefits flow to natives and a lower share of the benefits to immigrants. The “radically economic” policy here would be to use
the price system to equilibrate the market for immigrants rather
than to ration entry. An immigrant receiving country could charge
admission fees or auction immigration visas or place special taxes
on immigrants, and use those funds to redistribute the gains from
immigration to existing citizens. (Freeman 2006, p. 165)

Thus, the institutional capacity of home and destination states to
jointly charge a migration fee might allow them to enjoy a greater portion of the surplus from migration. This capacity might transform the
payoff structure of the migration schematic into more of a collective
action problem between states, with greater incentives for cooperation. Of course, the problem with a migration fee alone is that it would
not necessarily provide incentives for any particular political group to
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lobby for liberalization of immigration. So, the migration fee might be
used to fund adjustment assistance in the destination state, and perhaps
development assistance in the home state.
Any proposal of a special fee or tax on immigrants would have to
separate itself from the stigma associated with the early twentieth century “head taxes” imposed by the United States and Canada in order to
deter Chinese immigration.

Ot h er F ac tors In flu enc ing De s tina tion
C oun tr y Pol itics
As we develop a political economy model of migration, it is useful
to examine some of the historical experience, as a source of data regarding determinants of national policy beyond the economic welfare-based
factors discussed above. While the factors discussed here would add
too much complexity for it to be practical to include them in the simple
schematics developed above, they may affect policy in any particular
state.21 Furthermore, they suggest some of the concerns that may be
raised in connection with proposals for legal agreements to liberalize
migration, and some of the possible legal solutions to these concerns.
Given the possible divergence in the way the various parameters that
influence policy may arise in different countries, we would expect some
diversity in perspective across countries and across sectors. Different
perspectives may arise because states have idiosyncratic approaches to
policy making, or because specific situational or historical factors in the
experience of specific countries have a distinct effect on current policy
(Freeman 2006). In addition to the economic factors discussed above,
we must recognize that cultural, ethnic, religious, nationalist, and other
factors may play a role, whether legitimate or illegitimate, in the national politics of immigration. Ethnic groups may play a role in limiting
migration from some areas, and promoting migration from other areas.
However, Meyers (2004, p. 173) finds “extraordinary” similarity
among destination states in immigration policy for over a century. He
shows that immigration policy moved in broad synchronization for the
major destination states from the 1770s to the present. He argues that
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“the main reason for the similarities among the immigration control
policies of the major receiving countries is the international interdependence between the socioeconomic and foreign policy factors that
produce these policies” (p. 181). On the other hand, he sees greater
room for diversity of policy in connection with “structural factors” and
preferences over permanent versus temporary migration. The structural
factors include the economic structure of the country, the geopolitical
position of the country, and the population density of the country.
Hatton and Williamson (2006, p. 24) find that “today, country
differences in anti-immigration opinion are driven by: the scale of immigration, which represents the labor market threat; the size of the welfare
state, which represents the potential welfare burden; and the universal franchise, which assures that those concerns are reflected in tough
immigration policies.” They argue that public opinion would be much
more negative if immigration policies were more liberal. However, they
also find that today’s median voter is no longer unskilled, accounting
for the fact that immigration policies are not even tougher than they are.
Note that the driving forces that Hatton and Williamson identify are essentially economic forces, as mediated by political processes.
B acklash
In the early nineteenth century, long distances, high transport costs,
and poverty at home formed natural barriers limiting emigration from
poorer countries, or even emigration from wealthy countries by poorer
individuals. As poverty and transportation costs decreased, more poor
began to emigrate.
In the United States, after the unprecedented immigration of the
nineteenth century, there was a backlash that resulted in the head taxes,
the Chinese exclusion acts, and other measures to restrict immigration
(O’Rourke 2004, p. 15). When the United States began to restrict access, it was in response to the concerns of the unskilled or semiskilled
urban working man median U.S. voter (Hatton and Williamson 2006).
O’Rourke (2004, p. 17) concludes that the “big political lesson from
the period is . . . that immigration can be hard to sustain politically.”
“Moreover, the basic factor leading to the nineteenth century antiimmigration backlash—the impact of immigration on wages—is present
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in today’s world as well.” As detailed in Chapter 2, there is a continuing debate regarding the empirical support for the latter proposition.
Perhaps the most important point for purposes of this chapter is that the
link between immigration and wage suppression has significant political traction, if not clear empirical support.
Freeman (1995, p. 886) posits a political, as opposed to economic,
rationale for cyclicality in political attitudes toward migration. The political cycle is caused by the growth of opposition over the life of a
natural immigration cycle. Waves of immigrants give rise to political
opposition after they have been present long enough to have substantial
effects. This political cycle may or may not be synchronous with the
economic cycle.
R ecession and S capegoating
Furthermore, by virtue of vulnerability to scapegoating in connection with wage declines, migration policy is likely to be cyclical, with
greater openness during good times, and reduced openness during bad
times (Meyers 2004). Immigrants may be blamed for the effects of recessions that arise from other causes.
Meyers (2004) uses a comparative case study method examining the
history of immigration policy in the United States, Britain, Germany,
and the Netherlands to evaluate a number of hypotheses regarding the
cause of migration policy. He finds that, largely through an interest
group causal channel, and partly through partisan politics, recessions
cause a restrictive policy, while expansions cause liberalization. For
example, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the United States
moved to restrict immigration. Perhaps one reason for this phenomenon
is that the coalition of employers would not be interested in further immigration in the midst of an economic recession, when labor is plentiful
and cheap. Presumably, labor would be especially reluctant to allow
entry of additional workers during a recession, and politicians would be
especially sensitive to these concerns.
The western European states have served as laboratories for temporary migration, which was heralded as providing the “allocational”
benefits of migration without the “distributional” costs (Freeman 1995,
p. 891, citing Straubhaar 1992). Prompted by recession in the 1970s,
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European public opinion was stimulated and European citizens organized, providing an effective counter to proimmigration forces.
The observation (Meyers 2004) that recessions lead to restrictions
may suggest either a safeguard or a sliding scale approach to liberalization commitments that states may make in the future. Note that this
political cause is not dependent on an economic finding of causation
by immigration either of recession or of wage reduction. It thus may
(or may not) be consistent with a demagogic or mistaken view of the
factual relation between immigration and recession.
Income Inequality
In economic theory, immigration may accentuate income inequality. An increase in the labor supply reduces wages relative to returns to
capital and rents on land. “Since capital and land are held by those at
the top of the distribution pyramid, immigration-induced labor supply
growth should create more inequality, and the demise of immigration should create less, ceteris paribus” (Hatton and Williamson 2005,
p. 192).
In connection with immigration policy in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from 1850 to 1930, Timmer and
Williamson (1998) show a significant relationship between income inequality and increasing barriers to immigration. O’Rourke and Sinnott
(2002, p. 16) argue that “The late nineteenth century experience indicates that absent international institutions which can restrain individual
countries’ policies, globalization can undermine itself. Labor market
integration undermined itself by increasing income inequality in the
New World, which in turn led to immigration barriers.”
During the late nineteenth century, “immigration restrictions appear to have been motivated by economic concerns, and in particular by
fears that the immigration of unskilled workers would lead to increased
levels of inequality” (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002, p. 28). Consistent
with Heckscher-Ohlin theory, unskilled workers moved from Europe
to the “new world” (where unskilled workers were relatively scarce),
reducing wages of unskilled workers in the new world. “It was this fact
above all else which prompted immigration restrictions in the decades
leading up to the Great War” (p. 29).
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This research suggests that in order for liberalization to be sustainable, it should be combined with mechanisms that reduce or stabilize
income inequality. It would be innovative for international legal rules to
provide for this type of mechanism directly, but a variety of adjustment
or aid mechanisms could serve this purpose.
N ational H istory and Foundational Experience
Freeman links divergent immigration politics to particular immigration histories, dividing destination states into three main subsets, each
with distinct modes of immigration politics: 1) English-speaking settler
societies, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States; 2) western European states, including Germany, France, Britain,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium, and 3) southern
European states, including Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece (Freeman
1995).
Meyers (2004) suggests that “English speaking settler societies”
tend to favor large-scale permanent migration, while “ethnic societies”
(European societies) tend to prefer temporary migration. For the Englishspeaking settler societies, immigration is part of their foundational periods and “folklore.” In these countries, however, polling data does not
support larger intakes of immigration, but only maintenance or reduction of immigrant numbers (Freeman 1995, p. 887).
The western European states mentioned above are distinguished,
according to Freeman, by the fact that their modern experience of mass
immigration occurred after they were already fully developed states,
and after the Second World War. This migration was “narrowly economic,” and for some states was a result of their colonial history. When
migrants were welcomed or recruited, it was as a necessary measure to
meet postwar labor needs. “The politics of immigration in these states
today is haunted by the mistakes, failures, and unforeseen consequences
of the guestworker era and by the social conflicts associated with the
new ethnic minorities created during that time” (Freeman 1995, p. 890).
These states are much less positive toward immigration (although we
must note that these states have all subscribed to broadly free migration
within the context of, and among the states of, the EU).
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Ethnicity, N ationalism, and C hauvinism
As we consider the political economy of migration, it is not possible
to ignore the noneconomic politics of immigration. Heterogeneous societies are more likely to accept dissimilar immigrants than homogeneous
societies, such as Japan. While Meyers (2004) finds that migration policy is largely determined by the state of the economy, he also finds, inter
alia, that large-scale immigration of ethnically, culturally, or racially
dissimilar people may result in greater resistance to immigration.
This could be explained in terms of racism or ethnocentrism, or
irredentism, although Meyers suggests a less unattractive possible rationale in terms of maintaining existing bloc political power. For example,
the German and Irish waves of immigration to the United States in the
middle of the nineteenth century provoked anti-immigrant sentiment in
part due to concerns about the values of Catholicism and their consistency with individual freedom, and in part due to concerns regarding
European radicalism (Meyers 2004, pp. 29–30). Another benevolent
explanation may be that there are benefits to broad agreement on governance and on the types of public goods that will be provided; increased
diversity could result in less efficient production of public goods.
During the late twentieth century, the United States and other destination countries began to eliminate ethnic discrimination, which had
served as a proxy for economic discrimination. Hatton and Williamson
(2006, p. 9) conclude that “immigration policy is much tougher now
than a century ago simply because there are far more potential immigrants from poor countries to keep out.”
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) examine international survey evidence, and find that noneconomic factors such as patriotism and
chauvinism (the sense that locals are “better” than immigrants) play a
major role in determining attitudes of voters, and that individual views
relate to individual skill levels in a manner consistent with HeckscherOhlin theory. They find that patriotism and chauvinism are significant
factors in hostile attitudes toward immigration during the modern period, while economic factors remain important.
While in a number of European countries, right-wing parties have
adopted chauvinistic positions and have attracted substantial support
at times, they generally have not been able to convert their positions
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to policy. Examples include Le Pen’s National Front party in France,
Fortuyn’s eponymous party in the Netherlands, and Haider’s Freedom
Party in Austria. Freeman warns that “their general failure is more the
result of their extreme positions than an indicator that the alarms they
raise about immigration fail to touch profound chords within mass publics” (Freeman 1995, p. 885). Indeed, in the 2008 U.S. election cycle,
opposition to immigration has achieved a great deal of political salience. Xenophobia of the right, and sometimes of the left, is not fully
explained by economic factors.
In the trade context, we have seen demagogues of both the left and
of the right attack the loss of local autonomy or the loss of local jobs
due to adherence to WTO rules, with scant attention to the value of
the reciprocal benefits and jobs gained (Buchanan 2006). These same
demagogues, especially those of the right, attack immigrants and immigration with even greater vitriol. Any move toward greater international
legal commitments in the migration context must include an active public education and public relations component in order to counter these
opportunists. One critical question, in migration as in trade, is whether
global welfare could be improved by a global research and education
effort that would lay out the facts regarding migration (and trade) more
clearly and honestly.
Determinants of Specific Components of Destinatio
C ountry Policy
Of course, in addition to the more general factors adduced above,
government decisions on where to liberalize would depend on several
factors. These factors would include relative scarcity or abundance of
workers in particular categories, elasticity of demand for workers in
these categories, likely effects on wages and employment, relative political clout of the affected workers, importance of wages to domestic
employers in the relevant sector, and political clout of the affected employers (Freeman 1995, 2005; Joppke 1998, p. 266). With respect to
domestic employers, it is important to recognize that not all businesses
can appropriately be fully included in this category. Some multinational
corporations able themselves to arbitrage among labor markets may
benefit from labor market segmentation, and may prefer barriers to im-
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migration in order to deny their domestic competitors access to cheaper
labor. Since those barriers would simultaneously provide cheaper labor
to producers abroad, whether multinational corporations derive a net
advantage from migration barriers is ambiguous. However, they may derive a more obvious benefit from the efficient allocation of labor among
countries, which would maximize the return to mobile capital.22
Meyers (2004) seeks to explain how governments decide on
the number of immigrants they will accept, whether to differentiate
between various ethnic groups, and whether to favor permanent immigration over migrant workers. We might add to these three dependent
variables—number of immigrants (size), 2) ethnic selectivity (ethnic
composition), and 3) permanence versus temporariness—the additional
dependent variable of 4) skill level (skill composition). Meyers finds
that in practice the size and ethnic composition variables have been
closely linked because most migrants have been dissimilar in an ethnic
sense, and most countries applied more liberal policies with respect to
those who are ethnically similar.
As suggested above, it is also important to distinguish between
high-skilled migration and low-skilled migration. Freeman suggests
that skilled labor recruitment schemes are proliferating across rich democracies and only provoke modest conflict (Freeman 2005). “The
recruitment of the highly-skilled [in certain societies] has been successfully sold as a cost-free policy that produces substantial, if diffuse,
benefits for the society in a global economy privileging technology and
creativity” (p. 238). On the other hand, in the United States, more vigorous interest group politics has developed in this field.

H o me C oun tr y Pol itics
Home country policy seems less critical: most home countries allow freedom of emigration, and as we will see in Chapter 5, there are
international human rights norms that require this freedom. But it is
important to determine whether and with what level of enthusiasm
home countries would seek liberalization abroad. Governments would
consider their tax base, the local effects on domestic wages and em-
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ployment, the local welfare and growth effects of departing workers,
the magnitude of potential remittances, and the political clout of both
potential emigrants, and domestic employers. As discussed in Chapter
2, emigration of skilled labor may have a negative effect on per capita
income in the sending state under increasing returns to scale (Krugman
1971, p. 483). Home states may also lose positive externalities from
human capital.
Furthermore, home state capital might oppose, or at least be ambivalent with respect to, international negotiations to seek liberalization
of immigration abroad, as increased emigration from the home state
might reduce returns to capital in the home state. Home state capital
would presumably prefer selective reciprocity, where foreign states liberalize with respect to immigration of labor sectors that are abundant in
the home state.
There is an analogous problem in trade negotiations: exporting
state consumers may be hurt by liberalization commitments abroad, or
by reductions of export subsidies abroad. However, in the trade context, this consumer perspective is rarely articulated with force. A similar
concern felt by capital might be expressed with more force, but there is
also a collective action problem for capital’s lobbying here. That is, because labor liberalization is not necessarily sector-specific (unlike trade
liberalization), no single sector of capital would necessarily have concentrated incentives to lobby against requesting foreign liberalization.
As the greatest benefits of migration accrue to the migrants themselves, no political economy account of international migration would
be complete without evaluating the impact of migrants. However, migrants in this political sense are truly between societies: before they
migrate, they are not a part of the destination state political community,
while their hope for migration will, if realized, at least partially or temporarily remove them from the home state political community.
On the other hand, once they have migrated to the destination state,
immigrants might not support additional migration. First, there is some
evidence that the group of destination state workers hurt most by additional migration is recent immigrants. Second, recent immigrants
generally have no financial interest in additional immigration, although
they may be interested in family reunion–type immigration. Third, recent immigrants may not be politically active or have voting rights in
their new country.
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This political “dual outsider” situation of migrants may go a long
way toward explaining why we see few moves to liberalize migration:
those who would benefit the most are not full members of either the
home or the destination state political community. In all, the greater
political influence of migrants would appear to occur when they are
potential migrants, prior to their actual departure. This group may also
have some influence on the sending state after their departure, through
remittances, diaspora politics, or other mechanisms.
While few states any longer control emigration, due in part to the
influence of human rights concerns, the home state has a choice whether to seek liberalization commitments by destination states, or not. This
is a source of indirect control. In fact, where the default rule is restriction in the destination state, we might say that destination states seem
to cooperate with home states in refraining from liberalization of immigration. So, for example, Indonesia could theoretically determine to
seek commitments by the United States to liberalize immigration to the
United States of unskilled and semiskilled labor, while at the same time
refraining from requesting the United States to reduce restrictions on
immigration from Indonesia of software engineers or medical doctors.
The result is substantively similar to a restriction on emigration.
In connection with trade in goods, it is relatively unusual to engage
in tariff harmonization—thus, in connection with goods, we do not see
narrow reciprocity of commitments within a single sector. Similarly,
in services, we see little explicit harmonization of liberalization. So, in
connection with migration, we might expect to see exchanges of diverse
commitments. For example, the EU might liberalize in connection with
immigration of nurses in exchange for the Philippines liberalizing in
connection with immigration of architects. This type of flexibilit , or
specificit , would allow governments to appease stronger political
constituencies, and to tailor commitments to maximize local political
support.
But, examined from the standpoint of the home state, as opposed
to the potential migrants within the home state, and putting aside for
a moment remittances, potential benefits upon return, and a possible
Bhagwati tax, there is little for the home state to gain from emigration
of skilled workers, and the possibility of loss. There are possibly greater
gains from emigration of unskilled workers. However, it is highly un-
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likely that a wealthy country unskilled worker would migrate to a poor
country. In contrast to the situation with trade in goods, where trade is
bilateral, and all states stand to gain on both the import and the export
side, in migration as it stands today, benefits are not bilateral, in part
because migration is generally not substantially bidirectional. That is,
as Hatton (2007) points out, migration of the most important type is not
a “two-way street.”
On the other hand, as suggested above, migration between similar
economies may be much more of a two-way street, and may involve
the operation of comparative advantage. This suggests that bilateral or
plurilateral agreements regarding migration, among similar countries,
may be more likely than agreements between different countries.
The fact that home states do not generally benefit from emigration
of skilled workers may help to explain why we do not see international
legal commitments to liberalize in the migration context: putting aside
remittances and returns, sending states have little interest in liberalization by destination states. In fact, just the opposite: sending states should
be glad to see restrictions on immigration in the destination states, at
least as to skilled migration. But these types of restrictions are inconsistent with global welfare and the welfare of migrants.
How could sending states be given a stake in emigration in order
to induce them to seek welfare-enhancing liberalization commitments
by destination states?23 One answer is by facilitating the imposition of
a Bhagwati tax, or by enhancing the role of remittances or return. In
addition, perhaps sending states would be interested in commitments
to admit unskilled workers along with the skilled workers. Perhaps by
inducing destination states to decline to distinguish between skilled and
unskilled workers, or to make commitments to admit a specified number of unskilled workers, home states could see their welfare enhanced
by liberalization commitments.

Job Name:

--

/309724t

International Political Economy of Migration 163

To ward a R a tional
o f Migra tion

e for In terna tional

L aw

The above analysis suggests that different states will have different
strategic positions, that different economic sectors within these states
will have different strategic positions, and even that different occupational groups will have different strategic positions. Thus, it is clearly
impossible to specify a single arrangement for international cooperation, or even to predict whether international cooperation will occur.
However, we know that in the aggregate, liberalization is expected
to provide increased surplus, and, assuming that there are mechanisms
that can be devised to overcome the strategic problems that may exist
between different domestic constituencies, and between different states,
and that the increased surplus exceeds the cost of its capture, we would
expect states to move to do so. This book is an exercise in institutional
imagination intended first to evaluate whether the surplus may exceed
the cost of its capture, and how states may move to capture it. That they
have not made these moves generally thus far does not mean that such
moves are not available: it would be difficult to argue that the international legal system as we see it is already efficient. Some may argue
that capital markets, with their clear pricing, narrow profit motives, and
numerous transactions, are already efficient, and that therefore, new
transactions cannot result in profits. However, the international legal
system is far less efficient, so we may expect that new transactions—of
the nature described above—could make the parties better off.
In order to move forward, it will be necessary to analyze different
states, different sectors within states, and different occupations within
those sectors in order to understand the strategic position of each. Then,
once we know what game is being played, we can evaluate which international legal rules, if any, are useful in order to allow for the maximum
net payoffs.
A framework agreement that allows for states to agree on the structure of reciprocity, to allow sending states to share in the benefits of
liberalization through a Bhagwati tax or other mechanism, to make side
payments through linkage to other areas of liberalization, and to make
side payments through immigration fees, would establish an appropriate
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institutional framework—would minimize the transaction costs—for
states to negotiate optimal arrangements. While such a framework
agreement might best be legally binding, it is possible that it might
alternatively be best kept informal. In international law, the distinction
may have only subtle behavioral implications.
Assuming that liberalization of migration is potentially Pareto
efficient, it may be that states are unable to achieve the efficient liberalization unless a move is made toward actual Pareto efficiency: toward
compensation of states and individuals that are otherwise made worse
off.
The national political economy of international migration is complex: it mediates imperfectly the welfare considerations developed in
Chapter 2, and mediates even more imperfectly the ethical considerations developed in Chapter 3. However, even an imprecise assessment
of the interplay of interest and power yields insights into the possibility
that international legal rules may play a role in committing other states
to act, in order to support domestic coalitions that will support liberalization. The game theoretic abstractions developed here are merely
conjectures as to the possible interplay of interest and power, but the
research discussed in this chapter makes these conjectures plausible.

N otes
1. In a liberal democracy, it is possible to define optimal immigration policy as “that
preferred by the median voter where voters are utility-maximizers with complete
information” (Freeman 1995, p. 883).
2. Even under aggregate global benefits, international adjustment assistance may
compensate losing states for liberalization that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
3. This is the concept of embedded liberalism first theorized by Karl Polanyi and
recently extended and popularized by John Ruggie. For a recent example, see
Scheve and Slaughter (2007).
4. “Terms of trade” refers to the relative prices of a state’s imports and exports.
States may improve their terms of trade, and their welfare, by reducing the price
of imports relative to exports or increasing the price of exports relative to imports.
Under this model, international trade agreements are understood to be beneficial
in order to avoid a “beggar thy neighbor” trade war in which states, in a strategic
prisoner’s dilemma, obtain suboptimal outcomes by imposing terms of trade externalities on one another.
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5. Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2007) thus assume that migration policy can be
disaggregated into sectoral components. This assumption raises significant questions regarding the extent to which migration policy is disaggregated into specific
sectoral components.
6. Their model, following Grossman and Helpman (1994), does not include the ability of lobbies to influence voting, except to the extent that this is captured in the
amount of the lobby’s expenditures.
7. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
8. The fact that the home state does not protest, and perhaps does not see this state
of affairs as the imposition of a negative externality, is not necessarily determinative. Many externalities seem “natural” until they are identified and sought to be
internalized.
9. An empirical test might examine the scope of “differential fiscal treatment” in
different destination states, and compare it to the proportion of legal versus illegal
immigration in those states. The hypothesis is that the greater the differential fiscal
treatment, the greater the immigration.
10. Below, I suggest that discriminatory taxation of immigrants may, under limited
circumstances, be useful to promote liberalization, or to reduce transfer program–
motivated migration.
11. I do not try to model the political economy of the home state, but this would be
an important exercise in connection with attempts to evaluate the possibility that
home states would enter into international migration agreements.
12. Grossman and Helpman (1994) substitute aggregate social welfare for voting.
They do so partly, it appears, because aggregate social welfare is a proxy for voting, and partly because they have a hybrid model of government official behavior
that may partially reflect fidelity to public welfare. In the politics of immigration
policy, domestic employers would largely deploy political contributions, while
labor unions could deploy both political contributions and voting.
13. This set of assumptions seems slightly more pessimistic than the economic reality,
but it seems to comport with popular opinion regarding the effects of immigration.
14. Illegal immigration, as opposed to legal immigration, accentuates negative effects
on labor. Labor prefers legal to illegal immigration, because legal immigration
maximizes bargaining power of immigrants, allows unionization of immigrants,
and allows gradualism or regulation of immigration. Therefore, where the alternative to increased legal immigration is increased illegal immigration, labor may
support increased legal immigration. On the other hand, increased illegal immigration may be inevitable, and may be accentuated by increased legal immigration,
and so labor may simply decline to support increased legal immigration. Assume
that capital’s first-best alternative is increased illegal immigration, and that its
second-best alternative is increased legal immigration. So far, without introducing
international arrangements, the political equilibrium may be in equipoise. While
it is possible that the influence of capital, and the threat of increased illegal immigration, would cause labor to support increased legal immigration, the incentives
are not great. Labor solidarity may prevent acceptance of increased immigration,
unless adjustment assistance is provided to compensate those unskilled workers
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15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

who are made worse off. Furthermore, under uncertainty as to the magnitude and
distribution of gains, labor may simply determine to maintain the status quo.
In the two-country, symmetrical model I have been assuming, the abundant labor
factor may not seek mobility, because the other country has a symmetrical labor
market.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
Hiscox (2002) suggests that highly skilled workers may already have greater mobility across sectors, and therefore may be less concerned about migration.
It may be dependent upon government inaction; that is, offshoring could be prohibited or otherwise deterred. In the 2004 presidential elections in the United
States, John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, referred to companies that offshored
as “Benedict Arnold” companies (Rai 2004).
Of course, Mexico benefits from free trade in goods under NAFTA, and transport
costs are relatively low (Preston 2007, p. A:1).
Undocumented workers benefit from fewer labor rights protections than authorized workers or citizens (American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial
Organizations 2007).
Hollifield (2000, p. 92) states that “economic arguments [in the migration context]
tend to be overshadowed by political, cultural, and ideological arguments . . .” He
finds that migration policy is heavily influenced by national or founding myths,
codified in citizenship and nationality laws.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
In connection with negotiations for the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations,
the Indian Minister of Commerce, Kamal Nath, insisted that the United States
should provide a greater number of H-1B visas—should provide greater liberalization as a destination state for migrants (Beattie and Johnson 2007).
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5
Customary International Law,
Human Rights Law, and
Multilateral Migration Conventions
In order to evaluate possible reforms of the international law of economic migration, it is necessary to describe the existing international
law. The core point is simple: despite the argument for a moral obligation presented in Chapter 3, states generally have no legal obligation to
accept economic migration of citizens of other states. Furthermore, despite the right to emigrate discussed in this chapter, the right to emigrate
may be seen as incomplete without a right to immigrate somewhere
(Ghosh 2007, p. 102). However, other rules are salient to a comprehensive approach to economic migration. It is worth emphasizing that
neither this chapter nor the book deals with forced migration.1
The existing international law consists of both customary and
conventional law.2 In this chapter, I describe existing customary international law, including customary human rights law relevant to migration.
I also discuss conventional human rights law relevant to migration, as it
does not make expository sense to treat conventional human rights law
separately from customary human rights law in this context. In Chapters 6 and 7, I discuss other existing conventional law of migration.
As we commence our discussion of the international law of migration, it is appropriate to refer to the Lotus principle: states retain
sovereign discretion except to the extent that they have accepted international legal constraints (Case of the S.S. Lotus 1927). These constraints
generally arise either by custom or by convention. In the field of labor
market access, there do not appear to be customary international constraints on the discretion of states to exclude foreign persons from their
domestic labor markets.
The U.S. Supreme Court said in 1892 that “it is an accepted maxim
of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
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entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe”
(Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S. 1892).
As a matter of customary international law, this seems to remain
true, although Plender (1988) argues that this principle does not have the
long pedigree sometimes asserted.3 In fact, Nafziger (1983) points out
that in the same year that the U.S. Supreme Court made the statement
above, the Institute of International Law made a contrary proposal:
Article 6. Free entrance of aliens to the territory of a civilized State
may not be generally and permanently forbidden except in the
public interest and for very serious reasons, for example, because
of fundamental differences in customs or civilization, or because
of a dangerous organization or gathering of aliens who come in
great numbers . . .
Article 7. The protection of national labor is not, in itself, a sufficient reason for non-admission . .
Article 12. Entrance to a country may be forbidden to any alien
individual in a condition of vagabondage or beggary, or suffering
from a malady liable to endanger the public health, or strongly
suspected of serious offenses committed abroad against the life or
health of human beings or against public property or faith, as well
as to aliens who have been convicted of the said offenses.4

While there may be a growing custom of admission for tourism,
commerce, investment, or other temporary purposes, or even of admission for refugees, this is not the concern of this study. (Furthermore, in
most cases, the question of whether this custom is supported by opinio
juris, and is therefore customary international law, would likely be answered in the negative.) This study is concerned with international law
of migration for labor purposes, and it seems fairly clear today that
there is no customary international law rule requiring states to provide
access to their labor markets. However, it is worthwhile to review other
relevant customary international law rules, including possible rules of
access and egress for nationals, residents, and aliens, as they may have
important effects on labor migration.
Of course, while the customary international law of international
migration still does not seem to establish any obligation on the part of
states to accept immigrant workers, it is entirely possible that states
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would enter into new customary or conventional commitments to accept these immigrants. The reasons why states may turn from a policy
of remaining unbound to a policy of accepting commitments are discussed elsewhere in this work.
The main relevant principle of customary international law today
seems to be one of national discretion in determining the entry of aliens,
subject to the possibility of treaty or other modification (Aleinikoff
2003, p. 3). There is greater treaty- and custom-based regulation of national discretion regarding entry of nationals, and exit of both aliens and
nationals.5 During the nineteenth century, on the other hand, state practice differed, with individuals unrestricted in their movements (Nafziger
1983; Sohn and Buergenthal 1992, p. 3).
There seems to be some argument that the right to be free of arbitrary restrictions on departure is part of customary international law. Of
course, it is also expressed in human rights instruments, such as Article
13(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.6

Cust o ma ry Inte rna t iona l La w and Hu man
Rig hts La w
In this section, I discuss rights of migrants derived from customary
international law and from human rights law. In subsequent sections, I
examine rights under ILO treaties and under the UN Migrant Workers
Convention.
Citizenship and N aturalization
Importantly, there do not seem to be substantial legal limits on the
authority of states to determine which individuals are or become citizens.7 States may use the principle of jus soli or jus sanguinis. Thus, it
is possible for states to determine to deny citizenship to children of immigrants born within the state (on the basis of jus sanguinis).
Given general state autonomy in determining nationality, on varying
bases, it is possible for individuals to become stateless, or to intentionally or inadvertently become citizens of multiple states (Martin and
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Hailbronner 2003). To the extent that individuals are subjected to tax,
military service, or other obligations by multiple states, migration or
other actions that may result in multiple nationality will be deterred.
The European Convention on Nationality (ECN) states that individuals shall only be obligated to perform military service for one
state. Hailbronner suggests that the primary obligation of dual nationals should be to the country of habitual residence (Hailbronner 2003,
p. 81). Another possible disadvantage for multiple nationals is the possibility that diplomatic protection may be unavailable against a state of
which the individual is a national.
For long-term migrants and their children, acquisition of host country citizenship may be an important attraction and protection. While
customary international law of citizenship per se does not accord any
right to become a citizen, it may be argued that human rights law provides some limited rights (Orentlicher 1998; Zilbershats 2002).
Of course, conventional law may provide rights to citizenship.
For example, the ECN provides that each state party “shall provide
in its internal law for the possibility of naturalisation of persons lawfully and habitually resident on its territory” (European Convention on
Nationality 1997). While the ECN permits states to set conditions for
naturalization, they may not require residence longer than 10 years.
Many destination states have experienced the truth of Max Frisch’s
words quoted at the beginning of this book: “We imported workers and
got men instead” (Borjas 2007).
D iscrimination in A dmission
While there are extensive international human rights protections
against discrimination, these protections do not necessarily guard
against discrimination in admission policy. Generally, of course, there
is no obligation in customary international law or in human rights law
to treat foreign persons as well as nationals in connection with admission: nationals generally have a right to admission to their home state.
Other types of discrimination in connection with admission may raise
issues under human rights law.
Some have argued that states must come forward with a plausible
justification for distinctions among foreign persons (Martin 2003, p.
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35; Sohn and Buergenthal 1992, p. 18). Explicit racial discrimination
is thought to violate international human rights law, while nationalitybased discrimination does not (Martin 2003, p. 35). The latter principle
is important: otherwise human rights law would supply a rule of most
favored nation (MFN) nondiscriminatory treatment in connection with
immigration.
For example, in the East African Asians Case (Patel and Others v.
U.K. [1971]), the European Commission on Human Rights found that
the United Kingdom’s Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 discriminated against immigrants on the basis of race, violating Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 3 does not expressly
address discrimination, but it prohibits degrading treatment.
In Chapter 9, I discuss the potential application of the MFN principle of nondiscrimination to immigration. This principle is central to
the trade context, as it allows the operation of comparative advantage
among states. Most favored nation would seem to play a similar role in
labor markets, allowing the operation of comparative advantage among
nationals of states. Furthermore, MFN may be supported by ethical
principles of nondiscrimination.
Postadmission D iscrimination and Minimum S tandard
Discrimination inevitably involves a comparison of treatment. In
the present context, there are two relevant references for comparison:
citizens and other immigrants from different home countries. As suggested above, the two corresponding types of antidiscrimination rule
are national treatment and MFN treatment. As stated above, it is clear
that foreign persons do not benefit from national treatment in connection with admission, meaning that foreign persons have no customary
international law or human rights law–based right of entry. However,
once they have been permitted entry, they are entitled to a certain level
of treatment.
While, as set forth above, states may not have substantial general
international law obligations to admit aliens, much of the general customary and conventional international law of human rights applies to
aliens in a host state (Hailbronner 2003; United Nations Human Rights
Committee 2000). For example, the International Covenant on Civil
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and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies to “all individuals within [a State
Party’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction.” “With narrow exceptions relating to citizens’ rights to political participation and exemption
from immigration measures, the denial or limitation of migrants’ human rights must be justified as serving legitimate state aims pursuant
to measures that are proportionately linked to their migration status”
(Fitzpatrick 2003).
In addition, of course, aliens may enjoy certain additional rights beyond those available to citizens. For example, aliens may benefit from
bilateral investment treaties, while citizens may not.
E xpulsion and Return
Under general international law, states seem to have wide discretion
to accept or expel aliens. For example, Article 13 of the ICCPR requires
that expulsion be decided in accordance with law and minimal procedural requirements.8 The grounds for individual expulsion asserted
by states have generally not been economic. However, it is difficult to
say that a rule of customary international law prohibiting expulsion on
economic grounds has developed.
There seems to be little consensus that states are required by customary international law to accept the return of their citizens. To some
extent, this debate was colored by the Cold War, in which the Soviet
Union sought to deter emigration by blocking the return of those who left
without permission. It is often argued that the customary international
law obligation to accept return is a corollary of the customary international law right of a host state to remove nonnationals (Noll 2003).
In some cases, states have entered into bilateral agreements regarding readmission of returned citizens. These agreements may distinguish
between voluntary returnees and involuntary ones. Further, some home
states have conditioned acceptance on development or adjustment assistance, in order to be able to deal with the economic consequences of
large numbers of returnees (Noll 2003, p. 67).
T he Right to E migrate
A number of human rights instruments specify a right to leave for
both nationals of the host state and aliens. Indeed, Article 13(2) of the
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifies that “Everyone has
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.” The ICCPR specifies a right to leave in Article 12, subject to
exceptions that are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in that convention.
The right to leave includes both the right to travel abroad temporarily, and the right to emigrate for a more indefinite period (Chetail 2003,
pp. 47, 54). In this work, we are more interested in the latter—the “right
to emigrate.” While most of this study is concerned with limitations on
entry to the host state—the right to immigrate—there are important reasons to pay attention to limitations on exit from the home state.
In its General Comment No. 27, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (1999, para. 8) suggests that home states are prohibited to
make freedom to emigrate “dependent on any specific purpose or on
the period of time the individual chooses to stay outside the country . . .
Likewise, the right of the individual to determine the state of destination is part of the legal guarantee.” The Human Rights Committee also
suggests that the right to leave includes the right to obtain necessary
travel documents (para. 9).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE
2006, p. 56) reports that
in Asian labour-sending countries, however, there exist a varying
range of exit controls as part of protection measures. In the Philippines, for example, it is mandatory for migrant workers to have
[Philippines Overseas Employment Administration] clearance before leaving the country. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia have
varying degrees of restrictions on female migrant workers leaving
the country. In India, emigration clearance is required for certain
blue-collar occupations.

It is worth noting that the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration plays a role in ensuring the protection of migrating workers,
but also charges them a significant fee.
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Inte Rna t Ion a L Labo R o Rgan Iza t Ion
(ILo ) Convent Ions
While each ILO convention provides rights for migrants (Sivakumaran 2004, p. 120), two of them focus directly on migrant workers.
These are the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 (No. 97)
(the “Migration Convention”) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143) (the “Supplementary
Provisions”).
Forty-eight states ratified the Migration Convention as of January
15, 2009, including a number of European states, but excluding, for
example, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada. The Supplementary Provisions have been ratified by only 23 states at January 15,
2009, and of these the only wealthy states are Italy, Norway, Portugal,
and Sweden.
The Migration Convention includes an interesting and important
antipropaganda provision in Article 3: parties are required “so far as national laws and regulations permit, [to] take all appropriate steps against
misleading propaganda relating to emigration and immigration.” While
this type of provision might not have a substantial formal effect, it
shows that parties recognized the concern that populist or scapegoating
propaganda might be leveled against migrants.
The Migration Convention has an important nondiscrimination
obligation in Article 6. The nondiscrimination obligation is limited to
lawful immigrants. Furthermore, the obligation is limited to areas that
are subject to regulation or governmental control. On the other hand,
the nondiscrimination obligation includes labor conditions such as
membership of trade unions and access to social security.
Under Article 9 of the Supplementary Provisions, an illegal immigrant is entitled to “enjoy equality of treatment for himself and his
family in respect of rights arising out of past employment as regards
remuneration, social security and other benefits.” The limited rule of
nondiscrimination provided in the Migration Convention is extended in
Article 10 of the Supplementary Provisions, which provides that “each
Member for which the Convention is in force undertakes to declare
and pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee, by
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methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of
social security, of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and
collective freedoms for persons who as migrant workers or as members
of their families are lawfully within its territory.”
Article 9 of the Migration Convention requires member states to
allow remittances, but permits them to take into account their own rules
regarding inflows and outflows of money. This is an area of overlap
between migration law and international monetary law.
Under Article 14 of the Supplementary Provisions, states are permitted to “make the free choice of employment, while assuring migrant
workers the right to geographical mobility, subject to the conditions that
the migrant worker has resided lawfully in its territory for the purpose
of employment for a prescribed period not exceeding two years or, if
its laws or regulations provide for contracts for a fixed term of less than
two years, that the worker has completed his first work contract.
Optional Annex 1 of the Migration Convention regulates recruitment
activities. These activities are limited to public bodies, except insofar as
national law or international agreement permits certain private bodies to
engage in recruitment. Article 8 of the Annex provides that “any person
who promotes clandestine or illegal immigration shall be subject to appropriate penalties.” Article 3 of the Supplementary Provisions requires
each member to take all necessary and appropriate measures “to suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal
employment of migrants.” Article 6 of the Supplementary Provisions
further requires states to make arrangements to detect and to sanction
illegal employment of migrants, as well as organization and assistance
of movement of migrants. In fact, the Supplementary Provisions seem
more concerned with preventing unauthorized migration than with any
other issue. The reference in Article 3 to a purpose to prevent abuse of
migrants does not appear to limit the scope of obligations to suppress
illegal immigration.
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UN Convent ion on t he R ig hts of
Mig rant W o rke rs
In July 2003, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
(“Migrant Workers Convention”) entered into force. At that time, 21
states had acceded to the convention. As of January 15, 2009, the following states had signed, ratified, or acceded: Albania, Algeria, Argentina,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro,
Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Tajikistan, Timor, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, and Uruguay.
The wealthy destination states are notable for their absence. So,
while the Migrant Workers Convention no doubt will benefit some migrants, it will not be available to immigrants to wealthy states, unless
those wealthy states accept its obligations.
Importantly, the Migrant Workers Convention provides no commitments regarding access to the employment market of any state.
Interestingly, Article 66 of the Convention leaves open the possibility
for either home states or destination states to limit recruitment activities
in the home state to public bodies of the destination state.
Article 7 of the Migrant Workers Convention provides an obligation of nondiscrimination among migrant workers in terms of the rights
provided under the convention. These rights must be provided without discrimination based, inter alia, on nationality, race, ethnicity, or
economic position. While this provision has broad application, one
component of it provides a kind of MFN obligation. However, there
are some important limitations on MFN treatment. For example, Article
52:3(b) provides that for migrants whose permission to stay in the destination state is limited by time, the destination state may “limit access
by a migrant worker to remunerated activities in pursuance of a policy
of granting priority to its nationals or to persons who are assimilated to
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them for these purposes by virtue of legislation or bilateral or multilateral agreements.”
Article 25 provides for national treatment in respect of conditions
of work and terms of employment, including for illegal aliens. But note
the language of Article 52:3(b) mentioned above. Article 27 extends
national treatment rights to migrant workers with respect to social security. It leaves it to the competent authorities of the state of origin and
the state of employment to “establish the necessary arrangements to
determine the modalities of application of this norm.” Article 30 provides rights to education for the children of migrant workers, on the
basis of national treatment. Article 54 provides national treatment for
documented migrants in connection with protection against dismissal,
unemployment benefits, and access to public work schemes intended to
combat unemployment. Article 8 protects the right of departure, including from the state of origin.
A number of the substantive provisions of the Migrant Workers
Convention deal with human rights issues, such as freedom from involuntary servitudes, right to life, freedom of conscience, etc. These rights
apply to both legal and illegal immigrants.
Part IV of the Migrant Workers Convention grants certain additional
rights only to documented migrants. These include rights of free movement within the territory of the destination state, rights to unionize, and
rights to vote. Further, Article 43 provides documented migrants with
national treatment in connection with access to education, health services, and housing.
Article 46 addresses customs duties on personal belongings—an
interesting connection between migration and trade. Article 47 protects
the right to remit money to the migrant’s home country or any other
state—an interesting connection between migration and international
monetary law.
Article 48 provides for a sort of national treatment in connection
with taxation. It also calls on a state’s party to endeavor to adopt appropriate measures to avoid double taxation.
Article 49:2 provides that, where separate permissions to reside and
to engage in employment are required, “migrant workers who in the
State of employment are allowed freely to choose their remunerated
activity shall neither be regarded as in an irregular situation nor shall
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they lose their authorization of residence by the mere fact of the termination of their remunerated activity prior to the expiration of their work
permits or similar authorizations.”
Thus, legal migrants are not required to remain in any particular
employment, but enjoy flexibility as to their employment. Article 52
provides that legal migrants generally have the right to freely choose
their remunerated activities, subject to limitations such as limitations
on alien occupation in certain activities and requirements for licensing
for regulated occupations.
Finally, Article 68 of the Migrant Workers Convention requires
states to collaborate to prevent illegal immigration and employment
of workers in an “irregular situation.” In particular, destination states
are required to “take all adequate and effective measures to eliminate
employment in their territory of migrant workers in an irregular situation, including, whenever appropriate, sanctions on employers of such
workers.” Article 69 provides that states “shall, when there are migrant
workers and members of their families within their territory in an irregular situation, take appropriate measures to ensure that such a situation
does not persist.”

Con clus ion
Individuals seem to enjoy a wide range of human rights in connection with their treatment once they arrive in foreign states. However,
this chapter has found that, under human rights law, individuals do not
have rights, vis-à-vis destination states, to immigrate. It is interesting
that individuals have reasonably clear rights to emigrate, or to depart.
Of course, the right to emigrate without a right to immigrate may be
viewed as rather empty, or at least limited by the available destination
states (Sané 2007). Human rights law is currently undergoing a period
of uncertainty regarding the obligor of particular human rights obligations. In some cases corporations are charged with protecting human
rights under the rubric of “corporate social responsibility.” In other
cases states other than the state of residency or citizenship are argued to
bear responsibilities to protect certain human rights of foreign citizens,
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as in the argument that states should not seek to enforce their legal
rights under the WTO’s intellectual property agreement in cases where
to do so would restrict the ability of the home state to satisfy its obligations under the right to health. It would be too speculative, however, to
say today whether destination states will ever have human rights–based
obligations to admit aliens.

N otes
1. However, it may be that the substantive division, in terms of human security, between forced migration and economic migration, is less than clear (United Nations
Human Rights Committee 2000).
2. Customary international law arises from the practice of states, combined with
opinion juris: a sense of being legally bound. Conventional international law is
treaty law: formal written agreements between states.
3. Plender (1988) notes, “As recently as at the end of the nineteenth century there
continued to be support for the view that the power to control the ingress and
egress of aliens was circumscribed by international law.” (See also Goodwin-Gill
[1978].)
4. Resolutions of the Institute of International Law 104 et seq. (Institute of International Law 1916). The Institute of International Law was a private body, involved
in formulating principles for adoption by states.
5. For a historical perspective, see Plender (1988).
6. See also Article 12(2) of the ICCPR 1966 and Article 5(d)(ii) of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Hannum
(1985).
7. See Martin (2003, p. 43), who cites the Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 12 April 1930, Art. 1, 179 LNTS 89,
which states that it is “for each state to determine under its own laws who are its
nationals.” See also Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (1923).
8. See also Protocol 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950).
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Europe
The EU has reached a very high level of formal labor market integration. It is fair to say that the EU has developed a set of disciplines
designed to ensure a high degree of labor market integration, while
respecting national regulatory and public policy prerogatives. Under
these disciplines, individual nationals of EU member states have the
formal right to enter the labor market of any other member state, without explicit or implicit discrimination, and without losing rights that
they would otherwise have, such as social security rights.
The history of the development of labor market integration in the
EU is salient to a study of broader international labor market integration, insofar as it represents a kind of maximal menu of labor market
integration devices. It is important to keep in mind that in the EU, free
movement of workers is the fourth freedom, with free movement of
goods, services, and capital, and is part of a broader integration project.
It is also important to keep in mind that Europe exhibits a high degree
of ethnic and political homogeneity. The issues that have arisen, and the
way that these issues have been addressed, both substantively and institutionally, can provide a checklist for anticipating issues that will arise
as other efforts at international legalization of migration are undertaken.
Therefore, this chapter attempts to provide a brief historical perspective
on the legal measures taken toward EU labor market integration. The
treatment is by no means exhaustive or detailed, but it is designed to
show the relative depth of integration.
It is also important to note at the outset that the EU still allows certain restrictions on freedom of movement, which include the possibility
of exclusion, the possibility of expulsion from the state of residence,
and limitations on the recognition of professional qualifications. For
example, persons who have never worked and who are dependent on
social assistance are generally denied the right of free movement, although Union citizens may have short-term rights of residence, and
family members of workers have greater rights.
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Finally, it is important to note that despite the formal facilitation of
intra-EU free movement through a remarkably extensive set of rules for
market access, equal treatment, and avoidance of disadvantage, Europeans do not migrate within Europe with great alacrity. There has been
a high degree of economic homogeneity, making migration less attractive. Given the heterogeneity in the broader international context, we
could not expect the experience of the EU to be replicated. Indeed, the
lesson of the EU is one of integration on a number of fronts, with investment and free movement of goods and services rendering migration
less compelling. While there are relations both of complementarity and
substitutability among these types of integration, it seems reasonable
to believe that the parallel integration along a number of dimensions
moderates the extent to which any one dimension experiences excessive flows.
There are four important components of free movement in EU
law.
1) Article 39 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, formerly Article 48, provides for free movement of European Community “workers”
within the European Community, without discrimination as to
employment.1 Article 39(3) permits exceptions for “public policy, public security, or public health” reasons.2
2) Article 43 of the Treaty of Rome provides for the “right of establishment,” including the right to take up and to pursue activities
as self-employed persons.
3) Article 49 prohibits restrictions on freedom to provide services
within the community, in respect of nationals of member states
who are established in a member state other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
4) Finally, under Article 18 of the Treaty of Rome, added in the
2001 Treaty of Nice, “every citizen of the Union shall have the
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in
this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.” This
incorporated in the Treaty of Rome extensions of the right of
movement that had been adopted by directives in June 1990.3
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Fr ee Mov ement o f Work ers
Article 39, which provides the basic commitment to free movement
of workers, is worth quoting in full:
1) Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the
Community.
2) Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions
of work and employment.
3) It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds
of public policy, public security or public health:
a)

to accept offers of employment actually made;

b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this
purpose;
c)

to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in
accordance with the provisions governing the employment
of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action;

d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having
been employed in that State, subject to conditions which
shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn
up by the Commission.
4) The provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in
the public service.

As discussed in subsequent sections, similar freedoms apply to selfemployed persons who wish to establish in another member state, and
to service providers who wish to travel to another member state temporarily in order to provide services.
Most member states of the EU have gone further to eliminate most
border formalities between member states through the 1985 and 1990
Schengen Agreements.4 See the discussion below. A total of 30 states,
including also three non-EU members (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland), have adhered to the Schengen Agreements. Ireland and the
United Kingdom do not participate in the common border control or
visa arrangements.
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S cope of Application: “Workers”
Article 39 only provides direct obligations with respect to “workers,” understood to be employees.5 Under Article 39, “the essential
feature of an employment relationship . . . is that for a certain period of
time a person performs services for and under the direction of another
person in return for which he receives remuneration” (Lawrie-Blum v.
Land Baden-Wurttemberg 1986, para. 17). The definition of “workers”
is a community definition, not one determined by national law (para.
16).
Although Article 39 grants free movement to “workers” or “workers of member states,” and does not explicitly require that these workers
be nationals of EU member states, as opposed to nationals of third
countries, the implementing regulation limits freedom of movement to
nationals of member states (Council of the European Union 1968a). The
issue of nationality is a matter of member state law.6 Furthermore, recall
that all “citizens” of the EU—meaning all member state citizens—are
now entitled to free movement under Article 18 of the Treaty of Rome.
Under Article 39(3), movement is predicated on the employment relationship—the freedom of movement is to accept offers of employment
actually made. Individuals also have the right to look for employment
in another member state (Royer 1976).7 The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has found a “right for nationals of the Member States to move
freely within the territory of other Member States and to stay there for
the purpose of seeking employment” (Antonissen 1991). However, the
duration of the stay for purposes of seeking employment is limited to “a
reasonable time” (Commission v. Belgium 1997).
Regulation 1251/70 provided that workers and family members
may remain in the territory of a member state after the worker’s employment there terminates.8 This provision has been supplemented, and
probably obviated, by the Residence Directive. 9 The Residence Directive also provides for certain rights of permanent residence for workers
who have reached pension age, or who have become incapacitated. Under Article 17 of the Residence Directive, family members who reside
with a worker in a host member state are entitled to remain if the worker
has acquired permanent residence, and under certain circumstances if
the worker dies while still working but before acquiring permanent
residence.
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Furthermore, individuals have the right to reside in another Member State regardless of their employment relationship, so long as they
meet an economic needs test and are covered by health insurance
(Council of the European Union 1990c.) Retirees also have the right of
residence.10
S cope of Application: S elf-Employed Persons through
Establishment or Freedom to Provide S ervices
Self-employed persons benefit from protections similar to those
available to employed persons. Self-employed persons may benefit
either from freedom to provide services, or from freedom of establishment, depending on the circumstances (Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, p.
89). Self-employed persons who establish in a host state are covered by
Articles 43–48 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 49 provides that “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be
prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established
in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom
the services are intended.” Establishment in this context “involves the
actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment for
an indefinite period” (Council of the European Union 2000).
Self-employed persons who engage in temporary travel in order
to provide services are covered by Articles 49–55. Under Article 50, a
“person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue
his activity in the State where the service is provided, under the same
conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.” Services
include activities of an industrial character, activities of a commercial
character, activities of craftsmen, and activities of the professions. Under these provisions, travel must be temporary, the services must be
remunerated, and the services must have some transnational, as opposed to wholly domestic, character.
Citizenship
Citizenship of the EU was established under the Maastricht Treaty,
which entered into force on November 1, 1993. Under Article 17(1)
of the Treaty of Rome, “[e]very person holding the nationality of a
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.” The first recital of the
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Residence Directive states that citizenship of the Union confers on every citizen of the Union a primary and individual right to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and to the measures
adopted to give it effect.
One of the goals of the Residence Directive was to link movement
more firmly to the citizenship status of citizens, rather than to their status as workers, retirees, students, or other categories. The Residence
Directive makes clear that citizens have
• rights of entry and exit;
• the right of residency for up to three months without conditions;
• the right of residency for longer if they are workers or selfemployed persons, or if they have sufficient resources not to b come a burden on the host state’s social security system as well
as health insurance;
• the right to have family members accompany them; and
• the right to permanent residence after a period of five years
S cope of Application: N ew Member S tates
Interestingly, a transitional arrangement was put in place in 2004
with respect to migration by workers from 10 newly acceding member states. This transition arrangement provided for three periods of
two years, three years, and two years. At the end of each period states
that had previously been members of the EU—the “EU 15”—would
determine whether they would liberalize for the subsequent period. A
similar arrangement was put in place for the two states that acceded in
2007, Bulgaria and Romania. These temporary derogations from freedom of movement of workers were required to expire after seven years.
Therefore, from May 1, 2011, for the initial 10 new adherents, and from
January 1, 2014, for Bulgaria and Romania, the transition period will
end and free movement of workers will be applicable in full.
Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom did not opt to apply the
transition provisions to the first round of 10 new adherents, and so initially decided not to restrict immigration from the new member states.
After a review of the transition arrangements in 2006, Greece, Italy,
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Spain, Portugal, and Finland decided to lift their transition restrictions,
and Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg decided to reduce their restrictions. With respect to the first round of 10
new adherents, only Germany and Austria have maintained full restrictions through the end of the transition period.
In 2007, in connection with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania,
all EU-15 countries except Sweden and Finland decided to restrict Bulgarians’ and Romanians’ access to their labor markets.
In 2006, the EU Commission was able to conclude, as to migration
from the 10 initial acceding states to the EU 15 as follows: “mobility
flows between the EU-10 and the EU-15 are very limited and are simply
not large enough to affect the EU labour market in general” (Commission of the European Communities 2006, p. 13).

Dis cri min ation
The pattern of nondiscrimination protection, and other protection,
applied to migrant workers from EU member states, is extensive. It is
extensive enough that there is little room for host state measures to deter or to disadvantage immigration, and thus little scope for extraction
of rents from immigrants.
Under Article 39(2) of the Treaty of Rome, migrant workers who
are EU citizens are protected from discrimination based on nationality, as regards employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work
and employment. Regulation 1612/68 was intended, and has been interpreted by the ECJ, to prohibit discrimination of various kinds against
workers from other Member States (Apap 2002, p. 35). Under Article
1, nationals of Member States have the right to take up employment in
other Member States under the same conditions as nationals.
Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 prohibits all forms of direct and
indirect, de jure and de facto, discrimination. Areas covered include social, housing, and tax advantages. Those in search of work are excluded
from coverage of Article 7.
Interestingly, Article 7(4) of Regulation 1612/68 provides that any
clause of a collective agreement or individual agreement concerning
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eligibility for employment, remuneration, or other conditions of work
is null and void insofar as it provides for discrimination against nationals of other Member States. This type of provision is needed to ensure
that restrictions under domestic collective bargaining agreements are
not used to replace immigration restrictions in order to exclude foreign
workers. Furthermore, Article 8 of the regulation provides for equality
of treatment in connection with membership in trade unions.
Dependents and S ocial S ecurity
Free movement may be less attractive to workers if their dependents are not permitted to join them, or to work once they arrive, or if
by moving they may forfeit accrued social security rights, or the opportunity to accrue social security rights.
Under Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68, the families of migrants
are required to be admitted to the host state. Under Article 7(2) of
Regulation 1612/68, families of workers are entitled to the same social
advantages as families of national workers. Article 11 entitles a community worker’s family members to work in the host state, even where
they are not community nationals. These provisions have been repealed
and replaced by similar provisions in the Residence Directive. Article
12 of Regulation 1612/68 provides that children of migrants shall be
admitted to general education and vocational training under the same
conditions as nationals. Council Directive 77/486/EC requires that
children of migrant workers be provided with tuition-free education,
including teaching of the official language of the host state (Council of
the European Union 1977).
Under Article 39(2) of the Treaty of Rome, workers from other
member states are entitled to equal treatment as to employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work and employment. This
entails the same social and tax advantages as nationals of the host state
(Council of the European Union 1971, Article 7[2]). The requirement
of nondiscrimination includes such programs as interest-free loans for
parents (Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden Wurttemberg 1982) educational grants for students (Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Munchen
1974), and even certain nonpecuniary benefits (Netherlands v. Ann
Florence Reed 1985). Member states have coordinated their social se-
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curity legislation in order to ensure that these measures do not restrict
mobility or result in unequal treatment. This coordination addresses
both workers and self-employed persons. Regulation 1408/71 addresses the application of social security schemes to workers. Regulation
1390/81 extends this pattern of arrangements to self-employed persons. It should be emphasized that this is a system for coordination
rather than harmonization.
The general approach is to ensure that an individual only must
contribute to a single social security scheme, and that the individual
obtains benefits that are not reduced by virtue of his or her transnational
movement. Three principles are involved. First, Community citizens
are permitted to receive benefits from the “source” state—the state in
which they were earned, despite a change in residency (Council of the
European Union 1971). Second, periods of employment or residence
in multiple member states are aggregated for purposes of meeting the
paying member state’s requirements. Third, the law of the state of employment is generally the governing law; Article 13(2) and Title II of
Regulation 1408/71 establish the principle of lex loci laboris.
Regulation 1408/71 covers sickness and maternity benefits, occupational accident and disease benefits, family benefits, unemployment
benefits, invalidity pensions and benefits, old age benefits, death grants
and survivors’ benefits (Council of the European Union 1971). It excludes social and medical assistance (Council Regulation 1408/71,
Article 4[4]). Nondiscrimination in social assistance and other “social
advantages” is addressed in Regulation 1612/68.

N on dis cri min at or y (I n distin ctl y Appli cabl e)
Re gul ation an d Pro fession al Qu ali fi cations
Generally speaking, the freedom to provide services “may be restricted only by rules justified by overriding requirements to public
interest and applicable to all persons and undertakings operating in the
territory of the State where the service is provided, in so far as the service is not safeguarded by rules to which the provider of such a service
is subject in the Member State where he is established” (Arblade 1999).
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In Terhoeve the ECJ held that “provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to
exercise his freedom of movement constitutes an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers
concerned. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether there is indeed discrimination on grounds of nationality” (Terhoeve 1999). This
principle was established for the first time in Van Binsbergen (1974).
Under these cases, a restriction may be justified if it is adopted in pursuit
of a public interest that is not incompatible with community objectives,
is nondiscriminatory, and is proportionate to the aim pursued.
For workers in regulated fields, which may require specified qualifications or licensing, freedom of movement requires that the relevant
qualifications be accepted in the host state, and that a license be made
available. The right of establishment under Articles 43, 49, and 54 of the
Treaty of Rome has been found to include a right of national treatment,
barring limitation of specified professions to nationals of the host state
(Reyners v. Belgium 1974). It also includes a right to have educational
qualifications from another member state recognized in the host state
(Patrick v. Ministre des Affaires Culturelles 1977; Thieffry v. Conseil de
l’Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris 1977).
Thus, “even if applied without any discrimination on the grounds of
nationality, national requirements concerning qualificatio s may have
the effect of hindering nationals of other member states in the exercise
of their right of establishment guaranteed to them by Article [43] of the
EEC Treaty. That could be the case if the national rules in question took
no account of the knowledge and qualifications already acquired by the
person concerned in another member state” (Vlassopoulou 1991).
Article 47 of the Treaty of Rome authorizes the Council of Ministers to legislate directives on the mutual recognition of diplomas and
other evidence of qualificati ns, and the council produced a number
of sectoral directives for certain professions. These sectoral directives
provided for essential harmonization, and conditions for recognition of
diplomas and other qualifications in particular sectors.
In addition, the so-called General Systems Directives, generally
provided for recognition across regulated professions, other than those
covered by sectoral directives. These directives had broad coverage,
basing recognition of qualifications on the principle of mutual trust.
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This principle of mutual trust seems more likely to be workable within
a broader integration project, within a thick institutional context, than
on a stand-alone basis.
The General Systems Directives, and the sectoral directives noted
above, were repealed as of October 20, 2007, and were replaced by
Directive 2005/36/EC, providing for both freedom of establishment
and freedom to provide services (Council of the European Union 2005;
Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, pp. 24, 96–109). However, the method of
recognition of qualifications established in the General Systems Directives will continue. The purpose of this new directive is expressed as
follows: “This Directive establishes rules according to which a Member
State which makes access to or pursuit of a regulated profession in its
territory contingent upon possession of specific professional qualific tions (referred to hereinafter as the host Member State) shall recognise
professional qualifications obtained in one or more other Member States
(referred to hereinafter as the home Member State) and which allow the
holder of the said qualifications to pursue the same profession there, for
access to and pursuit of that profession.”
Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2005/36/EC prohibit restrictions on
the freedom to provide services based on lack of professional qualific tions if the service provider is legally established in another member
state for purposes of pursuing the same profession there. This structure
is usefully compared with the process provided under GATS, described
in Chapter 8 below.
Under Directive 2005/36/EC, the member states retain the sovereignty to set their own standards of competency, but they must accept
foreign credentials as satisfactory of these standards. They may also
impose “compensation” requirements, such as adaptation periods, in
order to make up for differences in training and preparation in different
member states.
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Publi c Poli cy Ex ceptions, Ex
Se r vi ce Ex ceptions

pulsion,

an d Publi c

Under Article 39(3) of the Treaty of Rome, member states may
limit freedom of movement for certain public policy reasons. Similarly,
Article 46 allows limitations on the right of establishment by selfemployed persons. Directive 64/221 stipulates that exclusions under
these provisions must be based on the “personal conduct” of the individual concerned. “Personal conduct” can include the individual’s
membership in an organization (Van Duyn v. Home Offic 1974). Furthermore, to rely on a public policy exception, member states must act
in a nondiscriminatory manner by prohibiting similar conduct domestically (Rutili 1975; Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgium 1982). Generally,
these exceptions are to be construed narrowly.
Article 28 of the Residence Directive provides detailed restrictions
on a member state’s right to expel nationals of other member states.
EU citizens and their family members who have acquired permanent
residence cannot be expelled except on the basis of serious grounds of
public policy or public security. These grounds must be “imperative
grounds of public security” if the individuals have resided in the host
state for 10 years or more.
Under Article 29 of the Residence Directive, “the only diseases justifying measures restricting freedom of movement shall be the diseases
with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the
World Health Organization and other infectious diseases or contagious
parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provisions applying to nationals of the host Member State.”
This type of external reference to an expert multilateral organization with a different functional remit may be understood as a response
to the phenomenon of fragmentation in international law.
Articles 39(4) and 45 of the Treaty of Rome provide that the freedom
of movement to provide services, and the freedom of establishment, do
not apply to employment in the public service. This exception is limited
to activities involving “direct or indirect participation in the exercise of
powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the
general interest of the State or of other public authorities. Such posts
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in fact presume on the part of those occupying them the existence of
a special relationship of allegiance to the state . . . ” (Commission v.
Belgium 1980).

B or der Controls

an d Sc h eng en

Under the original Treaty of Rome, member states retained the right
to impose identity checks at their borders. In 1985, however, France,
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands created an area
without internal borders: the “Schengen area.”
The Schengen agreements do not extend the right of movement per
se, but facilitate it by abolishing border controls for all people among
the EU member states that are party to the Schengen agreements. A
protocol to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (the “Schengen Protocol”)
incorporated the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen
Convention (the “Schengen Agreements”) into the EU. The Schengen
Protocol authorized the signatories of the Schengen Agreements to
establish closer cooperation among themselves, so long as the cooperation takes place within the institutional framework of the EU (Weiss
and Wooldridge 2007, p. 38). Thus, the Schengen “acquis” has been
incorporated within the EU.
Article 62 of the Treaty of Rome authorizes the adoption of “measures with a view to ensuring, in compliance with Article 14, the absence
of any controls on persons, be they citizens of the Union or nationals
of third countries, when crossing internal borders.” This authorization
is intended to work with the Schengen Protocol to create the concept of
“free circulation” within the EU: once an immigrant crosses the external
border, he or she may travel throughout the internal borderless territory.
Within the Schengen area, only one state—the state of entry—is responsible for carrying out European immigration formalities. The principle
is something like “mutual recognition” for prudential regulation: it requires member states to trust the initial state to apply appropriate rules:
“The removal of internal border controls under the Schengen Agreement is compensated for by an extensive range of measures relating to
the intensifica ion of police cooperation; judicial cooperation regarding
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mutual assistance and extradition; the handing over of criminals; cooperation in combating drugs; the creation of the Schengen Information
System (SIS, a centralized databank of people and objects): the implementation of unified and stricter border controls, and the coordination
of asylum policies” (Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, p. 36).
This suggests that removal of border controls (as opposed to liberalization of the right of movement per se) can only be effected under
conditions where collateral measures are in place or may be implemented in coordination with the removal of border controls.
Currently, European immigration law includes a common visa regime, common requirements for crossing external borders, common
standards for border controls, and common conditions governing the
movement of third country nationals within the EU (Hailbronner 2000,
p. 125).
The United Kingdom and Ireland join in limited aspects of the
Schengen area, including police matters. According to the Protocol on
the application of certain aspects of Article 14 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Ireland are entitled to exercise such border controls as they “may consider necessary” in order to determine the right to
enter their territories of citizens of European Economic Area Member
States, and in order to determine whether or not to grant other persons
admission. Ireland exercises its rights under this protocol in order to
maintain its “common travel area” with the United Kingdom.
The 10 member states that acceded to the EU in 2004 will participate in Schengen following a transition period intended to allow them
to upgrade their border controls and information systems.
It is worth noting that the Schengen agreements, and the general
treatment of free movement of people in Europe, owe much to the Benelux treaty arrangements. These arrangements themselves had a long
and complex history, growing functionally and geographically over the
years from 1945 (Plender 1988, pp. 273–276).
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S u mmar y
Table 6.1 sets out the basic points of the EU program for free movement of labor. As has been apparent from the discussion thus far, the EU
has addressed the issues that are critical to migration within the EU. Up
until recent eastern European accessions, the EU was characterized by
a high degree of labor market homogeneity compared to the rest of the
world. This homogeneity, as suggested in Chapters 2 and 4, makes it
less likely that large numbers of workers will migrate. It is also true that
the extensive liberalization of movement of goods and services trade
across EU borders also makes it less likely that large numbers of workers will migrate (except to the extent that migration is complementary
to trade). This latter effect also applies to the new accession states. With
the Fifth Enlargement, in 2004 and 2007, greater migration was expected due to greater wage differentials. However, thus far, migration
has not been as great as expected.

I nt ern ation al Migr ation

t o th e EU

Of course, the EU has both an internal migration policy and an
international migration policy. While EU citizens have broad internal
migration rights, third-party nationals also obtain more limited internal
migration rights and practically nonexistent rights to migrate into the
EU.
The EU has not extended to third-country nationals broad rights to
enter the EU in order to work. The Council Resolution of 20 June 1994
on limitation on admission of third-country nationals to the territory of
the member states for employment mandates that “Member States will
refuse entry to their territories of third country nationals for the purpose
of employment.”11 It then provides a number of exceptions, and sets out
procedures for admission of third-country nationals for employment.
Articles 61, 62, and 63 of the Treaty of Rome, added in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, provide authority for establishment of a common
approach to immigration of third-country nationals. Under Article 63,
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the council is directed to adopt measures, inter alia, on “conditions of
entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas and residence permits, including those for
the purpose of family reunion . . . ”
The European Council agreed in Tampere (Finland) in October
1999 on the elements of an EU immigration policy:
• It will be based on a comprehensive approach to the management
of migratory flows so as to find a balance between humanitarian
and economic admission.
• It will include fair treatment for third-country nationals aiming
as far as possible to give them comparable rights and obligations
to those of nationals of the member state in which they live.
• A key element in management strategies must be the development of partnerships with countries of origin including policies
of codevelopment (Commission of the European Communities
2000).
Third-country nationals present in the territory of the EU occupy
an ambiguous position in connection with their eligibility for EU rights
(Hailbronner 2000, p. 307). Moreover, different groups of third-country
nationals have different rights. We must distinguish among different
types of rights. For example, the social rights incorporated in Articles
138, 139, and 140 of the Treaty of Rome are generally applicable to
third-country nationals. For these purposes, we must also distinguish
among different categories of third-country nationals, including refugees, family members of EU citizens, and those who acquire rights
pursuant to an association agreement, cooperation agreement, or other
international agreement.

EU B lu e Car d Pro pos al
Pursuant to Article 63, the EU has proposed the introduction of
a Blue Card program as part of a plan to encourage the migration of
skilled labor in the form of third-country nationals into the EU (the Blue
Card Proposal) (Commission of the European Communities 2007a,b).
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This proposal is expected to be implemented in 2009. The proposed
draft directive (the Draft Directive) provides that, like the U.S. Green
Card, the Blue Card shall be a combination of a residence permit and a
work visa that would allow holders and their families to live, work, and
travel within the EU. The Blue Card shall be administered by individual
member states.
Specificall , Article 5 of the Draft Directive provides that thirdcountry nationals may apply for a Blue Card if they present a valid
work contract or an offer of a job of at least one year in the member state
concerned and satisfy the conditions set out under the member state’s
national regulations in the case of particular regulated professions or
have at least three years’ professional experience in unregulated professions. Further, Article 9 of the Draft Directive allows member states
to apply their labor market policies regarding vacancies in their labor
markets when deciding whether or not to approve an application for the
Blue Card. As noted in the preamble to the Draft Directive, the Blue
Card proposal is meant to be a “flexible demand driven entry system”
(Commission of the European Communities 2007a).
Once granted, the Blue Card entitles the holder to the same tax benefits, social assistance, and payment of pensions as EU nationals when
moving to another country (Article 15 of the Draft Directive). Also,
Article 13 provides that the Blue Card shall be valid for two years and
may be renewed. Further, the holder of a Blue Card shall be allowed
to cumulate periods of residence in different member states (after two
years of legal residence in a member state) so as to apply for long-term
residence status in the EU (Articles 17 and 19 of the Draft Directive).
The Blue Card proposal requires approval from the EU Member
States but has been hailed by the EC as a step toward solving problems
of the EU’s aging population (European Union 2007). Most recently, it
was noted by EC President Jose Barroso that the EU attracts 5 percent
of skilled labor from developing countries while the U.S. attracts 55
percent. It is hoped that the Blue Card proposal will help to even this
out (EurActiv 2008). Despite this optimism, the proposal has seen some
resistance from inside and outside the EU. Germany has commented
that immigration should remain the competence of individual member
states. Further, the Netherlands has expressed reservations while Austria called for further “clarifications” in the field of social security and
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minimum wages, saying it was already offering higher levels of protection. The UK has also suggested an alternative plan which is based on
a points system (Deutsche Welle 2007). In addition, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries commented that the Blue Card proposal
may cause a brain drain in Africa.

T h e EU an d T urk ey
Turkey has a closer and more complex relationship with the EU, especially in the field of migration, than any other associated state. Article
12 of the association agreement between Turkey and the EU provides
that the contracting parties shall be guided by Articles 39, 40, and 41 of
the Treaty of Rome for the purpose of progressively securing freedom
of movement of workers. This provision is aspirational, and does not
have direct effect. Member states are prohibited under Article 37 of the
additional protocol to the association agreement to discriminate against
Turkish workers in relation to conditions of work and remuneration.
This requirement amounts to a requirement of national treatment and
has direct effect (Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, p. 209).
Under Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkish Council of Association, a
Turkish worker who has been duly admitted and registered to work in a
member state of the EU has the following rights (Weiss and Wooldridge
2007, p. 210):
1) After one year of legal employment, to the renewal of his permit
to work for the same employer.
2) After three years of legal employment and subject to the priority
of EU workers, to take up another offer of employment for the
same occupation with an employer of his choice.
3) After four years of legal employment, to have access to any legal
employment of his choice.
This type of graduated accretion of rights is a way of managing
the transition from worker to man, while providing some protections
against excessive numbers of foreign workers claiming permanent
rights to work. It may be instructive in terms of the management of a
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transition from temporary to permanent employment in other international migration arrangements.
A similar graduated structure is provided for family members under
Article 7 of Decision 1/80: The members of the family of a Turkish
worker duly registered as belonging to the labor force of a member state
who have been authorized to join him:
Shall be entitled—subject to the priority given to Member States
of the Community—to respond to any offer of employment after
they have been legally resident for at least three years in that Member State.
Shall enjoy free access to any paid employment of their choice
provided they have been resident there for at least five years.
Children of Turkish workers who have completed a course of vocational training in the host country may respond to any offer of
employment there, irrespective of the length of time they have
been resident in that Member State, provided that one of their parents has been legally employed in the Member State concerned for
at least three years.

N otes
1. See Article 48 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(throughout this chapter, I use the updated numbering of provisions).
2. For an application, see Rutili v. Minister for the Interior (1982).
3. See Council of the European Union (1990a,b; 2004) on residence rights. Directive 2004/38/EC repealed and replaced Directive 90/365/EC, providing for similar
rights.
4. See the Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
Gradual Abolition of Controls at the Common Frontiers, June 14, 1985 as amended
by Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985 between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic
of Germany and the French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their
Common Borders, June 19, 1990. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain
Related Acts, Annex B Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the European Union (“Treaty of Amsterdam”) (entered into force May 1,
1999).
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5. See Council Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968, and Directive 68/360 of 15
October 1968, referring to the right to take up an activity as an “employed person”
(Council of the European Union 1968a,b).
6. Declaration No. 2 on nationality of a member state attached to the Maastricht
Treaty on EU states that “whenever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether
an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by
reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.” See also Micheletti
and Others v. Delegacion del Goberno en Cantabria (1992). The Treaty of Amsterdam added Article 17 to the Treaty of Rome, providing that “citizenship of the
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.”
7. See also Council Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within
the Community (Council of the European Union 1968a).
8. See Council Regulation 1251/70 of 29 June 1970, on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed in that state
(Council of the European Union 1970).
9. Council Directive 2004/38/EC (the “Residence Directive”). The Residence Directive is applicable to all EU citizens who move to or reside in a member state other
than that of which they are a national, as well as their family members who accompany or join them (Council of the European Union 2004).
10. See Directive 90/365/EEC of June 28, 1990, on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity
(Council of the European Union 1990a).
11. Council Resolution of June 20, 1994, on limitation on admission of third-country
nationals to the territory of the member states for employment.
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7
Other Bilateral, Regional,
and Plurilateral Arrangements
The intellectual history of international agreements regarding migration is reflected in preexisting international agreements. Draftsmen
prefer to use existing precedents, existing precedents often have been
produced through negotiations under similar constraints, and negotiators often find it compelling to request a concession granted by their
counterparty in another context. So each international agreement that
addresses migration has antecedents and descendents. Furthermore, as
negotiators seek to determine what may come next, it is useful to examine what already exists and ask why it exists. Regional or plurilateral
agreements have served as models for the WTO’s GATS, and have also
incorporated and expanded upon GATS commitments. I point out in
Chapter 6 how some of the EU’s arrangements may serve as models for
future agreements. The EU’s arrangements are the most sophisticated
and are among the most liberal arrangements so far devised for international legal liberalization of movement of workers.
However, there are several bilateral, regional, and plurilateral arrangements for labor mobility beyond the EU. Some of these are based
on historically rooted arrangements, such as the British Commonwealth,
the Nordic arrangements, or bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation. Others are bilateral agreements for management of labor flows. Others are more recent adjuncts to bilateral or regional free
trade agreements or customs unions. The goal of this chapter is not to
provide a comprehensive survey of all arrangements, but to provide a
reasonably descriptive set of modern examples in order to assess the
variety of arrangements for migration.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Nielson suggests that, generally, agreements among countries that are geographically proximate and at similar
levels of development entail greater liberalization of labor mobility
(Nielson 2003, pp. 93, 94). This itself is an interesting observation and
may be suggestive of patterns that we might expect to see in global ar-
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rangements. Of course, if global arrangements are subjected to a broad
MFN-type principle of nondiscrimination, then liberalizations motivated by proximity and economic similarity would also benefit those
farther away and at differing levels of development.
Indeed, it is worthwhile here to observe that, as we will see below,
the states of virtually all of Europe, most of Latin America, much of Africa, and Australia and New Zealand are party to fairly comprehensive
regional agreements for liberalization of labor movement. These agreements do operate at fairly homogeneous economic levels, and in fairly
proximate geographic circumstances. However, some of these agreements in Africa and Latin America have not been fully implemented.
These agreements demonstrate that, at least outside of Asia and North
America, states have been willing to negotiate legal commitments for
liberalization of labor migration.
One of the critical questions in any global liberalization of migration will be the scope of application, if any, of the principle of MFN. Of
course, the arrangements examined in this chapter are all inconsistent
with a global principle of MFN, and may even raise issues under existing GATS MFN obligations. I discuss the issue of MFN in detail in
Chapter 9.

Bil ate ral Labor Ag reements
The principal type of international arrangement—formal or informal—between states relating to labor migration is the bilateral labor
agreement. These agreements are generally, although not exclusively,
concluded between labor sending and labor receiving countries. These
agreements generally exclude coverage of commitments to accept migrants: they are not labor market access agreements. While they do not
contain commitments, they often have the result of providing privileged
labor market access to citizens of the sending country partner. They
therefore raise some issues of MFN-type treatment, and of competition
among potential sending countries (Panizzon 2008).
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Puri (2007, p. 105) warns
There exists the danger of exclusivity and marginalization for countries that are not on the radar screen of major developed country
receiving markets for political, cultural, or geographical reasons.
Not all developing countries wishing to export their labour can
expect to be engaged by the major developed countries in bilateral
labour agreements. Even if they do, their bargaining power would
be very weak as receiving countries would have the upper hand in
determining the conditions of the bilateral relations, for example,
in terms of defining the sector, job or occupation, quotas, period of
stay and renewability, and terms and conditions of employment.

Most bilateral labor agreements deal, often in nonbinding terms,
with managerial and collateral issues of recruitment, remittances, and
return: they address important issues of management related to migration that will be permitted unilaterally by the home and destination
states. Sending countries may be responsible for prescreening migrant
workers, including ensuring that they do not have criminal records.
These agreements also may provide for measures to ensure return to
the home country. These measures may include incentives or sanctions
applied to employers or employees to ensure return. Recent agreements
have also sought to ensure cooperation to restrict illegal immigration.
There are hundreds of bilateral labor agreements in force. The
OECD countries alone have entered into more than 176 bilateral labor
agreements (OECD 2004).
Geronimi (2004, pp. 23–26) lists 24 basic elements of an international labor agreement. I have highlighted the provisions that might be
expected to be found in an international agreement for labor market
access:
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1) The competent government authority.

13) Employment contract.

2) Exchange of information.

14) Employment conditions.

3) Migrants in an irregular
situation.

15) Conflict esolution
mechanism.

4) Notification of jo
opportunities.

16) T he role of trade
unions and collective
bargaining rights.

5) Drawing up a list of
candidates.

17) S ocial security.

6) Pre-selection of candidates.

18) Remittances.

7) Final selection of candidates.

20) Family reunification

8) Nomination of candidates
by the employers (possibility for the employer to
provide directly the name
of a person to be hired).
9) Medical examination.
10) E ntry documents.
11) Residence and work
permits.

19) Provision of housing.
21) Activities of social and
religious organizations.
22) Establishment of a joint
commission (to monitor
the agreements’ implementation).
23) Validity and renewal of
the agreement.
24) Applicable jurisdiction.

12) Transportation.

These bilateral agreements, while very important to deal with a
number of managerial and practical issues, ordinarily do not provide
formal commitments to market access, national treatment, or most favored nation treatment, or address other important economic issues.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of northern European countries
had bilateral agreements with southern European and North African
countries, or with developing countries, seeking to ensure orderly migration (Leary 2003). Germany, France, and Belgium had similar programs
in the late 1950s and 1960s, sometimes covered by bilateral agreements
governing working conditions and home country obligations.
From 1942 to 1964, the United States and Mexico had a series of
agreements relating to temporary farm work, generally known as the
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Bracero program. The Bracero program was initiated due to predictions in the U.S. agricultural market that there would be labor shortages
during the fall harvest in 1942. Accordingly, the U.S. agricultural sector
requested the U.S. government to recruit Mexican workers. Consequently, a number of bilateral agreements were concluded between the
two governments. The Mexican government, sensitive about the conditions under which some of its nationals had previously worked in the
United States, and doubtful that there was a real labor shortage, insisted that the U.S. government guarantee the contracts that the farmers
provided the migrant workers. The Bracero program brought 5 million
rural Mexicans to the rural United States over the next two decades,
and the status of many Mexicans was legalized after they arrived in the
United States (Martin 1993, pp. 60–61).
More recently, bilateral labor agreements have emphasized issues of
management, focusing on recruitment, remittances, and return, as well
as action to limit informal migration. These bilateral labor agreements
may be viewed as incorporating a particular type of reciprocity. The
home state assists with recruitment, remittances, and ensuring return,
while also perhaps acting to limit informal migration, and in exchange
the destination state unilaterally accepts migrants from the home state
(Panizzon 2008).

Free Tra de Are as and Cust oms U ni ons
This section examines the migration features of free trade area and
customs union agreements. These agreements address broader issues of
trade in goods and services, but also accept that migration is relevant
to trade in goods and services. These agreements also sometimes address migration in its own right, as a “fourth freedom” of movement of
factors.
Comprehensive Arrangements for M obility
In this section, I describe arrangements that provide for comprehensive free movement of workers. In the next section, I describe
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arrangements that provide for free movement by selected groups of
workers. Nielson (2003) provides a more refined taxonomy of these
agreements, from which the organization of this section is adapted.
T he E uropean E conomic Area and the E uropean Free
T rade Agreement
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway are members of the EEA, with
the EU. The European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) states are Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
Under the European Economic Area Agreement (EEAA), EEA nationals may enter the EU as workers, self-employed persons, or service
providers. These arrangements are very similar to those available to EU
citizens, as described in Chapter 6.
The EEAA agreement provides that workers can stay or move
freely within EU and EFTA states for the purpose of employment and
remain after having been employed. Immigrants are required to have
sufficient funds to avoid reliance on public support. There are a number of exceptions from liberalization, including access to public service
employment. The EEAA protects workers against discrimination based
on nationality with regard to employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work and employment (Nielson 2003, p. 99).
Article 28 of the EEAA provides as follows:
1) Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured among EC
member states and EFTA states.
2) Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of EC member states and EFTA states as regards employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work and employment.
3) It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds
of public policy, public security, or public health
• to accept offers of employment actually made;
• to move freely within the territory of EC member states and
EFTA States for this purpose;
• to stay in the territory of an EC member state or an EFTA
state for the purpose of employment in accordance with the
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provisions governing the employment of nationals of that
state laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action;
and
• to remain in the territory of an EC member state or an EFTA
state after having been employed there.
4) The provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in
the public service.
5) Annex V contains specific provisions on the free movement of
workers.
Rights of establishment are also guaranteed, even for self-employed
persons (Article 31 of the EEAA). There are no restrictions on the
freedom to provide services, and temporary service providers receive
national treatment. However, there are exceptions for public policy,
public security, or public health and the exercise of official authority.
Exceptions also apply for the exercise of official authority, and special
conditions apply to transport, financial, audiovisual, and telecommunications services (Nielson 2003, p. 99).
Moreover, the EEAA facilitates the free movement of labor by
providing for an integrated social security structure. Article 29 of the
EEAA states that
in order to provide freedom of movement for workers and selfemployed persons, the Contracting Parties shall, in the field of social security, secure, as provided for in Annex VI, for workers and
self-employed persons and their dependants, in particular:
a)

aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the
right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of
all periods taken into account under the laws of the several
countries;

b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of
Contracting Parties.

Furthermore, Article 30 of the EEAA ensures that measures are
taken for mutual recognition of educational and professional qualifications: “In order to make it easier for persons to take up and pursue
activities as workers and self-employed persons, the Contracting Parties
shall take the necessary measures, as contained in Annex VII, concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence
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of formal qualifications, and the coordination of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Contracting Parties concerning the taking up and pursuit of activities by workers and
self-employed persons.”
The Agreement Amending the Convention Establishing the EFTA
(which entered into force on June 1, 2002) (the EFTA Agreement) has
similar provisions to the EEAA. These amendments largely extend to
the entire EFTA area (i.e., also including Switzerland) the arrangements
existing amongst the EFTA-EEA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway). However, there are some limits and transition periods. Freedom
of movement into Switzerland from the other EFTA states is subject
to transition periods of up to five years. Switzerland reserves special
quotas for EFTA citizens. Special rules govern frontier workers, public
service and public authority activities, and the acquisition of real estate
in Switzerland (Nielson 2003, p. 99).
However, Annex K to Chapter VIII of the EFTA Agreement is a
new development in comparison to the EEAA provisions on free movement of persons, as it sets out a comprehensive framework with respect
to administration of free movement of persons. In particular, it specifies
particular rights of such persons and consolidates previously elucidated
rights into a specific document. Specific provision is made for right
of entry, right of residence, nondiscrimination, recognition of professional qualifications, and coordination of social security. One notable
development in Annex K of Chapter VIII of the EFTA Agreement is the
establishment of a “Committee on the Movement of Persons,” which
provides a centralized authority for the management and proper implementation of Annex K.
T he T rans-T asman T ravel Arrangement and Australia–N ew
Zealand Closer E conomic Relations T rade Agreement
The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA) is not a formal
treaty but a set of parallel policies whereby Australian and New Zealand citizens may live and work in the other country indefinitel .
Although the TTTA previously required no visas, New Zealand nationals are currently required to hold a Special Category Visa, denoted
in their passports with an arrival date stamp. This requirement stems
from the negotiation of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
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Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) Review of 1992 where there
were concerns on the part of Australia over use of New Zealand as
an easy transit point for international criminals who could use liberal
movement privileges to enter Australia. This requirement was only accepted by New Zealand after Australia had made assurances that this
new policy would not violate the spirit of the TTTA. Use of a special
category visa meant that there would be no cumbersome application
procedures for New Zealand citizens entering Australia (Hoadley 1995,
pp. 89, 94–97).
Australian citizens are exempt from any requirement to hold a visa
to travel to New Zealand or a permit to be in New Zealand, and residents
of Australia are exempt from the requirement to obtain a temporary or
residence visa. Certain exclusions apply, principally for persons with
a criminal record. Australians traveling to New Zealand require only a
valid Australian passport.
The most recent reaffirmation of the TTTA was on February 26,
2001, when Prime Ministers Helen Clark and John Howard announced
new trans-Tasman social security arrangements (New Zealand Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001). Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement
on Social Security provide that a person would be entitled to receive a
benefit under the social security laws of either New Zealand or Australia except that he or she is not ordinarily resident or resident and present
in either state on the date of application for that benefit, that person shall
be deemed, for the purposes of that application, to be ordinarily resident
and resident and present in either state on that date, if he or she is present in either state, is a resident of either state, or intends to be a resident
of either state.
The ANZCERTA regime, through its protocol on services, provides
a parallel arrangement relating to the provision of full market access
and national treatment for all service providers, including individual
service providers. Article 4 of the ANZCERTA Protocol on Services
provides as follows:
Each Member State shall grant to persons of the other Member
State and services provided by them access rights in its market no
less favourable than those allowed to its own persons and services
provided by them.
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Article 5 of the ANZCERTA Protocol provides for national
treatment:
1) Each Member State shall accord to persons of the other Member
State and services provided by them treatment no less favourable
than that accorded in like circumstances to its persons and services provided by them.
2) Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the treatment a
Member State accords to persons of the other Member State may
be different from the treatment the Member State accords to its
persons, provided that:
a)

the difference in treatment is no greater than that necessary
for prudential, fiduciar , health and safety or consumer protection reasons; and

b) such different treatment is equivalent in effect to the treatment accorded by the Member State to its ordinary residents
for such reasons.
3) The Member State proposing or according different treatment
under paragraph 2 of this Article shall have the burden of establishing that such treatment is consistent with that paragraph.
4) No provision of this Article shall be construed as imposing obligations or conferring rights upon either Member State with respect to Government procurement or subsidies.

Further, Article 6 of the ANZCERTA Protocol provides MFN treatment: “In relation to the provision of services inscribed by it in the
Annex, each Member State shall accord to persons of the other Member
State and services provided by them treatment no less favourable than
that accorded in like circumstances to persons of third States.”
Nielson (2003, p. 100) notes, “Because all service suppliers are
covered, the agreement does not feature detailed definitio s of types of
personnel, nor does it distinguish between different modes of delivering
services. However, certain service sectors are excluded from coverage
by the parties (in the Annex to ANZCERTA Protocol) and the agreement
also is subject to the foreign investment policies of the member states.”
Sectors excluded by the annex to the ANZCERTA Protocol include, for
both states, aviation sector, communications, and shipping.
Moreover, to facilitate the liberalization of trade in services,
ANZCERTA’s ancillary agreement, the Trans-Tasman Mutual Rec-
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ognition Agreement (TTMRA), provides for mutual recognition of
professional qualifications
Article 5.1.1 of the TTMRA provides as follows:
Under this Arrangement, a person who is Registered to practise an
occupation under a law of an Australian Party will be entitled to
practise an Equivalent occupation under the law of New Zealand
and a person Registered to practise an occupation under a law of
New Zealand will be entitled to practise an Equivalent occupation
under the law of any Australian Party. As a condition of Registration the person seeking Registration will be required to lodge with
the relevant Local Registration Authority a written notice containing certain basic information relating to his or her current Registration.

Further, Article 5.1.2 of the TTMRA states: “The Arrangement is
not intended to affect the operation of laws that regulate the manner of
carrying on an occupation, provided those laws: (a) apply equally to
all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation; and (b)
are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or
experience relating to fitness to practise the occupation.
Yet, despite these developments, a completely integrated TransTasman labor market has not yet developed. As Carmichael, Buetow,
and Farmer (1993, p. 9) note, “[the TTMA and ANZCERTA] have rendered unlikely any major restriction of the free flow of people between
Australia and New Zealand . . . ANZCERTA may have promoted some
long-term migration at the upper end of the occupational spectrum as
companies became more Australasian in outlook. According to many
commentators, a common trans-Tasman labour market has been developing. It is characterized by free access but persistent wage differences,
with specific occupational groups migrating in response to changes in
demand.”
Andean Community
In 2003, the Andean Community adopted the Andean Community
Labour Migration Instrument (Decision 545), which provides for the
progressive establishment of freedom of movement and temporary residence for employment purposes among the member states: Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (Andean Community 2003a).
(Venezuela has since withdrawn from the Andean Community.) The In-
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strument was preceded by an earlier effort, Decision 503, which was
limited to entry and exit for tourism, and did not address establishment
or movement for labor. Therefore, Decision 545 provides as follows:
Article 1. The objective of this Instrument is to establish provisions that will progressively and gradually permit the unhampered
movement and temporary residence of Andean nationals in the
subregion as wage workers.
Article 2. This Decision shall be applicable to Andean migratory
workers. Excluded from its sphere of application are people who
work for the public administration and those whose activities
threaten public morals, law and order, human life and health and
the essential interests of national security.

Decision 545 establishes four categories of migrant workers: 1)
individually moving workers; 2) company workers; 3) seasonal workers; and 4) border workers (Article 4). Individually moving workers are
those who have signed an employment contract or answered a call for
employment (Article 5). Company workers are already employed and
are sent to another Andean country by their employer (Article 6).
The decision also establishes the rights of Andean migrant workers.
In particular, it guarantees equal treatment (Article 10), and provides
for protection of the families of migrant workers. It includes permission
for unhampered entry and exit of migrant workers and their spouses,
children, parents, and dependents.
Decision 545 elucidates additional rights of migrant workers intended to facilitate migration. Article 13 provides as follows:
Member Countries shall guarantee Andean migrant workers the
following:
a)

Freedom to transfer funds earned by their work, with the
observance of the pertinent legal provisions insofar as tax
obligations or judicial orders are concerned;

b) Freedom to transfer sums owned by migrant workers in payment for food; this cannot be impeded in any case;
c)

That the income from their work can be taxed only in the
country where it was earned;

d) Free access to the competent administrative and legal authorities in order to exercise and defend their rights;
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e)

Access to the social security systems, in keeping with the
Community provisions that are in effect; and

f)

The payment of social benefits to Andean migrant workers
who work or have worked in the territory of the Member
Countries, in keeping with the legislation of the Country of
Immigration.

Importantly, Decision 545 provides for a safeguard mechanism,
which is worth quoting at length:
Article 16.
In the event of a disturbance that seriously threatens the employment situation in a given geographic zone or a given sector or
branch of economic activity, that is capable of causing effective
damage or that poses an exceptional risk to the people’s standard
of living, Member Countries may make a temporary exception
of up to six months in the principle of equal access to employment and shall communicate that circumstance and the period of
that exception to the rest of the Member Countries and to the Andean Community General Secretariat. The latter may propose the
amendment or suspension of the measure if it is not proportional
to the damage or risk that is to be avoided or is not in keeping with
the principles established in Andean law. Venezuela may establish
a temporary exception lasting up to one year, for reciprocal application by the rest of the Member Countries.
If the situation envisaged in this article makes it necessary to take
immediate measures, the interested Member Country may apply
those measures as an emergency response, and shall in that case
communicate them immediately to the General Secretariat, which
shall announce its decision within the following thirty days, either
authorizing, amending or suspending the measures.
The Member Country that has adopted that exception, with the
presentation of the pertinent substantiation, may extend that measure once only and for an equal period of time with the authorization of the Andean Community General Secretariat.
A Member Country that makes use of the safeguard clause contained in this article shall respect the stability of the workers who
migrated before the date of its application.

The right of access to social security was given particular emphasis in Decision 546 on the creation of the Andean Community Social
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Security Instrument, which recognizes the need to “guarantee the appropriate social protection of migrant workers and their beneficiaries
so that their social rights are not reduced as a result of their migration”
(Andean Community 2003b). It further provides in the preamble that
“migrant workers and their beneficiaries shall be acknowledged in any
of the Member Countries to possess the same social security rights and
obligations as the nationals of those countries.”
The Andean Community Social Security Instrument provides
guidelines to determine the national legislation that governs a particular
migrant worker’s access to social security (Articles 5 and 6 of the Social Security Instrument).
T he E conomic Community of West African S tates
In 1975, the member states of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) entered into the ECOWAS Treaty, providing for free movement of individuals, the right of establishment, and
the prohibition of discrimination (ECOWAS 2001a).1 ECOWAS members include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Togo. Article 59 of the ECOWAS Treaty provides
that “citizens of the community shall have the right of entry, residence
and establishment and Member States undertake to recognize these
rights of Community citizens in their territories” in accordance with the
Protocols entered into by the member states.2
The 1979 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, A/P.1/5/79, provides in Article 2 as
follows:
The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States. The right of entry, residence
and establishment referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional
period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of
this Protocol by abolishing all other obstacles to free movement of
persons and the right of residence and establishment.
The right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be
established in the course of a transitional period shall be accomplished in three phases, namely:
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Phase I—Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa
Phase II—Right of Residence
Phase III—Right of Establishment
Upon the expiration of a maximum period of five (5) years from
the definitive entry into force of this Protocol, the Commission,
based upon the experience gained from the implementation of the
first phase as set out in Article 3 below, shall make proposals to the
Council of Ministers for further liberalisation towards the subsequent phases of freedom of residence and establishment of persons
within the Community and phases shall be dealt with in subsequent Annexes to this Protocol. (ECOWAS 2001b)

Phase I was to be implemented via Article 3 which provides that any
citizen of the community who wishes to enter the territory of another
member state shall be required to possess a valid travel document and
an international health certificate. Moreover, citizens are not required
to have visas if they are visiting for less than 90 days. Article 11 of this
protocol also provides for the circumstances in which a citizen may be
expelled and the rights of expelled citizens.
This was followed by several supplementary protocols. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/7/85 on the Code of Conduct for the Implementation
of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence
and Establishment specifies the obligations of states to establish cooperation between respective immigration authorities, clarifying the rights
of illegal immigrants. Also, Decision A/DEC.2/7/85 on the Establishment of ECOWAS Travel Certificates for Member States provides for a
harmonized travel document other than national passports for use within ECOWAS in order to facilitate and simplify formalities governing
movement of persons across borders (ECOWAS 1999).
In 1986, Supplementary Protocol A/SP/.1/7/86 (the Phase II Protocol) implemented Phase II, providing for rights of residence (ECOWAS
2001c). Article 2 of the Phase II Protocol provides as follows: “For
the purpose of implementing the second phase (right of residence) of
the Protocol on free movement of persons, the right of residence and
establishment, each of the Member States shall grant to citizens of the
Community, who are nationals of other Member States, the right of residence in its territory for the purpose of seeking and carrying out income
earning employment.”
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Further, the right of residence includes the right to apply for jobs
offered, to travel freely for the purposes of applying for jobs, to reside
in one of the member states in order to take up employment and to live
in the territory of a member state. Exercise of these rights is only contingent upon the citizen of the community’s acquisition of an ECOWAS
residence card or residence permit (Article 5 of the Phase II Protocol).
The Phase II Protocol also distinguishes between border area, seasonal, or itinerant workers. Articles 10, 11, and 12 provide for the rights
of each category respectively. Border area workers have the right to
choose their employment freely and also enjoy all rights to which they
are entitled through their presence and their work in the territory of the
host member state, with the exception of rights relating to residence.
Seasonal workers are entitled to enjoy all rights to which they are entitled through their presence and their work in the territory of the host
member state. Itinerant workers shall enjoy the same except with respect to rights relating to residence or to employment.
Further, Articles 13 and 14 of the Phase II Protocol provide for protection against collective and arbitrary expulsion as well as individual
expulsion. They also provide for respect for the fundamental rights of
the migrant worker. Article 25 states that rights guaranteed in this protocol may not be withdrawn or waived: “Any form of pressure exerted on
migrant workers or members of their families to force them to give up
any of these rights or to refrain from exercising them shall be prohibited.
Any clause of an Agreement or Contract designed to force the migrant
worker to give up any of these rights or refrain from exercising them
shall be null and void according to the provisions of this Protocol.”
To facilitate the free movement of the migrant workers specified in
the Phase II Protocol, Article 17 provides for freedom of remittance.
In 1990, Supplementary Protocol A/SP/2/5/90 was entered into to
provide for the implementation of Phase III (the Phase III Protocol): the
right of establishment (ECOWAS 2001d). Article 4 states:
In matters of establishment and services, each Member State shall
undertake to accord non-discriminatory treatment to nationals and
companies of other Member States. If, however, for a specific
activity, a Member State is unable to accord such treatment, the
Member State must indicate as much, in writing, to the Executive
Secretariat. Other Member States shall then not be bound to accord
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non-discriminatory treatment to nationals and companies of the
State concerned.
The provisions of this Protocol and measures taken as a result
thereof shall be without prejudice to the application of legislative
and administrative provisions, which provide a special treatment
for non-nationals and are justified by exigencies of public order,
security or public health.
On the recommendation of the Commission, and on the proposal
of the Council, the Authority shall take the relevant decision for
the co-operation and harmonisation of legislative, statutory and
administrative provisions which, in at least one Member State,
make access to certain non-salaried activities (liberal or non-liberal
professionals) and the exercise of such activities subject to protective or restrictive measures.
To facilitate access to non-salaried activities and the exercise of
such activities, the Commission shall recommend to the Council,
which shall propose to the Authority that decisions be taken for the
mutual recognition at Community level of diplomas, certificates
and other qualifications.
Activities which, in a Member State, form part, even occasionally,
of the exercise of public authority, shall be exempted from the provisions of this Protocol.

Despite this impressive set of legal rules, implementation of free
movement within ECOWAS remains a challenge. “Most countries of
the subregion have enacted, or retained, a series of laws that in effect restrict ‘foreigners’ (including nationals of ECOWAS) from participating
in certain kinds of economic activities . . .” (Adepoju 2007). Addressing
a media briefing ahead of the ECOWAS commission’s 32nd anniversary scheduled for May 28, 2007, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, president
of the ECOWAS Commission, said that “the effective implementation
of our regional protocol on free movement of persons remains one of
our major challenges since the creation of ECOWAS” (People’s Daily
Online 2007).
T he Common M arket for E astern and S outhern Africa
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
is the largest regional organization including southern African coun-
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tries. Article 4 of the COMESA Treaty states that one of the objectives
of COMESA is to “remove obstacles to the free movement of persons,
labor and services, right of establishment for investors and right of
residence within the Common Market . . . In the interim, COMESA is
implementing a Protocol on the gradual relaxation and eventual elimination of visa requirements and a Protocol on the free movement of
persons, labour, services and the right of establishment and residence”
(Nielson 2003, p. 100). COMESA members are Angola, Burundi, the
Comoros, the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Article 164 of the COMESA Treaty provides:
1) The Member States agree to adopt, individually, at bilateral or
regional levels the necessary measures in order to achieve progressively the free movement of persons, labour and services
and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of establishment and
residence by their citizens within the Common Market.
2) The Member States agree to conclude a Protocol on the Free
Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment
and Right of Residence.
3) The Member States agree that the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements within
the PTA adopted under the PTA Treaty shall remain in force until
such time that a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Service, Right of Establishment and Residence enters into
force.
While protocols have been prepared, as of May 2007, only four
member states (Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zimbabwe) had signed
the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services,
Right of Establishment and Residence. Implementation has also lagged
(COMESA 2007, p. 45).
One possible reason behind the failure of member states to ratify
the various protocols may be the wide jurisdiction that the COMESA
Treaty accords to the COMESA Court. Pursuant to Article 23 of the
COMESA Treaty, the COMESA Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate
regarding all matters referred to in the Treaty. Further, Article 26 pro-
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vides that a resident of a member state may refer to the COMESA Court
for determination on the legality of any act of state on the grounds that
any such act is unlawful or an infringement of the treaty. This is itself
a novel creation, as it allows nationals to have direct access to an international tribunal, similar to that allowed in the ECJ. However, this type
of strong adjudication may present states with concerns regarding the
strictness of enforcement of their obligations.
Arrangements for M obility for S elected T ypes of Workers
The agreements described below provide for mobility for selected
groups of workers. The selectivity is established in two ways. First, it is
applied by focusing on “business persons,” a category which includes
certain business visitors, traders and investors, intracorporate transferees and professionals. Second, selectivity can be based on a schedule of
commitments that is selective as to the type of vocation or profession
that will be admitted. However, it is quite clear in these agreements that
liberalization of immigration is neither comprehensive nor normally
available to low-skilled workers.
U .S . Free T rade Agreements: N AFT A, Chile, S ingapore,
Australia, and Jordan
The structure and content of the migration provisions of recent
free trade agreements to which the United States is a party largely reflect important congressional resistance to negotiating immigration
commitments in the context of trade agreements. Congressman James
Sensenbrenner, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, noted in 2003
that
members of this Committee spoke with a united bipartisan voice
that immigration provisions in future free trade agreements will not
receive the support of this Committee. . . . I am also concerned that
there not be future changes in the basic immigration law contained
in future trade agreements. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
makes immigration and naturalization law an exclusive enumerated power of the Congress, and we intend to follow the Constitution and not to delegate this authority to the executive branch of
Government. (U.S. Congress 2003)
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Of course, the trade agreements that Congressman Sensenbrenner
discussed are required to be approved by Congress pursuant to majority
voting, so there is little formal question of full delegation of authority
to the Executive. The Naturalization Clause of Article I, Section 8, of
the U.S. Constitution, in relevant part, states that “Congress shall have
Power . . . To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” However,
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution also makes regulation of commerce with foreign nations the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress—this
is the reason why the U.S. has used “Fast Track,” now termed “Trade
Promotion Authority,” to bring trade agreements to an up or down vote
in Congress without amendment. So there is really no significant constitutional difference between migration and trade in terms of the role
of Congress. However, Sensenbrenner describes a substantial political
difference, and it is true that Congress has not made the kinds of delegations or preliminary delegations in the immigration area that it has made
in the trade area.
U.S. organized labor has opposed the negotiation of immigration
commitments in trade agreements. Hart noted that while negotiating
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), “The United States was
prepared to see relatively easier access for managerial and professional
travelers, but was reluctant to include general service and sale personnel, largely due to strong opposition from organized labour” (Hart 1994,
p. 305).
Hence, to varying degrees, the U.S. FTA regime does not treat immigration commitments in the same manner as the EU, EEAA, EFTA,
and certain other preferential trade agreement–based regimes, some of
which provide for freedom of movement, establishment, and residence.
The U.S. FTA approach to negotiating immigration commitments, like
its approach to GATS, focuses on facilitating liberalization of trade in
services, providing for temporary entry for business persons.
To a large extent, as a reflect on of consistent United States policy
with respect to negotiating immigration commitments in the context of
trade agreements, the immigration provisions in the various agreements
in the United States FTA regime appear to be modeled after or structured similarly to corresponding provisions in NAFTA.
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N AFT A
Signed in 1992, NAFTA established immigration provisions for
certain types of business persons modeled on commitments in the 1988
U.S.-Canada FTA (Wasem 2006). For avoidance of doubt, NAFTA
states clearly that nothing in the relevant chapter, Chapter 12 on CrossBorder Trade in Services, shall “impose any obligation on a Party with
respect to a national of the other Party seeking access to its employment
market, or employed on a permanent basis in its territory, and does not
confer any right on that national with respect to that access or employment” (Article1201[3] of NAFTA).
Similar language is found in the MONP Annex to the GATS, and
has been replicated in a number of subsequent FTAs. (See Chapter 8.)
Chapter 16 of NAFTA, “Temporary Entry for Business Persons,”
contains commitments from Mexico, Canada, and the United States to
allow for temporary migration of business workers. Importantly, these
provisions are limited to temporary entry (NAFTA Secretariat 2001).
Article 1601 of NAFTA provides as follows: “This Chapter reflects the
preferential trading relationship between the Parties, the desirability of
facilitating temporary entry on a reciprocal basis and of establishing
transparent criteria and procedures for temporary entry, and the need
to ensure border security and to protect the domestic labor force and
permanent employment in their respective territories.”
The agreement defines “business person” as “a citizen of a Party
who is engaged in trade in goods, the provision of services or the conduct
of investment activities” (NAFTA, Article 1608). NAFTA distinguishes
among four main categories of temporary entry for business persons: 1)
business visitors, 2) traders and investors, 3) intracorporate transferees,
and 4) professionals (Annex to Article 1603 of NAFTA).
Business visitors include persons in research and design, growth,
manufacture and production, sales, marketing, and other sectors.
Traders and investors include “business person[s] seeking to: (a)
carry on substantial trade in goods or services principally between the
territory of the Party of which the business person is a citizen and the
territory of the Party into which entry is sought, or (b) establish, develop, administer or provide advice or key technical services to the operation of an investment to which the business person or the business
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person’s enterprise has committed, or is in the process of committing,
a substantial amount of capital, in a capacity that is supervisory, executive or involves essential skills.”
Intracorporate transferee is defined as a “business person employed
by an enterprise who seeks to render services to that enterprise or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof, in a capacity that is managerial, executive
or involves specialized knowledge, provided that the business person
otherwise complies with existing immigration measures applicable to
temporary entry.” Further, “a Party may require the business person to
have been employed continuously by the enterprise for one year within
the three year period immediately preceding the date of the application for admission.” No party may limit the number of “intra-corporate
transferees.”
Professionals are provided for in Appendix 1603.D.1, which also
specifies the minimum education qualifications for each profession.
States may not provide a numerical restriction on the number of professionals except for particular circumstances.
These categories parallel similar categories in U.S. visa law under
§101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act: B-2 visitors, E1 treaty traders, L-1 intracompany transferees, and H-1B professional
workers.
The NAFTA professional status is designated “TN.” Neither Canadian nor Mexican professional workers otherwise meeting the
requirements for TN status are subject to labor certification or similar tests. In the U.S. system, labor certification requires that employers
conduct a search for U.S. workers and that the Department of Labor determine that admitting alien workers will not adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers (Wasem
2006, p. 5).
Under NAFTA, “each Party shall grant temporary entry to business
persons who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable measures
relating to public health and safety and national security, in accordance
with this Chapter, including the provisions of Annex 1603” (Article
1603[1] of NAFTA). “Work permits are required for all but business
visitors and visas are still required but are limited to the approximate
costs of services” (Nielson 2003, p. 101). Other existing immigration
requirements (relating to public health and national security) continue
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to apply. Furthermore, a “Party may refuse to issue an immigration
document authorizing employment to a business person where the temporary entry of that person might affect adversely: (a) the settlement of
any labor dispute that is in progress at the place or intended place of
employment; or (b) the employment of any person who is involved in
such dispute” (Article 1603[2] of NAFTA). The applicant must submit
an application including a letter of offer of professional employment
that describes the activity to be performed, the purpose of entry, and the
proposed duration of stay, along with evidence of professional status.
The United States amended its Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 to accommodate the new commitments.
The major nonimmigrant category for temporary workers is the
H visa. The current H-1 categories include professional specialty
workers (H-1B) and nurses (H-1C). There are two visa categories for temporarily importing seasonal workers, i.e., guest workers: agricultural workers enter with H-2A visas and other seasonal
workers enter with H-2B visas. Temporary professional workers
from Canada and Mexico may enter according to terms set by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on TN visas.
The law sets numerical restrictions on annual admissions of the H1B (65,000), the H-2B (66,000) and the H-1C (500) visas. (Wasem
2005, p. 5, citations omitted)

Under the agreement, the United States initially made a numerically limited commitment for up to 5,500 Mexican professionals to enter
annually under H-1 visas (Section 1 of the Appendix to 1603.D.4 of
NAFTA). This limitation on the U.S. commitment expired in 2005 and
was not renewed. Thus, there is no limit on TN visas (Wasem 2006).
The U.S. visa commitments with respect to temporary business visitors,
traders, and investors, and intracorporate transferees have remained the
same. NAFTA prohibited the imposition of numerical restrictions on the
quantity of visas available to these three categories of business persons
(Section A[4], section B[2] and section C[2] of the Annex to Article
1603 of NAFTA). Canadians may obtain a TN visa at the port of entry,
so long as they present a letter from a U.S. employer. Mexicans must
have their employer file a labor condition application before applying
for a visa at the U.S. embassy.
Under NAFTA, “parties shall encourage the relevant bodies in their
respective territories to develop mutually acceptable standards and cri-
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teria for licensing and certific tion of professional service providers and
to provide recommendations on mutual recognition to the Commission”
(Section 2 of Annex to Article 1210.5 of NAFTA).
Under Chapter 16 of NAFTA, a party may initiate dispute settlement
proceedings under Article 2007 in relation to denial of opportunities to
business persons, only if: “(a) the matter involves a pattern of practice;
and (b) the business person has exhausted the available administrative
remedies regarding the particular matter.” The remedies upon successful
dispute resolution are deemed to be exhausted if a final determination
in the matter has not been issued by the competent authority within one
year of the institution of an administrative proceeding, and the failure
to issue a determination is not attributable to delay caused by the business person.
U .S .-Chile FT A
The United States and Chile entered into a free trade agreement in
2003 (U.S. Congress 2003). Chapter 14 of the U.S.-Chile FTA, based
largely on Chapter 16 of NAFTA, is devoted to temporary entry of
business persons. The “general principles” of Chapter 14 state that the
parties seek to establish an agreement on temporary entry in order to
enhance “ . . . the preferential trading relationship between the Parties,
the mutual desire of the Parties to facilitate temporary entry of business
persons under the provisions of Annex 14.3 on a reciprocal basis and
of establishing transparent criteria and procedures for temporary entry,
and the need to ensure border security and to protect the domestic labor
force and permanent employment in their respective territories.”
Like NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA also contains the express qualific tion that “this chapter does not apply to measures regarding citizenship,
nationality, permanent residence, or employment on a permanent basis” (Article 14.1.2). Like NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA makes the same
distinction among traders and investors, professionals, intracorporate
transferees, and business visitors. In addition, there is a definition of
professional: “a national of a Party who is engaged in a specialty occupation requiring: (a) theoretical and practical application of a body of
specialized knowledge, and (b) attainment of a post-secondary degree
in the specialty requiring four or more years of study (or the equivalent
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of such a degree) as a minimum for entry into the occupation” (Article
14.9 of the U.S.-Chile FTA). Additionally, the U.S.-Chile FTA requires
a “labor attestation” (Section D(5) of Annex to Article 14.3 of the U.S.Chile FTA).
Notably, the number of visas that the United States is to issue for
professionals under the U.S.-Chile FTA is 1,400 (Appendix to Article
14.3(D)(6) of the U.S.-Chile FTA).3 An aggregate of 6,800 visas is set
aside during each fiscal year for the H-1B1 program under the terms of
the legislation implementing the U.S.-Chile FTA and the U.S.-Singapore
FTA together. This block of 6,800 H-1B1 visas is initially reserved from
the annual limit (currently 65,000) for H-1B visas. Unused numbers in
this pool can be made available for H-1B use. For fiscal year 2008, the
U.S. Customs and Immigration Service has estimated that only 1000 of
the H-1B1 visas will be used, and therefore has added 5,800 visas to the
number of H-1B visas available for fiscal year 2008.
H-1B1 professional worker visas are counted against the aggregate
U.S. H-1B cap of 65,000 visas during the first year and again after the
fifth year of renewal.4 Of course, the fact that these visas are counted
against the total U.S. H-1B cap means that visas issued under these programs reduce those available to nationals of other states. This raises the
same type of MFN issue that we see in trade law and investment law,
albeit with distinct economic ramifications. From a trade perspective,
we can think of this arrangement as a quota (the total cap) administered
on a non-MFN basis. When the EU attempted to justify such a quota
with respect to goods in the Bananas litigation, the WTO appellate body
found a violation of the MFN requirement.5
There is also provision for mutual recognition of each state’s academic structure. Hence, Chile recognizes the baccalaureate, master’s,
and doctoral degrees conferred by institutions in the United States as
such, while the United States recognizes the licenciatura degree and
titulo profesional and higher degrees conferred by institutions in Chile
as such degrees (footnote to Article 14.9 of the U.S.-Chile FTA).
Dispute settlement is also similar to NAFTA insofar as there is no
direct access to dispute resolution without having to prove continuous
conduct as well as exhaustion of existing administrative remedies (Article 14.6 of the U.S.-Chile FTA).
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U .S .-S ingapore FT A
The U.S.-Singapore FTA contains temporary entry provisions similar to the U.S.-Chile FTA and NAFTA, including provisions allowing
for temporary entry of business persons, traders and investors, and intracompany transferees.
As with the U.S.-Chile FTA, the chapter in the U.S.-Singapore
FTA that provides for temporary entry of business persons starts with a
strong qualifying statement that “this chapter does not impose any obligation on a Party with respect to a national of the other Party seeking
access to its employment market, or employed on a permanent basis in
its territory, and does not confer any right on that national with respect
to that access or employment” (U.S. Trade Representative 2003a).
Similar to the U.S.-Chile FTA, the U.S.-Singapore FTA provides
that professionals must have the following credentials to qualify for
temporary entry: “(a) theoretical and practical application of a body of
specialized knowledge; and (b) attainment of a post-secondary degree
in the specialty requiring four or more years of study (or the equivalent
of such a degree) as a minimum for entry into the occupation. Such degrees include the Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, and the Doctoral
Degree conferred by institutions in the United States and Singapore”
(Section IV[1] of Annex to Article 11A of the U.S.-Singapore FTA).
As noted above, the qualifi ations for temporary entry in these
FTAs prevent entry under these agreements by lower-skilled persons.
Although certain types of business exchanges were deemed suitable for
the FTA, the importation of lower-skilled labor was not open to negotiation. This was as agreeable to Singapore as it was to the United States,
as Singapore had a preexisting “Foreign Talent” policy where it seeks
to attract highly skilled, as opposed to lower-skilled, labor (Koh and
Chang 2004, p. 210).6
The U.S.-Singapore FTA provides the same types of obligations as
the U.S.-Chile FTA with respect to entry of “professionals.” Notably
there is also a similar requirement for labor market attestation. This
can be found in the side letter between the U.S. Trade Representative
and the Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry. In addition, another
side letter clarifies that Singapore’s intention of setting a salary criterion
does not constitute breach (U.S. Trade Representative 2003b).
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Under the U.S.-Singapore FTA, the United States committed to
provide up to 5,400 visas annually to Singaporeans (appendix to Article 11A.3 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA). Holders of an FTA professional
worker visa, unlike holders of an H-1B visa, may remain in the United
States indefinitel . Holders of the FTA professional worker visa are
temporary residents, and may only work for employers that meet the labor attestation requirements. The U.S.-Singapore and U.S.-Chile FTAs
provide that the United States shall not require labor certification as
a condition of entry and shall not impose numerical limits on intracompany transfers.7
The same types of arrangements as those found in NAFTA and the
U.S.-Chile FTA were used in the U.S.-Singapore FTA in relation to the
issues of dispute resolution and bases for denial of visa (Article 11.4
and Article 11.8 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, respectively).
U .S .-Jordan FT A and Australia-U .S . FT A
The U.S.-Jordan FTA and the U.S.-Australia FTA do not follow
the NAFTA structure of regulating the temporary entry of business persons. While the U.S.-Australia FTA, signed May 18, 2004, contains
no immigration provisions, the United States subsequently passed legislation for 10,500 visas for Australian nationals to perform services
in specialty occupations under a new E-3 temporary visa, as part of
supplemental appropriations for 2005 to support military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Trade Representative 2004). The professional requirements of the E-3 visa mirror requirements in the Chile and
Singapore FTAs, but eligibility is significantly expanded. According to
the Government of Australia’s Department of Home Affairs and Trade
(and illustrating the MFN issue raised above),
Qualified Australians, wishing to reside and work in the United
States, now find themselves in a privileged position. They have access to a dedicated visa that is easier and less costly to obtain than
the traditional H-1B business visa. Under the regulations, 10,500
E-3 visas per annum have been reserved exclusively for Australian
nationals (by comparison only 900 Australians succeeded in gaining the US H-1B business visa in 2004). Unlike the H-1B visa,
spouses of E-3 visa holders are now able to work in the United
States, eliminating a barrier that in practice stopped many Aus-
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tralians from applying for the H-1B visa. E-3 visa holders will be
able to apply for extensions. (Australian Government, Free Trade
Agreements 2005)

The commitments to Chile, Singapore, and Australia, like those
made in the WTO GATS, generally exclude low-skilled workers.
The introduction of the “E-3” visa in connection with the U.S.Australia FTA in May 2005, which is essentially an H-1B visa only for
10,500 Australians a year, will make the annual congressional H-1B
cap less reliable as a measure of foreign high-skilled labor inflows into
the United States. As the Immigration and Nationality Act draws a clear
distinction between H-1B visas and E-3 visas, the number of E-3 visas
provided to Australians should not count against the numerical limit
which only applies to H-1B visas. However, this special treatment for
Australia raises MFN-type issues. The E-3 arrangements for Australia further indicate that at least for “allied developed countries,” visas
for high-skilled persons are increasingly becoming a bargaining chip in
FTA negotiations. This does not so far seem to be the case in U.S. FTA
negotiations with developing countries (Kirkegaard 2005, p. 10).
The U.S.-Jordan FTA is also different from the NAFTA model.
Nielson defines it as “an agreement using the GATS model with some
additional elements” (Nielson 2003, p. 103). In the U.S.-Jordan FTA,
labor mobility is covered under the section on trade in services, which
is modeled after GATS. Accordingly, the same types of limitations on
rights and obligations relating to immigration and entry of the domestic
labor market provided under the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural
Persons, discussed in Chapter 8, apply under this agreement. Additionally, the U.S.-Jordan FTA provides that Jordan nationals are eligible to
apply for treaty-trader (E-1) and treaty-investor (E-2) visas (footnote
12 to Article 8(2) of the U.S.-Jordan FTA), no numerical limitation or
commitment was stipulated. Moreover, the numerical limitations that
apply to H-1 visas as provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act
would not apply to E visas (U.S. Trade Representative 2002).
While additional U.S. FTA partners have requested inclusion of
temporary entry provisions, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has
consistently demurred and instead referred FTA partners to Congress
for any potential new visa commitments.8 United States-Dominican
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement has no explicit im-
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migration provisions. This is noteworthy in light of the large amount of
illegal immigration to the United States from these countries.
It is reasonably clear, after a survey of the above U.S. FTAs, that
most of them follow a distinct NAFTA prototype. Even in the cases
of the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the Australia-U.S. FTA, deviations from
the NAFTA prototype are explained according to the specific negotiation contexts. As will be seen later, some other countries (in particular,
Japan and Singapore in the JSCEPA) have also adopted the NAFTA
model to some degree.
Caribbean Community
The original 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas did not address migration, but merely stated that member states should “as far as practicable”
extend to persons belonging to other member states, preferential treatment over persons belonging to states outside the common market with
regard to the provision of services. A 2001 revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (CARICOM 2001) integrates the obligations contained in a 1998
protocol, and provides for the prohibition of new restrictions to the right
of establishment and removal of existing restrictions on the right of
establishment. Article 32(3) provides as follows:
1) The right of establishment within the meaning of this Chapter
shall include the right to:
a)

engage in any non-wage-earning activities of a commercial,
industrial, agricultural, professional or artisanal nature;

b) create and manage economic enterprises referred to in paragraph 5(b) of this Article.
2) For the purposes of this Chapter “non-wage earning activities”
means activities undertaken by self-employed persons.

Further, the management of removal of restrictions is also provided
for in Article 34. A committee of national ministers of trade and development (COTED) is generally empowered, by a three-fourths majority
vote, to take a number of types of supplementary actions to secure the
right of establishment, including to “require the Member States to remove all restrictions on the movement of managerial, technical and
supervisory staff of economic enterprises and on establishing agencies,
branches and subsidiaries of companies and other entities established in
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the 23” (Article 34[c]). COTED is also empowered to make decisions
relating to “the conditions governing the entry of managerial, technical or supervisory personnel employed in such agencies, branches and
subsidiaries, including the spouses and immediate dependent family
members of such personnel” (Article 34[d][2]).
Furthermore, Article 45 of the revised Treaty establishes a commitment to the “goal” of free movement of Community nationals within
the Community. Article 46 establishes free movement in order to seek
employment for university graduates, media workers, sportspersons,
“artistes,” and musicians. It also provides that member states must act
in order to
provide for movement of Community nationals into and within
their jurisdictions without harassment or the imposition of impediments, including
i)

the elimination of the requirement for passports for Community nationals travelling to their jurisdictions;

ii) the elimination of the requirement for work permits for
Community nationals seeking approved employment in their
jurisdictions;
iii) establishment of mechanisms for certifying and establishing
equivalency of degrees and for accrediting institutions;
iv) harmonisation and transferability of social security benefits

To facilitate the free movement of highly skilled labor, the revised
Treaty also provides for the establishment of “common standards and
measures for accreditation or when necessary for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificate and other evidence of qualifications of
the nationals of the Member States in order to facilitate access to, and
engagement in, employment and non-wage-earning activities in the
Community.” Further,
Member States shall establish or employ, as the case may be, appropriate mechanisms to establish common standards to determine
equivalency or accord accreditation to diplomas, certificates and
other evidence of qualifications secured by nationals of other Member States and COHSOD [the Council for Human and Social Development] shall also establish measures for the co-ordination of
legislative and administrative requirements of the Member States
for the participation of Community nationals in employment and
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for the conduct of non-wage-earning activities in the Community.
(Article 35 of the revised Treaty)

In addition, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) regime provides a “safeguard mechanism” which allows for derogation from
obligations by states in cases of hardship. Article 47 provides a nuanced
procedure that can allow states to respond to “serious difficulties in any
sector of the economy of a Member State or occasions of economic
hardships in a region of the Community.”
Despite these measures, however, there are still significant gaps in
CARICOM labor mobility, including limitations of free movement of
labor to highly skilled labor, and slow and inconsistent implementation
(Jessen and Rodriguez 1999, pp. 16–71).9
CARICOM has also implemented a CARICOM visa arrangement
in 2007. This new visa arrangement was intended to enhance measures
being taken to reduce the risks associated with drug trafficking, terrorism and trafficking in humans during ICC Cricket World Cup 2007.
More importantly, it also is a step toward harmonization of visa policy
and procedures as part of common policy on the free movement of
persons.
Japan-S ingapore Closer E conomic Partnership
Agreement (JS CE PA)
The obligations with respect to movement of labor in the JSCEPA
are modeled after the GATS framework, and only apply to movement
of persons entering either territory for business purposes. As Nielson
(2003, pp. 102–103) notes, “Chapter 9 (Movement of natural persons)
applies to measures affecting the movement of natural persons of a
Party (nationals of Japan and nationals and permanent residents of Singapore) who enter the territory of the other Party for business purposes
(including as investors). Carve-outs are similar to the GATS Annex
(i.e., regarding nationality, citizenship, residence or employment on a
permanent basis).”
Further, like the U.S. FTA regime, the JSCEPA provides for specific
commitments which distinguish between four kinds of persons entering
for business purposes. They are business visitors, intracorporate transferees, investors, and natural persons who engage in work on the basis
of a personal contract with public or private organizations.
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Article 92(4) limits the specific commitments to allow entry of persons for business purposes only to sectors provided under Chapter 7
(the chapter that deals with trade in services).
Singapore’s specific commitments allow for business visitors to
stay for one month, extendable up to three months. Intracorporate transferees who are managers, executives, or specialists of firms providing
services in Singapore (note the linkage to services), and have been in
the employ of their firm for at least one year, may remain for a two-year
period extendable for periods of up to three additional years each time
for a total term not exceeding eight years (further extensions may be
possible). Independent service suppliers are limited to engineers recognized under the domestic laws and regulations of Singapore, and are
admissible under similar terms.
Japan’s specific commitments allow for business visitors (as defined) to remain for a period not exceeding 90 days. Intracorporate
transferees who have been employed for at least a year, and who are
high-level managers, work with high technology or high-level human
science, and certain types of legal specialists, may also enter and stay
without specific limits. Finally, independent engineering professionals
are permitted to enter and stay without specific limits.
Also, the JSCEPA, in Article 93, provides that either state may recognize the professional qualifications of the other state. To this end,
Article 94 establishes a Joint Committee on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications. The Joint Committee is responsible to review
the issues concerning the effective implementation of Article 93, identifying and recommending areas for and ways of furthering cooperation
between the parties.
Agreements U sing the G ATS M odel with S ome Additional E lements
EU -M exico Free T rade Agreement
The EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (EU-Mexico FTA) called
for the negotiation of a services integration agreement under Article V
of GATS and addresses labor mobility through trade in services. Article
27(4) guarantees that individual states retain their sovereignty to regulate immigration in their own jurisdictions.
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Nothing in this title shall prevent a party from applying its laws,
regulations, and requirements regarding entry and stay, work, labor
conditions, and establishment of natural persons provided that, in so
doing, it does not apply them in a manner as to nullify or impair the
benefits accruing to the other party under the terms of a specific provision of this title.
Article 9 of the EU-Mexico FTA also provides that parties shall
move toward mutual recognition of requirements, qualific tions, licenses, and other regulations, for the purpose of the fulfillment, in whole or
in part, by service suppliers of the criteria applied by each party for the
authorization, licensing, operation, and certification of service suppliers
and, in particular, professional services.
Agreements T hat U se the G ATS M odel
M ercosur
Mercosur has not moved toward general free movement of labor.
As can be seen from the Protocol of Montevideo on Services (the Montevideo Protocol), Mercosur’s treatment of movement of labor directly
replicates the GATS model.10 Market access is based solely on specific
commitments which are annexed to the Montevideo Protocol covering
the movement of all categories of natural persons who provide services
within the framework of the protocol (Pena 2000, p. 158). The Annex
to the Montevideo Protocol on the Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services is largely similar to that under GATS.
Article XI of the Montevideo Protocol addresses the possibility that
a Mercosur member state might enter into an arrangement for mutual
recognition of profession qualifications with a third state. It provides
in paragraph (a) that this will not necessarily violate the obligation to
provide MFN treatment.
When a Member recognizes, unilaterally or by way of an agreement, the education, experience, licenses, matriculation records,
or certificates obtained in the territory of another Member or any
country that is not a member of Mercosur:
a)

Nothing in this Protocol shall be construed to require this
Member to recognize the education, experience, matricula-
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tion records or certificates obtained in the territory of another Member; and
b) The Member shall accord to any other Member an adequate
opportunity to i) demonstrate that the education, experience,
licenses and certificates obtained in its territory should also
be recognized; or ii) to conclude an agreement or treaty of
equivalent effect.

Modest progress toward liberalization has been made in other areas.
Mercosur approved in two decisions in 1999 and 2000 an agreement to
facilitate movement across neighboring borders. In 1997, Mercosur had
approved an agreement to coordinate social security rights. In 2000,
Mercosur approved an agreement on visa exemptions allowing artists,
scientists, sportspersons, journalists, specialized technicians, and professionals to enter other member states without a visa for a stay of up to
90 days, extendible to up to 180 days.
The 2002 Agreement on Residence in Mercosur States, Bolivia and
Chile (the Residence Agreement) provides that citizens of the member
states may live and work in other member states. The Residence Agreement is not yet in force. It provides that citizens of member states may
apply for temporary residence in other member states, with a maximum
of two years, and may apply for permanent residence thereafter. Immigrants are permitted to bring their families with them, except for those
who are disabled. Immigrants are permitted to work in any occupation,
and are accorded broad rights of national treatment.
The Residence Agreement is an important step, as it was motivated
in part by the need to stop illegal human trafficking and exploitation—it
does so by making movement legal.

Con clusi on
As stated at the outset of this chapter, the review of agreements
performed here advances our discussion in two ways. First, it provides
evidence that many states are indeed engaging in negotiations of liberalization of international labor migration. While these efforts are regional
and often limited, they show that states believe that cooperation may
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be useful in this area. Second, this review provides a broader supply of
examples of methods of cooperation. It will assist negotiators as they
examine the possible methods of cooperation available to them.

N otes
1. For a recent look at the state of legislation on migrant workers in West Africa, see
Ba and Fall (2006).
2. It should be noted that due to the conclusion of the various protocols relating
to freedom of movement, residence and establishment, the ECOWAS Treaty has
been amended to reflect the rights and obligations contained in the respective protocols. References to the ECOWAS Treaty here all are made to the revised treaty.
3. The implementing legislation amended §101(a)(15)(H) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to designate a portion of the aggregate H-1B visas (H-1B1 visas)
for professional workers entering pursuant to the Chile and Singapore FTAs.
4. Arguably, U.S. commitments under NAFTA to provide H-1B visas are not subject
to the general numerical limitation on H-1B visas as provided in the Immigration
and Nationality Act. Sections 214(e)(i) and 214(e)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act give the Attorney General the authority to regulate the admission of
Canadian and Mexican nationals pursuant to NAFTA and the Canadian-U.S. FTA,
including establishing numerical limits on the admission on Mexican nationals.
Further, U.S. commitments under the U.S.-Australia FTA and U.S.-Jordan FTA are
not affected by the numerical limitations in the Immigration and Nationality Act as
the limitations only relate to H-1B (professional worker) visas and not to E visas.
5. WTO (1997). Adopted by Dispute Settlement Body, November 17, 1997.
6. See also Low (2002, pp. 409–425) for discussion on aspects of Singapore’s Foreign Talent Policy.
7. Chapter 11, §3 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, Annex 11A, signed May 6, 2003;
Chapter 14, §3 of the U.S.-Chile FTA, Annex 14.3, signed June 6, 2003.
8. Mikael Lurie, who served, along with Jeremy Leong, as research assistant to the
author in connection with the preparation of this chapter, participated in FTA negotiations between the United States and the United Arab Emirates in November
2005 where the UAE delegation repeatedly requested temporary entry provisions
in the FTA USTR and State Department negotiators insisted that the United Arab
Emirates negotiators would have to lobby the U.S. Congress directly, akin to the
strategy employed by Australia following Judiciary Chairman Sensenbrenner’s
objections to including immigration provisions in the Chile and Singapore FTAs.
9. Duchs and Straubhaar provide a useful overview of the state of ratification of the
various CARICOM protocols (Duchs and Straubhaar 2003, p. 12). They conclude
that “Fourth, the establishment of free movement within CARICOM might not
stimulate strong migration flows. There are not many incentives for a broad reallocation of labour within CARICOM” (Duchs and Straubhaar 2003, p. 55).
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10. Franciso Prieto (2000, p. 230) argues that commitments negotiated in regional
trade agreements for services provided through GATS (temporary movement of
natural persons) are limited. He states, “The limited commitments in this field are
restricted to intracompany personnel movements and to top-level executives, with
little progress in the provision of professional services and much less or none at
all in the provision of technical and specialized services.” The same criticism may
also be directed by analogy to arrangements using the GATS model with some
additional elements as discussed above.
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Mode 4 of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services
The WTO does not deal with labor or migration per se, just as it
does not deal with finance or investment per se. However, labor has entered the WTO in several ways, including through the subject of trade in
services. In fact, there is an important overlap between trade in services
concerns and migration concerns.
From a trade standpoint, limits on immigration, where immigration is necessary to cross-border trade in services, are barriers to that
trade. These barriers include quotas or other quantitative restrictions on
immigration, bureaucratic formalities involved with obtaining a visa,
visa fees, discrimination against foreign workers, and limits on recognition of professional qualifications (Chaudhuri, Mattoo, and Self 2004).
Indeed, some states have imposed wage parity conditions that require
those employing foreign personnel to pay them a wage similar to that
paid to domestic personnel. This is reminiscent of antidumping measures in connection with goods trade. Other states impose economic
needs tests or labor market conditions that have not been used in connection with trade in goods or other types of trade in services (although
economic needs tests have been scheduled in some sectors under Mode
3). Of course, individuals are not commodities, but there are salient
analogies and overlaps between trade and migration.
From the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades
(GATT) in 1947 until the founding of the WTO in 1994, the multilateral
trade system paid little attention to labor (Charnovitz 2003a, p. 241).
Under the 1994 WTO GATS, one mode of supply of services across
borders is the so-called Mode 4, specified in Article I:2(d) of GATS:
“by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.”
Perhaps surprisingly, Mode 4 was seen as compensation to developing countries for inclusion of Mode 3 (commercial presence, which
includes investment in services enterprises) at the request of developed
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countries (Nielson and Taglioni 2003, p. 6).1 This is surprising from an
economic standpoint because, first, investment is generally understood
to be beneficial to developing countries, and second, the risk of brain
drain makes Mode 4 of uncertain benefit to developing countries, especially because Mode 4 commitments as agreed in 1994 generally did
not cover unskilled labor (although there is no a priori reason why they
could not have). Of course, the fact that Mode 4 is limited to temporary
migration reduces any brain drain concern.
Furthermore, the 1994 Uruguay Round commitments in Mode 4
were modest (see Carzaniga 2003; OECD 2002; and WTO 1999a).
The GATS is a framework agreement in the sense that it is a positive
list in which most obligations only apply to service sectors listed and
then only to the extent not excluded. Most countries only made limited
commitments. However, this does not mean that greater commitments
cannot be made in the future, or that the character of GATS as a positive
list agreement cannot be modified if states determine to do so.
The basic GATS disciplines include national treatment and market
access. But in connection with these disciplines, GATS is a positive
list-based agreement. Therefore, the application of these disciplines is
dependent upon scheduling of the relevant service sector in the schedule of commitments of the relevant state. In other words, unless the
service sector is scheduled, there is no national treatment or market access obligation. States were permitted to specify limits to their national
treatment or market access obligations on the face of their schedules
of commitments, and the schedules are replete with such limits. On
the other hand, the MFN obligation contained in GATS applies regardless of the scheduling of the relevant service sector. This obligation
was subject to the much more limited, and degressive, list of Article II
exemptions. Finally, GATS contains rather modest disciplines on domestic regulation.
There are three critical limitations on Mode 4 as agreed in the Uruguay Round. First, GATS does not cover all labor, only that which is
related to the supply of services as specified in Article I:2(d). So, labor
related to the production of goods is generally not covered (even though
in theoretical terms production of goods results from the application
of “services” to raw materials).2 Second, as mentioned above, GATS
is a positive list agreement, meaning that only those service sectors
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that are scheduled are the subject of commitments, and states negotiate
over these schedules. In the 1994 WTO agreement, Mode 4 services
commitments did not fare very well. Third, the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement (the
MONP Annex) restricts the scope of application of GATS to immigration measures.
In fact, the commitments were generally limited to high-skill-based
services. Many commitments were linked to Mode 3—commercial
presence: movement of natural persons as intracorporate transferees
in connection with commercial establishments. Most commitments
were limited to cases of intracorporate transferees where the transferee
had worked for the corporate transferor for a minimum period of time.
The requirement of a Mode 3 linkage limits availability to developing
countries, which are generally capital importing rather than exporting
countries. For commitments relating to independent service providers,
most commitments specified that a prior contract would be required:
Mode 4 did not open up the domestic market to contract seekers. See
the discussion of the MONP Annex below. Many of the commitments
still contain economic needs tests or labor market condition tests that
are highly discretionary with the destination state.

The MONP Annex
The MONP Annex specifies as follows:
1) This Annex applies to measures affecting natural persons who are
service suppliers of a Member, and natural persons of a Member
who are employed by a service supplier of a Member, in respect
of the supply of a service.
2) The Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.
3) . . . Natural persons covered by a specific commitment shall be
allowed to supply the service in accordance with the terms of that
commitment.
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4) The Agreement shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary
to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of
natural persons across, its borders, provided that such measures
are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific commitment. (footnote omitted)

Under the first clause of paragraph 2, states have no obligations under GATS with respect to those seeking employment. The exclusion by
paragraph 2 of the GATS MONP Annex of “measures affecting natural
persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member” would
seem to allow member states to prevent individuals from looking for
a job within the member state (Mattoo 2003, p. 4). However, once an
individual secures a position, it would seem that GATS would apply.
One interpretation of the MONP Annex is that it adds emphasis
to the limitation imposed by the first clause of Article I:2(d) of GATS:
“by a service supplier of one member” (emphasis added). “Service
supplier” includes both juridical and natural persons.3 This interpretation assumes a distinction between service supplier and job seeker. Of
course, at the margins the difference between an individual as service
supplier seeking clients (covered) and an individual as labor market
entrant (excluded) is one of contractual style, and not necessarily of
substance (Winters et al. 2002, p. 87). This is the distinction between an
independent contractor and an employee.
The second clause of paragraph 2 also makes clear that GATS does
not apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis. Thus, GATS does not address permanent
migration. However, the second clause of paragraph 2 would seem to
suggest, by reverse implication, that GATS does apply at least to measures regarding employment on a temporary basis. This understanding
is especially interesting when combined with paragraph 4. The “shall
not prevent” language of paragraph 4 can reasonably be understood as a
“necessity” test. Paragraph 3 seems to confirm this understanding.
In its Turkey–Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products decision, the appellate body examined the relationship between
Article XXIV of GATT, regulating the formation of customs unions
and free trade areas, and other provisions of GATT. In that provision,
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the appellate body emphasized the words “shall not prevent” and held
that “Article XXIV can justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is
introduced upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the
introduction of the measure were not allowed” (see WTO 1999b, para.
46). If the same language in paragraph 4 of the MONP were understood
similarly, it would mean that the purposes listed in paragraph 4 would
justify action inconsistent with GATS only to the extent that achievement of those purposes would be prevented if the measure were not
allowed.
By allowing states unrestricted authority to “regulate” the entry of
natural persons, does paragraph 4 allow prohibition, or is “regulate”
meant in a narrower sense? After the appellate body decision in U.S.—
Gambling Services, we might expect some bias toward foreclosing state
discretion that could be used to reduce the value of concessions (see
WTO 2005). Thus, a narrower approach to “regulate” seems more likely (Charnovitz 2003a, pp. 243–244).
Paragraph 4 of the MONP Annex provides that immigration measures shall not violate the GATS “provided that such measures are not
applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing
to any Member under the terms of a specific commitment.” Thus, no
exception is available for immigration measures that nullify or impair
benefits accruing under a specific commitment
Footnote 13 to paragraph 4 states that “the sole fact of requiring a
visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others
shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific
commitment.” This clarifica ion can be read under an expressio unius
interpretation to mean that other types of discrimination among natural
persons of members might nullify or impair specific commitments. The
“specific commitment” most likely to be considered nullified or impaired by discrimination between natural persons of different members
would be the MFN obligation in Article II, although there is certainly
an argument that by “specific commitment” the authors intended to address positive list–type commitments for national treatment and market
access, rather than the “negative list” MFN obligation, which is applicable unless specifically excepted.
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Furthermore, there is at least some question whether such measures
could be the basis for a complaint that they nullify or impair existing
concessions, even if no violation of a specific GATS obligation exists.
Article XXIII of GATS provides the possibility for this type of nonviolation complaint. The possibility for such a complaint, against measures
specifically excluded from coverage in the agreement, is not free from
doubt. Moreover, a nonviolation nullification or impairment claim
would generally depend on the restriction being imposed after the date
that the nullifi d or impaired concession is made, and in a way that the
complaining state should not have anticipated (Trachtman 1998).
The GATS MONP Annex seems to require states to allow service
suppliers and employees of service suppliers to enter temporarily, provided that they are covered by a commitment (Arup 2000, p. 125). As
suggested above, the temporary nature of entry is derived by reverse
inference from the second clause of paragraph 2 of the GATS MONP
Annex.
No guidance is given by GATS as to what is meant by “temporary,”
which itself is not treaty language but is inferred from the exclusion of
“permanent” employment. While this issue was debated extensively in
the original GATS negotiations, negotiators determined to allow fle ibility to reflect different circumstances (Self and Zutshi 2003, p. 35).
Thus, it is open to states in their schedules of commitments to specify
the period of time for which people admitted under particular concessions may remain. Where states do not define the period of time for
admittance in their schedules, they could be understood not to make any
commitment as to the period of admittance (WTO 2001b).
In any event, there seem to be substantial limits on the scope of
labor market access that can be provided by Mode 4. This seems intentional. In 1994, few would have thought it practical to suggest that
extensive commitments for labor market access would be feasible.
This work argues elsewhere that it may be normatively attractive to
reconsider the possibility for such commitments, and to do so in a comprehensive manner that considers detailed issues to an extent similar to,
or even beyond, the level addressed in the GATT and GATS.
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GATS Commi tme nts
GATS is best understood as a framework agreement, providing a
structure that states may use in order to negotiate services commitments
over time. So the discussion above of the framework must be qualified
by the degree to which states actually have made, or will make, commitments in particular areas.
It is also worth noting that states approached their Mode 4 commitments in the Uruguay Round, as they did other services commitments:
warily. In connection with Mode 4, they generally made commitments
at lower levels of liberalization than those applied in practice (Chaudhuri, Mattoo, and Self 2004, p. 7; Nielson and Cattaneo 2003).
So far, commitments in Mode 4 have been quite limited. Mode 4
today is estimated to account for less than 2 percent of the total value of
services trade. Present commitments refer almost exclusively to higherlevel personnel. More than 40 percent of Mode 4 commitments are
for intracorporate transferees whose mobility is intimately related to
foreign direct investment; another 50 percent of commitments cover executives, managers and specialists, and business visitors. All this means
that the Mode 4 liberalization achieved to date has been of limited significance for developing countries whose comparative advantage lies in
the export of medium- and low-skilled, labor-intensive services (World
Bank 2004). It also means that Mode 4 might facilitate brain drain, with
the possibility of adverse effects for developing countries under some
conditions, although the limitation of Mode 4 to temporary movement
ameliorates this risk.
Schedules of Commitments
States may make different commitments in different service sectors
or subsectors and as they make these commitments, they are permitted to impose limitations on the extent to which these commitments
provide national treatment or market access. National treatment and
market access only apply to the extent of commitments. Thus, states
can craft their schedules of commitments to respond to particular concerns, or to allow space for particular types of protective measures. For
example, many GATS commitments refer to short-term employment,
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and distinguish between business visitors staying less than three months
and temporary movement of up to a few years (Nielson and Taglioni
2003, p. 6).
States are also permitted to distinguish among the four modes of
supply comprehended by GATS. So, they may make a commitment as
to commercial presence (Mode 3) in accountancy services but determine not to make any Mode 4 commitment in accountancy services.
Again, the key is that states may determine the scope of their commitments, even to the extent of including in their commitments rules that
are discriminatory against foreign service providers. It is in this sense
that GATS must be understood as a framework agreement. Moreover,
in connection with Mode 4, many schedules begin by stating that the
sector is “unbound” in Mode 4, and then make narrow exceptions to
this basic unbound position.
The main exception to the positive list principle is in MFN: states
are required to provide unconditional MFN treatment in connection
with all measures covered by GATS, except in the rather limited cases
where they listed an exemption to their MFN obligations.4 This raises
important questions for bilateral, plurilateral, or regional agreements
for labor market integration or free trade in services. These questions
are addressed below.
Sectors Addressed
Most of the Uruguay Round service commitments in Mode 4 are
confined to higher-skilled types of service: manager, executive, or
specialist (Nielson and Taglioni 2003, p. 8). “Only 17 percent of all horizontal entries cover low skilled personnel (e.g., ‘business sellers’) and
only 10 countries have allowed some form of restricted entry to ‘other
level’ personnel” (Nielson and Taglioni 2003, p. 12). States made fewer
fully liberal commitments in Mode 4 than in other modes. Where states
made Mode 4 commitments, they often imposed restrictions. For example, there are a number of commitments that are subject to economic
needs tests or labor market tests: is the relevant area underserved, or is it
glutted? Other types of restrictions include quotas or specified proportions of foreign versus local workers and senior staff.
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H orizontal Commitments
Nearly all WTO members made liberalizing commitments under
Mode 4 in the Uruguay Round (Self and Zutshi 2003, p. 35). Most of
these commitments were in the form of horizontal commitments—applying broadly to all sectors listed subsequently in the member state’s
schedule of commitments. However, these horizontal commitments
often take the form of “unbound, except for . . .” and then specify particular conditions for admission of particular types of service workers.
The sector covered by these horizontal commitments are themselves
limited: an OECD study found that “there is a particularly low incidence of commitments in those sectors of particular importance to
Mode 4” and that generally, “commitments for Mode 4 are restricted
compared to other modes” (OECD 2002).
According to a WTO analysis of GATS horizontal Mode 4 commitments made in the Uruguay Round (and through 2002), 42 percent
of these commitments relate to intracorporate transferees, 28 percent
relate to other executives, managers, or specialists, and 23 percent
relate to business visitors. Thus, 93 percent of commitments are irrelevant to semiskilled or unskilled labor. In connection with Mode 4, the
horizontal part of many states’ schedules represents the limit of their
commitment (Carzaniga 2003, p. 24).
The original U.S. GATS schedule of commitments included a horizontal commitment relating to Mode 4. However, this commitment was
limited to temporary entry of services salespersons for up to 90 days,
intracorporate transferee managers, executives, and specialists, as defined, for up to three years with the possibility of extension for up to two
years, and managers or executives in connection with establishment of
commercial presence under the GATS. Note that service salespersons do
not perform the services themselves. Currently, managers and executives
can remain in the United States for a total of up to seven years (under the
L1-A program) and “specialists” can remain up to five years (L1-B). The
U.S. Immigration Service is subject to no limits in the number of L-1
visas that it can issue, and these visas are not subject to a wage parity or
economic needs test.
Thus, like the commitments of many other developed countries,
these U.S. commitments are limited to certain hierarchical criteria that
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tend to exclude low-skilled labor. Horizontal commitments as of April
2002 are largely concerned with executives, managers, and specialists (Carzaniga 2003, p. 25). With respect to intracorporate transfer
and managers and executives in connection with the establishment of
a commercial presence, developed countries such as the United States
have linked Mode 4 to Mode 3 and have thereby ensured the movement
of capital (or at least establishment) in connection with labor. As the
users of Mode 3 are more likely to be capital-exporting countries, this
type of linkage results in a certain bias.
In addition, in connection with employment-based movement,
the U.S. bound temporary entry for up to 65,000 persons annually as
set out in the U.S. H-1B visa program (Grimmett 1998), consisting of
certain fashion models and persons engaged in a specialty occupation,
requiring theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in
the specialty. This horizontal commitment represents the maximum
U.S. commitment—specific sectors do not provide additional market
access, but in some cases reduce market access. For the H-1B program,
employers must not pay below the prevailing wage, and there may be
no layoffs for the position within six months before or 90 days after the
date of hiring. Workers entering under this program can stay for three
years, with a possible extension to a maximum total stay of six years.5
Many H1-B visa holders move from temporary migration to permanent
residence status (Lowell 2000).
E conomic Needs and Wage Parity Tests
As discussed above in connection with GATS commitments, many
states continue to impose economic needs tests—or labor market needs
tests—as conditions for market access. Another related test is a wage
parity test, which seeks to ensure that imported labor does not undercut
the pricing of domestic labor. Wage parity tests, while distinct from
antidumping duties and antisubsidies countervailing duties in the goods
field, serve a similar purpose: to limit the degree to which domestic
persons are placed under price pressure by imports.
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Doh a Ne goti ati ons
Many developing countries have emphasized Mode 4 in the Doha
Round negotiations, which began in 2002 (the services negotiations actually began in 2000, pursuant to the “built-in agenda” of the Uruguay
Round agreements). The negotiations for increased market access proceed through a “request-offer” system in which states make requests to
other states that they liberalize, which respond with initial offers.
Immigration and Mode 4 interests of developing countries have
received some attention in the Doha Round, but there are few signs
that substantial commitments will be made that would allow developing country personnel, especially at less than the highest skill levels, to
enter other countries (Winters 2003).
Fourteen developing countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, The
People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, and Thailand) made an informal proposal in 2003 (WTO 2003a). They stated
that “developing countries in general have comparative advantages
only across a narrow range of service activities. The primary mode for
most of these relates to Mode 4.” They suggested that
commitments in Mode 4 are primarily horizontal and bound for
only a small subset of personnel related to commercial presence
and at higher levels of skills. There is an asymmetrical absence of
commitments for categories of personnel delinked from commercial presence and at lower skill levels, areas in which developing
countries have comparative advantage. Recognition of common
categories of movement, both linked to as well as delinked from
commercial presence in the horizontal commitments of Members
could prove useful and valuable. (WTO 2003a)

These states also suggested the codification or abolition of economic needs tests. As mentioned above, economic needs tests as
structured in the Uruguay Round left wide discretion to states. They
may be understood to play a similar role to that of safeguards, without
the multilateral discipline.
In 2006, India prepared a collective request on behalf of itself and
14 other developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Mexico, Morocco,
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Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Uruguay. The target of the request was a
group of wealthy countries. One of the main thrusts of this request was
to de-link Mode 4 commitments from Mode 3, and to establish commitments relating to contractual service suppliers (CSS) and independent
professionals (IP). Contractual service suppliers are employees of
foreign-based enterprises with no commercial presence in the territory
of the other WTO member. Independent professionals also provide services pursuant to contract, but as self-employed persons. Access would
be permitted only for provision of services at a level of complexity and
specialty that require, at a minimum, a diploma or a university degree,
or demonstrated experience. For both CSS and IP, market access would
not be subject to wage parity or economic needs tests, or if economic
needs tests persist, they would be subject to narrower definition. Duration of stay would be for one year or for the duration of the contract (if
longer) with provision for renewal. The concept of these categories is
to address high-skilled-type activities.
Immigration and visa issues have generally been avoided. There
has been discussion of a so-called GATS visa, which would facilitate
temporary movement of natural persons through greater transparency
and ease of administration, and impose clear limitations on the duration
of stay.
The relationship between movement of natural persons under Mode
4 and immigration should be addressed directly, with specific commitments regarding the relationship between immigration rules and market
access. Instead, under the MONP Annex, immigration is largely retained within the domaine reservé. Immigration might be understood
as a “border measure” not unlike a tariff or a quota, while domestic
regulation is an “internal measure.” While this distinction should not
be accorded great substantive effect, it may be useful to consider the
approach to immigration and Mode 4 commitments as part of general
liberalization, while domestic regulation issues are treated separately.
Transparency has been a critical issue in Doha Round negotiations around Mode 4. Immigration rules, and visa and qualification
requirements, remain complex and difficult, especially for unskilled
and semiskilled labor unable to afford sophisticated legal advice. Developing countries have made proposals for greater predictability and
transparency.
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India proposed establishment of a “GATS visa” to ease entry of
individuals benefiting from Mode 4 liberalization.6 The United States
and EU service industry associations have made similar proposals. This
would entail a streamlined process for a limited visa. The Indian proposal includes more transparent criteria and improved administrative
procedures for visas and work permits.

MFN Obli gati ons and E x ce pti ons Rel ati ng to
Econom i c Int e grati on, La b or Marke ts
Int e grati on, and Re cogni ti on
As we evaluate the lessons of GATS for rules relating to free movement of labor, one of the most critical issues is the role of MFN-type
antidiscrimination rules, and the exceptions to these rules for arrangements for closer economic integration.
Article II of GATS provides as follows: “With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and
service suppliers of any other country.”
Thus, bilateral, regional, or other plurilateral agreements for service market integration, relating to measures covered by GATS, such
as some of those discussed in Chapter 7, are regulated by Article II of
GATS. These obligations are not dependent upon scheduling. However,
bilateral, regional, or other plurilateral agreements may be eligible for
exceptions under Article V (economic integration), Article V bis (labor
markets integration agreements) and Article VII (recognition).
Of course, before we go too far it is necessary to recall that to the
extent that the MONP Annex effectively excludes “measures affecting
natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member
. . . [as well as] measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis,” these types of measures are not subject to
the Article II MFN obligation, because these measures are not covered
by the GATS. On the other hand, measures relating to temporary employment other than those affecting access to the employment market of
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a member would generally be subject to the MFN obligation. So these
distinctions will determine whether the MFN obligation applies or not.
However, Article V of GATS, similar to Article XXIV of GATT
pertaining to goods, permits agreements for economic integration that
cover services. Article V of GATS sets two main requirements. First,
agreements must have “substantial sectoral coverage.” Footnote 1 of
GATS provides that “this condition is understood in terms of number of
sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to meet
this condition, agreements should not provide for the a priori exclusion
of any mode of supply.” Importantly, Mode 4 should not be a priori
excluded. Second, within covered sectors, “substantially all discrimination” must be eliminated.
Article V bis of GATS provides that GATS shall not prevent states
from entering into agreements for full labor market integration, provided that they exempt citizens of other parties to the agreement from
requirements concerning residency and work permits. Footnote 2 to
GATS states that “typically, such integration provides citizens of the
parties concerned with a right of free entry to the employment markets
of the parties and includes measures concerning conditions of pay, other
conditions of employment and social benefits.” Qualifying agreements
must exempt “citizens of parties to the agreement from requirements
concerning residency and work permits.” Some of the GATS negotiators speculate that this provision may be ineffective because, as noted
above, the MONP Annex excludes issues of access to labor markets
(Self and Zutshi 2003, p. 35).
Under GATS Article VII, member states that develop mutual recognition arrangements are required to “afford adequate opportunity
for other interested Members to negotiate their accession to such an
agreement or arrangement or to negotiate comparable ones with it.”
Recognition arrangements provide that the receiving state will recognize certain licenses or credentials attained in the home state. GATS
Article V permits economic integration arrangements. The relationship between these two provisions, and the circumstances under which
developing countries will be permitted to participate in recognition arrangements among developed countries, is an emerging issue. Under
the WTO appellate body’s jurisprudence, it is at least arguable that recognition arrangements within regional integration arrangements are not
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protected by Article V, and would be required to comply with Article
VII.
Both Article V and Article V bis state that “this Agreement shall not
prevent” entry into plurilateral services liberalization or labor market
integration agreements. This type of language has been interpreted by
the WTO appellate body (in the GATT Article XXIV context) as establishing a kind of “necessity” test (Trachtman 2003b). This necessity test
in this context would permit measures necessary to fulfill the requirements specified in order to constitute a qualifying services liberalization
agreement or labor market integration agreement.
Finally, Article VII of GATS, discussed below, allows member states
to enter into recognition arrangements relating to standards or criteria
for the authorization, licensing, or certification of services suppliers.

Nati onal Tre atme nt u nde r Arti cle X VII
In trade law, national treatment obligations are generally used to
ensure that domestic regulation or taxes are not used so as to protect domestic production, implicitly reneging on liberalization commitments.
National treatment obligations are generally understood as “behind the
border” measures, although they can of course be applied at the border
with respect to imported goods. In services, there is often no customs
or other border administration, so that all services regulation is, in effect, behind the border. In services, GATS was intended in part simply
to establish national treatment as a direct form of liberalization, where
domestic regulation sometimes simply prohibited foreign persons from
supplying a particular service. In migration, national treatment obligations would serve a similar function. However, they may serve a more
extensive function as well. Not only would they provide for market access, but they would also ensure that destination states do not, through
discriminatory treatment, reduce the value of migration to the migrant,
diverting rents to themselves. In this way, some types of discrimination
may function similarly to a tariff.
Article XVII:1 of GATS provides that “in the sectors inscribed in
its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out
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therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.”
Thus, as already noted, national treatment under GATS is not universal, but is subject to the positive listing of the relevant service sector
in the relevant state’s schedule. In addition, it is subject within each
listed sector to the negative listing of any exception to the national
treatment obligation in that schedule. Deciding that national treatment
should not be a general principle as in GATT, but a concession to be
bargained over, is one of the distinctive features of GATS. The core of
a nondiscrimination obligation such as national treatment is the comparison between the favored good, service, or service supplier, and the
disfavored one. Article XVII sets up the comparison as being one between “like” services or service suppliers, referring on its face to the
“like products” concept articulated pursuant to Article III of GATT.
What makes two services alike? For example, is Swedish massage
like chiropractic adjustment? Similarly, is Internet telephony like standard telephone service? More fundamentally, is it permissible to make
distinctions between services on the basis of the identity of the service
supplier as well as the way the service appears to the consumer? While
it would be plausible to attempt to apply the border tax adjustments
factors to services, it is not clear that these parameters of likeness make
sense even in GATT. And, of course, the word “like” has meant different things in different contexts, even within GATT.
The majority of the appellate body in E.C.—Asbestos found that
likeness under Article III:4 is, “fundamentally, a determination about
the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among
products.”7 To perform such an assessment, the appellate body recalled
that the four basic criteria, derived from the border tax adjustment report (GATT BISD 1970) —1) the physical properties of the products
in question, 2) their end uses, 3) consumer tastes and habits vis-à-vis
those products, and 4) tariff classification—are to be used as tools in
the determination of this competitive relationship between products.
These criteria do not exhaust inquiry (WTO 2001a, para. 101). This approach is intended to approximate the competitive relationship between
the relevant goods—it is not as accurate or refined as simply testing
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cross-elasticity of demand. But the more important point is that this test
is relatively ignorant of factors that motivate regulation. The economic
theory of regulation suggests that regulation is necessary precisely
where consumers cannot adequately distinguish relevant goods—where
they are in close competitive relation. Thus, a competitive relationship
test for likeness will often result in a finding that goods that differ by
the parameter addressed by regulation are indeed alike, and should be
treated the same.
Interestingly, on its face, the structure of Article XVII seems to indicate that a national regulation imposed on a foreign service provider
must meet two tests: it must provide treatment no less favorable than
that accorded domestic like services and domestic like service providers. Therefore, even if the service providers are not alike, and thus there
is no possible basis for finding illegal discrimination between them, it
is still possible that the services they provide may be alike, giving rise
to a claim of violation of the requirement of national treatment. So, if a
nurse and a doctor perform the same service, but their performance is
regulated differently, there is a concern that such differential regulation
would violate the national treatment obligation. This may lead to absurd
outcomes.
Thus, a better reading would read the two requirements above in the
disjunctive, i.e., to separate the evaluation of treatment of services from
the evaluation of treatment of service providers.8 It would simply evaluate regulation of services by determining whether the regulation treats
like services alike, full stop. If this were the case, regulation of service
providers would be evaluated to determine only whether like service
providers are treated alike. Using this interpretation, there would be no
violation of national treatment if like services were treated differently
where the reason for the difference in treatment is the regulation of the
service provider. This is likely to be the interpretation that a WTO panel
or the appellate body would apply.
Service regulations, as such, would only be evaluated to determine
whether like services are treated alike, while service provider regulations, as such, would only be evaluated to determine whether like service
providers are treated alike. The WTO dispute settlement body would be
required to distinguish between regulation of services and regulation of
service providers. In addition, the analogy to products might be taken
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one step further, suggesting stronger constraints on host state regulation
of the service provider than on the service.
Thus far, GATT/WTO dispute resolution has been unable to provide a predictable, consistent approach to determining when products
are alike. We cannot expect GATS dispute resolution to do better as to
services. Thus, for example, we might ask whether two accountants,
each with advanced university degrees from different states, are like
service providers. Under GATT jurisprudence, these questions cannot
be answered predictably, or in the abstract, but must be determined on
a case-by-case basis. While this jurisprudence results in a degree of
unpredictability, the appellate body has now addressed several cases,
providing experience in how these multiple factors are likely to be
viewed and applied. The question for us is whether this situation of
case-by-case analysis by the dispute settlement mechanism is superior
to a more discrete, ex ante/specification that could be provided by treaty
making or other quasi-legislative process?
Once services or service providers are determined to be alike,
it is necessary to determine that the measure imposes less favorable
treatment on the foreign service or service provider compared to the
domestic ones. In its Asbestos decision, the appellate body emphasized
that this is a distinct analysis, and that not every national measure that
treats foreign goods differently from domestic goods would result in
less favorable treatment.

Qu ali fi cati on Re qui re me nts, L i ce nsi ng
Re qui re me nts and Proce du re s, Te ch ni cal
Re gul ati ons, and Transpare ncy
For professional labor, subject to qualification or licensing requirements, states may have a nonprotectionist, or prudential, reason for
imposing qualification or licensing requirements. However, it is also
clear that these requirements and related technical regulations pose barriers to labor movement.
Article VI (domestic regulation) spells out general obligations for
service sectors that have been included by contracting parties in their
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national schedules, except for measures that are covered by reservations in these schedules under Article XVII (national treatment) and
XVI (market access).
In vague terms, Article VI:1 provides that domestic regulations, applied in a sector that a member has agreed to include under specific
liberalization commitments, must be administered in a “reasonable,
objective, and impartial manner.” This commitment will be very important to ensure the utility of Mode 4. Furthermore, it is possible that this
requirement—especially its reasonableness prong—may be employed
and developed in WTO dispute settlement to impose substantive obligations of proportionality in connection with domestic regulation (but
see WTO [2005]). Interestingly, and provocatively, the relevant portions of the dictionary definit on of “reasonable” include “in accordance
with reason; not irrational or absurd,” “proportionate,” and “within the
limits of reason; not greatly less or more than might be thought likely
or appropriate” (Brown 1993). The limitation of this discipline to the
“manner of administration” may be important, although it will be difficult to separate the manner of administration from the substance of
rules.
Article VI also includes procedural guidelines requiring that decisions in cases where the supply of a service requires authorization in
the host country must be issued within a reasonable period of time, and
that signatories establish tribunals and procedures to process potential
complaints by foreign service suppliers.
Article VI:4 of GATS calls on the Council for Trade in Services
(CTS) to develop any necessary disciplines to ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards,
and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to
trade in services. We will discuss the Article VI:4 work program and
its fruits below.
Prior to the agreement and entry into force of more specific rules
under Article VI:4, disciplines on national measures are available under
Article VI:5 in sectors in which the importing member has undertaken
specific commitments. In order for these disciplines to apply, two sets
of criteria must be satisfied
1) the licensing or qualification requirements or technical standards
must nullify or impair specific commitments in a manner that
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could not reasonably have been expected at the time the specific
commitments were made; and
2) the measure must not be based on objective and transparent criteria, or be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service, or in the case of licensing procedures, in itself
be a restriction on the supply of the service.
I examine these two criteria in turn.
Nullification o Impairment
Nullification or impairment (N/I) has served as a central feature
in GATT and WTO dispute resolution. Under Article XXIII of GATT,
redress pursuant to the dispute resolution system of GATT is only available in the event of N/I. Where a provision of WTO law is violated,
N/I is presumed. On the other hand, it is possible, although infrequent,
for N/I to serve as the basis for a successful complaint in the absence
of an actual violation of GATT: so-called nonviolation nullification or
impairment. Article VI:5 of GATS incorporates this concept of nonviolation nullification or impairment
In the leading nonviolation nullification or impairment case, Film,
the panel reviewed in detail the basis for certain U.S. expectations, in
order to decide whether the U.S. had “legitimate expectations” of benefits after successive tariff negotiation rounds (see WTO [1998a]). As
the complaining party, the U.S. was allocated the burden of proof as to
its legitimate expectations. In order for the U.S. to meet this burden,
it was required to show that the Japanese measures at issue were not
reasonably anticipated at the time the concessions were granted. Where
the measure at issue was adopted after the relevant tariff concession,
the panel established a presumption, rebuttable by Japan, that the U.S.
could not have reasonably anticipated the measure.
The import of this approach in the services context is clear. The
complaining party must show that the measures attacked were not
reasonably anticipated. Thus, long-standing regulatory practices or
circumstances are protected. This provides a certain advantage to developed countries, as compared to developing countries that may be
establishing new regulatory regimes. Furthermore, this understanding
means that the domestic circumstances as they are form a background
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for all concessions; as a matter of negotiation strategy, members of
GATS must recognize this and bear the burden of negotiating an end to
existing measures that reduce the benefits for which they negotiate. It is
also clear, as described in more detail below, that Article VI:5 will not
impose substantial discipline on existing domestic regulation, placing a
greater burden on Article VI:4 as a source of discipline.
It is worthwhile to compare this structure with that applicable to
goods under the GATT and under the two WTO agreements applicable
to regulatory standards: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. Neither GATT nor these agreements include the N/I requirement in the prohibition itself. Therefore, in connection with trade in
goods, determination of a violation of a provision of a covered agreement results in prima facie N/I under Article 3:8 of the D.S.U., placing
the burden of rebutting the existence of N/I on the respondent. In the
context of Article VI:5 of GATS, without N/I, there is no violation.
Without a violation, there is no prima facie N/I. Consequently, it will be
for the complaining party to show nullification or impairment. This will
make it more difficult for national services regulation to be addressed
under Article VI:5.
We may speculate as to why GATS relies on the N/I concept so
heavily in this context. N/I is an extremely vague standard, but one
which by itself has been difficult to meet. Thus, in the absence of an
ability to negotiate more specific disciplines on national regulation, N/I
provides a modicum of more general discipline. It might be viewed as
a “least common denominator,” insofar as the parties could agree not
to nullify or impair concessions earnestly made, but could not agree
on more pervasive, blanket restrictions on their national regulatory
sovereignty. Thus, Article VI:5 is first and foremost merely a standstill
obligation.
The Necessity Test
Under this additional component of the GATS Article VI:5 test, we
focus on the requirement (incorporated from Article VI:4(b)) that the
national measure not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the
quality of the service. Even if it is possible to show that a national mea-
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sure nullifies or impairs service commitments, a complainant would
still be required to show that the national measure does not comply
with the criteria listed in Article VI:4, the most likely of which is the
necessity test examined here.
Until the E.C.—Asbestos and Korea—Various Measures on Beef
decisions of the Appellate Body, “necessity” was generally interpreted as requiring the domestic regulation to be the least trade restrictive
method of achieving the desired goal. In Korea—Various Measures on
Beef, the Appellate Body interpreted the necessity test of Article XX(d)
to imply a requirement for balancing among at least three variables:
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement
of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.
(See WTO [2000].)

In the context of Article VI:4(b), the reference is to measures “not
more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.”
The last clause could be very interventionist. It could restrict not just
the means to attain a given regulatory goal but even the types of regulatory goals that might be achieved, as when the regulatory goal is not to
maintain the quality of the service but to avoid some other externalization or regulatory harm by the service provider. For example, if a bank
is required to maintain a particular reserve in relation to a loan, is that
necessary to ensure the quality of the service? Many types of service
regulation might be subject to similar, inappropriate, attack. This provision should be revised.
Furthermore, in a placement comparable to the inclusion of the N/I
criterion in the substantive prohibition, here the necessity criterion is
included as a parameter of the substantive prohibition, in addition to
being included in the exceptional provisions of Article XIV(c), relating to health, morality, and other regulatory goals. Therefore, in order
to make out a violation of Article VI:5 under this clause, the national
measure will be required to be shown to be unnecessary in the sense
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described above. Then, in order for the respondent to claim an exception under XIV(c), it will be required to show that it is necessary in the
broader sense defined there. One interesting question involves the burden of proof. Under the products jurisprudence of the Appellate Body,
it appears that the complainant will be required to show the lack of necessity under Article VI:5, while the responding state would ordinarily
be required to prove the affirmative defense of necessity under Article
XIV(c). This is at least an odd legal circumstance, where each side is
allocated the burden of proof on the same issue at different phases. The
complaining state, say for example the EC in an attack on U.S. separation of commercial from investment banking, would be required to
show that the U.S. regulatory approach is “unnecessary” under Article
VI:5, while the U.S. would be required to demonstrate its necessity under Article XIV(c).
In 1998, the Committee on Trade in Services adopted the Disciplines
on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (the Accountancy
Disciplines), developed by the GATS Working Party on Professional
Services (now the Working Party on Domestic Regulation) (see WTO
[1998b]). These disciplines apply to all member states that have made
specific commitments in accountancy (positive list) but do not apply
to national measures listed as exceptions under Articles XVI and XVII
(negative list). They generally articulate further and tighten the principle of necessity: that measures should be the least trade restrictive
method to effect a legitimate objective. In fact, these provisions replicate requirements that have been imposed in the EC pursuant to the
ECJ’s single market jurisprudence. They also replicate the approach of
the EC’s General System Directives on professions, codifying principles of proportionality, or necessity. They have the following features
relevant to this chapter:
• Necessity. Member states are required to ensure that measures
relating to licensing requirements and procedures, technical
standards, and qualification requirements and procedures are not
prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary barriers to trade in accountancy services.
Such measures may not be more trade restrictive than necessary
to fulfill a legitimate objective, including protection of consumers, the quality of the service, professional competence, and the
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integrity of the profession. As will be clear from the discussion
above, this necessity requirement is substantially stronger than
that contained in Article VI:5 of GATS.
• Qualificatio requirements. Member states must take account of
qualifications acquired in the territory of another member state,
on the basis of equivalency of education, experience, and/or examination requirements. Examinations or other qualification requirements must be limited to subjects relevant to the activities
for which authorization is sought.
• Technical standards. Technical standards must be prepared, adopted, and applied only to fulfill legitimate objectives. In determining conformity, member states must take account of internationally recognized standards (of international organizations)
applied by that member.
It is worth noting that the EC has stated that the following should
be considered in defining necessity under Article VI:4: “A measure that
is not the least trade restrictive to trade will not be considered more
burdensome/more trade restrictive than necessary so long as it is not
disproportionate to the objective stated and pursued.”9 This is substantially more lenient in respect of domestic regulation than the definition
of “necessity” developed in GATT/WTO jurisprudence. Furthermore,
it is not clear precisely what “disproportionate” means in this context.
Proportionality stricto sensu (Emiliou 1996, p. 6) inquires whether the
means are “proportionate” to the ends: whether the costs are excessive
in relation to the benefits. It might be viewed as cost-benefit analysis
with a margin of appreciation, as it does not require that the costs be
less than the benefits. At the same time that it prefers proportionality
and necessity to a least trade restrictive alternative test, the EC seems
to suggest that “the validity, or rationale, of the policy objective[s] must
not be assessed.” (See WTO [2001c, para. 17].)
Necessity has a complex relationship with recognition. That is, a
necessity test, interpreted as a requirement that the national measure
be the least trade restrictive alternative reasonably available to address the regulatory concern, can either be an absolute requirement or
a relative requirement. Thus, a less restrictive option might make sense
irrespective of the home regime or conversely might only be justified in

Job Name:

--

/309724t

Mode 4 of GATS 265

reference to the home country regulatory regime, as a complementary
measure. Judgments based on the former assessment reflect a high degree of judicial activism and are unlikely to be found legitimate.
In the latter case, where the home country regulatory regime satisfies the host country concerns, necessity may require recognition. This
would be an extreme interpretation of necessity as least trade restrictive
alternative analysis, stating in effect that no regulatory intervention on
the part of the importing country is necessary at all. The least restrictive
alternative is to do nothing. We have seen this in the ECJ’s jurisprudence, and there are also treaty provisions reflecting this concept in
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement.
Under this interpretation, recognition may be mandated, or equivalence
may be determined, by judicial fiat
Note that Article VII of GATS and paragraph 3 of the Annex on
Financial Services, in contrast, do not require recognition, but merely
authorize it. Although a strong GATS standard of necessity might eventually lead to such judicially required recognition, this is unlikely to
be the case under current treaty language for reasons we will come to
in the last section. But the necessity test might nevertheless mandate
partial recognition of some regulations and not others, whereby partial
recognition becomes the operational consequence of the principle of
proportionality. It is important to note that the Accountancy Disciplines
require recognition of professional qualifications in accountanc .
As noted above, the Accountancy Disciplines include a greatly enhanced necessity test, applicable within that sector.
GATS, like GATT, does not specifically require the use of international standards, and provides weaker incentives for the use of
international standards than the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement. As noted above, Article VI:5(b) requires that account be taken of
compliance with international standards where a member state’s compliance with Article VI:5(a) is being evaluated. This is a nod toward a
safe harbor for states that comply with international standards, although
it should provide only very modest incentive effects, because of the
weakness of Article VI:5(a). It does not provide a presumption of compliance, as do Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement and Article 3.2 of the
SPS Agreement.
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The Accountancy Disciplines require that member states take
account of internationally recognized standards of international organizations in determining conformity with technical standards (see WTO
[1998b, para. 26]). This is a different and additional requirement. Under
Article VI:5(b), compliance with international standards is taken into
account in determining the compliance of a member’s regulation with
WTO law.10 Under the Accountancy Disciplines, a member state must
take compliance with international standards into account in determining the acceptability of foreign service providers. This is a gentle shove
toward recognition based on essential harmonization.
The Article VI:4 Work Program was intended to deal over time with
certain regulatory barriers to trade in services, through decisions made
by the C.T.S. under its authority. The WTO Secretariat, with the assistance of member states, has prepared a list of examples of measures
to be addressed by disciplines under GATS Article VI:4 (WTO 1999a,
2001d). These examples included, inter alia, residency requirements,
failure to recognize foreign qualifications, and national standards that
diverge from international standards. By focusing on examples of regulatory barriers that service suppliers actually face, it is possible to target
additional disciplines more precisely. Developing countries should participate actively in this process in order to focus attention on the barriers
that their service providers face.
So far, the Article VI:4 Work Program has operated sectorally, and
only in the single sector of accountancy. However, it may be that other
professional service sectors, and even other service sectors, may be
amenable to similar types of disciplines. Thus, it would be possible to
evaluate application of similar necessity, equivalence, and other disciplines on a horizontal basis.
The proposed draft annex on domestic regulation prepared by Japan
suggests adoption of the core disciplines contained in the Accountancy
Disciplines, with some modifications, on a horizontal basis (see WTO
[2003b]). This would retain the possibility for separate, additional, or
alternative disciplines on a sectoral basis.
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Notes
1. The other modes are cross-border supply (Mode 1) and service consumer travel
(Mode 2).
2. The scope of activities that may be included in the word “service” may be determined, in part, by reference to the Services Sectoral Classification List, W/120.
3. GATS, Art. XXVIII(g).
4. For a list of MFN exemptions affecting Mode 4, see Nielson and Taglioni (2003).
5. As discussed in Chapter 7, the NAFTA, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-Chile, and U.S.Singapore free trade agreements allow for employment-based movement, facilitated by a streamlined visa.
6. For a useful discussion, see Self and Zutshi (2003).
7. See WTO (2001a, para. 99). Note the different opinion with regard to the very
specific aspects mentioned in para. 154
8. But see WTO (1997, para.7.322), considering that like service suppliers are producers of like services.
9. See WTO (2001a, para. 22). Note that the appellate body may be understood to
have adopted a similar position in Asbestos and Korean Beef.
10. Article VI(5)(b) refers to standards “of relevant international organizations,”
which are defined as “international bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the WTO.” This definition might exclude,
for example, the Basle Committee.
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Negotiating Global
Disciplines on Migration
This chapter examines some of the main dynamics of international
agreements on migration. The present chapter builds on the welfare
economics, the ethical, and especially the international political economy perspectives developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It
also utilizes as data the legal rules described in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.
This chapter develops the broad contours of the possible negotiation
dynamics that may develop in the field of migration, based in part on
the schematics advanced in Chapter 4. Based on these contours, Chapter 10 discusses a number of more specific disciplines in this field, and
Appendix A provides a conjectural outline of a possible multilateral
agreement on migration.

Bila teral,
R e gio nal, Plurila
teral,
Mul tila teral
Ne gotia tio ns

a nd

As we begin to consider the possibility of international legal rules
of labor migration, we must first consider the alternatives. There are
three main types of alternative forms of institutionalization in this field:
1) bilateralism, 2) regionalism (or other plurilateralism), and 3) multilateralism. These can be either formal or informal. Of course, another
alternative is unilateralism. In Chapter 11, I will discuss possible organizational features of a multilateral organization dealing with migration.
The first question is that raised in Chapters 2 and 4: what benefit
do legal commitments produce—to what extent is formalism desirable?
Thus, states may choose to engage in no legal institutionalization at
all: they may continue to determine their immigration policy unilaterally, without legal restriction. This is similar to Coase’s postulated
choice between the market and the firm, with the informal structure of
271

Job Name:

--

/309724t

272 Trachtman

relationships theoretically equivalent to the market (Trachtman 1997).
This is the system that broadly applies today: aside from the regional
efforts already described, we generally have a regime of rough give
and take, with states exercising power constrained by a degree of informal reciprocity. This does not mean that there is no cooperation—it
merely means that there is no longer-term legalized and institutionalized cooperation.
However, outside of the EU and forced migration contexts, international law and organizations have so far had little influence over
migration policy. According to Meyers (2000, p. 1266), “The limited
influence of international organizations and regimes is caused by the
high political costs of immigration, the difficulty of distributing the
benefits of immigration, and the almost unlimited supply of labor that
has exempted the receiving countries from the need to cooperate with
the countries of origin or with other receiving countries.”
We must ask whether this type of reservation of complete national
autonomy, perhaps with some degree of informal reciprocity, is efficient,
or whether some legal restrictions would be useful to states in order to
achieve a more efficient strategic equilibrium. Recall that Chapter 2 suggests that there is a substantial welfare gain to be won by liberalization
of migration. The demand for immigrants may be more complex than
Meyers describes, especially with respect to skilled workers, but also in
some contexts with respect to unskilled workers. Chapter 3 describes a
rights-based approach to migration that may support legal confirmation
and delineation of this right. Chapter 4 describes a domestic political
equilibrium that might fail to support liberalization of migration unless
some reciprocal arrangements are made, either within the migration
field or in cross-sectoral linkage. Chapter 4 models states’ immigration
policies in some contexts as a coordination game along the lines of a
stag hunt, in other contexts along the lines of a prisoner’s dilemma, and
in still other contexts as a game in which the efficient equilibrium is
noncooperation.
Chapter 4 suggests the possibility that states might benefit from the
ability to bind one another to liberalization. It is likely that the utility
of reciprocal commitments will only be fully known once a framework
agreement is developed and states begin earnest negotiations to determine the scope of acceptable commitments.
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Recall that some of the ideas developed in Chapter 4 suggest the
possible utility of reciprocity, but do not require formal legal commitments for reciprocity. However, the more specific the arrangements,
and the more carefully balanced the reciprocity, the more likely it will
be that states will determine to act more self-consciously through formal legal regimes. Note that even a regime of informal reciprocity is an
institution in the institutional economics sense, and is a regime in the
international politics regime theory sense. As a matter of fact, in many
circumstances, including some relating to the global environment, states
are able to reach implicit (customary) or explicit (treaty) agreements to
cooperate, and to enforce these agreements (Norman and Trachtman
2005; Scott and Stephan 2004). They are able to do so among relatively
patient states, under circumstances of frequently repeated, or linked, interaction, over a long duration, where information about the compliance
or failure of compliance of others is readily available.1 This problem is
analogous to other global public goods problems.
Formal law and formal organization are thus not necessarily required to achieve a different strategic equilibrium, but they are an
important means by which states may self-consciously revise institutional dynamics. Formal law and organization provide a set of additional
tools, accepted default rules, and additional linkages that may be quite
valuable.
It is understood that states with certain political affinities, and
with greater ethnic or socioeconomic homogeneity, are more likely to
liberalize immigration vis-à-vis one another (Neumayer 2005, p. 18).
Regionalism is likely to be a good proxy for cultural affinit , but there
are certainly counterexamples—contexts in which there is great cultural
or ethnic affinity despite geographic distance. In addition, regionalism
may be a proxy for symmetry in terms of labor market structure. While
asymmetry may provide greater welfare gains, it may also provide
greater political obstacles.
States may choose to enter into bilateral agreements in order to liberalize their immigration policies. As described in Chapter 7, a number
of states have entered into bilateral migration agreements, but these
generally do not involve formal commitments to liberalize. Rather, they
ordinarily involve management of such topics as recruitment, remittances, and return.
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Importantly, states have developed webs of bilateral treaty arrangements in connection with foreign investment and international taxation.
There have been efforts to multilateralize foreign investment treaty regimes, without success to date. Bilateral arrangements of course raise
important issues of discrimination: of MFN nondiscriminatory treatment (Ugur 2007). However, it is even possible to establish MFN rules
that link treatment under separate bilateral or plurilateral agreements.
Bilateral foreign investment treaties often contain MFN obligations that
effectively link treatment under one treaty to obligations under another,
multilateralizing the best treatment a particular state has conceded.
Again, would entry into a broader form of agreement confer greater
benefits?
Bilateral arrangements may be unsatisfactory for several reasons.
First, as the number of bilateral labor market agreements increases, it
is likely that states will grow increasingly concerned about their relative position, suggesting the utility of MFN-type obligations, or at least
multilateral negotiations. Why will states be concerned about their relative position? To the extent that the negotiation is over a discrete quota,
the relative position—the share of the quota allocated to the sending
state—will determine market access. To the extent that the negotiation
is over discriminatory taxes imposed by the destination state, which
may be assimilated to a tariff, relative position will determine degree
of market access, and the extent to which migration flows conform to
actual comparative advantage in producing appropriate migrants, as opposed to the relative burden of discriminatory taxes.
Second, and along similar lines, with increasing competition for
migrant access to wealthy markets, developing countries may find
themselves competing with one another for access. They may wish to
negotiate together in a multilateral setting in order to avoid a collective
action problem in bargaining. For example, the Philippines and Indonesia have entered into an agreement for a modest level of coordination
of their emigration activities (Go 2007). Asian countries have already
sought to coordinate their activities to protect their emigrants and maximize the beneficial effects for home countries through the Colombo
Process.2
Third, with increasing competition to attract skilled workers, states
may find themselves racing to the bottom in terms of their taxation or
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other aspects of their treatment of skilled workers. (See the discussion
of regulatory competition in Chapter 2.) “The similarities in labour demand across receiving countries, as well as the emerging competition
for labour from sending countries, may support a multilateral approach
or at least co-ordinated policies among receiving countries” (OECD
2004, p. 27). In effect, with increasing competition for skilled migrants,
competing destination states may wish to negotiate together to establish
a cartel in order to retain their market power.
Fourth, while, as noted above, MFN does not require a multilateral
agreement, if an MFN rule is desirable, it may be easier to negotiate and
to seek reciprocal commitments within a multilateral negotiation that
leads to a multilateral agreement. This was one of the benefits that led
the United States and the UK to seek a multilateral trade agreement in
the 1940s, resulting in the GATT. Even a multilateral agreement may be
structured in such a way that it should be understood as a series of bilateral agreements. Much depends on the structure of the relationships and
whether MFN treatment multilateralizes all concessions.
Fifth, there are economies of scale that may make a multilateral
agreement less costly in terms of diplomatic and administrative resources than a series of bilateral agreements. Bilateral arrangements will
be more costly to implement than multilateral arrangements, and may
be less transparent. It is also possible that there would be economies
of scale in connection with international institutional arrangements,
such as secretariat operations or dispute settlement. Of course, it is possible to have a hybrid multilateral-bilateral agreement: a multilateral
framework agreement under which states agree to specific bilateral
arrangements.
Finally, it may be that a multilateral agreement would facilitate
multilateral surveillance and enforcement action that would result in
greater possibilities for compliance.
A third and intermediate option is regional or other plurilateral arrangements. I have discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 the fact that some
groups of states have already entered into regional or other plurilateral
arrangements for immigration. So, of course, one important question is
why some states have chosen bilateral or regional agreements, and why
they have considered bilateral or regional arrangements to be more desirable than multilateral arrangements. The emergence of regional and

Job Name:

--

/309724t

276 Trachtman

bilateral arrangements for migration might indeed be taken as evidence
that migration is not, or at least is not yet, a global problem that requires
global institutionalization. Another way of saying this is that the extent
to which it is a global problem may be small compared to the costs of
global institutionalization. It is possible that, due to greater economic
homogeneity and lower travel costs, migration is more likely to be the
subject of regional agreement first (Nielson 2003, pp. 93, 94), but it
is entirely possible that multilateral arrangements for migration would
also be desirable or would subsequently be desirable. That is, it may be
that the experience of regional liberalization may break down resistance
to further liberalization, thereby facilitating multilateral liberalization.
Thus, where and when it is valuable to engage in multilateral institutionalization, as in the WTO, states may determine to do so. Bilateral
and regional agreements may serve as pathfinders for multilateral agreements, or they can serve as substitutes for multilateral agreements. In
trade, this set of alternatives has been dubbed the “building blocks”
versus “stumbling blocks” question, assuming that global welfare is
maximized by, and global society is heading toward, multilateral agreement. Multilateral institutionalization can serve as a response to the
question of MFN treatment raised above. It also provides a broader forum for engaging in negotiations, and perhaps for complex multiparty
barter that increases the scope of possible agreement.
So, to the extent that liberalization of migration is understood as
a deeper form of integration than trade in goods or services, it may
be that submultilateral integration would be appropriate according to a
variable geometry perspective. Some states may be more interested or
more prepared for this type of integration than others, and the variable
geometry perspective would suggest that the faster states need not wait
for the slower ones, and that the slower ones need not be required to
accelerate. It is certainly plausible that some states would refrain from
entering into a global migration agreement, and so it is reasonable to
expect some type of plurilateral framework to emerge.
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T he Nee d for Glo

bal R ules

There seem to be two main legitimate goals for international law.
First, international law may be designed to increase welfare by overcoming bargaining problems in order to allow efficient cooperation, as
suggested in Chapter 4 (Trachtman 1996). I focus on the welfare impact
here.
Second, international law may serve an expressive function: an international legal commitment may help to legitimate or popularize a
certain principle. While I do not dwell on this expressive function here,
it may be that one of the important functions of an international legal regime for migration would be to begin an educational process that would
help voters and governments to realize the legitimacy and benefits of
a permissive regime for migration. This would also serve perhaps as a
bulwark against demagoguery.
In this chapter, I seek to speculate regarding the design of a system
that would improve the welfare of each member state: that would be
Pareto-improving from at least a state-level aggregate standpoint.
So, what might an agreement among states to achieve an efficient
equilibrium in migration look like? One possibility, among many,
would be simply to allow free migration. However, simple permission
for free migration might result in losses to states that invest in human
capital, and to states that provide high levels of social welfare transfers,
assuming that immigrants have access to these programs. A move to
free migration might result in public goods problems and congestion
problems, and ultimately cause these states to move to otherwise inefficient levels of investment in human capital and social welfare. A move
to global free migration would also be politically unthinkable in most
wealthy states.
Furthermore, a simple move to free migration would lose the
benefits of both gradualism and customization to particular national
circumstances. It appears more likely that states would select a more
nuanced arrangement. Therefore, any new system would by necessity
include different rules for different states, allowing customization or
scheduling of commitments. These customized commitments would be
produced through negotiation, which would include a process of eval-
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uation by each state of its position, presumably based on a welfarist
analysis.
As shown in Chapters 2 and 4, states are likely to have divergent
domestic politics in relation to migration. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach to migration liberalization would
fit all states—or would even be consistent with maximizing global welfare. Furthermore, different states will find it appropriate to liberalize
at different rates. Therefore, request-offer-type negotiations, in which
states make a request of another state to liberalize in a specific sector
in a specific way, and the requested state makes an offer conditional on
appropriate reciprocity, would seem attractive. This is the method used
in services negotiations at the WTO in the Doha Round, and it has been
used in goods negotiations as well.
I show in Chapter 4 that there are circumstances where a wealthy
state’s best option, considering migration alone, may be simply to protect its labor markets. This may be the case even where liberalization
would enhance global welfare. Perhaps under these circumstances,
wealthy destination states would find it useful to exchange liberalization commitments in migration for liberalization commitments in other
sectors by home states. These might include liberalization by poor home
states in services, investment, or goods sectors, or it could involve other
concessions.
To the extent that anti-immigrant demagoguery in destination states
combines with anti-import mercantilism in sending states, these erroneous economic perspectives may be harnessed, by international legal
agreement, to counteract one another.
Economists and developing countries have criticized the crosssectoral “grand bargain” that concluded the Uruguay Round, on the
ground that developing states took on obligations, especially in connection with intellectual property rights, that were costly to them.
Economists have grown nostalgic for the original GATT years, when
negotiations were largely concerned with tariff reduction. This is because from the trade economics perspective, both the importing and the
exporting state were on the whole made better off by tariff reduction, so
policymakers could not err. Where all of the possible concessions are
welfare-improving (at the level of the state), bargaining may be expected to result in benign outcomes (at least at the level of the state). While
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the field of migration does not offer the same kind of “error-proof” negotiations, Chapter 2 shows that worldwide welfare is only likely to be
diminished by migration that is either in error or excessively motivated
by public welfare programs.
Governments might welcome assistance, in the form of international legal restrictions, in resisting the temptation to restrict immigration,
where restriction is not consistent with public welfare. As shown in
Chapter 4, rational governments may seek to maximize their support
through such international legal restrictions providing for reciprocity. International legal commitments play a similar role in the trade
context.
There may be circumstances in which surges of migration cause
excessive adjustment costs. Therefore, commitments would ideally
contain economically nuanced safeguards that would allow states to
revise their commitments to the extent that the commitments actually
seem to be causing recession, accentuating the adverse effects of recession, or causing other economic disruption.
As described in Chapter 4, whether the international migration
setting is appropriately described in various real world contexts as a
coordination game, a prisoner’s dilemma, or another strategic model, it
may be useful for states to cooperate through international law in order
to communicate regarding selection of an equilibrium strategy in the
case of a coordination game, and in order to change the payoffs in the
case of a prisoner’s dilemma and therefore support welfare-improving
behavior.

In ter na tio nal Pu blic Goo
In ter na tio nal R e gi mes

ds a nd

Hollifield (2000, p. 90) states that until recently there was little demand for international regimes in the area of migration policy. Low
demand for institutionalization is synonymous with a transaction costs–
transaction benefits structure in which unilateral action and reaction,
without institutional modific tion, results in a stable (but not necessarily
efficient) strategic equilibrium. Where, for example, the value to states
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of migration is small, we would expect them to expend no resources to
establish institutions to regulate migration.3
Often the rise of international law has been associated with
technological or social change that has resulted in the emergence of
international public goods that can be achieved through cooperation.
Is liberalization of migration a public good? It is if one state’s use of it
does not diminish its availability to other states (consumption is nonrivalrous) and if it is not possible to exclude states from its benefits (it is
non-excludible).
There is at least some argument that liberalized migration would
benefit all states due to direct and indirect effects on the general enhancement of global welfare, as well as growth effects. This is similar
to the argument that free trade constitutes a global public good (Kaul
et al. 2003). The indirect effects of this enhancement would seem to be
non-excludible, so in this sense we may view liberalized migration as
a global public good. The implications of this understanding are that
we would expect this public good to be undersupplied—its supply is
a collective action problem. Therefore, some institutional mechanism
for cooperation may be indicated (not all collective action problems are
worth solving—it depends on a comparison of the costs and the benefits
of doing so).
In addition, if we understand human capital as a global public good,
it also will be undersupplied (Straubhaar 2000, p. 128). As outlined
above, another way to describe this problem is to generalize that each
state wishes to attract or retain skilled workers, while many states wish
to exclude or expel unskilled workers. This conflict coexists with the
collective goods problems relating to free migration. This collective action problem could be addressed by allowing states to appropriate the
benefits of their investments in human capital through a Bhagwati tax,
or through other mechanisms.
Migration can be understood as a global problem, and as a collective action problem, in another way. In order to regulate the flows
of workers effectively, with low costs in economic terms and in ethical, human rights, and communitarian terms, destination states need
the cooperation of sending states. This is why many bilateral migration
agreements include provisions for home state cooperation in restraining
illegal immigration to destination states.
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The development dimension of migration may add yet a further
public goods aspect. To the extent that migration is seen as a means
to reduce poverty, these results may have some characteristics of public goods. The willingness of destination states to accept migrants in
order to promote welfare of people in sending states may be understood as a collective action problem that may be resolved through
institutionalization.
Thus, both free migration and human capital enhancements may
be understood as global public goods, with possibly somewhat inconsistent solutions. In order to resolve this set of problems, it may be
appropriate to seek a solution in which each state agrees to allow a
measure of free migration with respect to both unskilled and skilled
workers, while reaping the benefits of its human capital enhancement
programs. Of course, to the extent that states have comparative or absolute advantages, it would seem appropriate to allow them to utilize
these advantages.
So, for example, if the Philippines has an absolute advantage in
semiskilled nursing care while the United States has an absolute disadvantage, it may be appropriate to ensure that semiskilled nurses from
the Philippines may migrate to the United States. In order to induce the
Philippines to make appropriate human capital investments, this regime
should ensure that remittances, Bhagwati taxes, or compensatory payments reimburse the Philippines for its investment.
By allowing states to capture the value of these types of created advantage in the production of human capital, human capital is converted
from a public good to a private good from the perspective of the home
state. This is not an endorsement of limitations on emigration. Rather,
the point is that states will invest efficiently in human capital—and will
invest more—if this public goods problem is resolved.

MF N a nd Ne gotia tio n Dy na mics R evisite

d

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, states would wish to
consider the utility of an unconditional MFN principle in international
migration law. In the migration context, the comparative advantage
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principle suggests that individuals willing to work at the lowest price
(all other things being equal) should migrate. Comparative advantage
would be diminished if, in the EU context for example, a Greek worker
were to move to France to accept a job where an otherwise equivalent
Nigerian worker would have taken the job at a lower wage rate. The
MFN principle is broadly consistent with comparative advantage. Thus,
an MFN principle contributes to the global gains from migration.
One of the main reasons for a global trade organization (i.e., the
WTO) is the economic and political need in the trade context for nondiscrimination in the MFN sense: each state requires a promise that
it will be accorded trade concessions equal to those accorded to each
other state. As more bilateral and regional arrangements are entered into,
states may seek a rule of MFN in order to protect the relative value of
concessions achieved. An MFN rule also ensures negotiators against having their work “undercut” by subsequent superior concessions to other
states, allowing them to avoid adverse political consequences. Both
of these motivations appear to be applicable in the migration context,
although there are cultural, regional, or other reasons why departures
from MFN might be more acceptable in connection with migration than
in connection with trade in goods or services.
Of course, there are important distinctions. In the goods context,
assuming fungible goods, MFN in the application of tariffs would be
expected to have a significant effect on market penetration, and on terms
of trade. In the migration context, we often think in terms of quotas,
rather than tariffs, although it is possible to impose measures equivalent
to a tariff through discriminatory fees or taxes.
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the home state may not have the
same mercantilist perspective, wishing to increase outbound migration,
as in connection with trade in goods. Thus, it may be less concerned
about departures from MFN in connection with migration than it is in
connection with trade in goods. On the other hand, citizens hoping to
migrate may criticize their governments for failing to obtain equal treatment with other home states.
An MFN rule of negotiations would raise the possibility that some
states would attempt to “free ride” on negotiations by other states, declining to make concessions themselves. However, at least within the
GATT/WTO system, this problem has generally been addressed through
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concerted negotiations, with careful examination of each state’s concessions. In connection with GATS, at least for a period in the original
1994 agreement, states preserved a right to decline MFN treatment to
certain other states in order to retain a means to deter free-riding.
As described in Chapters 6 and 7, there already exist regional and
bilateral migration arrangements that may conflict with MFN and with
comparative advantage.
States that find it valuable for their citizens to migrate will desire
at least MFN treatment. The possible negotiation of treatment superior to other comparable states may be modeled in strategic terms as a
prisoner’s dilemma among sending states, in which sending states undermine their collective interest. If they are able to join together, using
an agreement containing an MFN obligation, to form a cartel they may
be able to extract superior liberalization commitments from destination
states (Guzman 1998). In particular, they may be able to countervail
the market power of destination states by forming a kind of “cartel” of
home states—they may thus be able to reduce the use of market power
by destination states.
One way to evaluate the choice between submultilateral liberalization of migration and multilateral liberalization is under the
global cost-benefit analysis approach described by Jacob Viner (1950)
in connection with goods as trade creation versus trade diversion. This
analysis asks to what extent establishment of submultilateral liberalization increases global welfare through liberalization of submultilateral
migration, while diminishing global welfare by diverting migration
from its most efficient destinations. In the years since 1950, economists
have critiqued and extended the static Vinerian analysis in a number of
ways.
Economists have also importantly added to Viner’s “static” analysis
by consideration of what Bhagwati (1993) has called the “dynamic”
time-path issue. This dynamic question includes the question of the
relationship between the growth of regional trade integration and the
growth of multilateral trade integration: whether regional integration
agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks on the path to
global economic integration (1991).
It would be possible to establish a multilateral agreement that
would regulate submultilateral integration in order to prevent welfare-
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reducing arrangements. This type of agreement would mimic the purpose of Article XXIV of GATT.
Thus, as in the case of goods and services trade, there may be some
need to allow submultilateral integration as a departure from MFN
requirements. The EU is an example of such integration. Of course,
the EU is also inconsistent with the MFN requirements of GATT and
GATS, and is thought to qualify for relevant exceptions. So, it would
be consistent to provide similar exceptions in a multilateral agreement
on migration. There would be similar normative arguments regarding
the utility of an exception from the MFN principle, in terms of trade
creation and trade diversion, and in terms of building blocks versus
stumbling blocks.

L i nka ge Politics

a nd In stitutio

nal L i nka ge

It is not appropriate to consider migration negotiations as standalone negotiations, isolated from other international issues. As suggested
in Chapters 2 and 4, there may be circumstances in which beneficial
cross-sectoral reciprocal arrangements may improve aggregate welfare
as well as state welfare.
Linkage, as a political fact, is pervasive. States bargaining with one
another in the international relations market use whatever tools are at
hand: security matters are linked to trade, finance is linked to environmental protection, membership in regional organizations is linked to
human rights. This is a natural and a presumably efficient phenomenon.
In these contexts, states find themselves in a barter economy, trying to
make deals by seeking to identify “bilateral coincidences of wants.”
Until the days of greater use of techniques, such as internationally tradeable pollution permits, or more direct monetary payments in exchange
for substantive concessions, barter will continue. In barter economies,
the greater the breadth of subject matters available, the greater the possibilities for making a deal.
As an example of linkage as a political fact, consider the linkage
between trade and intellectual property rights. This political linkage
evolved into an institutional linkage. The United States sought enhanced
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protection under domestic intellectual property laws of other states for
its intellectual property–dependent industries. It achieved this goal at
the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations with the signing of
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). This agreement was the product of political linkage: in the
famous so-called Grand Bargain, the United States, the EC, and others
exchanged concessions in agriculture and textiles for concessions in
intellectual property protection and services trade. Political linkage was
transformed into institutional linkage in the form of the TRIPS, within
the broader context of the WTO.
TRIPS is an archetypical, and advanced, case history of linkage.
We may view TRIPS as a possible precedent for migration. In fact,
Mode 4 of GATS already demonstrates the degree of natural linkage between migration and trade in services, and even more narrowly between
mode 3 commercial presence and mode 4 movement of natural persons.
The question is whether political, legal, and/or institutional linkage
would allow states to make and enforce broader welfare-improving
agreements.
Of course, it is by no means clear that the WTO should be accorded
responsibility to address international migration law issues (see Chapter 11). However, broader organizations may offer economies of scale
and scope. On the other hand, broader organizations could reduce the
domain of possibly beneficial interorganizational competition (Trachtman 2002b). Moreover, it does not necessarily matter whether functions
are separated in function-specific international organizations, or are integrated within a single organization, such as the UN, or perhaps the
WTO. Linkage can be established either between organizations or within an organization. We live in a world of path dependence: given that
the WTO exists, with a highly articulated set of institutional and legal
capacities and tools, there may be actions, such as adding functional
responsibility to the WTO, that make sense that would not make sense
were the starting point different.
It is possible that negotiations in the WTO context may provide an
advantage over negotiations in a separate multilateral migration agreement, IOM, ILO, or another functional context: the greater possibility
of linked package deals. While institutional linkages may be made
between discrete functional organizations, under some circumstances
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doing so within a single organization may enhance administration and
legitimacy (Guzman 2003; Ryan 1998). The WTO already contains
much scope for package deals: for side payments. “With all side payments prohibited, there is no assurance that collective action will be
taken in the most productive way” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, p.
153). However, it is worth noting that the WTO system, with its effective requirements of unanimity for amendment, results in greater
requirements for “package deals” than a system that relies on majority
voting for new “legislative” rules.
Martin, Lowell, and Taylor (2000, p. 156) suggest that because host
countries require the cooperation of home countries in ensuring that
temporary migrants return home, some means of enforcing commitments (on the part of the home country) are needed. They suggest that
the host country provide “special trade rights, investment and other preferred treatments” as a device to secure compliance through threats of
withdrawal. Depending on the structure of such incentives, they may
require amendments to existing WTO law, and so some formal linkage
may be necessary.
Similarly, these types of benefits could be linked to efforts to assist in preventing unauthorized immigration (see Chapter 4). Martin,
Lowell, and Taylor argue that “the emigration countries that benefit
from freer trade and investment should be expected to help immigration
countries manage migration, especially the unwanted or unauthorized
migration that freer trade is expected eventually to reduce. Given the
resistance to free trade in many aging industrial democracies worried
about unwanted immigration, it seems naive to suggest that migration
can continue to be excluded from trade negotiations” (pp. 157–158).
Furthermore, restriction on imports of goods produced in developing
countries, such as agricultural products and textiles, “reduces employment in emigration countries and increases employment for migrant
workers in industrial countries” (p. 158). For more on the relationship
between trade and investment, see Chapter 2.
Of course, other linkages and compliance mechanisms could be
considered, and linkages and compliance mechanisms could be formal
or informal.
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Brai n Drai n versus

L ow -S kill

A cce pt a nce

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, states may have two different
stances with respect to skills. First, from a Heckscher-Ohlin perspective, states in which unskilled workers are scarce would generally be
expected to welcome unskilled workers, despite the opposition of competing workers. Where states vary and develop preferences as predicted
under Heckscher-Ohlin, there is room for welfare-improving agreements. This would provide a motivation for negotiations.
However, it may appear that many skill-abundant countries are uninterested in encouraging migration from unskilled-abundant countries.
Under some circumstances, both skilled and unskilled workers may
flow toward the high-skilled country—the wealthy country. Thus, as
discussed in Chapter 4, there may be little to bargain over: the game
type that may describe the migration game in this context is a “bully”
game. However, it is possible, through linkage, to identify a broader set
of feasible bargaining solutions.

T axa tio n a nd F or mula App or tio nme nt
It is surprising that states do not engage in more frequent disputes
regarding jurisdiction to tax. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, a Bhagwati tax may be useful to redress certain distributive problems that may
arise in connection with immigration, to the extent that the brain drain
may confer harm on the home state. It may also redress certain allocative problems in connection with the ability of a state to capture the
returns from its investment in human capital. This seems especially
valuable where the home state is a developing country.
It seems that increased migration would put increasing pressure on
states to coordinate in setting tax rates and collecting taxes. Otherwise,
they may find themselves in an uncooperative competition in which
they lose the ability to tax mobile resources. It is increased mobility, as
may result from liberalization of migration, that provides relative market power to the mobile factor.
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Bucovetsky (2003) evaluates the strategic characteristics of a setting
in which high-skilled workers initially resident in a low-productivity
home state wish to migrate to a particular high-productivity destination state. The voters in that destination state would be motivated to
improve their own positions by capturing rents from the immigrants.
Bucovetsky assumes that immigrants have above-average incomes in
the destination state. Therefore, in order to capture rents from the immigrants without discriminating explicitly, the destination state will
increase the progressivity of its income tax system. This outcome assumes that the home state and destination state are unable to cooperate
with one another. Moreover, it assumes an inability to discriminate in
taxation between migrants and native-born workers.
If countries were to seek to cooperate, one equilibrium solution
might involve an agreement to share the tax base, with or without discrimination to the disadvantage of migrants. While there are many ways
in which to share the tax base, countries might find some guidance in
the literature on formula apportionment in connection with corporate
income tax. Formula apportionment ordinarily divides the tax base
among tax jurisdictions by reference to a formula referring to the proportion of sales, payroll, and assets within each jurisdiction. These
components would not be relevant in apportioning the tax base relating
to a migrant, but other components might be relevant. One is years of
education. Another might be years of experience. A third might be relative productivity in the two taxing states.

Ad just me nt
As suggested in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, adjustment will be a critical
part of any regime for liberalized migration. A core question is whether
the adjustment mechanism is internal to states or is international.
Adjustment costs in the migration context arise in connection with
a political or altruistic response to shocks to labor markets. And indeed,
if the unskilled or semiskilled jobs in developed countries immediately
became open to workers from poor countries, the incumbent workers
might find themselves under severe wage pressure, at least in the short
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term. This would be both cruel and politically infeasible. So an adjustment mechanism must accompany substantial liberalization.
Experience in the United States and elsewhere seems to indicate that
destination countries with more flexible labor markets will experience
reduced adjustment costs. Furthermore, countries with sophisticated financial markets will also experience reduced adjustment costs.
As suggested in Chapter 2, migration is similar in adjustment terms
to importation of labor-intensive goods. Both raise global welfare, but
may threaten home country workers who compete with the imported
goods or the imported workers.
The simplest adjustment mechanism is gradualism. In connection
with trade in goods, GATT and now the WTO have served to phase in
liberalization, and have been complemented by various national and
perhaps international schemes for adjustment. GATT, which should be
understood at its inception in 1947 as a framework agreement, has been
successful in allowing states to negotiate liberalization selectively and
gradually. GATS is similarly a framework agreement awaiting the negotiation of more stringent commitments. As discussed above, it seems
likely that any new international agreement relating to migration would
be in the form of a framework agreement, and would entail a degree of
experimentation and adjustment over successive “rounds” of negotiation and commitment. Further, it should be recalled that the experience
in Europe of migration after removal of formal barriers has been underwhelming in the sense that citizens of less wealthy member states
of the EU have not migrated in great numbers to wealthier states (Ugur
2007, p. 83).
In addition to negotiation over time, another form of gradualism
entails the use of prenegotiated transition periods. These have the advantage of being locked in legally, and therefore being somewhat more
predictable than relying on future negotiations. These have recently been
used in connection with the accession of new countries to the EU.
A second alternative, often combined with a degree of gradualism,
is adjustment assistance in the form of transfer payments, outplacement, or training. The U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program is
one example. That program currently only extends to workers who lose
their jobs due to imports of goods, and not due to offshoring of services
or immigration.
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Assuming that the relevant liberalization was indeed global welfare improving, there is by definition sufficient surplus to compensate
the displaced workers, subject to certain limitations. The first limitation
is that compensation is often only pecuniary, and does not restore the
nonpecuniary losses occasioned by displacement. Second, significant
transaction costs may be associated with compensation. Third, for a
variety of political and social reasons, compensation may not occur or
may be insufficient to address losses.
Although a true international “embedded liberalism” approach
would provide for cross-national compensation payments, it is difficult
to justify these types of payments in formal political settings. However,
in informal and less transparent ways, such payments do take place.
Polanyi (1944) and Ruggie (1982) believe that states must regulate
the distribution of gains from trade in order to avoid political discontent, and, ultimately, a “backlash” that would destroy the liberal system.
While Polanyi and Ruggie address distributive issues arising from trade,
those arising from migration are comparable.
In Ruggie’s interpretation, individual states must cushion the domestic “losers” from the loss of wages, livelihoods, and investments
that results from liberalization—Ruggie extends Polanyi’s approach to
relate free international trade to a domestic welfare state. The embedded liberalism “bargain,” in short, is one in which the state takes care of
its own through regulatory intervention in order to maintain its political ability to liberalize. But, importantly, embedded liberalism calls for
national regulatory intervention, not global regulatory intervention. Its
call for redistribution is state-centered, and limited by domestic politics
and budgetary capacity.
Further, it is important to recognize that global liberalism embedded within a domestic welfare state is not quite analogous to the system
described by Polanyi (Ruggie 2002). Polanyi saw the need for societywide regulatory intervention to make adjustments in connection with a
society-wide market. The true analog in connection with global markets
is global regulatory intervention—a global welfare state. Thus, if the
scope of the market is to some degree global, then it would seem appropriate that the scope of regulatory intervention in the market would
need to be roughly commensurately global (Trubek 2002). After all,
what would be the purpose of artificially constraining the possible
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funding for adjustment, or of other redistributive regulation, to sources
within a particular geographic segment of the market?
It is important to recognize, with Polanyi’s original work and Ruggie’s extension, that the regulation that they are concerned with is best
understood as implicitly redistributive. The point is not necessarily to
provide a certain quality of regulation, but to provide a certain quality
of life. It may be that labor regulation, health regulation, environmental
regulation, and others are the best means to do this under particular
circumstances.
But, as Kaplow and Shavell (2000, 1994) have pointed out, if redistribution is the goal, then taxation and explicit redistribution are the
most efficient means, subject to what we might call political transaction costs. That is, there may be circumstances in which regulation is
used to redistribute because direct redistribution will be too difficult in
political terms. This technique, of course, has its ethical and practical
problems. But it has even greater problems in the global setting, where
these regulatory policies are dependent on different national economic,
legal, and political systems and cultures. Suppression of differences
in order to embed liberalism may be too costly in terms of legitimate
regulatory diversity. Moreover, the scope for transnational externalization—for transnational redistribution—may be too greatly constrained
by a requirement to act through regulatory means.
So, a true global embedded liberalism would extend to poor countries and would allow them, as well as wealthier countries, to attenuate
the risks and costs of liberalism to which their citizens are exposed.
The transfers could occur on a global basis, and would seem to require
global institutions to overcome collective action problems in order to
make them effectively.
Once extended in this way—in terms of both geographic reach
and redistributive scope—the embedded liberalism idea seems to have
more in common with the cosmopolitan ethical perspective described
in Chapter 3. Of course, its motivations are not based on ethics but on
prudent self-interest: the embedded liberalism concept suggests that in
order to protect liberalism from destruction by those who lose, it is necessary to compensate them through regulatory intervention. One way
in which the Rawlsian difference principle and Polanyi’s embedded
liberalism can be merged is through recognition that, to some extent,
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each of us lives in a “real” veil of ignorance. That is, over time, we are
uncertain to which group we will belong—whether we will be among
the lucky few who hold wealth, or among the poorest wraiths. Under
these circumstances, the difference principle is simply a hypothetical
constitutional arrangement that we might actually enter into under uncertainty (Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Buchanan and Tullock 1962;
Mueller 1996).
The embedded liberalism concept calls for redistribution in order
to forestall a backlash. The backlash may be a simple move toward
demagoguery and nativism in destination states, with ugly or inefficient
effects. With respect to sending states, on a very speculative and perhaps even a counterfactual level, we can at least imagine a relationship
between poverty and terrorism along these lines. Does global apartheid result in frustration, anger, and violence, either domestically or
internationally? Is the rise of terrorism a kind of backlash against an
insufficiently embedded global liberalism? Is the correct response to
embed liberalism in a regulatory regime?
Finally, let us emphasize the connection between liberalization and
redistribution based on the cosmopolitan nature of poverty. In many
instances, liberalization gives rise to substantial political costs. These
costs may be paid through selective protectionism: dissenting interests
may be paid off through protection against competition. This despite
the fact that it might enhance global social welfare to simply pay direct
compensation. However, direct compensation is more readily criticized,
and allows costs to fall fully on local taxpayers. On the other hand, protection often raises costs only to presumably less politically powerful
consumers, and also diminishes the welfare of foreign persons, whose
interests are not directly taken into account in the domestic political
system. The point is that domestic redistribution is critical to efficient
liberalization, just as international redistribution is necessary to poverty
relief more generally.
While some wealthier states have domestic institutions capable of
facilitating redistribution, others do not, and we lack global institutions
capable of facilitating international redistribution. That is, redistribution may be impeded, or at least rendered inefficient, by the lack of
appropriate institutions to allow individuals or states to engage in redistribution with confidence and efficienc . Institutional development
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can assist in overcoming collective action problems in connection with
individual decisions to engage in redistribution.
Arrangements to share the tax base with respect to migrants, as
discussed in Chapters 4 and 10, allowing home developing countries
to at least avoid conferring uncompensated benefits on wealthier states,
would be a step toward this type of redistribution.

S afe guar ds
As discussed in Chapter 4, recession is a leading cause of scapegoating, and rejection, of immigration. Yet there are other circumstances
that may make decisions to admit immigrants, or decisions to accept
commitments to admit immigrants, regrettable.
While states have liberalized trade in goods significantly since the
establishment of GATT in 1947, states have determined that it is desirable to maintain the right to impose “contingent protection” in order to
reverse their liberalization under certain circumstances. Obviously, if
the right to engage in contingent protection is not constrained enough—
if it is too easy to rightfully apply safeguards—then the concessions
made by states in international trade negotiations would have little
value. So the international trade law system is finely balanced between
enforcement of liberalization commitments and permission to derogate
from liberalization commitments.
It might be argued that the permission to derogate from liberalization commitments under appropriate circumstances may play a role in
inducing greater liberalization commitments. That is, trade negotiators
may be willing to make greater liberalization commitments under conditions of uncertainty regarding the effects of liberalization, where they
know that they can derogate from these commitments in the event that
they turn out to be unexpectedly burdensome. It might further be argued
that at least the safeguards mechanism represents a kind of international
law facility for “efficient breach.” That is, it allows states to determine
to back away from their commitments if they are willing to provide
compensation (under certain circumstances).
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The main argument for safeguards is that a domestic industry needs
a period of protection to shield it from a surge in imports, and that
after a period of protection the domestic industry will be able to compete globally. Horn and Mavroidis have argued in the trade in goods
context that safeguards measures may serve an efficient temporizing
function by allowing more gradual and therefore (under specific and
limited circumstances) less costly reallocation of resources, especially
labor (Horn and Mavroidis 2003). However, economists are broadly
distrustful of the ability of governments to sort between valid claims
along these lines, and invalid claims that will result in a chronic need
for protection.
One quasi-economic explanation of safeguards law is Corden’s
“conservative social welfare function” (1974, p. 107). “The [conservative social welfare function] embodies Corden’s notion that ‘any
significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section
of the community should be avoided’” (Deardorff 1987). This early concept is consistent with modern behavioral economics insights regarding
individual preferences to avoid risks of loss in favor of obtaining risks
of gain. It is also consistent with a pragmatic political approach to significant disruptions in incomes.
Deardorff extends Corden’s analysis, suggesting that safeguards
may serve as a technique by which to compensate persons injured by
trade liberalization. In this sense, safeguards may be consistent with
embedded liberalism. However, Sykes (2005, p. 18) suggests that protection arising from safeguards is an “extremely costly and clumsy
device for compensating the ‘losers’ from trade liberalization.”
The best way to understand safeguards measures is as a facility
for politically efficient breach. The leading work in this area is Sykes
(1991). Under this explanation, liberalization commitments are understood as “contractual” commitments made by governments at particular
points in time. At those points in time, governments are not able to
predict accurately the competitive effects of their liberalization commitments. However, governments recognize that, for political reasons (as
suggested by Corden), “any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section of the community should be avoided.”
Under uncertainty, governments include the escape clause in order to
provide the possibility for derogation from commitments, with com-
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pensation to harmed states. This type of facility is known in domestic
legal analysis as a facility for efficient breach. Interestingly, the efficiency is measured, according to this analysis, in political welfare of
governments rather than in public interest welfare of citizens.
Sykes’s argument is predicated on the assumption that declining
domestic industries have made sunk investments, and that these sunk
investments serve to deter domestic entry. At the same time, foreign exporters have less at stake, especially as they are assumed to be efficient
and therefore profitable. Sykes does not assume that domestic persons
have greater political influence than foreign exporters, but this may also
affect political decisions.
Bagwell and Staiger (2005) suggest that politically efficient breach
may be permitted, but that it must be constrained in order to induce
member states to exercise restraint in their use of the facility for breach.
And so, for Bagwell and Staiger, it is critical that the Safeguards Agreement, applicable to goods, restricts the repeated use of safeguards
measures.

L e gal L i mits a nd Na tural

L i mits

As discussed in Chapter 2, migration is a function of supply and demand, which in turn depends on relative conditions in the home country
and in the destination country. As also discussed in Chapter 2, migration
may result in convergence of incomes and standards of living. Thus,
migration, if it is not artifi ially constrained, is a self-equilibrating
process, tending toward an equilibrium. The earlier equilibrium is disrupted by natural, technological, or demographic shocks, as well as
institutional shocks such as a change in law.
Migration is thus a self-limiting process, although social transfers
and other factors may affect the point of limitation (O’Rourke 2004, pp.
12–13). Given these natural limits, it is worth considering the question
of the utility and scope of formal limits. In the late nineteenth century,
emigration from poor countries followed an inverted U-shaped life cycle, rising sharply and then declining (Hatton and Williamson 1998).
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As home country incomes tended to converge with destination country
incomes, emigration rates declined.
Furthermore, it might be argued that legal limits are counterproductive and unnecessary, at least according to a welfare economics
perspective. On the other hand, to the extent that emigration may overshoot an efficient equilibrium due to information problems, collective
action problems, or other market failures, legal limits may be useful
from a welfare economics perspective in order to dampen the swings
toward emigration. As is well understood, legal limits may also become
necessary from a political perspective.

Notes
1. For an extended analysis, see Norman and Trachtman (2005).
2. See http://www.colomboprocess.org.
3. Forced migration and refugee management has a somewhat different structure
(Hollifield 2000)
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10
Toward Specific Global
Disciplines to Promote Migration
Of course, it is not possible in this academic work to elaborate a
complete and acceptable set of rules for international migration. However, in order for negotiators representing states to build a set of rules, it
is necessary first to establish a taxonomy of rules, and to understand the
function and benefits or detriments of each rule. Such a taxonomy will
promote negotiations by states based on their individual circumstances.
So, the main function of this work is as an exercise in institutional
imagination, to help focus policy planning and negotiations. Indeed, my
main argument is that a framework agreement is appropriate in order to
facilitate negotiations, through which states may discover appropriate
commitments and rules.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the core political economy functions
of an international agreement on migration will differ for individual
states, and even for individual sectors or occupations. But that chapter argues that there would likely be circumstances where states would
find it useful to reach agreements on liberalization of migration. The
core functions described would include the type of framework agreement structure described in Chapter 4, including the ability for states to
make commitments in particular fields, arrangements for cooperation
on any Bhagwati-type taxes and immigration fees, and safeguards arrangements, would be appropriate. However, certain other provisions
are also important in a subsidiary sense.
As discussed in Chapter 9, it is not clear that a multilateral agreement
is necessary or optimal in this area. However, there are a number of arguments in favor of a multilateral agreement, which, if flexible enough,
can encompass bilateral, regional, and plurilateral subagreements.
So the description here, and in Appendix A, of a possible basis
for a multilateral agreement is not intended to preempt the question of
the form of agreement or agreements that will arise in the future—it is
merely intended to posit a checklist of considerations and an illustrative
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sample of the types of provisions that might be considered for inclusion
in an international agreement on migration.
While the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p.
76) is of course correct to emphasize, as others do, that individuals are
not goods, and that the types of disciplines developed in the area of
trade in goods are not necessarily appropriate for application to movement of persons, this argument proves too much. No one would suggest
simply adding “nurses” to the GATT tariff schedules, or even to the
GATS Mode 4 schedules of commitments, and consider the problem of
liberalization of migration resolved. Yet this does not mean that greater
international legal commitments, and more nuanced institutional capacities and commitments dealing with the complexities of migration,
are not desirable or feasible. The purpose of this work is to examine the
desirability and feasibility of these types of commitments.

Prohibi

tion of

R e stric tion s on Em i gra tion

A national welfarist (as opposed to a global welfarist) analysis
might support some restrictions on emigration to avoid the possibility
of reduction of origin state welfare by emigration of high-skilled workers. The only significant threat to developing countries from liberalized
migration would seem to arise from the possibility of brain drain.
However, the possibility and magnitude of reduction of welfare depends on a number of factors, and it may be difficult for governments
to determine in advance which types and amounts of emigration will be
welfare reducing. After all, to determine the welfare impacts of emigration, governments would be required ex ante to ascertain the needs of
their own labor markets, the possibility for return, the possibility for
remittances, and so on.
On the other hand, human rights considerations argue in favor of full
rights to emigrate. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, full rights
to emigrate may promote beneficial regulatory or fiscal competition.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5, the right to emigrate may already be
protected by international human rights law.
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Finally, we must recognize that emigration fees along the lines
discussed below are associated with abuses by Nazi Germany and the
former Soviet Bloc. So, any proposal of emigration fees must be structured in a way that is sensitive to the human rights ramifications of
these fees. Perhaps states should not have unconstrained discretion to
set these fees. Rather, some independent means of evaluating the state’s
contribution to the earning power of the emigrant, along with broadly
available financing arrangements, might allow emigration fees to satisfy both human rights concerns and concerns for the public finances of
the home state.
So, while it appears appropriate to ensure that an agreement on migration protect a broad right to emigrate, it is also important to consider
the concerns that developing countries may have as to possible welfare
losses. As we saw in Chapter 4, under the common skilled labor–scarce
home country and skilled labor–abundant destination country pattern,
the home country may lose from emigration of skilled workers, while
the host country per se (i.e., excluding the migrants themselves) does
not capture much of the gain. Rather, the gain stays in the migrants’
pockets. As suggested in Chapter 4, one possible solution is to require
compensation to those who lose—in this case, those remaining behind—from those who gain: the migrants.
In order to prevent welfare losses to home states, it may be appropriate, as discussed in Chapter 2, to allow home states to impose an
education fee in order to enable them to recapture the value of public
education in connection with emigrants. Such fees must be calculated
in a reasonable amount and should not be charged as a condition for
emigration, but they should be paid over time after emigration. Alternatively, if the fees were charged in full upon emigration, it would
be appropriate to ensure that reasonable financing arrangements were
available to emigrants.
One way to ensure the reasonableness of financing arrangements
is to ensure that the obligation is enforceable in destination states. The
more secure the arrangements for collection, the cheaper and more
available the financing. Destination states might accept a commitment
to assist in the enforcement of payment of this charge. This type of issue
might be addressed as a matter of private international law, relating to
enforcement of obligations and, eventually, judgments.
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An alternative structure might involve a taxation structure that
would have a substantively similar effect: “Young persons who could
gain greatly from immigration may have limited capital and be unable
to fund themselves; they would be better served by an arrangement in
which they pay an extra amount in future income taxes, in the same
manner that young Australians may borrow for higher education and
then repay with additions to future income taxes” (Freeman 2006, p.
165).
Ideally, from the standpoint of the migrant, the tax charge would
be eligible for a credit, or at least a deduction, under the host country
tax system. If it were eligible for a credit, the host country would in effect be ceding tax jurisdiction, or tax base, to the home country, to the
extent of the tax charge. It is also possible to establish a credit even if
the home country charge is not structured or characterized as a tax. This
type of credit could be allocated or depreciated over a number of years.
Of course, a credit or deduction for education charges is just one way
to “apportion” the tax base relating to migrants. See the discussion of
possible formula apportionment in Chapter 9.
A hybrid structure, such as the following, could be devised:
• an ex post facto schools charge, based on quantity and quality of
schooling,
• arising upon emigration, and held in abeyance upon and during
return,
• to be paid in installments over an extended period of time,
• enforceable by the authorities in the host state, and
• eligible for a deduction (or credit) in the tax system of the host
state, allocated over a period of time.1
A different structure, perhaps more attractive from an economic
standpoint, would involve an auction of immigration rights, as discussed in the following section.
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Quo ta s ver su s Tariff

s ver su s A uc tione d A cce ss

Above, I have discussed home state taxation. However, destination
states may determine that the efficient means to regulate entry is through
an immigration fee or a discriminatory tax structure. The purpose may
be, as discussed in Chapter 4, to exercise market power in order to share
the surplus that would otherwise fall largely to the migrants, or it may
be to compensate the destination state for negative externalities that it
may experience. An immigration fee might be especially appropriate in
relation to unskilled labor.
One way to analyze the difference between a quota or quality requirement on the one hand and a fee on the other is by analogy to the
difference between a quota and a tariff on trade in goods. Under an immigration fee, immigration would be permitted, but the host state would
charge fees, or taxes, that would establish a barrier to entry.
States may view it as useful to replace the current system of quotas
with a system of tariff-like immigration taxes, emulating the transformation that took place in the Uruguay Round to “tariffy” quotas on
agricultural products. Tariffication would have some welfare benefits in
the sense that, under uncertainty as to the efficient quantity of migration,
a tariff-type charge would allow market mechanisms to adjust, while a
quota would not automatically adjust. Tariffication also provides some
benefits in terms of transparency, predictability, and tractability in negotiations. Finally, tariffication allows the state to capture a portion of
the surplus, and perhaps apply it to fund adjustment.
This structure could be combined with a home state exit fee structure as discussed above, with joint enforcement between the host state
and the home state. Under this combined mechanism, both states would
calculate and negotiate an aggregate charge to migrants, and then negotiate, presumably on the basis of some set of apportionment principles,
a division of this charge. While these fees would deter some migration,
the home state and host state would presumably have a joint incentive
to set the fee at a level that allows efficient migration.
Thus, the same system of charges would permit the home state to
internalize a portion of the benefits from allowing their high-skilled
workers to migrate, and allow the host state to impose a charge on un-
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skilled immigrants that would either compensate the host state for the
adjustment, fiscal, or administrative costs it incurs in relation to their
entry, or deter their entry (Hatton and Williamson 2005). The magnitude
of these fees, and their apportionment between home and destination
states, could be subject to negotiation. One role for international law or
organization in this setting would be to establish principles for apportionment, and perhaps an independent mechanism for apportionment.
These fees could be paid as lump sums, or could be charged over
time through domestic tax systems or other collection mechanisms.2 As
suggested above, it would be very important to efficienc to establish
a mechanism to facilitate financing of these fees over time in order to
allow payment from future earnings. There would be no need to harmonize fees among destination states, as some destination states might
be more interested in attracting unskilled workers, while others may be
less interested in attracting or retaining skilled workers. Uniformity of
fees would tend to suppress the operation of regulatory competition,
although it may promote the operation of comparative advantage.
Destination states may wish to distinguish between entrants to their
labor markets who arrive without a job and those who are recruited or
already employed. They may also wish to distinguish between service
workers and manufacturing workers, and between different types of
skills. Different fees might apply to different types of workers.
Another way to set the migration fee, which would be even more
sensitive to market conditions, may be to hold an auction (Simon 1987).
From time to time, different commentators have suggested auction
structures for entry visas: “Since immigration quotas are often subject
to excess demand, there are strong reasons for supposing that, from the
viewpoint of existing residents, the right to migrate is a valuable scarce
resource which should, optimally, be sold” (Clarke 1994). Collie finds
that “when immigration occurs with auctioned immigration visas, it is a
Pareto-improvement” when the wage difference between the two countries is substantial (Collie 2007, p. 11). This is based on the assumption
that the auction and redistribution system is structured such that the native workers in the destination country gain, the migrant workers gain,
and the workers that remain in the home country gain. “At the optimal
level of immigration, the wage in the host country is at least twice the
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wage in the source country, and the cost of the immigration visa is equal
to more than half the earnings of the immigrant workers” (p. 11).
Under the mechanism described above, the auction would in effect
be conducted by the home and host states jointly, or at least it would allow the migrant to pay a single charge. One complicating factor would
be the fact that potential migrants from multiple countries should be
allowed to bid in the same auction, in order to allocate the right to immigrate efficientl .
On the other hand, destination states may be concerned about their
ability to absorb migrants, and may desire to have a “safeguard” capacity to bar immigrants in case of unexpected labor market disruption or
other economic or political problems. I deal with this “safeguard” issue
in policy terms in Chapter 9, and in more technical terms below.

Taxa tion
I have already discussed home state taxation in connection with
migration fees. In order to remove disincentives to emigrate, origin
states would ordinarily be required to defer to destination states in
connection with income taxation on destination state–source income.
States generally do this already through their national tax systems and
through bilateral income tax treaties, either through an exclusion of foreign source income or through a credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign
source income. A credit system provided by the home state maintains
a disincentive to migration where the destination state tax rate is lower
than the origin state tax rate, as the emigrant will be required to pay the
difference. Furthermore, this type of credit system might suppress fi cal competition, insofar as migrants would be subject to a minimum tax
equal to their home state’s tax, regardless of their residence. Therefore,
subject to the discussion above of migration fees in order to address
brain drain, it would seem appropriate to provide an exclusion from
home state taxation for migrants, with respect to income sourced in
their host state.
Furthermore, subject to the above discussion of migration fees,
host states should not otherwise be permitted to discriminate against or
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among immigrants in connection with income taxation. Income taxation
should otherwise be subject to a rule of national treatment and MFN.
This approach would direct all protection and externality internalization into the migration fee.
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible that states would engage in
a competition to attract highly skilled or other desirable workers, and
it is also possible that they would seek to induce migration by workers
whose training has been heavily subsidized by their home states. In
order to avoid the kinds of public goods problems described in Chapter
9, and in order to avoid an inefficient regulatory competition, it may be
appropriate to coordinate with respect to taxation.

C o mmi tmen ts to Imm i gra tion Libera
un der a Po si tive Li st App roach

liza tion

Despite the demonstrated difficulty in determining the welfare
consequences of immigration on both the host and home state sides,
states will continue to make policy in this area on the basis of the analytical resources available to them. Not to decide is to decide, and it is
just as ignorant to assume that no immigration is beneficial as it is to
assume that an open door policy is beneficial. It is also equally as ignorant to assume that no international legal commitments in this field
are feasible or desirable as it is to assume that a comprehensive set of
multilateral obligations is feasible and desirable. Moreover, even under
uncertainty, given the context of the generally beneficial effects of liberalization, the principle of conservatism would counsel not against but
for liberalization.
At least as a starting point, it appears that a positive list approach
provides sufficient flexibilit and transparency for states to use it as a
basis on which to commence negotiations. The negotiations that led
to GATS in 1994 were conducted on a “positive list” basis. That is,
each member state prepared a positive list of sectors in which it would
liberalize. The alternative, a negative list approach, entails preliminary
acceptance of a comprehensive commitment to liberalize, and then negotiation to establish exceptions (a negative list approach). While the
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distinction may not seem significant—it may seem akin to the question
of whether a glass is half full or half empty—there is wide agreement
among negotiators and commentators that the bureaucratic dynamic of a
positive list approach has less of a bias toward liberalization. However,
the positive list approach has been used so far in services negotiations
at the WTO (with some criticism), and at least up until the 1979 Tokyo Round, in effect was the dominant approach to reduction of tariffs.
Since the 1940s, states in the GATT and WTO have debated whether to
have across-the-board tariff reductions, with exceptions, or to simply
negotiate on a product-by-product basis. Those states have most often
used product-by-product negotiations.
A positive list approach seems to provide more power and possibility for lobbying either for or against liberalization in particular sectors:
stronger sectoral lobbies may achieve their goals more readily with a
positive list approach. A positive list approach may help to overcome
a collective action problem among industries that might otherwise lack
sufficient motivation to lobby for liberalization. Therefore, a positive
list may be more politically feasible and may facilitate beneficial gradualism. It also may provide an opportunity to increase liberalization after
experience and information are gained. The positive list approach could
be combined with the migration fee discussed above.
In order to facilitate negotiations and differentiation of commitments based on particular sectors or skills, it will be important to have
some degree of harmonization, or at least understanding, regarding
classification of different types of skills. The International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO), maintained by the ILO, is already available and serves both as a model for national classifications
as well as to facilitate communications among countries and analysts.
The ILO describes the ISCO as follows:
The International Standard Classification of Occupations is a tool
for organising jobs into a clearly defined set of groups according
to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job. It is intended both for
statistical users and for client oriented users. The main client oriented applications are in the recruitment of workers through employment offices, in the management of short or long term migration of workers between countries as well as in the development of
vocational training programmes and guidance. (ILO 2007a)
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ISCO operates at several levels of specificit , as reflected in Appendix A. It will be up to states to determine at what level of specificity
to allow and make commitments. In the WTO legal system, there have
already been a number of disputes regarding classification including in
connection with the distinction between data processing machines and
telecommunications equipment, the question of whether an exclusion
of “sporting” also excluded gambling services, and the question of what
constitutes salted chicken. We would expect similar types of issues to
arise in connection with migration, under a positive list approach that
results in differential liberalization.

Te mporarine

ss an d Per manence

Individual migrants may wish to remain in a destination state temporarily, indefinitel , or permanently. Most of them would prefer to have
a choice. From an economic standpoint, despite arguments that home
states may avoid the harmful effects of brain drain through regimes of
temporary migration, individual choice would seem to be most congruent with efficiency in this context. Another way of saying this is that, if
there is an externality produced by migration, the best way to address it,
if it is worthwhile to do so, is likely to be with an instrument that measures and redresses the externality, rather than by imposing arbitrary
constraints on a type of activity that sometimes gives rise to the externality. As discussed in Chapter 2, artificial limitations might reduce the
possibility of efficient migration. So, restriction of migration to allow
only temporary migration seems like a second-best technique for protecting home states from brain drain, compared to the type of migration
fee discussed above. A migration fee is the less migration-restrictive
alternative, and is likely to be the less welfare-reducing alternative, as a
means to remedy brain drain.
While the better approach would seem to be to allow migrants to
remain permanently, for host state political purposes, it may be useful
to provide the possibility in any international migration agreement for
term limits applicable to migration. Any limits would be taken into account in discounting the amount of a migration fee.
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Ill e ga l Imm i gra tion
Some states might propose that as a quid pro quo in exchange for
formal liberalization, sending states would be required to take appropriate measures to reduce illegal immigration. As illegal immigration is
otherwise less desirable than legal immigration, all else equal, formal
liberalization along the lines proposed here should naturally reduce the
incentive to engage in illegal immigration. On the other hand, migration
fees would provide a financial incentive to evade the formal system.
It may even be that migration fees, collected through the tax system,
would increase incentives for illegal immigrants to remain in the underground economy. More research may be required, and particular
situations may require special treatment, for example, where costs of
illegal migration are relatively low, and benefits of increased wages are
relatively high, such as at the U.S.-Mexico border.
The WTO legal system, particularly in connection with the TRIPS
agreement, has some experience in mandating domestic regulation on
behalf of trading partners.

Di scri mina tion (M FN )
As suggested in Chapter 9, a general MFN requirement should be
evaluated for inclusion in any international migration agreement in order to reduce state discretion to discriminate among origin states.
Most-favored-nation treatment compares the treatment of different
foreigners. In the past, states have used origin state–specific quotas and
rules as proxies for ethnicity, likely skills, wealth, and perhaps other
criteria. However it is possible to address these criteria directly, to
the extent that they are acceptable as criteria, and then apply restrictions and rules on an MFN basis. So, while ethnicity would often be an
illegitimate factor, and may raise human rights issues if applied as a criterion for admission (see Chapter 5), other factors may be acceptable.3
Destination states would be permitted to establish qualitative and/or
quantitative restrictions.
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Hatton (2007, p. 364) argues that most countries already unilaterally
operate in a nondiscriminatory fashion regarding migration. However,
there are a number of counterexamples, including recent FTAs between
the United States and Mexico, Canada, Australia, Chile, and Singapore
(see Chapter 7). There are many bilateral labor agreements and other
regional agreements that are structurally inconsistent with a principle
of multilateral MFN (see Panizzon 2008).
As noted in Chapter 9, a strict MFN rule could provide incentives to
“free ride” in liberalization negotiations. Especially given the possibility
that states would negotiate arrangements to share migration fees between home and destination states bilaterally, it may be that uniformity
of migration fees under a strict MFN principle would be inconsistent
with welfare maximization. Some kind of conditional MFN, or system
of bilateral relations, could be superior to a rule of unconditional MFN.
In this connection, under a rule of conditional MFN, migrants might be
eligible to migrate on an equal basis, except that pairs of states would
establish different migration fees, and different allocations, depending
on each state’s particular circumstances.
So, for example, if the Philippines determined that its welfare would
be improved by emigration of its nurses to Japan, due to remittances or
otherwise, while Japan also determined that its welfare would be improved by the same activity, they might determine not to charge any
migration fees. On the other hand, assume for a moment that South Africa has a shortage of nurses and spent great amounts to train its nurses.
Under these circumstances, South Africa and Japan might determine to
charge a migration fee. No other discrimination would be permitted.

E xce ption s to M FN
It is likely that states would wish to negotiate some exceptions to
an MFN obligation. One type of exception might relate to arrangements
for mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Another type of
exception might permit entry into free trade areas or customs unions
that include labor mobility components. If, for example, Australia and
New Zealand, in pursuit of a broad program of economic integration,
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agree to free movement of labor between them, this should not require
them to accept free movement of labor with every other country of the
world. Such an exception would be similar to those already existing in
WTO law with respect to regional integration.

Di scri mina tion ( N a tiona l Trea tmen t)
National treatment compares the treatment of foreigners to the
treatment of host country nationals, and is intended in the trade in goods
context to protect the value of liberalization commitments from defection through discrimination. In the migration context, human rights
values would also be served by a rule against discrimination.
In this section, I am discussing national treatment after admission:
inside the border. If a right of national treatment prior to admission
were established, it would simply effect a broad liberalization of immigration. National treatment is intended in trade agreements to protect
the value of trade concessions by ensuring that the playing field between national and domestic is otherwise level: to ensure that states
do not defect from their liberalization commitments by discriminatory
treatment “inside the border.”
The important thing to keep in mind with respect to national treatment in migration, as in trade in goods, is that ordinarily domestic
persons are entitled to extensive access to their home labor markets,
while foreign persons start off with only constrained access. So, national treatment obligations in trade agreements, and in migration
agreements, begin by assuming important and enduring barriers. These
barriers are addressed in tariff negotiations in connection with goods,
and could be addressed in positive list–based negotiations in connection
with migration.
As the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 74)
points out, minimum wage laws and social insurance schemes set a
floor on the price of labor. But there may still be scope for competition
above the floo , or utility in establishing rules of nondiscrimination.
Nondiscrimination by virtue of governmental measures would be an appropriate rule; it is uncertain whether private discrimination needs to be

Job Name:

--

/309724t

310 Trachtman

addressed in connection with an economic migration treaty, as opposed
to national law or a human rights treaty.
Although Hatton (2007) argues that permanent immigrants are generally accorded national treatment, this leaves out many ways in which
immigrants are at least temporarily denied the same rights as nationals, including rights to vote and access to certain transfer programs.
Furthermore, Hatton envisions a regime in which states do not make
commitments to accept immigrants; experience with trade agreements
demonstrates that under a regime where states made such commitments,
but later wished to renege, denial of national treatment would be a primary avenue for defection (p. 364). National treatment obligations in
an international migration agreement would have the effect of ensuring
that protectionist measures are confined to those actually negotiated.
National treatment obligations would require careful structuring
and exceptions. For example, immigrants may be excluded from certain
national security–oriented jobs, or may only be permitted to vote after
an extensive transition period. But the basic idea of a national treatment
provision, as in the trade context, would be to limit protectionism—to
limit defection from liberalization commitments through differential
treatment that makes migration less attractive but does not have a bona
fide prudential or other justifiable purpose

R e gu la tion an d Licen sin g
It is well understood, both in the EU context (Chapter 6) and in the
GATS context (Chapter 8), that both discriminatory and even nondiscriminatory regulation and licensing of professions or trades may serve
as a barrier to trade in services and movement of workers. Yet these
regulatory and licensing regimes may serve important prudential purposes, so they can neither be disregarded nor dismantled. Requirements
of proportionality can serve to ensure that these regulatory rules are
not used to establish barriers to migration. Regimes of harmonization
and recognition can serve to ensure the achievement of prudential purposes while minimizing the concomitant impediment to free movement
(Trachtman 2003c, 2007).
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As described in Chapters 6 and 8, EU and GATS contain instruments to discipline domestic regulation, through tests of discrimination
and proportionality, through requirements or facilitation of recognition,
or through harmonization. These types of instruments may be adapted
to use in the migration context, with varying degrees of discipline. Of
course, in an initial multilateral agreement on migration, something
more along the lines of the GATS facility for future agreements might
be appropriate, rather than a detailed work program toward harmonization and mutual recognition, as in the EU.
It is important in this context to erect structures that will cause domestic regulators to take into account the effects that their regulations
have on foreign persons, and to seek to ameliorate those effects without
losing the prudential benefits expected from the regulation.

A cco mpanyin g F a mi ly Me mber s
Denial of entry for members of a migrant’s close family may serve
as a substantial deterrent to migration—as an additional barrier to
migration. There does not appear to be a specific customary or conventional international law right to family unity, or family reunification, in
this context. However, a number of human rights instruments contain
component rights that may form the basis for an argument of unity or
reunification under particular circumstances. While, for example, Article 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that state’s
parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her
parents against their will, it does not specifically require states to admit
the children of immigrants. For economic migrants, who presumably
have a choice to emigrate or not, a host country policy of adult workers
only would not appear to violate the obligation of Article 9. But conditioning migration on a parent’s willingness to separate from his or her
children may be an effective barrier to migration. And so, it would seem
appropriate for any agreement on international migration to address this
issue.
In order to make effective the right to bring family members, accompanying family members should be provided access to appropriate
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public services, including educational services. Furthermore, it may be
appropriate to provide relevant language or other destination state cultural training to migrants and their families. While these are costly, they
may be covered through a migration fee (Clarke 1994).

A cce ss of Imm i gran ts to Pub lic Ser vice s
One of the possible sources of inefficienc , and potential injury to
the destination state, is excess utilization by immigrants of public services. And of course, this type of utilization raises political concerns
as well. Qualitative restrictions may address these concerns by establishing criteria for admission associated with nonuse or modest use of
relevant public services. Migration fees can be structured to respond to
the same concerns. On the other hand, broad denial of access to public
services would deter immigration.
Trebilcock (2003) proposes using an insurance arrangement to provide for coverage, while providing that the destination state does not
bear the cost. He proposes that migrants be required to obtain private insurance to cover possible drawings on noncontributory social programs
during a specified period after entry. The programs addressed would
include welfare payments and public noncontributory pensions. Trebilcock would not deny immigrants coverage under public education and
health care. He is attracted to this structure because it would develop
a private insurance market that would assess and price the risk to the
social insurance system posed by particular immigrants. In a sense, this
insurance-based structure covers some of the same concerns that might
be addressed through a migration fee, although it is administered by a
private party and may be structured to be more specific to particular
immigrants. The assumption is that the private insurance market would
evaluate and price these potential costs more accurately than government planners.
This private insurance requirement is certainly worthy of consideration as a less restrictive alternative to skill, age, or other criteria
designed as proxies for an acceptable level of use of social welfare programs. This type of insurance would also provide some experience that
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could be used to determine whether the risk to the destination state fisc
is great enough to require a regulatory response.
As a matter of equal respect for individuals and perhaps human
rights, it seems desirable to ensure that equally situated persons are
treated similarly in terms of social welfare programs. Trebilcock’s private insurance proposal ensures equality of access to social welfare
programs, after entry and mandatory arrangement for private coverage. It is therefore consistent with these concerns. Long-term denial of
access to social welfare programs, and short-term denial of access to
public education and public health programs, seem inconsistent with
these concerns.

Socia l Securi ty an d H ea lth
I n surance
C on tinui ty
Along similar lines, individual workers will be artificially deterred
from migration if they lose their home country social security–type
or health benefits, or if they are ineligible to participate in destination
country social security or health programs, or if their work in either the
destination or home country is ineligible to qualify them for benefits.
Again, it would make sense to funnel all protection, or internalization
of externalities, into a single migration fee, and to provide a continuous
system of social security and health benefits. The EU has developed appropriate systems for providing continuous coverage and sharing costs
between home and destination states. These may serve as a model, although they require a high degree of coordination and administrative
capacity.

C i tizen shi p, N a tiona l Ser vice,
Draf t O b li ga tion s

an d

States have often been reluctant to grant citizenship to immigrants.
Difficulty in achieving citizenship may be seen by potential immigrants
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as a disincentive to migration: the longer it takes and the more difficult
it is to become an equal member of society, the less attractive migration
will be. One potential solution is to negotiate a uniform, or a scheduled
nonuniform, maximum period of residence prior to eligibility for citizenship. At some point, states must recognize, with Max Frisch, that
they have imported not just workers, but men and women who deserve
the same status, rights, and treatment as native-born men and women.
States may impose criteria, such as civic knowledge, language ability,
or others, but these criteria should be required to be reasonable, transparent, and fairly applied. On the other hand, a maximum period prior
to citizenship may have the perverse effect of inducing states to limit
the stays of immigrants in order to prevent them from attaining the right
to citizenship, so this type of structure must be evaluated carefully in
terms of its interaction with other policies.
With citizenship, and sometimes residence, come responsibilities.
It would seem unfair to allow immigrants to acquire a full set of rights
without requiring them also to contribute in terms of national service or
military service, if native-born citizens are required to make these types
of contributions. If the immigrant has already performed these types of
services, the relevant home state sharing in any migration fee should be
reduced accordingly, and the destination state sharing increased. This
would provide a rough way to establish a level playing field and avoid
cumulative requirements for service.

Tran sparency

an d R e gu lar Proce

dure s

As migration is a “retail” individual decision, unlike much of international trade in goods and services, transparency of rights, obligations,
and procedures is critical. Efficient migration depends on good information. States should undertake to provide effectively useful information
about conditions and procedures so that potential migrants can make
accurate decisions. This would include complete, integrated, and understandable publication of all measures affecting migrants. States
should also agree to administer their rules in a reasonable and impartial
manner.
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Loy a lty , De ma go guer y , an d Pub lic R e la tion s
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are significant tendencies in destination states to scapegoat immigrants in order to deflect criticism of
the host government for economic setbacks. These tendencies should
be restricted and fought with public relations efforts. Provisions requiring member governments to refrain from themselves engaging in these
tactics, and to fairly and fully report to their populaces on an annual
basis the effects of their immigration liberalization on the domestic
economy as a whole and on particular segments of the economy, may
serve to restrict demagoguery. The type of immigration fee proposed
above should be carefully explained to citizens so they understand that
this fee ensures that immigrants do not burden the domestic public welfare system, and that those domestic workers who are displaced due
to immigration will receive appropriate adjustment assistance so that
they are not harmed. Member states should contribute to a global public
relations effort, especially focused on the destination states, to promote
understanding of the benefits of liberalized migration.

Safe guar ds an d C o mpen sa tion
Immigration flows may respond to a number of causal factors
and may be difficult to predict. Alternatively, states may have trouble
predicting the effects on domestic employment markets, or they may
have trouble predicting jobs growth. So, to the extent that states make
meaningful commitments that are not otherwise limited, there may be
a rationale for a safeguards-type mechanism to allow contingent protection against inflows, as discussed in Chapter 9. If a compensation
system were thought useful, requiring the state utilizing the safeguard
to compensate the states that relied on the liberalization commitment,
it might take the form of withdrawal by sending states of immigration
concessions, or it might be cross-sectoral in goods or services. An alternative would be financial compensation.
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One of the problems with a safeguards mechanism would be identifying causation of injury. If the predicate for contingent protection
is that increased immigration causes economic dislocation, it may be
necessary to prove both causation and injury. Neither of these legal
tests has been without problems in the goods sector, and of course there
has been a running empirical debate in the United States regarding the
econometric analysis of the impact of increased flows of immigrants on
the welfare of domestic workers.
F orced Migration and “R everse Safeguards”
Although the possibility cannot be considered in detail within the
context of this work, it may be appropriate to include in an international agreement regarding labor mobility some arrangements to assist in
dealing with surges in the demand to migrate. States may have difficulty
predicting the demand to migrate, so a completely different kind of
safeguard system from the type used in connection with trade in goods
may be appropriate in connection with migration.
This “reverse safeguard” would provide for increased commitments to accept immigrants under circumstances such as famine, civil
war, or economic crisis. These types of events have often caused surges
of emigration (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 213). This type of safeguard would have a completely different function from safeguards now
in place with respect to trade in goods, and would really be an extension
of the concept of forced migration or refugee management. In order to
work well to relieve misery in sending states, these would be required
to be coordinated contingent commitments, in which many destination
states agree to “share the pain” of increased immigration.

N a tiona l Securi

ty an d C ri mina li ty

Immigration raises critical issues from a national security standpoint (Fisher, Martin, and Schoenholtz 2003). Each state will reserve
the right to qualify its commitments by reference to national security
concerns. Within the WTO agreements, this type of exception qualifies
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virtually all commitments, and is expressed as to goods in Article XXI
of GATT.4 While there have been circumstances in which states have
questioned a purported use of this exception, such as the case of the
U.S. Helms-Burton law, it has generally not been used for substantial
defection from liberalization commitments.
In addition, states will generally wish to restrict entry by criminals
who may pose a threat of criminal conduct. If states did not have the
power to restrict entry, malevolent sorting processes might occur, and
criminals might tend to congregate and exercise power in particular
states.

H ea lth E xce ption s
Obviously, states will wish to exclude individuals who may present
a threat of epidemic. There would seem to be less risk of protectionist
use of health exceptions in the context of migration than there is in the
context of sanitary and phytosanitary measures relating to agricultural
products. Consequently, there would appear to be less need for strict
disciplines on national health measures used as a basis to exclude immigrants. Reference to World Health Organization standards may be
appropriate in this area. The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures may be a useful reference as states determine how to
address this issue.

C u ltura l I n te gri ty , I rre den ti sm, an d
Et hnic C onf lic t
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there is an ethical and political
argument for allowing groups of individuals to protect a certain political culture by excluding individuals who do not accept that political
culture. Arguments of this nature can easily shade into irredentism or
worse. On the other hand, there may be strong historical and security
arguments for maintaining an existing ethnic balance. This is the type
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of “high politics” with which international economic law has in the past
been loath to interfere. And it is easy to see how an influx of members
of a minority ethnic group could upset delicate balances (Ghosh 2000,
p. 17). However, in a world of increased multilateral liberalization of
migration, ethnic exceptions may seem more and more suspect.

N otes
1. Under U.S. law, for example, certain education loan payments by certain taxpayers (subject to a cap on gross income) are eligible for a deduction. However, under
current law, only loans paid for expenses at a limited number of foreign educational institutions qualify for deductibility.
2. For a suggestion regarding modifications to the international tax principle of
residence-based taxation, see Straubhaar (2000, pp. 132–133). Straubhaar recommends “a fixed lump-sum entrance fee to be paid by every person wishing to
immigrate, collected at the country of residence, and shared in equal proportions
by sending and destination countries could be a first idea to follo .”
3. Some states may view religion (as opposed to ethnicity) as a critical criterion.
4. Article XXI of GATT has not been applied in WTO dispute settlement (WTO
1986). For scholarly commentary, see for example, Schloemann and Ohlhoff
(1999). See also Article XIV of GATS (providing exceptions for actions that the
acting state considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests,
where such actions are taken during a state of war or other emergency in international relations).
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Organizational Structures
Should the ILO have been the fourth Bretton Woods institution,
alongside IMF, the World Bank, and GATT? After World War I, France,
Italy, Japan, and Poland argued unsuccessfully that the ILO should regulate migration (James 2001). But after the tightening of immigration
restrictions in the interwar period, migration was not addressed at Bretton Woods.
In order for an assignment of authority to an international organization to be justified, states must first wish to regulate the relevant
subject matter under international law. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10 have
addressed this issue. Once it is decided to regulate a subject matter under international law, an organization may be useful in order to serve
as a secretariat for—to manage, enforce, and develop—a multilateral
agreement on migration. An international organization may house adjudication or be a forum for decision making. Of course, the type of
international organization that will be useful, the desirable structure,
and the type of functions that it would perform, are dependent upon the
type of international legal rules that are determined to be desirable.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which describe the role of the EU, other regional
or bilateral organizations, and the WTO, respectively, provide examples
of the types of roles that an organization might play in connection with
migration. The major roles include facilitation of negotiations, research,
technical assistance, preparation of new treaty rules, making of new
rules other than by treaty, surveillance, dispute settlement, and punishment. And, of course, at least four important multilateral organizations
already address economic migration, in at least some dimensions: 1)
the IOM, 2) the ILO, 3) the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and 4) the WTO.
This chapter addresses four main questions:
1) Assuming that international law would be useful in the field of
international economic migration, would an international organization be useful, compared to the alternatives?

319
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2) What organizational features and governance arrangements
would be appropriate for an organization dealing with international economic migration?
3) Would the IOM, ILO, UNCTAD, or WTO serve usefully as the
international organization principally charged with responsibility for international economic migration?
4) How should different organizations addressing varying facets of
international economic migration coordinate their activities?

Would an Interna
be Us eful?

t ional Organ iza t ion

Not all international law requires an organization. Much, if not
most, international law lacks a secretariat, dispute settlement, decision
making, surveillance, and other organizational functions. While Chapters 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10 suggest that some type of international law may
be useful in the field of economic migration, it is not necessarily clear
what, if any, organizational components are suitable. Nor is it clear
what relationship international migration law should have with other
international law, or with existing international organizations.
One theoretical justification for international organizations is to
reduce the transaction costs of international cooperation. This is the
Coasean story of the market versus the firm, with the international organization playing the role of firm (Trachtman 1997). In the Coasean
theory of the firm, the reason for firms (in our case, organizations) is
dependent on transaction cost reduction. The best way to think about
this model is in terms of cost-benefit analysis. There are gains to be
achieved from cooperation. Where the net gains from cooperation exceed the transaction costs of cooperation, we would expect to observe
cooperation. States would be expected to seek to maximize their net
benefits from cooperation by utilizing the institutional structure, from
case-by-case cooperation to organizationally structured cooperation
(analogous to the continuum between the market and the firm), that
maximizes the transaction benefits, net of transaction costs.
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In connection with international cooperation regarding economic
migration, transaction costs arise from two main sources. First, they are
occasioned by the cost of establishing mechanisms to promote cooperation and avoid strategic behavior. If an organization can reduce these
costs by, for example, supplying information, certifying information, or
changing the structure of retaliation and the payoff from defection, then
the organization may be justified. A second channel of transaction costs
is the complexity of identifying, evaluating, and negotiating a Paretoimproving transaction.
It is not possible to determine with any certainty whether an international organization would have greater net transaction benefits
compared to those resulting from a simple treaty without a specific
organization formed around the treaty. In important dimensions, the
question of which would have greater net benefits is dependent on the
question of the structure of the international organization.
However, given the complexity of a likely migration treaty, with
many opportunities for uncertainty and defection, it is certainly possible
that an organization may provide certain useful services. In particular,
we might examine the possibility of strategic behavior. To the extent
that the strategic context in which states find themselves maps into a
prisoner’s dilemma or another strategic model that could be resolved
efficiently by a change in the payoffs effected through legal rules, an
international organization might be useful. It would allow states to cooperate where cooperation is beneficial, and where it otherwise would
not be possible.
Let us pursue the example of a prisoner’s dilemma. Recall that the
dominant strategy for any state in the prisoner’s dilemma is defection.
The only way to avoid the Nash equilibrium of defection by all parties
is to change the payoffs. An international legal rule that entails some
kind of informal or formal punishment, or other negative consequences
of defection, can change the payoffs so as to change the game from a
prisoner’s dilemma to a coordination game, with a much greater likelihood of compliance. Organizations can serve to engage in surveillance,
communication, and adjudication in order to implement rules that
change payoffs.
Williamson, extending the Coasean theory of the firm, focuses on
asset specifici y as a basis for problems of opportunism and, in turn,
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as a basis for integration within a firm (Williamson 1985). This type
of problem arises after economic relations are entered, and arises from
the fact that one party makes an investment in transaction-specific assets. The classic and perhaps apocryphal example of Fisher Body and
General Motors is used to illustrate the utility of vertical integration to
safeguard the party required to make the asset specific investment from
opportunistic behavior on the part of the other party.1 In this example,
an asset specific investment is one that can only realize its full value in
the context of continued relations with another party.
Williamson (1985, p. 42) claims that “it is the condition of asset
specificity that distinguishes the competitive and governance contracting models. Contract as competition works well where asset specificity
is negligible. This being a widespread condition, application of the
competitive model is correspondingly broad. Not all investments, however, are highly redeployable.”
What makes a particular transaction in international migration “asset specific”?Any transaction where one state advances consideration at
a particular point in time—and must rely on one or more other states to
carry out their end of the bargain at a later point in time—or experiences
a significant loss in its expected value is asset specific. For example, a
state might increase its immigration quotas. While it might be argued
that this is the kind of self-enforcing transaction in which the consideration can be withdrawn, it may be difficult to reestablish restrictions on
immigration, and doing so involves political and economic costs. The
domestic political costs of reducing restrictions will be incurred at the
time they are reduced, and perhaps cannot be fully recouped later by
reestablishment of the restrictions.
Furthermore, to the extent that migration barriers are initially reduced on a multilateral basis, under conditions of MFN, withdrawal
may be made more difficult, as a matter of both international law and
domestic politics, not to mention immigration administration. In addition, the entry into an international organization itself may have high
political costs, again at the outset. It may not be fully possible to be
reimbursed for these costs. It may be attractive for some states to defect,
knowing that other states are unable to retaliate.
Williamson (1985) sees transaction costs economizing as the main
purpose of vertical integration—of formation of organizations. Verti-
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cal integration is seen as a governance response to a particular set of
transaction dimensions, including high asset specificity as the principal
factor. With high asset specificit , the value of contracting is increased,
but the type of contract—and institution—depends on other factors.
International law is often subject to the problem of incompleteness
in a way that domestic contracts are not. Domestic contract disputes
always have an answer: “the common law abhors a vacuum.” In general
international law, there are fewer institutional and legal structures to
complete contracts. First, there is not a complete body of law that can
be applied to supply missing terms to incomplete treaties. Second, there
is no dispute resolution tribunal with mandatory jurisdiction. Informal
mechanisms are more likely to apply. Thus, it is often difficult to rely on
the ability to complete contracts through general international law.
Assuming asset specificit , it may be useful to establish devices
to constrain opportunism in order to realize gains from cooperation,
depending on the costs and benefits of these devices. Institutions may
be used to constrain opportunism. Institutions entail transaction costs,
as do market transactions. Institutions may specify discrete rules, but
are, under positive transaction costs, always incomplete. Even the
discrete rules are incomplete in their interpretation, application, and
enforcement.
In addition, it is necessary to specify bureaucratic, legislative, or
dispute resolution methods of completing contracts in order to avoid
opportunism: to complete the contemplated transaction as intended.
The higher the magnitude of asset specificit , the greater the incentives
for opportunism and institutional integration: for the transfer of authority to bureaucratic, legislative, or dispute resolution mechanisms.
So, in determining whether an international organization would be
useful, it would be important to evaluate the strategic setting, the magnitude of the payoffs, the capacity for informal enforcement, and other
aspects of the migration agreement circumstances. It is a complex determination, as the types of commitments that would be appropriate are
interdependent with the types of institutional structures that would be
appropriate to enforce them, including the design of the international
organization.
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How Should an Interna
t ional Organ iza t ion
A ddre ssing M igra t ion be D e signed?
As described earlier in this work, there are many parameters of
any international agreement regarding economic migration. These parameters include, among others, certain commitments, exceptions and
safeguards, calculation of sharing of migration fees between home and
host states, coordination of health insurance, social security, and other
benefits. As states enter into agreements, they may find it efficient to
specify in great detail the treatment of every possible circumstance.
This would require states not only to anticipate every possible circumstance, but also to negotiate and specify the treatment of each
circumstance. However, not only is it difficult to address every known
circumstance, but it is also extremely difficult to anticipate change.
Thus, complete contracts in international law, as elsewhere, are impossible. Rather, states must accept a degree of incompleteness. They
may use a variety of methods to ex post complete their contracts. One
method is simply to negotiate regarding new circumstances as they
come up. This method may give rise to stalemates or strategic behavior.
A second method is to provide for a legislative system that involves less
than full unanimity, or that has other expediting characteristics. A third
method, with a somewhat different domain, is to provide for dispute
settlement, with all of the varieties of dispute settlement structure that
may be available. In particular, it is possible to delegate greater or lesser
discretion to dispute settlement, through lesser or greater specificity of
treaty text.
Dispute settlement is not just a method of completing an international contract, it is also a method of enforcing rules. These are separate
functions and should be evaluated and structured separately. In the
enforcement role, dispute settlement declares who is right and who is
wrong, removing the subject treaty from the default international legal
mechanism of autointerpretation. This declarative role can have important informal effects, and these may be sufficient to induce the desired
level of compliance. However, where the declaration alone is deemed
insufficient to induce the desired level of compliance, dispute settle-
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ment can be the basis for imposition of penalties or authorization of
retaliation against the miscreant state.
Responsibility for international economic migration could be assigned to an existing organization or to a new organization. In this
subsection, I will describe the possible features of a new international
organization addressing migration. For purposes of discussion, let us
call it the World Migration Organization (WMO) (Bhagwati 2003). By
describing a WMO, I do not mean to prejudge the determination of
whether the relevant responsibilities could be assigned to an existing international organization, as discussed below. I simply wish to describe
what functions may be appropriate. A WMO could have a variety of
features beyond substantive treaty obligations, including perhaps the
following:
• Purposes. These would include the facilitation of international
migration in order to better the welfare of individuals. A focus
on the welfare of poor individuals might be appropriate. The purposes may be expressed in broad enough terms to include collateral matters such as social security, health care, and other matters
to the extent that they would bear on economic migration.
• Membership arrangements and termination. Membership could
be open to states willing to accept the obligations of the WMO
treaty, including obligations to liberalize immigration.
• Secretariat
• Facilitating negotiations. The WMO secretariat could be accorded responsibility to manage negotiations regarding liberalization commitments and other matters. Whether these
negotiations would be continuous or focused in particular
periods, like GATT/WTO rounds, would be determined by
the member states.
• Facilitating dispute settlement. The WMO secretariat could
include a function similar to that of the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO, or like the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, in servicing independent
dispute settlement tribunals. Alternatively, the WMO could
house a specialized permanent tribunal.
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• Surveillance. The secretariat could be tasked with periodic
review of member states’ systems to evaluate the degree to
which they could be improved in order to facilitate migration. This function could be modeled on the WTO’s trade
policy review mechanism.
• Technical assistance. Some member states will require technical assistance in support of their negotiation, as well as
in support of their implementation, compliance, and dispute
settlement activities. The secretariat, or an independent entity, could provide these services.
• Research. Member states will require research to be performed about many aspects of migration, including especially the economic effects of different types of migration
in different contexts. The secretariat could perform this service. One type of assistance that may be extremely useful is
assistance in providing sophisticated, independent, and reliable economic analysis of the likely effects of liberalization
of immigration. If states were able to develop a mechanism
for providing this type of information in a way that would be
separated from ordinary domestic politics, it might be seen
as providing accurate information that could form a basis
for political support, and policy. Thus, if analysis showed
that a particular commitment to liberalize would not have
adverse effects on competing domestic workers, they might
be convinced not to oppose the commitment. Conversely, if
analysis showed adverse effects, this determination might be
used as a basis to calculate and apply adjustment assistance
or other compensation.
• Public relations and transparency. As discussed in Chapters
4 and 11, immigrants can often be scapegoats for economic
problems in destination states. If the antiglobalization backlash has been significant with respect to goods, it may become even more active, and more dangerous, with respect to
immigration. Therefore, it may be appropriate to develop an
effective public relations function for the secretariat. Given
the criticism that has been experienced by the EU, the OECD,
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the WTO, and other international economic organizations, it
will be important to develop sufficient transparency to support the perception of legitimacy of a migration organization. Adopting the ILO’s tripartite governance structure may
also facilitate transparency and the perception of legitimacy
between employers as well as workers (Charnovitz 2003a).
• Substantive expertise and experience. A WMO might contain
experience in economic negotiations, including analytical capabilities that could support negotiations and dispute settlement,
expertise in the human side of migration, including the capacity
of societies to absorb migrants, expertise in labor market conditions and dynamics, expertise in tax policy, expertise in human
rights, and experience in multilateral negotiations.
• Treaty making and secondary law-making. It is possible for
an organization to be mandated to promote future treaty making in the field of liberalization of migration and related matters. While the original GATT in 1947 did not contain a specific
mandate along these lines, GATT, and now the WTO, proceeded
by “rounds” of treaty making. This treaty making was able to
operate in the same way that all international law treaty-making
proceeds: by a rule of unanimity in which only signatories are
bound. It is important to note that even under a rule of unanimity, there can be great pressure on states to join where the cost of
exclusion is great.
• Committee structure. From a bureaucratic standpoint, it may
be useful to divide the work of an organization into committees to prepare for law making of various types. These types
of committees may have an important agenda-setting role
and should be structured in a way that advances the goals of
the organization.
• Majority voting. It would be highly unlikely that states
would agree in the near term to allow significant liberalization or public policy decisions to be made against their individual will by virtue of majority voting. On the other hand,
many related issues have been addressed through majority
voting within the EU, so we know that such majority vot-
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ing is not categorically impossible. After more experience
of increased liberalization, and greater commitments for
liberalization, states may determine that some matters could
be addressed through majority voting. A number of different
decision-making structures are possible. One would have the
composition of delegates to the WMO take a tripartite structure, similar to the ILO, where representatives of states, employers, and workers are integrated into the decision-making
process (Charnovitz 2003a).
• Dispute settlement. As discussed above, this is an alternative
method of completing incomplete contracts as new issues or
new facts arise. Dispute settlement mechanisms may be understood as a type of agent of a collective principal, for purposes of
completing the contract along the lines desired by the collective
principal. Dispute settlement can be more or less limited, with
more or less “legislative” discretion. Dispute settlement should
be evaluated in relation to legislative capacity. Under relatively
strong and expeditious legislative capacity, dispute settlement
may not require great authority to complete contracts.
• Tribunals or permanent bodies. In many areas of international law, we see a choice between ad hoc tribunals and
more permanent bodies. In international investment law and
international trade law, we see ad hoc tribunals, while in
international criminal law and in some areas subject to the
mandatory jurisdiction of the World Court we see permanent
bodies. Permanent bodies have advantages of continuity and
expertise.
• Appeal. One possible hybrid arrangement is that used in the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, with ad hoc tribunals
at a first stage, and a permanent body at the appellate stage.
However, not all international litigation makes provision
for appeal. Appeal has the advantage of the possibility for
quality control and correction of errors, assuming that the
appellate entity has the ability to provide superior decision
making.
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• Acceptance. Under circumstances where legislative capacity
may be limited, there may be some argument for a political
filter to evaluate and determine whether to accept adjudicative decisions. This would prevent tribunals, as agents of a
collective principal, from exceeding the wishes of the principal.
• Remedies. Remedies should be designed to induce an efficient level of compliance with obligations. They may include
payment of fines, withdrawal of rights, or requirements of
provision of alternative concessions.
• Private rights of action. One important question, especially
in the migration context, is whether individuals would have
any rights to bring cases under the relevant treaty, and before
an international tribunal (as opposed to a domestic tribunal).
Private rights of action may provide important advantages
in terms of compliance. They motivate individuals to seek
out and address violations of rules—often in cases where
individuals, rather than states, are likely to have first-hand
knowledge of violations. On the other hand, private rights of
action may result in enforcement under circumstances where
states would prefer to informally allow noncompliance.
• Scope for complex barter. In connection both with negotiations
and with dispute settlement to implement negotiated concessions, greater breadth of coverage may ensure that the set of
Pareto-improving barter transactions among states will not be
empty, and that states will have continuing incentives to comply
with their obligations. As noted in Chapter 9, this does not necessarily mean that the organization must have other responsibilities, but under some transaction cost circumstances, a broad set
of responsibilities will facilitate barter.
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Wha t Should B e t he Ro le of t he IOM, I L O,
and WT O?
Now that we have defined some of the functions of a WMO, we
can begin to assess whether a new organization is necessary or appropriate, or whether one or more of the existing organizations could best
take up these responsibilities. However, the list of functions provided in
the prior section is not definitive, nor is it required to be provided by a
single organization. So, it is possible that multiple organizations could
combine to provide these functions. For example, analytical work or
research could be assigned to the OECD, UNCTAD, and perhaps the
IOM, while the IOM, ILO, UNCTAD, WTO, or a WMO could perform
other functions. Or, dispute settlement for individuals, if they are to
have private rights of action, could be assigned to a specialized organization such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, which would thereupon require a change in name. Negotiations over liberalization commitments could take place at the WTO, and
could even be addressed in rounds in order to allow package deals to
be created that would include all the subjects presently addressed at the
WTO, plus migration liberalization.
Indeed, there are no “ideal” answers to these questions, only practical choices to be made based on multiple criteria. I begin by describing
the present functions of the IOM, ILO, and WTO.
T he IOM
The IOM has had an operational role in managing specific flows of
migrants, but has not served to facilitate the development and operation
of international law in this field. “Facilitating the migration of the hundreds of thousands of people in Europe displaced or lacking economic
opportunity in the post war period was one of the principal activities
of IOM when it was founded in 1951” (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2003).
Article 1(1)(e) of the IOM constitution provides that it shall provide
a forum for the exchange of views and the “promotion of cooperation
and coordination” among states. However, Article 1(3) of the IOM
Constitution stipulates that it “shall recognize the fact that the control
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of standards of admission and number of immigrants to be admitted are
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States . . .” Thus, the mandate
of the IOM does not seem to include the establishment of international
legal commitments for admission of migrants. Of course, this is by no
means an insuperable barrier: in the same instrument by which states
entered into a multilateral agreement to liberalize migration within the
context of the IOM, they could modify the IOM constitution to permit
this activity. Furthermore, as a matter of interpretation, the fact that the
IOM recognizes that admission is within domestic jurisdiction does not
mean that states cannot make international legal commitments to constrain their authority over admission.
However, the IOM has no particular history or institutional commitment to liberalization of migration. The IOM contains a great deal of
expertise regarding the dynamics of migration, and the facilitation and
management of migration, especially under dire circumstances. This
expertise would no doubt be beneficial in any initiative toward liberalization of migration.
T he IL O
The ILO was established in 1919 as part of the League of Nations
system, and became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1946.
The ILO, with 179 members, engages in analytical work and in facilitating negotiations relating to labor. It states its goals as follows:
The ILO is devoted to advancing opportunities for women and men
to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity,
security, and human dignity. Its main aims are to promote rights at work,
encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection,
and strengthen dialogue in handling work-related issues.
While this set of goals does not necessarily include liberalization
of migration, there are important connections. Moreover, liberalization
of migration may be a critical means to advance opportunities to obtain
the kind of decent work described in this statement. “In the view of the
ILO, the main route out of poverty is work” (International Labour Organization 2007a). Yet, surprisingly, the ILO does not today seem to see
facilitation of liberalization of migration in order to make work available as one of its “fields of action.” Article 10 of the ILO Constitution

Job Name:

--

/309724t

332 Trachtman

states that it shall focus on “international adjustment of conditions of
industrial life and labour.” The Declaration of Philadelphia, concerning
the aims and purposes of the ILO, calls for the provision . . . of facilities
for . . . the transfer of labour, including migration for employment and
settlement . . .”
In 2004, the ILO adopted a multilateral framework on labor migration as part of a plan to manage labor migration better. However, none
of the activities planned under this framework seem aimed at liberalizing migration. In 2004, the ILO adopted a plan of action with respect
to migration, which includes as one component the development of a
nonbinding multilateral framework for a rights-based approach to labor
migration.
The ILO has produced a number of treaties, mostly addressing issues relating to the conditions of work. However, the rate of ratification
of ILO treaties which relate to migration for employment as well as the
suppression of illegal employment and trafficking of labor has been
low (Charnovitz 2003a). The ILO also provides technical assistance in
areas such as vocational training and rehabilitation, employment policy,
labor administration, working conditions, and social security. So it has
important experience in many critical areas relating to migration.
The ILO also has some salient governance features. As noted above,
one of the intriguing and attractive features of the ILO for purposes of
work on issues of labor migration is its tripartite governance, which
includes representatives of states, employers, and workers. Each member state has four representatives at the International Labor Conference,
which is held annually: two state delegates, one employers’ delegate,
and one workers’ delegate. Each delegate has one vote, and there is
no requirement for the four delegates of each state to vote as a bloc.
This tripartite structure and its potential to “catalyz(e) new international
norms on worker mobility” has been noted by Charnovitz (2003a), who
has also recommended that any WMO should consider adopting this
structure “to enable the formation of stronger constituencies for lessening barriers to migration.”
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T he WT O
The WTO, formed in 1995, addresses trade in goods, trade in services, and intellectual property rights. Unlike the ILO and the IOM, the
WTO’s main function is to facilitate and service national commitments,
mostly in the area of liberalization of trade in goods and services. The
WTO generally makes decisions by consensus, meaning that decisions
can generally be adopted if no state objects, although its charter provides for voting on certain issues. But any significant new commitments
are made by treaty, where a state is only committed if it actually signs.
The WTO has a very highly articulated system of mandatory dispute
settlement, which is used often.
As discussed in Chapter 8, the WTO’s GATS Mode 4 already addresses movement of natural persons to perform services but has an
ambivalent relationship with immigration law in the host state. The WTO
has a highly developed and successful system of dispute settlement.
While states would be able to make “cross-concessions”—exchanging
liberalization, for example, in goods for liberalization in migration—
even if migration were not assigned to the WTO, as discussed above
and in Chapter 9, such cross-concessions might be facilitated by inclusion of these subject matters in a single organization.

Coheren ce and t he R eg ime C omplex f
Interna t ional L ab or M igra t ion

or

Any analysis of international cooperation in the field of international labor migration, or of lack of international cooperation, must
examine the relationship among the different “regimes,” or in this case,
organizations, involved in this area. To some extent, examining the
IOM, ILO, and WTO, it is striking how liberalization of labor migration seems to have been deemed to fall outside the mandate of each of
these organizations, even though their formal mandates arguably could
be understood to include significantly broader activities in this field.
As Ghosh (2007, p. 111) suggests, “the fragmented institutional set-up
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inhibits a comprehensive and coherent policy approach to the multidimensional problem of migration management.”
Yet, as we examine the rationales for international cooperation in
this field, it appears that as many economists have suggested, the greatest payoff from cooperation may come from liberalization of migration.
International law, and these international organizations, have done little
to address this issue. Presumably, it is the determination of the member
states of these organizations to avoid addressing commitments regarding migration that has kept these organizations from moving into this
area.
As noted in Chapter 1, the Global Migration Group was established in order to provide coherence in migration policy. Indeed, the
Global Commission on International Migration report suggested the
establishment of an interorganizational facility for coherence among
international organizations dealing with migration issues.
As Jagdish Bhagwati wrote in 2003,
We have only a fragmented set of institutions to deal with flows
of humanity. The International Labour Organisation looks after workers’ rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees deals with forced migrants. The World Trade Organisation, under its services agreement, manages the temporary access
of professional and semi-professional workers—from builders to
doctors—to other countries. The International Organisation for
Migration is a cross between a consulting body and an altruistic
group. Besides, its status is not defined by a treaty. Indeed, we do
not have a treaty-defined “World Migration Organisation” (WMO)
that could oversee the whole phenomenon, according to internationally agreed objectives and procedures.

Which Organ iza t ion?
As stated above, there would be many parameters to consider in
order to determine the organizational structure that would be appropriate to perform the functions useful in connection with international
liberalization of migration. But perhaps it would be appropriate here to
speculate, or brainstorm, a possible structure.
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One alternative would be the status quo. This would involve utilizing the existing organizational structure, and assigning new functions
to particular agencies based on the affinity of those functions to existing
functions and capacities. These agencies would be required to cooperate with one another in an intensified manner. The cooperation might
take place under the umbrella of a coordinating agency, such as the
Global Migration Group.
Of course, it would be straightforward to simply assign liberalization to the WTO, insofar as the WTO is the premier organization for
negotiations over international liberalization of goods and services.
Cross-concessions would be facilitated, the WTO’s experience with
dispute settlement would be made available, and cross-retaliation in the
event of a violation might support compliance. And if this path were
followed, the OECD, UNCTAD, IOM, and ILO could keep their current functions and engage in cooperative activities. However, while
cross-concessions seem appropriate, these could be facilitated in other
ways, as discussed above.
The ILO has broad experience in a variety of labor and migration
issues, and its tripartite structure may facilitate negotiations that necessarily will involve the concerns of industry and labor. However, the ILO
has little experience in the kinds of distributive negotiations that have
been the subject matter of the WTO.
None of the other existing agencies seem to have special institutional features that would make them a likely candidate for authority
over economic migration. Perhaps if there were thought to be a sufficient relationship between forced migration and economic migration,
the expertise of the IOM would be relevant.
On the other hand, a new agency—a WMO—might be designed
with an agreement that it would draw specified resources from, and engage in specified joint activities with, the other agencies with relevant
responsibilities.

N ote
1. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) consider asset specificity only one explanation of vertical integration. Coase (2000) has challenged the factual accuracy
of this example. However, the example is useful as a parable, regardless of its
veracity.
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Conclusion
In geologic time, the period during which migration has been
restricted has been quite short. As noted at the outset of this study,
migration has served throughout time as a mechanism of human betterment (Chanda 2007).
Restrictions on migration are probably the strongest corollary of
the strict theory of national sovereignty—derived from the idea of a
sovereign and its subjects. After all, the other core concomitant of sovereignty—exclusive territorial authority—has been eroded along many
dimensions. So, a proposal to reduce restrictions on migration must be
understood as subversive of sovereignty. Perhaps the most important
way in which liberalization of migration is subversive of sovereignty
is by breaking the sovereign-subject relationship once and for all, making it clear that governments exist to serve citizens and not the other
way around. As discussed in Chapter 2, individual mobility may also
provide a welcome competitive discipline on governments, although
there are circumstances under which mobility could induce an inefficient competition.
Given advances in understanding of international law and international economics, it seems that restrictions on migration can no longer
be presumed to be beneficial Indeed, there is consensus among economists that broad restrictions on migration diminish human welfare. So,
the next question is, which restrictions might best be dismantled, and
what are the political conditions for dismantling them? This work has
reviewed the welfare economics and political economy of migration,
in order to suggest the answers to these questions. It is clear that the
answers will vary from state to state, and that a legal structure that accommodates diverse approaches to liberalization is required.
The role of international law, in this area as in other areas, is to allow states to cooperate—to allow them reciprocally to cede autonomy
in order to achieve superior outcomes. In order to increase human welfare, and in order to achieve poverty-reduction benefits, an appropriate
structure for liberalization of migration seems desirable. For practi337
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cal reasons, and for ethical reasons, it seems appropriate to establish a
framework for gradual negotiation of liberalization in this field.
People are not commodities. This work has attempted to give this
fact due respect, and to suggest how, nevertheless, international legal
commitments to allow people to migrate are legitimate and appropriate.
But it is a challenge to avoid commodification of people. Nuanced international legal commitments, written with the whole person in mind,
and with sympathy and humanity, are needed. It is a challenge to international law to defragment its thinking enough to merge the more
defined economic concerns with the no less valid concerns of humanity.
There really is no choice, as Max Frisch meant when he said, “We imported workers and got men instead” (Borjas 2007).
There is today no multilateral system for liberalization of economic
migration. While there are human rights norms that protect the right of
exit, and regional systems for liberalization of migration such as the
European Union, there is no general system for commitment to labor
market access. And yet, the economic welfare that could be unlocked
by such a system, especially to the extent that it allows poor people
to move to places where they could be more productive, is enormous.
The development potential for sending states is also substantial. This
book examines the political barriers to unlocking welfare, and at the
same time unlocking the “global apartheid” in which poor people are
prevented from leaving places that keep them poor. This book proposes
legal mechanisms that can assist states in consensually diminishing
these political barriers.
It is indeed true that people are not commodities, and it will not do
simply to apply existing trade rules to the movement of people. People
involve complex needs and social connections, making movement delicate and challenging. And yet, many people wish to move, and there are
good ethical and economic reasons to promote this movement.
What are the factors suggesting unmet demand to move? First, wage
rate disparities are very large. They are much larger than the differences
in prices of goods that provide the motivation for trade. Second, demographic decline in wealthy countries, combined with demographic
surge in poor countries, suggests the bilateral need for migration. For
example, as to the United States, the Pew Research Center has recently
stated that, based on current trends, “the population of the United States
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will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and 82 percent of the increase will be due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to
2050 and their U.S.-born descendants . . . .”1
Empirical studies of factor mobility, and estimates prepared by
Winters et al. (2002) and by the World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group (2006), seem to confirm that there are very large potential returns from increased liberalization. These potential returns substantially
exceed the potential returns from further trade liberalization. Barriers
to both permanent and temporary movement of natural persons are still
quite large, and many of these barriers lack a non-economic, or prudential, justification. Thus, there is a strong initial argument from allocative
efficiency for liberalization of economic migration.
From the standpoint of destination states, immigrants may bring
many benefits, including skills, knowledge, entrepreneurial spirit,
and innovation. These benefits may assist in growth. There is little
doubt that many likely destination states would gain from immigration of skilled workers. Destination states are benefited by migration
to the extent that the migration responds to relative scarcity or productivity gains, increasing the general productivity of the economy. By
increasing the supply of labor, immigration increases the productivity
of factors that are complementary to that labor. The increased income
for destination country employers is termed the “immigration surplus.”
Smith and Edmonston (1997) develop a basic economic model using
what they believe to be plausible assumptions, including constant returns to scale, to show that immigration produces net economic gains
for domestic residents. Immigration allows existing domestic workers
to increase their specialization, producing goods more efficientl . On
the consumption side, immigrants produce new goods and services and
are paid less than the value of these goods and services, so domestic
residents are likely to gain.
Furthermore, to the extent that immigrants contribute more in taxes
than they receive in government services and transfer payments, immigrants may provide another benefit. The excess is a net fiscal transfer to
nonimmigrant taxpayers. It is easy to see that high-skilled immigrants
are likely to pay more in taxes, and consume less in government services and transfer payments, than low-skilled immigrants.
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However, destination countries may be harmed through three mechanisms. First, they may be harmed to the extent that certain groups of
native or earlier immigrant workers are harmed, where the costs of adjustment exceed the productivity benefits. Second, they may be harmed
through the fiscal mechanism, whereby immigrants receive more in
public services and transfer payments than they contribute through
taxes. As Hanson concludes, discussing the U.S. market, if “immigrants
are a net fiscal drain, the total impact of immigration on the United
States would be positive only if the immigration surplus exceeded
the fiscal transfer made to immigrants.” “For low-skilled immigration
. . . this does not appear to be the case” (Hanson 2007, p. 21). Third,
the destination state will experience the costs of administering an immigration system.
Economic theory suggests that, for destination states, an “optimal
immigration policy would admit individuals whose skills are in shortest
supply and whose tax contributions, net of the cost of public services
they receive, are as large as possible” (Hanson 2007, p. 4). Yet it may
not be a simple matter to determine relative scarcity or abundance. “A
given type of worker may be scarce [in the U.S.] either because the U.S.
supply of his skill type is low relative to the rest of the world, or because
the U.S. demand for his skill type is high relative to the rest of the world,
as with computer scientists and engineers” (Hanson 2007, p. 14). So it
is not strange, as Hanson (2007) explains, that in the United States, both
high-skilled software programmers and engineers employed by rapidly
expanding technology industries, and also low-skilled workers in construction, food preparation, and cleaning services, are scarce.
One of the critical issues that liberalization of migration will have
to face is the fact that much of the desire to migrate involves migration
from poor countries to advanced countries. Richard Freeman (2006, p.
161) suggests that “one plausible explanation is that countries differ
in technology (Markusen 1983; Markusen and Svensson 1985). If an
advanced economy uses more productive technology than a developing country, then returns to both labor and capital will be higher in the
advanced economy and both factors will migrate there (Gierking and
Mutti 1983).”
It is possible that destination states may under some circumstances
lose from immigration of unskilled workers, while origin states may
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gain. Emigration of low-skilled workers can increase wages and reduce
unemployment and underemployment of poor workers in the home
country. O’Rourke finds that wages rose in emigration countries during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, converging with
countries of immigration, and that “emigration was an important source
of living standard convergence for [emigration countries]” (O’Rourke
2004, p. 7). Taylor and Williamson (1997, p. 27) find that international
real wage dispersion declined by 28 percent from 1870 to 1910, but
that without the mass migrations of this period, wage dispersion would
have increased by 7 percent. Migration explains about 70 percent of
living standards convergence during this period. O’Rourke concludes
that “emigration was thus a major source of poverty relief in these economies, allowing living standards to grow far more rapidly than they
would have in its absence” (O’Rourke 2004, p. 9; Williamson 2002).
Emigration of low-skilled workers has usually been beneficial to
developing countries, contributing to poverty alleviation (World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 64). However, recent studies
of Albania, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka show no discernible wage improvements, despite large-scale emigration (Lucas 2004). Much will
depend on remittances, return migration, and facilitation of investment
by virtue of emigration. While the effects of brain drain are uncertain,
it is possible that poor states could be harmed by emigration of skilled
workers.
Although it seems fairly clear that there are significant potential
global gains to be achieved by liberalizing migration, it is also clear that
these gains are not distributed evenly. Rather, as is the case with trade
in goods or services, there will be winners and there will be losers. The
problem for domestic and international politics, and for international
institutions, is to establish a method of facilitating policy changes that
are Pareto improvements in the sense that even those who might otherwise be losers are better off. The problem for international institutions
is to assist in building domestic coalitions that will enable welfareenhancing policy changes. These policy changes may require careful
structuring of liberalization, or linkage of liberalization of emigration
to other types of concessions.
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I focus here on the implications of economically self-interested
behavior by voters and lobbyists, rather than important issues of irredentism, demagoguery, and security.
Between wealthy states, there is little need for international agreements regarding migration. First, there is little demand to migrate,
because wages and productivity are relatively homogeneous. Second,
wealthy states already autonomously allow immigration of skilled
workers from other wealthy states, and unskilled workers have little
reason to move. While there is little need for such an agreement, and the
welfare payoff would be low, there is little reason not to provide commitments and clarification of market access for labo .
The more interesting case is migration between poor and rich countries. Here, the potential welfare gains are very large. However, there
are three substantial political problems:
1) The welfare gains accrue largely to the migrants themselves. The
implication of this fact is that neither the home country nor the
destination country has strong incentives for liberalization.
2) There is little room for reciprocal agreements within the field of
migration, because migration between poor and rich countries
is a “one-way street.” That is, generally speaking, there is little
demand by rich country citizens to migrate to poor countries.
This is because the differences in productivity that give rise to
the incentive to migrate from poor to rich countries also give rise
to strong disincentives to migrate from rich to poor countries.
3) There is concern, although there is no consensus among economists on the empirics, that migration of low-skilled workers into
wealthy countries reduces the jobs and employment of native
low-skilled workers in wealthy countries.
And yet, the political economy of migration is different from the
political economy of trade, because producers are generally interested
in liberalization of immigration by their own state.
Let us focus on the political problems of liberalizing migration
between poor and wealthy states. If productivity differences were not
great, it would be possible that reciprocal international agreements for
liberalization could assist in forming a proliberalization coalition between producers and potential emigrants who seek openness in other
states. If productivity differences are great, it may be more difficult
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to form proliberalization coalitions. However, one way to do so is to
provide for other concessions by poor states to wealthy states, perhaps
along the lines of liberalization of investment or high-value services.
This type of reciprocation would be benevolent, with both parts of the
bargain improving the welfare of poor states. To the extent that unskilled or other classes of workers are hurt in wealthy states, the wealthy
states may need to provide adjustment mechanisms to procure support.
Another possible inducement for a proliberalization reciprocal agreement might be the alternative strategy that destination state capital can
pursue, through use of outsourcing or through employment of illegal
workers. From the standpoint of destination state labor, it may be that
legal immigration is a superior outcome compared to outsourcing or
illegal immigration.
One of the political problems with migration is that most of the
benefits accrue to the migrants themselves. Economists often support
temporary migration in order to guard against potential adverse effects
of brain drain. However, a more attractive option in order to prevent
adverse effects of brain drain, and to increase political support of liberalization in the home state, is to support the home state’s efforts to
recapture its investment in high-skilled emigrants through the ability to
charge a tax on some portion of the emigrant’s income. Furthermore, to
the extent that immigration may harm certain classes of workers in the
destination state, or may impose undue pressures on welfare or transfer
programs, it may be appropriate to allow some level of discriminatory
taxation of migrants by the destination state. These tax arrangements
may assist in inducing the development of proliberalization coalitions.
In Chapters 9 and 10, this work has suggested the possibility of a
migration fee levied on migrants, perhaps in the form of a tax, which
could be split, as determined to be appropriate, between the host state
and the home state. The calculation of this migration fee, and its allocation, would depend on two principal components: 1) the value of
the home state contribution to human capital of the migrant, and 2) the
value of the increment to productivity, and wages, that the migrant attains simply by moving from the host state to the home state. In a sense
these components together measure the societal contribution to the
individual’s productivity. They also are a measure of the “moral luck”
of the individual in receiving from society a certain measure of produc-
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tive capacity. It would be ethically innovative to charge individuals a
tax or fee calculated by reference to their moral luck. This structure,
combined with redistribution designed to provide equality of resources,
might be understood as a way to implement Dworkinian egalitarianism
as to resources (Dworkin 1981). Of course, application of this type of
redistribution only to migrants might be improperly limited, and might
have the result of distorting migration.
Of course the form of any agreement, and the structure of any organization, to address international economic migration will result, if at
all, from an extensive domestic and international political give-and-take
that this book cannot reflect. Rather, this book should be understood as
a suggestion to commence the give-and-take: as an indication that this
is a path to greater welfare worthy of exploration. And yet, I thought it
useful to set out as an appendix a speculated form of agreement. This is
intended not as something that states should enter into, but more as an
example or checklist of the types of things that may be worthy of consideration. It is by no means complete and does not purport to reflect the
preferences and concerns that must be reflected: only the political process of negotiation can do that. The main concern of this book has been
to show that a multilateral agreement on migration may be feasible and
useful. The actual shape of such an agreement will depend on a number
of parameters that are unknown at this time, and upon the dynamics of
negotiation.
This book’s analysis suggests that different states will have different
strategic positions, that different economic sectors within these states
will have different strategic positions, and even that different occupational groups will have different strategic positions. Thus, it is clearly
impossible to specify a single arrangement for international cooperation, or even to predict whether international cooperation will occur.
However, we know that in the aggregate, liberalization is expected
to provide increased surplus, and, assuming that there are mechanisms
that can be devised to overcome the strategic problems that may exist
between different domestic constituencies, and between different states,
and that the increased surplus exceeds the cost of its capture, we would
expect states to move to do so. This book is an exercise in institutional
imagination intended first to evaluate whether the surplus may exceed
the cost of its capture, and how states may move to capture it. That they
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have not made these moves generally thus far does not mean that such
moves are not available: it would be difficult to argue that the international legal system as we see it is already efficient. Some may argue
that capital markets, with their clear pricing, narrow profit motives, and
numerous transactions, are already efficient, and that therefore, new
transactions cannot result in profits. However, the international legal
system is far less efficient, so we may expect that new transactions—of
the nature described above—could make the parties better off.
In order to move forward, it will be necessary to analyze different
states, different sectors within states, and different occupations within
those sectors, in order to understand the strategic position of each. Then,
once we know what game is being played, we can evaluate which international legal rules, if any, are useful in order to allow for the maximum
net payoffs. It is by establishing a framework agreement, and engaging
in negotiations, that states will be able to evaluate and reveal whether
there are useful transactions that may be effected.
A framework agreement that allows for states to agree on the structure of reciprocity, to allow sending states to share in the benefits of
liberalization through a Bhagwati tax or other mechanism, to make side
payments through linkage to other areas of liberalization, and to make
side payments through immigration fees, would establish an appropriate
institutional framework—would minimize the transaction costs—for
states to negotiate optimal arrangements. While such a framework
agreement might best be legally binding, it is possible that it might
alternatively be best kept informal. In international law, the distinction
may have only subtle behavioral implications.
Assuming that liberalization of migration is potentially Pareto
efficient, it may be that states are unable to achieve the efficient liberalization unless a move is made toward actual Pareto efficiency: toward
compensation of states and individuals that are otherwise made worse
off.
The national political economy of international migration as developed in Chapter 4 is complex, and mediates imperfectly the welfare
considerations developed in Chapter 2, and mediates even more imperfectly the ethical considerations developed in Chapter 3. However, even
an imprecise assessment of the interplay of interest and power yields
insights into the possibility that international legal rules may play a role
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in committing other states to act, in order to support domestic coalitions
that will support liberalization.

Note
1. Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Population Projections 2005–2050 (February 11, 2008), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/703/population
-projections-united-states.
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Illustrative Draft General
Agreement on Labor Migration
This illustrative draft agreement is provided merely to indicate the types
of provisions that might be negotiated by states if they were to determine to
enter into a multilateral “General Agreement on Labor Migration.” Its provisions should be understood more as a checklist of issues to consider than as a
recommendation as to how issues should be resolved. Furthermore, there are
many additional issues that states will wish to consider as they approach such
an agreement. Finally, this illustrative draft agreement does not contain provisions creating or specifying the design of an organization in which to house
the agreement.
1. Preamble
1.1. Recognizing the growing importance of migration for the growth and
development of the world economy;
1.2. Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules
for migration with a view to the expansion of migration under conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the
economic growth of all home states and destination states and the development
of developing countries;
1.3. Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of migration through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations
aimed at promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous
basis and at securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving
due respect to national policy objectives;
1.4. Recognizing the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new
regulations, on the health standards applicable to immigrants, the security
standards applicable to immigrants, and the qualifications of professions and
skilled work within their territories;
1.5. Desiring to facilitate the reduction of poverty and the development of
developing countries;
1.6. Taking particular account of the serious difficulty of the leastdeveloped countries in view of their special economic situation and their development, trade, and financial needs
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Hereby agree as follows:
PART I
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
2. Scope. This Agreement applies to measures by member states affecting
labor migration, including without limitation immigration.
3. Definition
3.1. For the purposes of this Agreement, labor migration is defined as the
physical departure of a citizen of one Member from that Member, the travel of
such citizen to a destination Member, and the admission and residence of such
citizen in the destination Member, for the purpose of seeking or taking up any
type of labor.
3.2. For the purposes of this Agreement:
3.2.1. “measures by Members” means measures taken by:
3.2.1.1. central, regional, or local governments and authorities; and
3.2.1.2. nongovernmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by
central, regional, or local governments or authorities;
3.2.2. In fulfilli g its obligations and commitments under the Agreement,
each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to
ensure their observance by regional and local governments and authorities and
nongovernmental bodies within its territory.
PART II
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINES
4. Transparency
4.1. Each Member shall publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of
general application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement.
International agreements to which a Member is a signatory pertaining to or affecting labor migration shall also be published.
4.2. Where publication as referred to in paragraph 1 is not practicable,
such information shall be made publicly available otherwise.
4.3. Each Member shall promptly and at least annually inform the Council
for Migration of the introduction of any new, or any changes to existing, laws,
regulations, or administrative guidelines which significantly affect migration
covered by its specific commitments under this Agreement.
4.4. Each Member shall respond promptly to all requests by any other
Member for specific information on any of its measures of general application
or international agreements within the meaning of paragraph 1. Each Member
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shall also establish one or more enquiry points to provide specific information
to other Members, upon request, on all such matters as well as those subject
to the notification requirement in paragraph 3. Such enquiry points shall be
established within one year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Appropriate flexibility with respect to the time limit within which such
enquiry points are to be established may be agreed upon for individual developing country Members. Enquiry points need not be depositories of laws and
regulations.
4.5. Any Member may notify to the Council for Migration any measure,
taken by any other Member, which it considers affects the operation of this
Agreement.
4.6. Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Member to provide confidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement,
or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
5. Labor Market Access Commitments
5.1. Each Member shall set out in a schedule appended to this Agreement
the specific commitments it undertakes under this Agreement.
5.1.1. Commitments shall be structured in any of the following ways:
5.1.1.1. Horizontal Commitments. Horizontal commitments relate to all
immigrants.
5.1.1.2. Occupational Title Commitments. Vertical occupational title
commitments relate to immigrants who are categorized within a particular occupational title. Wherever possible, each Member shall utilize the International
Standard Classification of Occupations 2008, as in force on the date hereof
(“ISCO 2008”), as a basis for its occupational title commitments. Each Member shall publish a set of definiti ns of each occupational title, showing how its
definitions di fer from the relevant ISCO 2008 definitions.
5.1.1.3. Occupational Group Commitments. Vertical occupational group
commitments relate to immigrants who are categorized within a particular
occupational group. Wherever possible, each Member shall utilize the ISCO
2008, as a basis for its occupational group commitments. Each Member shall
publish a set of definitions of each occupational group, showing how its defin tions differ from the relevant ISCO 2008 definitions.
5.1.1.4. Skill Level Commitments. Skill level commitments relate to immigrants who are categorized within a particular skill level group. Wherever
possible, each Member shall utilize the ISCO 2008 skill level group defin tions, as a basis for its skill level commitments. Each Member shall publish a
set of definitions of each skill level, showing how its definitions differ from the
relevant ISCO 2008 definitions.
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5.1.1.5. Wealth Level Commitments. Wealth level commitments relate to
the net worth of the individual immigrant or family of immigrants, and shall be
specified in the Schedule of Commitments in terms of a monetary amount, as
well as a statement as to evidentiary requirements required to be met in order
to qualify under these commitments.
5.1.2. With respect to each commitment undertaken, each Schedule shall
specify:
5.1.2.1. distinctions, where desired, between those who already have accepted a job offer in the destination Member, and those who wish to enter the
labor market of the destination Member;
5.1.2.2. terms, limitations, and conditions on access;
5.1.2.3. conditions and limitations on national treatment;
5.1.2.4. undertakings relating to additional commitments;
5.1.2.5. where appropriate, the time frame for implementation of such
commitments;
5.1.2.6. the date of entry into force of such commitments.
5.1.3. Schedules of specific commitments shall be annexed to this Agreement and shall form an integral part thereof.
5.2. With respect to labor market access, including the issuance of a visa (if
necessary) and entry, each Member shall accord citizens of any other Member
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule
5.3. Quota for entry. A Member may specify within their schedules as to
a specific classification of immigrant such quotas or other numerical limit on
entry as such Member shall determine.
5.4. Immigration fee or discriminatory tax. Members may specify within
their Schedules as to a specific classification of immigrant, from a specific
home Member, that such immigrants shall be subject to an immigration fee,
or an income tax that may be greater or less than that ordinarily applicable to
citizens or residents. To the extent that the tax is greater than that ordinarily
applicable to citizens, the collecting Member shall, as specified in its Schedule, either (i) apply the proceeds in a manner reasonably designed to provide
adjustment assistance to citizens or residents who have experienced economic
dislocation due to immigration, and shall notify the Council for Migration
annually of the details of such application, or (ii) transfer the proceeds representing the excess of the applied tax over that ordinarily applicable to citizens
to the home Member in respect of the subject immigrant.
5.5. Restrictions on term of residence, if any. A Member may specify
within its Schedule as to a specific classification of immigrant such temporal or
other limitations on the term of residence of such immigrant as such Member
shall determine.
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5.6. Entry of family members. A Member may specify within its Schedules
as to a specific classification of immigrant such provisions relating to permission for entry of family members and national treatment of family members
as such Member may determine; provided, however, that any immigrant who
resides or is expected to reside in the territory of a Member for a period greater than one year shall be permitted to be accompanied by such immigrant’s
spouse or domestic partner, children, or parents.
5.7. Members may negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting immigration, including those regarding qualifications or licensing
matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a Member’s Schedule.
6.Prohibition of other Quantitative or Economic Restrictions, Including
Labor Market Certification Arrangements.
6.1. Other than the types of restrictions permitted to be included in Members’ Schedules pursuant to Article 5, Members shall apply no quantitative
restrictions on immigrants.
6.2. “Quantitative restrictions” include not only quotas but also, without
limitation, labor market certification requirements, competitive needs tests,
minimum wages (other than generally applicable minimum wages applied
without discrimination by nationality), or other similar labor market condition-based restrictions or conditions on entry.
7. MFN in Entry
7.1. With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, except as
specifically provided in this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to citizens of any other Member treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to like citizens of any other country.
7.2. Where a Member maintains a quota on immigration, such quota shall
be allocated among home countries. The Member applying the restrictions
may seek agreement with all other Members having a substantial interest with
respect to the allocation of shares in the quota. In cases in which this method
is not reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members
having a substantial interest shares based upon the proportions of immigrants
supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be
affecting immigration.
7.3. A Member may maintain a measure inconsistent with paragraph 1
provided that such a measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article 7 Exemptions.
7.4. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be so construed as to
prevent any Member from conferring or according advantages to adjacent
countries in order to facilitate short-term migration limited to contiguous frontier zones.
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8. MFN Exceptions for Existing Arrangements, Including Bilateral Labor
Agreements
8.1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a
party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing labor migration between or
among the parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement:
8.1.1. provides for substantial liberalization of immigration restrictions in
both high-skilled and low-skilled occupations,
8.1.2. has substantial occupational coverage, and
8.1.3. provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense of Article 11, between or among the parties, in the
occupations covered under subparagraphs 1 and 2, through:
8.1.3.1. elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
8.1.3.2. prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, either at the
entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time frame,
except for measures permitted under Article 11 and exceptional provisions of
this Agreement.
8.2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1 are met, consideration may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process
of labor integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned.
8.3. Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type
referred to in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided regarding the conditions
set out in paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph 3 thereof,
in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both
overall and in individual occupations.
8.4. Any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed to facilitate migration between the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect
of any Member outside the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to
migration within the respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level applicable prior to such an agreement.
8.5. Members that are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1
shall promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or any significant modification of that agreement to the Council for Migration. They shall
also make available to the Council such relevant information as may be requested by it. The Council may establish a working party to examine such an
agreement or enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to
the Council on its consistency with this Article.
8.6. Members that are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph
1 which is implemented on the basis of a time frame shall report periodically
to the Council for Migration on its implementation. The Council may establish a working party to examine such reports if it deems such a working party
necessary.
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8.7. Based on the reports of the working parties referred to in subparagraphs 5 and 6, the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it
deems appropriate.
9. Prohibition of Restrictions on Emigration.
9.1. Members shall not take any measures to restrict or hinder emigration
by their citizens and residents.
9.2. The obligations of Members under paragraph 1 shall be subject to
exceptions as appropriate on reasonable grounds of protection of national or
international public health, national security, and public policy, provided that
these exceptions comply with international human rights law.
10. Emigration Tax
10.1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, and notwithstanding any provision in any tax treaty or other treaty in force between
Members, home state Members may continue to tax their citizens after emigration to any destination state Member.
10.2. Any tax imposed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be limited to an
amount calculated as specified in the Schedule of Article 10 Taxes of the relevant Member. The relevant Member may reduce the tax specified on such
Schedule at any time.
10.3. Any tax imposed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall give rise to a deduction or to a credit under the tax regime of the destination state Member as
and to the extent specified in the Schedule of Commitments of the destination
Member.
10.4. The destination state Member shall provide full assistance to the
home state Member in connection with the collection and enforcement of any
tax imposed under paragraph 1.
11. National Treatment
11.1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions
or qualifications set out therein or elsewhere in this Agreement, each Member
shall accord to citizens of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting immigration, the right to work after entry, and the conditions of work after
entry, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like citizens.1
11.2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the treatment a Member
accords to citizens of the other Member may be different from the treatment
the Member accords to its persons, provided that:
11.2.1. the difference in treatment is no greater than that necessary for
prudential, fiduciar , health and safety, or consumer protection reasons; and
11.2.2. such different treatment is equivalent in effect to the treatment accorded by the Member to its ordinary residents for such reasons.
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11.3. The Member proposing or according different treatment under paragraph 2 shall have the burden of establishing that such treatment is consistent
with that paragraph.
11.4. No provision of this Article shall be construed as imposing obligations or conferring rights upon either Member with respect to government
procurement or subsidies.
11.5. Labor organization. Where membership in a labor organization is
available to citizens, Members shall ensure that such labor organization admits
immigrants under conditions and circumstances that are no less favorable than
those that the labor organization accords to citizens of the Member. Any clause
of a collective agreement or individual agreement concerning eligibility for
employment, remuneration, or other conditions of work shall be null and void
insofar as it provides for discrimination against nationals of other Members.
11.6. Military service. No migrant under this Agreement shall be obligated
to serve in the military service of the destination state, unless and until such
individual becomes a citizen of such destination state.
11.7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, no Member
shall have any obligation under this Agreement to accord to any person the
right to vote in political elections, to admit any person to elective or appointive
public office, or to allow any person to enlist in its military, police, or other
security services.
12. Public services. In addition to the obligations provided under Article
11.1, Members shall ensure that immigrants have equal access to public services provided to citizens, including public education, public health services,
public housing, police and fire protection services, social work services, and
other public services.
13. Coordination of Social Security. In order to provide freedom of movement for workers and self-employed persons, the Members shall, in the field
of social security, secure, as provided for in Annex 13, for workers and selfemployed persons and their dependants, in particular:
13.1. aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to
benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries;
13.2. payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of
Members.
14. Professional Qualifications, Licensing, and Recognitio
14.1. In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting immigration
and authorization to work are administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner.
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14.2. Each Member shall maintain or institute as soon as practicable judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at the
request of an affected person, for the prompt review of, and where justified,
appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting migration. Where
such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted with the administrative decision concerned, the Member shall ensure that the procedures in fact
provide for an objective and impartial review.
14.3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not be construed to require a
Member to institute such tribunals or procedures where this would be inconsistent with its constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system.
14.4. Where authorization is required for the practice of an occupation
on which a specific commitment has been made, the competent authorities of
a Member shall, within a reasonable period of time after the submission of an
application considered complete under domestic laws and regulations, inform
the applicant of the decision concerning the application. At the request of the
applicant, the competent authorities of the Member shall provide, without undue delay, information concerning the status of the application.
14.5. With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification
requirements and procedures and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to immigration, the Council for Migration shall, through
appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines. Such
disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia:
14.5.1. based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence
and the ability to practice the occupation;
14.5.2. not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the
practice of the occupation and to achieve other relevant public policy goals;
14.5.3. in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction
on immigration.
14.6. In sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments,
pending the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors pursuant
to paragraph 5, the Member shall not apply licensing and qualification requirements that nullify or impair such specific commitments in a manner which
14.6.1. does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 14.5.1,
14.5.2, or 14.5.3; and
14.6.2. could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the
time the specific commitments in those sectors were made
14.7. In determining whether a Member is in conformity with the obligation under paragraph 6, account shall be taken of international standards of
relevant international organizations applied by that Member.2
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14.8. In sectors where specific commitments regarding professional occupations are undertaken, each Member shall provide for adequate procedures
to verify the competence of professionals of any other Member.
15. Recognition.
15.1. For the purposes of the fulfillment, in whole or in part, of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing, or certification of practitioners
of specific occupations, and subject to the requirements of paragraph 3, a
Member may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements
met, or licenses or certification granted in a particular country. Such recognition, which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be
based upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned or may
be accorded autonomously.
15.2. A Member that is a party to an agreement or arrangement of the type
referred to in paragraph 1, whether existing or future, shall afford adequate
opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their accession to such
an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate comparable ones with it. Where a
Member accords recognition autonomously, it shall afford adequate opportunity for any other Member to demonstrate that education, experience, licenses,
or certifications obtained or requirements met in that other Member’s territory
should be recognized.
15.3. A Member shall not accord recognition in a manner which would
constitute a means of discrimination between countries in the application of its
standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing, or certification of practitioners of specific occupations, or a disguised restriction on migration
15.4. Each Member shall:
15.4.1. within 12 months from the date on which this Agreement takes effect for it, inform the Council for Migration of its existing recognition measures
and state whether such measures are based on agreements or arrangements of
the type referred to in paragraph 1;
15.4.2. promptly inform the Council for Migration as far in advance as
possible of the opening of negotiations on an agreement or arrangement of
the type referred to in paragraph 1 in order to provide adequate opportunity to
any other Member to indicate their interest in participating in the negotiations
before they enter a substantive phase;
15.4.3. promptly inform the Council for Migration when it adopts new
recognition measures or significantly modifies existing ones and state whether
the measures are based on an agreement or arrangement of the type referred to
in paragraph 1.
16. Permission for Remittances in Host State and Home State. Members
shall not prohibit or inhibit the freedom of migrants to transfer funds earned by
their work, subject to the observance of applicable law relating to regulation of
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money laundering, taxation, or judicial orders, or other reasonable regulatory
purposes.
17. Economic Safeguards
17.1. In the event of a labor market disturbance that a Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions below, seriously threatens or causes serious
injury to that Member’s affected citizens’ standard of living in a particular
labor market of that Member (the “relevant labor market”), that Member may,
as a safeguard measure, temporarily derogate from the relevant liberalization
commitments specified in its Schedule, to the extent and for such time as may
be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. Under no circumstances shall
such temporary exception be applied for longer than six months. Any Member
taking such measure shall communicate the circumstance and the period of the
exception to the Secretariat, which shall notify the other Members.
17.2. Safeguard measures shall be applied by restricting entry of new immigrants in accordance with the most-favored nation principles of Articles 7
and 8 of this Agreement.
17.3. Safeguard measures shall not be applied in any way to affect the
position of immigrants who arrived prior to the determination specified in
paragraph 1. Nor shall any form of expulsion be applied in connection with
immigrants who immigrate pursuant to this Agreement,
17.4. A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures
previously established and made public in consonance with Article 4. This investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and
public hearings or other appropriate means in which employers, workers, and
other interested parties may present evidence and their views, including the
opportunity to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their
views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of a safeguard measure
would be in the public interest. The competent authorities shall publish a report
setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent
issues of fact and law.
17.5. For the purposes of this Agreement:
17.5.1. “serious injury” shall be understood to mean a significant overall
impairment in the position of workers in a relevant labor market;
17.5.2. “threat of serious injury” shall be understood to mean serious injury that is clearly imminent. A determination of the existence of a threat of
serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture,
or remote possibility;
17.5.3. in determining injury or threat thereof, a “relevant labor market”
shall be understood to mean the workers as a whole who are directly competi-
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tive with one another such that the entry into the market of additional workers
has a direct and significant e fect on the wages of incumbent workers.
17.6. In the investigation to determine whether a labor market disturbance
has caused or is threatening to cause serious injury to affected citizens’ standard of living in a relevant labor market of a Member under the terms of this
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an
objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that labor
market. The determination referred to in subparagraph 1 shall not be made
unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the
existence of a causal link between a labor market disturbance in the relevant
labor market and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than the
labor market disturbance are causing injury to the relevant labor market at the
same time, such injury shall not be attributed to the labor market disturbance.
The competent authorities shall publish promptly a detailed analysis of the
case under investigation as well as a demonstration of the relevance of the
factors examined.
17.7. Any safeguards measure taken under this Article shall be accompanied, within six months, by a program of adjustment assistance undertaken by
the Member taking the safeguards measure. Such program of adjustment assistance shall be sufficient to ensure that the significant overall impairment in
the position of workers in the relevant labor market is ameliorated.
17.8. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. If a
quantitative restriction is used, such a measure shall not reduce the quantity
of immigration below the level of a recent period which shall be the average
of immigration in the last three representative years for which statistics are
available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary
to prevent or remedy serious injury. Members should choose measures most
suitable for the achievement of these objectives.
17.9. In cases in which a quota is allocated among home countries, the
Member applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other Members having a substantial
interest. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members having a substantial interest shares based
upon the proportions of immigrants supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting immigration.
18. Public Policy and Public Security Exceptions
18.1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, Members may derogate
from their commitments under this Agreement, on grounds of public policy or
public security. These grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends.
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18.2. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall
comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on
the personal conduct of the individual concerned.
18.3. The personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent
a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. Justifications that are isolated from the particulars
of the case or that rely on considerations of general prevention shall not be
accepted.
18.4. In order to ascertain whether the person concerned represents a
danger for public policy or public security, the host Member may, should it
consider this essential, request the home Member and, if need be, other Members, to provide information concerning any previous police record the person
concerned may have. Such enquiries shall not be made as a matter of routine.
The Member consulted shall give its reply within two months.
19. Public Health Exceptions
19.1. Members retain the right to take action in order to protect national
and international public health, pursuant to the provisions of this Article.
19.2. The only diseases justifying derogations from the commitments
undertaken pursuant to this Agreement shall be the diseases with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the World Health Organization
and other infectious diseases or contagious parasitic diseases if they are the
subject of protection provisions applying to nationals of the host Member.
19.3. Diseases occurring after a three-month period from the date of arrival shall not constitute grounds for expulsion from the territory of the host
Member.
19.4. Where there are serious indications that it is necessary, Members
may, within three months of the date of arrival, require immigrants to undergo,
free of charge, a medical examination to certify that they are not suffering from
any of the conditions referred to in paragraph 2. Such medical examinations
may not be required as a matter of routine.
20. Right of Return. The home Member of any person who has left any
destination state for any reason, including without limitation if such person has
been expelled on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health,
shall allow that person to return at any time from another Member and to reenter its territory without any formality even if the nationality of the holder is
in dispute.
21. Protection Against Expulsion
21.1. Before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or
public security, the host Member shall take account of considerations such as
how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state

Job Name:

--

/309724t

360 Trachtman
of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into
the host Member, and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.
21.2. The host Member may not take an expulsion decision against persons
who have the right of permanent residence on its territory, except on serious
grounds of public policy or public security.
21.3. An expulsion decision may not be taken except if the decision is
based on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member, if
they:
21.3.1. have resided in the host Member for the previous 10 years; or
21.3.2. are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as provided for in the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.
22. Cooperation in Reduction of Unauthorized Migration. Members shall
exercise their best efforts to cooperate with other Members in discouraging and
preventing unauthorized migration.
23. Progressive Liberalization.
23.1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members shall
enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years
from the date of entry into force of this Agreement and periodically thereafter,
with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization. Such
negotiations shall be directed to the reduction or elimination of barriers to migration. This process shall take place with a view to promoting the interests of
all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and to securing an overall
balance of rights and obligations.
23.2. The process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for national policy objectives and the level of development of individual Members,
both overall and in individual sectors. There shall be appropriate flexibility for
individual developing country Members for liberalization in line with their
development situation and, when making access to their markets available to
foreign persons, attaching to such access conditions aimed at achieving their
development objectives.
23.3. For each round, negotiating guidelines and procedures shall be established. For the purposes of establishing such guidelines, the Secretariat shall
carry out an assessment of migration in overall terms and on a sectoral basis
with reference to the objectives of this Agreement, including its development
objectives.
23.4. The process of progressive liberalization shall be advanced in each
such round through bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral negotiations directed
toward increasing the general level of specific commitments undertaken by
Members under this Agreement.
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24. Loyalty. Member governments shall refrain from disparaging the
labor market, cultural, political, or ethnic effects or contributions of immigrants. Member governments shall ensure that any official analyses of labor
market conditions follow sound social scientific methods of establishing causal
relationships.
25. Relationship to International Human Rights and Labor Rights
Treaties.
25.1. Except as specifically provided in their Schedules, Members shall
comply with the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 (No. 97),
including Optional Annex 1 thereof, the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143), and the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families.
25.2. With respect to migrants, Members shall comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
25.3. [other human rights and labor rights instruments to be listed]
26. Relationship to Other Treaties
26.1. Relationship to International Tax Treaties
26.2. Relationship to International Investment Treaties
26.3. Relationship to International Trade Treaties
27. Secretariat and Funding [to be provided]
28. Decision-Making [to be provided]
28.1. The Committee on Migration
29. Dispute Settlement [to be provided]
30. Final Provisions [to be provided]
Notes
1. Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed to require
any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the individual.
2. The term “relevant international organizations” refers to international bodies
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.
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165n8

global effects of welfare economics
on, 36–37, 47, 53–61, 80–85, 341
politics in, 159–162
Honduras, 178
Housing, migrant right to, 179–180
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Treaty of Rome applications for,
186–187, 203nn5–10
Labor markets in international political
economy
access to, 207–208, 309, 338, 349–
351
asymmetric, 136–37, 143–152
equal productivity in, 143–146,
144t
mobile capital/offshoring or illegal
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141–143, 142f, 288
equal productivity in, 138, 138t
mobile capital in, 140–141,
166n15
Labor migration agreements, 6, 12, 21,
205–209
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See also International political
economy of migration; Labor
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labor mobility beneficial with, 123
124, 126
mechanisms to accomplish, 198t, 289,
337–346
political problems of, 342–343
welfare economics and, 7–8, 12–13,
33–48, 90, 95
illegal and legal migrants, 75–76,
92n11
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revisited in migration negotiation
dynamics, 274, 275, 281–286,
307–309
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discrimination in, 309–310
draft agreement on, 353–354
GATS and, 247, 255–258, 259
Nationality
Conventions on, 171–172, 181nn6–7
human rights and, 95–108, 192, 309,
337
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